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Abstract
Masters and Servants legislation was received into 
New South Wales at settlement in 1788. Subsequently the 
New South Wales legislature passed its own Masters and 
Servants Acts in 1828, 1840, 1845, 1847, 1857 and 1902.
Though Petty Sessions reports are incomplete, there 
are 8199 surviving records of Masters and Servants Act cases, 
and the total number of cases between 1845 and 1930 amounted 
to (a possible) 160,000. The majority of these cases were 
brought by employees against employers. Through Masters and 
Servants Act litigation, both employers and employees sought 
to apply to their employment relationships their own opposing 
interpretations of the common law relating to the contract of 
employment. Employers contended for a diffuse contract, 
relying heavily on the hierarchical nature of the implied 
terms. Employees argued for a specific contract, confined 
within the bounds of specific and expressly-agreed terms.
Although the Acts provided for redress for concrete 
breaches of contract, the evidence shows that litigation 
arose more out of inherent tensions within the employment 
relationship, centering around the employer's assertion of a 
right to manage and the employee's attempt to achieve a right 
to job control. The procedures of the Acts were used by 
the parties as a means of industrial bargaining. The cases 
uncover a considerable degree of unorganised, individual 
and spontaneous militancy in the workforce; and even when 
the development of strong trade unions and systems of 
compulsory arbitration provided other means of bargaining,
employees still resorted to the Masters and Servants Acts 
when that tactic was more appropriate to the needs of 
particular industrial situations.
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INTRODUCTION
Sir Lewis Namier is credited with the remark that a
historian should avoid working in an area unless a fool has
worked in it before him. This warning, like many of Namier's
statements, is oblique. If taken at face value, it might
require that one avoid writing about the Masters and Servants
Acts, or be prepared to take on the role of fool, for the
examination given to them to date has been fragmented,^- at
times superficial, and even on occasion erroneous.
2Lawyers have ignored the Acts so completely that now 
even the best-informed believe the Acts to have been long 
since unenforceable. While some historians are beginning to
3investigate the operation of Masters and Servants legislation,
1. The application of the British Acts in the 1860s was 
examined by Daphne Simon in her chapter, 'Master and 
Servant' in John Saville ed., Democracy and the Labour 
Movement. Essays in Honour of Dona Torr, London, 1954, 
pp.160-199. Before the 1970s there were few Australian 
studies - F.K.Crowley, 'Working Class Conditions in 
Australia , 1788-1851*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
19 , Part II, Chs . 4 & 5 ; F. K .Crow^ley, 'Master and
Servant in Western Australia 1829-1851, Journal and 
Proceedings of the Western Australian Historical S~ociety 
Vol.IV, Part V, pp.94-115; J.W. Turner, 'Newcastle 
Miners and the Masters and Servants Act, 1830-1862', 
Labour History, No.16, 1969, pp.30-36.
2. But see A.P. Davidson, 'A Skeleton in the Cupboard;
Master and Servant Legislation and the Industrial Torts 
in Tasmania', 5 University of Tasman-ia Law Review, 
1975-77, pp. 123-146. ~
3. This work results from the stimulus of the Bicentennial 
History project. See Martin Sullivan 'Master_and 
Servant in New South Wales before 1850', The- Push from 
the Bush. A Bulletin of Social History, No.3, May 1979, 
pp. 44-63 John Cashen, 'Masters and Servants in Early 
South Australia', The Push from the Bush, No.6, May 1980, 
pp.23-33; Tony Rayner 'Master and Servant in the New 
Norfolk Magistrates' Court', The Push from the Bush, No,6 
May 1980, pp.34-41.
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they appear to be still influenced^ by the views of earlier 
historians who treated the Masters and Servants Acts as a 
purely colonial phenomenon, designed for the particular 
circumstances of the Australian settlements and restricted
2in operation to the convict phase of the colonies' history.
But to see the legislation in this light is to misread it in
two important ways. It is wrong in the first place because
Masters and Servants legislation was in force in England
before the settlement at Port and in the second
place - as the title of this thesis shows - because it
continued in operation well into the post-colonial era.
The system of regulation of contracts of employment
by summary actions for breach did not originate in the
Australian colonies, but was part of the law the colonists
brought with them from England where it had been in
existence, in one form or another, for some centuries.
This system can in fact be traced bach to the socio-economic
changes of the fourteenth century and to the controls
3attempted by the Statute of Labourers in 1349, with its 
provision that labourers should not leave the service of 
their masters before termination of their yearly contract 
of hiring. This approach to the regulation of labour was
4later continued by the Elizabethan Statute of Artificers.
The law of the infant colony of New South Wales included
1. Since they concentrate on the pre-1850 period.
2. For example, G. Greenwood, ed., Australia: A Social and 
Political History, Sydney, 1967, pp.34-35.
3. Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw III c.8 1349, and 25 Edw III c.1, 1350.
4. An Act touching divers Orders for Artificers Labourers 
Servants of Husbandry-and Apprentices. 1562 , 5 Eliz. c.4
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British Masters and Servants Acts of 1747 and 1765, and 
when the British Act of 1823 was passed, it also was received 
into the colony. The first colonial Masters and Servants 
Act was passed in 1828, without _ it would seem - completely 
displacing the British legislation. The provisions of the 
British Acts and of the later colonial Acts were similar 
in purport and for the most part in wording.
The Masters and Servants Acts were not repealed nor 
did they fade away once the early years of hardship and 
rough justice were succeeded by civilisation, paved roads 
and steam locomotion. Except in South Australia,^ the 
Masters and Servants Acts are still in force. Their 
continued effect depends on the existence, in relation 
to individual employment contracts, of awards under the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and on the 
force of those awards as 'laws of the Commonwealth'. For, 
by Section 109 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act (63 & 64 Vic, c.12 , 1900) , state Acts which are 
inconsistent with Commonwealth Acts are, to the extent 
of the inconsistency, inoperative; and awards made under 
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904) 
are treated as having the status of 'laws of the 
Commonwealth for the purpose of determining issues of 
inconsistency.1 2
1. Where the Act was repealed by the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1972.
2. Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 C.L.R. 466.
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Historians presumably concluded that the Acts were
rarely used because they did not find evidence of their
use in traditional sources. Eric Fry, in his work on urban
wage earners in the 1880s argued that 'In effect, the
laws remained a dead letter for urban wage earners.... Their
existence may have inhibited workers but they were not the
normal machinery for regulating the relationships of
employers and employees'.1 23 There is enough evidence,
however, of a considerable use of the Masters and Servants
Acts right through the period from 1845 to 1958 to suggest
that this statement needs substantial qualification. The
Acts were certainly not a dead letter. Statistics of their
2use are incomplete, but my computation gives an estimated 
total of 160,000 prosecutions in New South Wales from 1845 
to 1930, and there were another 32,000 prosecutions from 
then until 1963. That figure may still not make them the
1. E.C, Fry, 'The Condition of the Urban Wage Earning Class 
in Australia in the 1880s'. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Australian National University, 1956, pp.480-481.
2. Infra, pp.189-191.
3. New South Wales. Statistical Register, 1837-59 and 
annual volumes from 1860. Throughout the 1950s, there 
were approximately two thousand Masters and Servants Act 
prosecutions each year. In 1958, there were 1998, in 
1959 none, in 1960 and 1961 two cases, in 1962 one case 
and in 1963 two cases. From 1964, the Act was not 
separately covered in the statistical tables. I have 
not yet been able to find the reason for the dramatic 
drop in the number of prosecutions after 1958. Since 
Masters and Servants Act prosecutions were brought by 
individuals, the explanation cannot lie in government 
policy. It would appear that alterations to other 
legislation (as yet unidentified) made the Act's 
procedures less advantageous to complainants, who by 
that, time were almost exclusively employees.
Vnormal method of regulating employment relationships, but 
it certainly suggests they were one of the important 
regulatory mechanisms used.
These figures for the number of prosecutions come from
the judicial statistics collected in the Statistical Registers
of New South Wales'^  and from the records of benches of
magistrates and Courts of Petty Sessions. I have examined
2all surviving New South Wales magistrates' court records
3from 1845 to 1949 , and all of the (very few) surviving
4Quarter Sessions Records from 1845 to 1930. From the
magistrates' records, I have compiled a data base of 8199 
5cases. On the basis of this evidence, I have been able 
to make a detailed survey of Masters and Servants 
legislation in the post-convict and post-colonial periods.
Given the size of the body of litigation thus uncovered, 
there is obvious value in an attempt to explore the 
development of the legislation and the patterns of its 
application. This may provide historians and students of 
industrial relations with the evidence unavailable to 
those earlier writers who discounted the significance of 
the Acts. However, although I have worked within a 
historical frame of reference and addressed some of the 
perennial problems of industrial relations, my primary 
focus has been the law. I have approached the issue of
1. Ibid.
2. Infra, pp. 183-184.
3. After which time, access is restricted.
4. For records of appeals against magistrates' decisions; 
see infra p. 73.
5. Because of the uneven chronological and geographical 
distribution of surviving cases (see infra pp.426-428) 
it was not feasible to construct a representative 
sample, and my calculations are therefore based on the 
total number of cases.
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Masters and Servants legislation from a concern with the 
law relating to employment, in an effort to see how that 
law, both in its common law guise and as modified by 
statute, moulds the patterns of behaviour within the world 
of the work-place. I have attempted, then, to write a 
historically-based case-study of employment law in action.
For this reason, my concentration has been on the 
legislation and the cases, rather than on the surrounding 
social context. It is in relation to this focus also that 
I have chosen the opening and closing dates of the survey. 
The underlying purpose of my work is to examine the system 
of employment and the law relating thereto that is in force 
today. Before 1845, there was in New South Wales a large- 
scale system of convict labour, and the regulation of 
employment was considerably affected by that system.
The 1845 Masters and Servants Act was the first of the 
colonial Masters and Servants Acts to apply in an economy 
based predominantly on free wage labour. It has the added 
advantage of having been preceded by a parliamentary inquiry 
ranging over many of the problems encountered in the 
operation of the Acts and in the general area of employment 
in the colony.'*'
I have closed the survey in 1930 because in that year
2the High Court decision in Ex parte McLean made an
1. New South Wales. Legislative Council. Select Committee 
to inquire into and report on an Act of the Governor and 
Council (4 Vic. No.23) intituled 'An Act to ensure the 
fulfilment of engagements, and to provide for the 
adjustment of disputes between masters and servants in 
New South Wales and its dependencies.' Report. New 
South Wales. Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings. 
1845, pp.509 ff.
2. (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472.
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important restriction to the field of the Act's operation.
After that case, the Act ceased to cover parties to awards
of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
(and later the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission)^
where the awards dealt with matters which were offences
2under the Masters and Servants Act.
While the decision in Ex parte McLean left a
considerable range of employment situations still within
the ambit of the Masters and Servants Act (as witnessed
by the 32,000 subsequent prosecutions), the effect of the
case has been widely misunderstood by writers and 
3practitioners. However, this misunderstanding must have 
affected the ambit of operation given to the A.ct by the
1. Following the reorganisation of the arbitration system 
in the wake of the Boilermakers' Case. R v Kirby &
Ors; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (T955-56) 
94 C.L.R. 254 (High Court), (1956) 94 C.L.R. 529 
(Privy Council).
2. As a result cf the doctrine of inconsistency, and the 
paramountcy of Commonwealth legislation over State 
legislation by virtue of Section 109, Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act, 1901.
3. See, for example, J.J. Macken, G.J. McCarry and C.
Moloney, The Common Law of Employment, Sydney, 1978, 
p.209 - '...it was argued~by the High Court that the 
state Act [i.e. the 1902 Masters and Servants Act] was 
invalid under S.109 of the Constitution, being 
inconsistent1 23[italics mine]. In fact, the decision was 
that the Act was invalid only pro tanto - that is, to the 
extent of the inconsistency. In other words, it was 
inoperative in relation to parties bound by awards 
which dealt with matters previously covered by 
provisions of the Masters and Servants Act.
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lower Courts, and the case did in fact withdraw from the 
Act's jurisdiction a sizeable body of workers covered by 
federal awards.
In keeping with its predominantly legal bias, the 
bulk of the thesis is devoted to the legislation, the 
existing common law, and the prosecutions brought under 
the various Masters and Servants Acts. My first chapter 
describes and analyses the content of the Masters and 
Servants Acts in force from time to time in New South Wales.
I have traced the course of amendments, and attempted to 
suggest why they were made and what effect they had. This 
analysis involves also an examination of decisions of the 
superior courts on questions of law relating to interpretation 
of the Acts.
In Chapter 2, I have outlined the common law of 
employment which was applied through the summary procedures 
provided by the Masters and Servants Acts. It is important 
to realise that, though Masters and Servants legislation 
made certain behaviour by employers and employees 'offences’, 
that behaviour had not - outside the legislation - been free 
of legal consequences. The function of the legislation 
was to provide an expeditious way of hearing and deciding 
cases relating to breaches of the contract of employment, 
which were, however, already actionable by the more 
cumbersome methods of the common law. The main breaches 
for which this summary procedure was available were: 
failure to commence service, absenting from service without
ix
leave, misconduct while at work, loss of or damage to 
property of the employer in the employee's care, failure 
to pay wages due and ill-treatment of the employee. Where 
a party alleged that such a breach had occurred, the Acts 
allowed the case to be tried by two magistrates; and, if 
they held the breach proved, penalties of fine or 
imprisonment for up to three months could be imposed.
In the case of breaches by employees, up to 1858 the 
penalty was for the most part imprisonment, and after 
1858 employees could still be sentenced to imprisonment 
if their goods were insufficient to cover an unpaid fine.
However, there were important departures from basic 
common law principles in the legislation, and these are 
detailed in the third Part of Chapter 2. Since my aim is 
to examine the use of employment law by parties to 
employment relationships, I have also looked at the 
interpretation of the Masters and Servants Acts and the 
common law by the magistrates (Chapter 2, Parts IV and V) 
and at the way in which employers and employees 
conceived their rights under their employment contracts 
and argued for those rights before the magistrates' courts 
(Chapter 2, Part VI).
The reports of cases in the court records contain 
details of offences, sentences, and (sometimes) the 
occupations of the parties. On the basis of that information, 
I have presented, in Chapters 3 to 5, statistical analysis 
of prosecutions according to time, place, offence and 
verdict in order to chart the ways in which the Acts were
Xused as a method of controlling employment relations. It
is possible to construct from these data a number of
hypotheses about the pattern of industrial relations in
the colonial period in New South Wales.
In the end, however, to achieve any worthwhile
understanding of law, or of any one of its constituent
areas, we cannot view it, as E.P. Thompson would have it,
'simply in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures -
1that is, simply as law'. Employment law, to be understood,
must be seen in terms of the role it plays in the work-place.
How far does it regulate the behaviour of the parties to
the employment relationship? To what extent do the
parties make use of it? How effective is it as a means
of conflict resolution? To attempt to answer these
questions, I have focussed, in Chapters 6 to 9, on the
way the Masters and Servants Act procedures were
integrated into the disputation and negotiation of those
employers and employees represented in the cases surveyed.
In so doing, I have sought to arrive at some insight into
how systems of industrial relations work, and how the
individual one-to-one focus of contract-based employment
law complements the group-oriented focus of institutionalised
2conflict and conflict-management.
1. Whigs and Hunters, London, 1975, p.260.
2. Rather than conflict-resolution. My contention, based 
on this study and more general observation, is that 
industrial relations systems do not provide for conflict- 
resolution, but merely set up processes in which 
inherent conflicts can be staged within an institution­
alised or semi-institutionalised framework.
xi
TABLE OF CASES
Adami v Maison de Luke (1924) 35 C.L.R. 143 ..........  126
Adams v Union Cinemas [1939] 3 All E.R. 136 ..........  119
Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries
[1967] V.R. 37 ............................. 12 6,130
Appleby v Johnson (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 158 ............. 121
Barnett, Ex parte (1907) S . R. (N. S . W . )7 88 .............. 27
Beddoe, Ex parte (1912) 29 W.N.(N.S.W.) 21............ 38
Bents Brewery v Hogan [1945] 2 All E.R. 570 ..........  126
Bilby v Hartley 1892 Q.L.J. 137 .....................  5
Bouzourou v Ottoman Bank [1930] A.C. 271 ............. 127
Cameron, Ex parte (1890) 11 S.R. (N.S.W.) 422 ........ 37
Re Cameron, Tarl, 181.................................. 37
Cassidy v Minister for Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343 ....... 117
Clouston v Corry [1906] A.C. 122 ..................... 126
Collier v Sunday Referee [1940] 2 K.B. 647...........  123
Coulls v Bagot's Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd (1967)
119 C.L.R. 460 .................................. 135
Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 C.L.R.466. iii
Danahey, Ex parte (1911) 28 W.N. (N.S.W.) 155 27
Davis Contractors v Fareham U.D.C. [1956] A.C. 696 .... 179
Denmark Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd
[1969] 1 Q.B. 719 .............................  119
Devonald v Rosser [1906] 2 K.B. 728 .................. 123
Durham, Ex parte (1916) 33 W.N. (N.S.W.) 90 ......... 27
Erwin, Ex parte (1854) 2 Legge 816 .................. 29
Evenett, Ex parte (1854) 2 Legge 813 ...15, 19, 24, 29, 156
Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union 
of Australia, N.S.W. Branch v North Bondi R.S.L.
Club Ltd N.S.W. Industrial Commission, No. 288 of 
1980, 15' April 1980 (unreported)...............  127
Gapes v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd,Federal Court 
of Australia, Industrial Division, No VII of 1979, 
(unreported) ................................... 176
Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services
[1974] 1 Q.B. 468 ............... ............... 162
Harmer v Cornelius (1859) 5 C.B. (N.S.) 236 .. 128, 163,340
Healy v The Law Book Co. of A/sia Pty Ltd
(1942) 66 C.L.R. 252 ..........................  125
Hebden v Buxton (1893) 10 W.N. (N.S.W.) 69 .......... 37
Hill v C.A. Parsons and Co. Ltd. [1972] Ch. 305 .. 144, 176
xii
Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd
[1946] 1 Ch. 169 .............................. 126
Hore, Ex parte (1900) 16 W.N. (N.S.W.) 144 ........... 26
Johnson v Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co.
(1853.) 3 De G.M.& G.194..........................  144
Kashemije Stud Pty Ltd v Hawkes (1978) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 143.126
Kimpton, Ex parte (1900) 16 W.N. (N.S.W.) 144 .......  29
Kirchner v Gruban [1909] 1 Ch. 413 ..................  126
Langston v A.E.Ü. [1974] 1 All E.R. 980 .............  176
Laws v London Chronicle [1959] 2 All E.R. 285 .... 126, 127
Liffen v Watson [1940] 1 K.B. 556 .................... 130
Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd 
[1957] A. C. 555 ................................  126 , 163
Marbe v Georae Eawardes Daly's Theatre Ltd 
[1928] 1 K.B 269 ....................................  123
Marriott v Oxford and District Co-operative Society
Ltd ( No. 2) [1969] 3 W.L.R. 984 ................ 120
McLean, Ex parte (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472 ................ vi
Moore v Lindsay (1904) 21 W.N. (N.S.W.) 139 ........ 27 , 29
Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd
[1940] A . C. 1014 .................................  162
Ormonoid Roofing and Asphalts Ltd v Bitumenoids (1931)
31 S.R. (N.S.W.) 347 ............................  126
Orr v University of Tasmania (1957) 100 C.L.R. 526 .... 126
Ottoman Bank v Chakharian [1930] A.C. 277 ............ 127
P.I.E.U. v Jackson and O'Sullivan Pty Ltd.
(1957) 1 F.L.R. 17 S ...............................  344
Parsons v Southern Tablelands and South Coast Racing
Association (1978) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 47 .............. 157
Pepper v Webb [1969] 1 W.L.R. 514 ..................... 126
Price v Mcuat (1862) 11 C.B. (N.S.) 508 ...............329
Pyne, Ex parte (1878) 1 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 14 .... 25, 28, 29
R v Kirby & Ors; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of 
Australia (1955-56) 94 C.L.R. 254 (High Court)^
(1956) 94 C.L.R. 529 (Privy Council).............  vii
R v Mann (184 4) 1 Legge 182 ..........................  76
R v Me rewet her (1862) 1 S.C.R. 260 ...........  24, 29, 156
Rathbone, Ex parte (1892) 13 L.R. (N.S.W.) 56 ........ 29
Richardson v Koefod [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1812 ........... 125
Robb v Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 315 ....................... 126
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850 ................... 139
Robson v Sykes [1938] 2 All E.R. 612 ................. 127
xiii
Secretary of State v A.S.L.E.F. (No. 2) [1972] 7 7 92 All E.R. 92 6 ...................................
Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1038 . 123
Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. [1939]
-2 -K .B . 206..........................................  180
Sinclair v Neighbour [1967] 2 Q.B. 279 ...............  126
Sperring, Ex parte (1890) 11 L.R. (N.S.W.M07 ......... 29
Spooner v Alexander (1912) 13 C.L.R. 704 .... .......  37-40
Taylor v Laird (1856) 1 H. & N. 266 ...... ............. 151
Thorpe v S.A.N.F.L. (1974) 10 S.A.S.R. 17  .......  12j
Tomlinson v L.M.S. Railway [1944] 1 All E.R. 537 .....  126
Turner v Mason (1845) 1 M. & W. 112 ............  126 — 127
Walsh v Kent 1862 Q.S.C.R. 44 ....................... 4 - 5
Wessex Dairies Ltd v Smith [1935] 2 K.B. 80 .... 126, 130
White v Australia and New Zealand Picture Theatres
Ltd. (1943) 67 C.L.R. 266 ..........................  123
Williams, Ex parte (1909) 9 S.R. ( N.S.W.) 140 ........ 29
Yewens v Noakes (1850) 6 Q.B.D. 530 ................... 339
Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 561 ......  339
TABLE OF STATUTES
1. Commonwealth
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-80...110, 112, 118,
176, 322
Trade Practices Act 1974-80 ..........................  322
2. New South Wales
a) Masters and Servant Acts
An Act for the Better Regulation of Servants
Labourers and Work People 9 Geo IV No. 9. 1828 ..........
2-6, 8-10, 30-33, 43-5, 51-2, 56-8, 60-62, 64, 67,
69-70, 72-3, 131,174
An Act to Ensure the Fulfilment of Engagements
and to provide for the Adjustment of Disputes between
Masters and Servants in New South Wales 4 Vic No. 23.1840.. .
6, 10-17, 33-4, 41, 43-4, 46-8, 52-5, 57-8, 60, 62, 
64-5, 68-74, 76-7, 79, 81-2, 84, 88, 131, 133,
136-7, 174, 351, 366-7
An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws between 
Masters and Servants in New South Wales 9 Vic No. 27 1845.. 
4, 17-22, 34-5, 41, 43, 46-52, 54, 56, 59-62, 65, 
67-69, 71-4, 80, 89, 94, 131, 133, 136-141,
143-4, 147, 174, 258, 301, 351-2, 366, 368
An Act to amend an Act intituled 'An Act to Amend 
and Consolidate the Laws between Masters and Servants
in New South Wales'. 11 Vic. No. 9 1847 .....................
6, 50-52, 61-2, 65-6, 80
An Act to continue two Acts passed in the ninth and 
eleventh years of the reign of the present Majesty 
respectively intituled 'An Act to amend and 
Consolidate the Laws between Masters and Servants 
in New South Wales’ and 'An Act to amend an Act 
intituled "An Act to amend and consolidate the Laws 
between Masters and Servants in New South Wales"'.14 
Vic No. 25 1850 6
XX
An Act to continue the Masters' and Servants'
Acts nine Victoria number twenty-seven and
eleven Victoria number nine for a period of
four years. 16 Vic. No. 10 1852 ...........................
An Act to continue the Masters and 
Servants Acts nine Victoria number 
twenty seven and eleven Victoria number 
nine for a period of two years. 18 Vic.
No. 12 . 1854 ...................................... *........
An Act to regulate the Law between Masters and Servants#
20 Vic. No. 28. 1857 ......................................
4,6, 22-6, 36-41, 44, 47-50, 52-6, 60-62, 
65-6, 68-73, 102-8, 131-4, 136-141, 143-6, 
155-6, 167, 174, 246-7, 258, 266, 301-2,
351-2, 366, 369.
An Act to Consolidate the Enactments relating to
Masters and Servants. Act No. 59 of 1902 ................
6, 27-9, 36-41, 47-9, 53-6, 60-61, 63, 65-6, 
68, 71-3, 118, 131, 133-4, 136, 138-9, 141,
366
b) Justices Acts
An Act to regulate Summary Proceedings before 
Justices of the Peace. (Justices Summary Jurisdiction 
Act) 5 Gul IV No. 22 1835 .............................  73
An Act to adopt and apply certain Acts of Parliament 
passed for facilitating the performance of the Duties 
of Justices of the Peace and for protecting them from 
vexatious actions and to prevent persons convicted of 
offences from taking undue advantage of mere defects or 
errors in form. 14 Vic. No 43 1850 ..............  65, 147
An Act to amend the Justices Act of 1850 in respect 
of Prohibitions and Amendments and other matters.
17 Vic No. 39. 1853 . ................................... 65»
xxi
c) Other
Distillation Act. 3 Vic No. 9 .........................  7 6
Industrial Arbitration Act. Act No. 2 of 1940 ...........
110r 118,134,176, 322
An Act to amend the Law respecting the recovery 
of small Debts in all parts of the Colony. 10 Vic.
No. 10. 1846 .................................. ......... 66
%
Preferable Lien on Wool Act. 7 Vic No. 3. 1843 ........ 94
Truck Act. Act. No. 55 of 1900 ....................... 133
Workers' Compensation Act. Act No. 15 of 1926 ........
118,178
2. Queensland
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act..............
Act No. 25 of 1961....... ............................. 110
An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Laws relating to 
Justices of the Peace and their Powers and Authorities. 
(Justices Act) 50 Vic No. 17 . 1886................ ........5
An Act to regulate the Law between Masters and Servants. 
(Masters and Servants Act) 25 Vic No. 11. 1861 .......... 5
An Act to make better provision for the Payment of Wages 
due to Workers, and for other incidental purposes.
(Wages Act) 9 Geo V No. 19. 1918 ..................... 114
3. South Australia
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
Act No. 125 of 1972 ................. .............. iii,110
4. Tasmania
Industrial Relations Act. Act No. 59 of 1975 ......... 110
5. Victoria
An Act to amend the Employers and Employes Act 1890
yand for other purposes. (Employers and Employes Act)
55 Vic No. 1219. 1891 .....:...........................  114
xxii
Labour and Industry Act.
Act No. 6283 of 1958 ................................  110
6. Western Australia 
Industrial Arbitration Act.
Act No. 114 of 1979 ................................. 110
7. Britain
%
a) Masters and Servants Acts
Statute of Labourers. 23 Edw III c.8 . 1349 ......... ii
Statute of Labourers. 25 Edw III c.l. 1350 ........ ii
An Act touching divers Orders for Artificers 
Labourers and Apprentices (Statute of Artificers)
5 Eliz c.4. 1562 ..................................  4,144
An Act for the Better Adjusting and More Easy 
Recovery of the Wages of Certain Servants, and 
for the Better Regulation of Such Servants and
Certain Apprentices. 20 Geo II c. 19. 1747 .......
iii,1,3-4,7-8,30
An Act for Better Regulating Apprentices 
and Persons Working under Contract.
6 Geo III c . 2 5 . 1765 ...................  iii , 1,3-4,7-8,30
An Act to Enlarge the Powers of Justices in
Determining Complaints between Masters and Servants
and between Masters, Apprentices, Artificers and
Others. 4 Geo IV c. 34 . 1823 ............ iii , 1-4,7,30,83
b) Colonial Administration
An Act to Provide until the First Day of July 1827, 
and until the End of the Next Session of Parliament 
for the better Administration of Justice in New South 
Wales and Van Diemen's Land, and for the more 
effectual Government thereof; and for other Purposes 
relating thereto. (Constitution Act)
4 Geo IV c.96. 1823 1-2
xxiii
An Act to provide for the Administration of 
Justice in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land 
and for the more effectual Government thereof, 
and for other Purposes relating thereto.
(Australian Courts Act) 9 Geo IV c. 83. 1828 ......... 2,5
An Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia. 
(Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act)
63 64 Vic, c. 12 . 1900 ......................  iii,vii,112
c) Other Industrial Legislation
An Act to repeal the Laws relating to the
Combination of Workmen and to make other Provisions
in lieu thereof. 6 Geo IV c. 129. 1825 . ................ 5
Employment Protection Act. 1975. c.71 .......... 111,176
Health and Safety at Work Act. 1974. c.37 .......... Ill
Industrial Relations Act. 1971. c.72 ............... Ill
Industry Act. 1975. c.68 ........................... Ill
Redundancy Payments Act. 1965. c.62 ............  111,176
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. 1974. c.52 .... Ill
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act
1976. c. 7 ...........................................  Ill
An Act to Prohibit the Payment, in certain Trades, 
of Wages in Goods, or otherwise than in the Current 
Coin of the Realm. (Truck Act)
1 & 2 Gul IV c. 37 . 1831 .............................  133
An Act to amend and extend the Law relating to 
Truck. (Truck Amendment Act)
50 & 51 Vic c. 46. 1887 ...............................  133
An Act to Amend the Truck Acts. (Truck Act)
59 & 60 Vic c. 44 . 1896 ...............................  133
d) Other
An Act to facilitate the performance of the Duties 
of Justices of the Peace ;out of Sessions within 
England and Wales with respect to summary Convictions 
and Orders. (English Duties of Justices (Summary 
Convictions) Act) 11 & 12 Vic c.43. 1848 65
CHAPTER I
The Masters and Servants Acts:
Structure and Interpretation
Part I Reception of British Masters and Servants
Legislation and the Introduction of Colonial 
Legislation
Masters and Servants legislation was received into Australia
from Britain at the time of colonisation. The Acts in force in
Britain at the time of settlement of the first Australian colony
included the Act for the Better Adjusting and More Easy Recovery
of the Wages of Certain Servants, and for the Better Regulation
of Such Servants and Certain Apprentices (20 Geo II, c.19, 1747),
and the Act for Better Regulating Apprentices and Persons Working
under Contract (6 Geo III, c.25, 1765). In 1823, the British
Parliament passed the Act to Enlarge the Powers of Justices in
Determining Complaints between Masters and Servants and between
Masters, Apprentices, Artificers and Others (4 Geo IV, c.34).
The issue of whether that 1823 Act was at the time legally part
of the law in New South Wales was, and still is, doubtful.
Uncertainty existed as to the date at which English statutes of
general application (rather than of paramount force) ceased to
apply in New South Wales. On one view, their automatic attachment
ceased at the date of settlement in 1788.^ The 1823 Constitution
Act gave no clear guidelines, but appears to have brought the
2automatic reception up to that date. Chief Justice Forbes 
allowed for a continued reception of English statutes thereafter,
1. Alex Castles, An Introduction to Australian Legal History, 
Sydney, 1971, p.127.
Ibid., p .1262 .
2.
but persistent unease about the situation led to requests to
London for guidance,^  and finally in 1828 to the Australian Courts 
2Act (9 Geo IV, c.83) which received the Royal Assent on 25 July
V
1828. By S.24, 'all Laws and Statutes in Force within the Realm
of England at the time of the Passing of this Act...shall be
applied in the Administration of Justice in the Courts of New
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land respectively... '. This
provision therefore would have made the 1823 British Masters and
Servants Act part of the law of New South Wales.
The first colonial Masters and Servants statute was also 
3passed in 1828, and assented to on 17 July, just eight days 
before the 1823 British Act was given force in the colony by 
the Australian Courts Act. That enactment was passed by the 
youthful New South Wales Legislature established in 1824 under 
the Act 4 Geo IV, c.96, S.24, (An Act to Provide until the First 
Day of July 1827, and until the End of the next Session of 
Parliament, for the better Administration of Justice in New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, and for the more effectual 
Government thereof; and for other Purposes relating thereto), 
which provided for the establishment of a Legislative Council but 
also laid down that the Council could not pass laws repugnant to 
the laws of England. Was the 1828 New South Wales Masters and 
Servants Act repugnant to the 1823 British Act (which, whatever 
doubts may have existed in 1823, would, by the force of the 
Australian Courts Act, have become law in New South Wales in 
1828)? And if it was not of itself repugnant, would the passage 
of the 1828 Act have resulted in both Masters and Servants Acts
1. Ibid., p. 128
2. An Act to provide for the Administration of Justice in New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land and for the more effectual 
Government thereof, and for other Purposes relating thereto.
3. An Act for the better regulation of Servants Labourers and 
Work People. 9 Geo IV No. 9. (In all subsequent references 
this Act will be referred to simply as the 1828 Act.)
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being in force, or did the New South Wales Act displace the
operation of British law in the masters and servants area?
This question is of importance because the British Act of 1823
was wider than the 1828 New South Wales Act.
Discussions on issues of repugnancy deal with statutes (or
provisions within statutes) which alter established English law,
that is, with statutes which lay down requirements differing
from those provided in British statutes. The point about the
1828 Masters and Servants Act is that it re-enacted some of the
British requirements and did not deal with others.'*' It also
introduced provisions concerning matters not dealt with in the 
2British Acts. There would seem to be little difficulty about 
the re-enacted requirements. These sections may have been 
unnecessary, since what they covered was already law in New 
South Wales, but it can hardly be said they were 'repugnant to' 
the British provisions.
What of the new elements? These related to destruction or 
loss by a servant of property of his master. The British Acts 
did not make provisions for actions before magistrates in such 
cases, but there would be little difficulty in arguing that such 
actions were in keeping with the spirit of the system established 
by the 1747, 1765 and 1823 Acts, and that - furthermore - they 
were necessary to deal with problems specially pressing in the
3colonial situation.
1. Like the British Acts, the 1828 New South Wales Act provided 
for charges relating to absconding and misconduct. Unlike 
the British Acts, it did not deal specifically with claims 
for unpaid wages.
2. The 1828 Act provided for charges relating to illtreatment of 
servants, loss of property by servants, and to the employment 
of the servant of another employer.
See E.Campbell, 'Colonial Legislation and the Laws of England 
2 University of Tasmania Law Review, 1964-67, pp.160-161
3 .
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The 1828 New South Wales Act would therefore have been
quite valid, and it therefore remains only to establish whether
the British Acts remained in force side by side with the
1828 Act, or whether the 1828 Act displaced them and covered the
masters and servants field completely. The question is of more
than academic interest, for the 1828 Act made no provision for
claims for unpaid wages. The issue of the co-existence of the
statutes arose for decision in the Queensland Supreme Court
in 1862 in the case of Walsh v Kent ^in relation not to the
British Masters and Servants Acts so far referred to - 20 Geo II
c.19, 6 Geo III c.25 or 4 Geo IV c.34 - but rather to almost the
oldest piece of British Masters and Servants legislation, the Act 
25 Eliz., c.4. A Police Magistrate in Maryborough had given
an order of discharge from employment to a shepherd on the
grounds that he had been assaulted by his master. The master
appealed against the decision, arguing that the magistrate had
no jurisdiction to make such an order. The order had been made
on the basis of powers given to magistrates by the Elizabethan
statute. The question for the Supreme Court was therefore, in
the words of Lutwyche J. : 'whether any colonial Act has been
passed which, either in express terms or by implication, has
repealed the statute 5 Eliz., c.4'. He referred to the 1828,
3 41845 and 1857 New South Wales Acts, and said
1. 1862 Q.S.C.R.44
2. An Act touching divers Orders for Artificers Labourers 
Servants of Husbandry and Apprentices. 1562.
3. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws between Masters 
and Servants in New South Wales. 9 Vic No.27. (In all sub­
sequent references, this Act will be referred to simply
as the 1845 Act.)
4. An Act to Regulate the Law Between Masters and Servants.
20 Vic No. 28. (In all subsequent references, this Act 
will be referred to as the 1857 Act.)
5.
The only Act, therefore, of New South Wales 
relating to masters and servants which was in 
force when Moreton Bay was erected into a 
separate colony, was 20 Vic., no. 28, and this 
was repealed by the Queensland statute 25 Vic.,
No.11. None of the Acts which I have enumerated 
profess, in terms, to impeach 5 Eliz., c.4, and 
it could only be repealed by implication if its 
provisions were inconsistent with those of any 
colonial Act now in force, the only Act in force 
[in Queensland] being 25 Vic., No. 11. I see 
nothing, I confess, in that Act, from first to 
last, which takes away the remedy which is given 
by the Act of Elizabeth, or ousts the jurisdiction 
of the magistrate. 1 23
The implication of this is clearly that sections of British Acts 
dealing with aspects of the master/servant relationship not 
covered in colonial Acts continued to have force in the colonies 
side by side witii the colonial legislation.
Again, in 1892, the Queensland Supreme Court dealt with this
2problem in Bilby v Hartley. This case concerned the effect of
3the British Act 6 Geo IV, c.129, which dealt with intimidation 
by violence or threats, and its status vis-a-vis the Queensland
4Justices Act. The decision of the Court as to the effect of 
9 Geo IV, c.83 (the 1828 Act on reception of British law referred 
to earlier) supports the interpretation of Lutwyche J. in 
Walsh v Kent.
Thus the effect of the 1828 New South Wales Masters and 
Servants Act was to provide the law to be applied in New South 
Wales concerning the particular types of conduct referred to 
therein. Matters not specifically covered in that Act 
continued to be governed by received British law. The same 
effect attached to the later colonial statutes - their
1. Walsh v Kent, op. cit., p.47.
2. 1892 Q.L.J. 137.
3. An Act to repeal the Laws relating to the Combination of 
Workmen and to make other Provisions in lieu thereof. 1825. 
50 Vic No. 17, 1886.4 .
6provisions stood side by side with the provisions of British 
statutes not replaced by the colonial provisions.
The 1828 New South Wales Act - An Act for the Better 
Regulation of Servants, Laborers and Work People (9 Geo IV, 
c.9) - was replaced in 1840 by the Act to Ensure the Fulfilment
of Engagements and to Provide for the Adjustment of Disputes 
Between Masters and Servants in New South Wales (4 Vic. No. 23), 
and this Act in turn was repealed in 1845. The Act then passed, 
though entitled An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws 
Between Masters and Servants in New South Wales (9 Vic 27), 
in fact completely replaced the 1840 legislation. The operation 
of this Act was extended in 1847 by a direct amending Act.^
The 1845 Act was specifically stated to have force only until 
1848. It was progressively continued until 1856 by Acts of 
1847,^ 1850,^ 1852  ^ and 1854.“* On 11 March 1857 a new Act 
was passed. This Act, An Act to Regulate the Law Between 
Masters and Servants (20 Vic 28), remained in force until it 
was replaced in 1902 by An Act to Consolidate the Enactments 
Relating to Masters and Servants (Act no. 59) which was 
assented to on 4th September of that year. It is this 1902 
Act which remains in existence today.
1. An Act to amend an Act intituled 'An Act to amend and 
consolidate the Laws between Masters and Servants in New 
South W7ales! 11 Vic No. 9.
2. Ibid., S.17.
3. 14 Vic No. 25.
4 . 16 Vic No. 10.
5. 18 Vic No. 12 :
Part II
7 .
Types of Employment Covered by the Masters 
and Servants Acts.
Part I constitutes a genealogy of the Masters and 
Servants Acts in New South Wales. The obvious starting point 
for a more detailed examination of the provisions of the Acts 
is to establish what types of employment were and are covered 
by the Acts - that is, what types of 'servants' do they cover?
I will discuss later various judicial interpretations of this 
aspect of the application of the Acts. At present, I want to 
concentrate on the successive enumerations in the legislation 
itself. For the most part, these enumerations presented the 
familiar teaser of a highly specific list followed (or preceded) 
by one or more general or blanket categories. How far the 
particular qualified the general was ultimately a matter for the 
magistrates and judges to decide.
a ) The English Acts
The English Acts gave much more comprehensive enumerations
of particular occupations than the earlier colonial statutes, but
at the same time their general categories were, if anything,
wider. Thus the 1747 Act referred to servants in husbandry (if
hired for one year or longer), artificers, handicraftsmen, miners,
c°iliersf keelmen, pitmen, glassmen, potters, and other labourers
employed for any certain time.1 The 1765 list followed the
earlier list from artificers to potters (servants in husbandry
hired for a year or more were left out), and then included
labourers, and other persons who contracted for any time or
2term whatsoever. In 1823, servants in husbandry returned to
1 .
2 .
20 Geo II c.19, S. I 6 Geo III, c.25, S.IV
8.
head the list, without any limitation to hirings of over a
year.  ^ The rest of the list was as in 1765.
It is easy to see how such enumerations could give rise
to numerous ambiguities. For example, under the 1747 Act, were
agricultural labourers - 'servants in husbandry' - who hired for
less than a year covered by the category 'other labourers
2employed for any certain time', or did that refer only to 
industrial labourers in the sorts of occupations specified 
beforehand - pitmen, glassmen, potters? It is significant that 
in 1823 when the custom of yearly hiring was giving way to
3hirings by the week, the day or even the hour, the Act merely
4said 'servants in husbandry'.
We need not delve too deeply into the interpretation of 
the English Acts on this point. They serve mainly as a frame 
into which to place the colonial Acts. Before 1828 the economy 
of the colony, and therefore the distribution of its workforce, 
was rudimentary, and the exigencies of the convict system led 
to a rough and ready attitude by magistrates towards freeman 
and bondsman alike, with scant attention to legal niceties or 
definitional wrangles.
b) 1828 Act
This simple distribution of labour resources must also have 
led to the humbler wording of the 1828 Act, which referred to'any 
artificer, manufacturer, journeyman, workman, labourer or servant 
employed in any manner... either as a menial or house servant or
1. 4 Geo IV, c .34, S.III.
2. 20 Geo II, c .19, S.I.
3. E. J. Hobsbawm and G. Rude'', Captain Swing, London, 197 3, 
pp. 23-24.
4. 4 Geo IV, c .34, S.III
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on any farm or estate...for any time.'1 One obvious difference 
between this and the English provisions is that the categories 
of the colonial Act refer only to types of workers rather than to 
types of industries. Thus 'artificer', 'manufacturer' and 
'journeyman' refer to skilled workers; 'workman', 'laborer', and 
'servant' to unskilled or general workers. The descriptive 
section following - 'employed either as a menial or house servant 
or on any farm or estate' - supplies an elaboration of the types 
of work in which the workers are employed. It is not clear from 
the syntax or punctuation whether this elaboration refers to 
'servant' only, or to 'laborer' and 'servant', or to the entire 
list. The more sensible interpretation is that it refers only 
to 'servant'. The bulk of the artificers, manufacturers and 
journeymen of the colony would have been employed elsewhere than 
on farms or estates. There would seem to be little reason to so 
frame the Act as to exclude them, particularly since a large 
proportion of the workers 'employed as a menial or house servant 
or on any farm or estäte', being convicts, would have been liable 
to disciplinary action without having to be brought within the 
meaning of the Masters and Servants Act.
The purpose of the extension of the English list of workers 
identified by their industry is, however, not simply to indicate 
the types of persons covered by the general phrase ’other 
labourers'. It has two other functions at least. First, 
it covers a range of employments which are not handled by 
categories concerned basically with orthodox notions of 
skilled and unskilled work. Second, it takes into consider­
ation variations in the nature of the employment contract so as
1. Section 1.
10.
to cover workers employed through various gang and 'butty' 
systems. Again, there is unlikely to have been much necessity 
for such flexibility in a provision dealing with the Australian 
labour force in the first half of the nineteenth century.
c) 1840 Act
The list of persons covered by the 1840 Act is similar
to that in the 1828 Act, with three major differences. First,
the Act specifically mentions 'shepherd'  ^ (after 'workman').
It is not clear why this one specific inclusion was thought
necessary. It would have been open to the magistrates and
judges to hold that shepherds were covered by the reference to
2a 'servant employed in any manner... on any farm or estate'; 
though it might perhaps have been argued that 'workman' related 
to the industrial types of employment suggested by reference to 
skilled trades - 'artificer', 'manufacturer' and 'journeyman', 
and that 'laborer' referred to heavy manual work such as dam 
sinking, roadbuilding etc. Even if these unnecessarily restrictive 
interpretations had been given to 'laborer' and 'workman', there 
seems little justification for restricting 'servant... on any farm 
or estate'. It is possible that this could have been interpreted 
as referring to farm and station hands employed around the farm­
house or head station, rather than to workers employed at out- 
stations such as shepherds. If that interpretation were made, 
however, the 1840 Act would have required further extension to 
include, for example, stockmen, hutkeepers, sawyers, splitters, 
employed drovers, men engaged in clearing and felling etc. Yet
1. 
2 .
Section 2.
1828 Act, S.l.
11.
only shepherds were mentioned. I suspect the explanation is 
simple and not profound. By 1840, the bulk of employer-initiated 
Masters and Servants prosecutions were against shepherds.1 2 The 
legislators were, therefore, very conscious that the Act applied 
to those particular workers, and made a point of specifically 
mentioning them, without realising the uncertainty which would 
be caused by an isolated specification amongst general categories.
The second difference may be connected with this inclusion 
of shepherds. The elaboration of 'other male servants' was 
altered to read 'hired either as a manual or house servant on any 
estate farm stock-station lands or premises...' ^. Thus, 'menial' 
became manual , and an 'or' was omitted. The section no longer 
dealt with a 'servant employed... as a menial or house servant’ and a 
servant 'employed on any farm or estate', but a composite category - 
servants hired as manual or house servants on any estate farm.' 
was the omission of the 'or' deliberate, or unintentional? Did 
the changes produce a narrower category than that in the 1828 
Act - that is, were there groups of workers hired or employed 
on farms or estates who could not be classified as 'manual' 
workers? Why the change from 'menial' to 'manual'? Did the 
legislators feel that these words had the same connotation? Was 
a shepherd a manual worker? If not, his specific inclusion is 
obviously necessary, but the other categories I mentioned - stockmen 
hutkeepers etc - are still obviously not catered for.
Again I suspect the explanation lies in the realm of 
l^^i^laLive carelessness. This suspicion is strengthened by 
the strange case of 'grooms' in Section 4, dealing with fraudulent
1. This was true from 1845, when my survey of the cases starts, 
and the situation in 1840 is unlikely to have been any 
different.
2. 1840 Act, S.2.
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breach. Whereas Section 2 in 1840 refers to an 'artificer 
manufacturer journeyman workman shepherd laborer or other male 
servant', Section 4 specified 'artificer manufacturer journey­
man workman shepherd groom laborer or other male servant'.‘
Does this specific reference mean that grooms were not covered 
by the general words 'workman', 'male servant' or 'laborer'?
If so, why include grooms only in the section dealing with fraud­
ulent breach and not in the section which covers breaches 
without any element of fraud? And if Section 2 is to receive a 
restrictive interpretation so that grooms and shepherds must be 
separately mentioned, why not mention other types of workers 
who would also be outside the ambit of that restrictive inter­
pretation? The likelihood seems overwhelming that the sections 
were drafted without any real care as to the words used.
There is, however, a further elaboration in the 1840 Act 
which takes up some of the categories of workers who would not 
have been covered if the restricted interpretation, above 
referred to, had been adopted. For Section 2 refers not only 
to 'any artificer... [and] other male servants who shall have 
been engaged or hired either as a manual or house servant on 
any estate farm...for any time or period' but also to 'any 
artificer...or male servant' 'who shall have been engaged or 
hired...for the execution performance and completion of any 
work job or business taken in task by the piece or in gross 
and where the amount to be paid shall not exceed the sum of 
thirty pounds'. (Section 4 speaks in very similar but not 
identical terms - 'any artificer...or other male servant... 
who shall have hired or engaged himself...to do perform 
finish or complete any work or employment whatsoever taken in
1. The italics in this quotation, and all subsequent quotations from the statutes, are mine.
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task by the piece or in gross').
This further construction suggests that the whole of 
the phrase 'any artificer manufacturer journeyman workman 
shepherd laborer or other male servant' is covered by one of 
the two elaborations which follow. Therefore the Act applies 
either to artificers, manufacturers, journeymen, workmen, 
shepherds, laborers and other male servants employed as manual 
or house servants on any farm or estate or to artificers, 
manufacturers, journeymen, workmen, shepherds, laborers and other 
male servants employed for the performance of any work taken in 
task by the piece or in gross. It does not therefore cover any 
workers employed in commercial, industrial or artisanal establish­
ments and paid by time rather than taskwork rates - for example 
a blacksmith's striker, hired by the week. This depends, of 
course, on the meaning given to 'premises'. The first group of 
workers dealt with are those 'engaged... on any estate farm stock- 
station lands or premises whatsoever'. All the words preceding 
'premises' are ways of referring to rural establishments. Normal 
practice would therefore suggest that 'premises' meant rural estab­
lishments not specifically referred to in the preceding list.
If not, and it meant any premises - urban, industrial, maritime 
etc., then all manual servants employed on a time basis would be 
covered by the Section, but not workers who could not be called 
manual servants. I think one would find that 'manual servants' 
has a very hazy connotation at law, which would rather depend 
on the length, or more likely comfort, of the Chancellor's (or 
judge's) foot. Whatever the definition of 'premises', we confront 
once again an oddly incomplete categorisation of the types of
servant covered.
The difficulties are not eased by the fact that different 
sections have different categorisations. I have mentioned 
already the appearance of grooms in Section 4. This specific 
inclusion is doubly perplexing because in that section, the first 
qualification for artificers etc and male servants noted in 
Section 2 -'hired as manual or house servants on any estate... 
or premises' is absent. The section refers to 'artificers... 
and male servants' 'who shall have entered into any agreement... 
for any time or period' or artificers etc and male servants 'who 
shall have hired to...perform any work taken in task by the piece 
or in gross'. Now this begins to make sense. The formulation 
appears to cover all male employees employed by time or task, 
provided they come within general categories such as 'artificer', 
'workman' or 'other male servant'. Yet this section refers only 
to fraudulent breach.  ^ Most employer-initiated prosecutions 
would have come within Section _2. Are we to assume that Section 4 
indicates what Section 2 was intended to cover? I think we are, 
but strictly speaking we cannot interpret away whole phrases 
because they distort an intended meaning. The sections must be 
interpreted on the basis of the meaning the words can reasonably 
bear. Section 2 can only with extreme difficulty be interpreted 
to bear the same meaning as Section 4, even though such a meaning 
would be a more rational, one.
The belief that the Section 4-type categorisation represents 
the legislature's intention is strengthened by a further vari­
ation - that of Section 3, which covers claims against employers 
for wages. Here the reference is to 'persons employed or engaged 
[by masters or employers] to perform certain services in agric-
1. That is, absconding after having received an advance on 
wages - 1840 Act, S.4.
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ultural or other work or labour*. The only possible limitation
of the entire range of employees would come from the phrase
'work or labor*. An operatic soprano could hardly be said to be
engaged to perform certain services in 'labor', but under normal
interpretations of words, she would be engaged in 'work'. It is
1 2fairly clear from the writings of legislators and judges of 
the time that they did not see the Masters and Servants Acts as 
applying to all classes of employees but only to the more lowly. 
They would certainly not have regarded operatic sopranos, art 
teachers, or research chemists as covered by the Acts. Therefore 
one must assume that a more or less restrictive interpretation 
of 'work or labor' was intended, though it would have been 
difficult to make that interpretation so restrictive as to 
exclude those types of workers whose more obvious exclusion by 
the formulation in Section 2 has already been explored.
One final aspect of the 1840 Act's elaboration of workers 
must be mentioned. Some of the sections (Ss 2 and 4) covered 
only male servants. In those days before feminism and Equal 
Opportunities legislation, 'artificers' 'journeymen' 'workmen' 
and 'laborers' were almost certain to be all men. 'Manufacturers' 
is more doubtful - what of milliners and dressmakers? What, for 
that matter, of shepherds? The draftsmen of the bill may have 
been innocently unaware of the fact, but the economic exigencies 
of the time resulted in a number of women, and more particularly
3girls, acting as shepherds. So the limitation to males was
1. The discussions in the hearings of the 1845 Select Committee 
of the Legislative Council to inquire into and report on the 
working of the legislation (see infra, pp. 74-102) clearly 
proceeded on the basis that the regulatory system incorporated 
in the Masters and Servants Acts was directed at the lower 
levels of employment.
2. See, for example, Sir Alfred Stephen C.J. in Ex parte Evenett, 
1854,2 Legge 813 at 814.
Maryanne Purtil. v James Hooke, Wellingrove, 9/3/1853.3.
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made simply by qualifying 'other servants' as 'other male 
servants'. This limitation resulted from the unwillingness 
of legislators, as representatives of the employer class, to gaol 
women servants because of the deleterious effect they believed 
this had on the character and conduct of women.  ^ At the same 
time, they realised that if a fine could not be bolstered by a 
sentence of imprisonment in default of payment, there was no 
compelling incentive to pay. The women could have been ordered to 
forfeit all or part of the wages due. In this case, the commandeer­
ing of the wages before they were passed over to the female 
servant would have meant that payment was ensured without the 
need to impose or threaten a prison term. This solution would be 
dependent, however, on wages being due. The lack of faith in this 
expedient, evidenced by the limitation of Sections 2 and 4 to male
servants, and voiced when the Act was examined in 1845 by a Select
2Committee of the Legislative Council, suggests that the wages 
of women servants were frequently, if not generally, redirected by 
the operation of station stores and the imposition of penalties 
for breakages etc.
In view of this lack of confidence in the disciplinary value 
of fines and forfeiture with respect to women servants, it is at 
first puzzling that the 1840 Act did make women servants subject 
to forfeiture of wages under S.7, the section dealing with wilful 
or negligent destruction of goods etc of the employer by the 
servant. Section 7 provided that servants 'whether male or female'
1. Select Committee to inquire into and report on an Act of the 
Governor and Council (4 Vic No. 23) intituled 'An Act to ensun 
the fulfilment of engagements, and to provide for the adjust­
ment of disputes between masters and servants in New South 
Wales and its dependencies'. New South Wales. Legislative 
Council. Votes and Proceedings, 1845, p. 509.
2. Ibid.
(as well as artificers etc) shall forfeit or pay double the value 
of such goods. However, I believe the provision here for penalties 
on female servants reinforces my explanation of the employers' 
lack of faith in forfeiture for other breaches - the female
servants usually had no outstanding wages to forfeit.
\
d) 1845 Act
The compounded ambiguities of these aspects of the 1840 Act
were largely avoided by the short working life of the Act. Even
before its replacement in 1845, it was failing to provide a means
for completed actions because of other confusions surrounding the
1 2jurisdiction of magistrates under it. The 1845 Act was far 
simpler and therefore clearer, though it also left a number of 
questions unanswered. Strangely, the change from the chaos of the 
categorisation in the 1840 Act to the greater clarity of the 
1845 Act was not accompanied by any .discussion of this particular 
matter in the Report of the Committee which drafted the new Bill or 
in the evidence presented to the Committee. Perhaps the 1845 
Committee members, being somewhat better draftsmen, simply replaced 
the previous horrors automatically without consciously alluding 
to the difficulties they had reacted against.
The organisation in the 1845 Act recalls that which was 
intimated but not effectively accomplished in 1840. The main 
categories are arranged on the basis of time work and piece-work. 
Therefore Sections 2 and 3 relate to 'any servant who shall contract 
with any person...for any time or times whatsoever', while Section 8
17 .
1.
2 .
Infra, p. 76. 
1845 Act.
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covers 'any artificer splitter fencer sheep shearer or person 
engaged in mowing reaping getting in hay or corn or in sheep 
washing or other laborer who shall contract... for the performance 
of a certain work at a certain price1. It would have been too much 
to hope, however, that the simplification would not create new 
difficulties.
Though the purpose of Sections 2 and 3 seems to be to deal 
first with time work and then with piece wTork, a completely clear 
division is not made. Section 2 is not content to specify 'any 
servant who shall contract...for any time or times whatsoever', 
but continues 'or in any manner'. The additional phrase would 
surely make the section apply not only to hirings for a term but 
for hirings to perform a certain task. If so, what is the role of 
Section 8? It may be that for some reason, it was intended to 
cover agricultural and pastoral work done by piece rates, for all 
the examples are of rural occupations, except for the first word - 
artificer - which would cover all skilled trades and not only 
rura_l ones. Clearly Section 8 was intended to gather in groups of 
workers not covered by Section 2, for the conduct complained of and 
the penalty imposed are the same as in Section 2. There is no othei 
point in the additional section. Yet, when one considers the refer­
ences to a contracting -for any time or times...or in any manner', 
there remains no group of workers which needs to be separately 
provided for.
Since, as mentioned on page 15, the legislators and judges 
did not consider that the Acts applied to all levels of employees, 
some restriction in interpretation of 'any servant' and 'other 
laborer was obviously needed, and an attempt was made in Section 21 
to indicate how 'servant' should be interpreted. It provided that
19 .
’...throughout this Act unless when otherwise required by the 
context the word 'servant' shall extend to and include: all 
agricultural and other labourers and workmen shepherds and 
artizans domestic and other servants...'. It is questionable 
how much guidance this, in fact, provided. There is the same 
mixture of particular and general categories. However, the 
impression is certainly given that the Act was intended to 
cover only the lower levels of employment and not to extend to 
those areas which today are loosely described as 'white-collar'. 
The section does not, nevertheless, provide any criterion of the 
division of workers between Section 2 and Section 8. Again one 
must conclude that there was a mistake, that the draftsmen did 
not realise that they had covered by 'in any manner' the ground 
they went on to deal with in Section 8.
Only two cases reached the Supreme Court for decision about 
the interpretation of the sections dealing with what employees 
came within the purview of the 1845 Act, and of these, only one,
Ex parte Evenett,  ^ contained any discussion of the matter.
This case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus at the 
instance of Frederick Evenett who had been sentenced under 
Section 2 to a term of imprisonment for absenting from the service 
of Andrew Gribben. Evenett argued that the conviction and 
sentence were unjustified on the grounds that he was not a 
servant within the meaning of the Act. He had been hired as a 
'veterinary surgeon and working farrier' as 'assistant in the 
Veterinary Department, also to the working of the Farrier Depart­
ment' . He was to be paid a certain sum per week, and for working 
over hours he was to receive half the profits of that work 
(although no hours were specified).
1 . Op. cit.
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over hours he was to receive half the profits of that work
(although no hours were specified).
Stephen CJ referred to English cases as showing that words
such as those in the 1845 Act will not encompass every type of
employee.^ He suggested by way of example that 'a singer hired
2by the week and receiving board' would certainly not be covered, 
and also argued that only the express words of Section 8 would
3bring in shinglesplitters, shearers or fencers. One wonders 
why. There seems to be some confusion in the judicial mind 
about the elements constituting a contract of employment. For 
the workers mentioned are undeniably engaged in work of a type 
that would allow them to be categorised with 'agricultural and 
other laborers and workmen' - hard, demanding, physical work.
The difference which His Honour presumably found significant 
is that these are task workers - contracting to perform a 
certain task for a specified amount, the amount representing 
either a total sum or a rate per piece. Shinglesplitters 
contract to split so many thousand shingles at so many shillings 
per thousand; fencers contract to fence a particular area at 
so much per rod, plus so much per post for preparing the timber; 
shearers contract to shear at so much per score - though the 
task is unlikely to be specified in actual numbers of sheep, 
but more usually on something more like a time basis - till cut­
out, till all the sheep are shorn. Thus His Honour might 
have said that these are not employees but contractors.
Such an argument however is insupportable both in principle 
and in practice. In principle, it indicates lack of apprecia­
tion of the fundamental constituents of an employment relationship.
1. Ibid, 814.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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In practice, it would disrupt the operation of the system of 
regulation of employees through the Masters and Servants Acts.
For it would require the exclusion (in the absence of specific 
reference) not only of the three types of workers His Honour 
mentioned, but of numerous other types, such as reapers, mowers, 
thrashers, ploughmen, grinders, and numerous types of skilled 
or industrial workers paid by the piece - cobblers, masons, wheel­
wrights, shipwrights, blacksmiths, coopers etc. In other words, 
it would exclude a large proportion of the workers whom employers 
had traditionally aimed to control through such legislation. 
Furthermore, with regard to the Act's function of providing 
methods of action against recalcitrant employers, it would 
withdraw that facility from the very workers who would probably 
need it most.
Sir Alfred Stephen, in the same case, was also of opinion 
that 'a shopman, an assistant in trade (not actually an artificer, 
or artisan, engaged in manual labour) and other instances might 
be added as falling within the same category...'  ^- that is, the 
category of workers not covered by the Act. This view presents 
real difficulty, not simply as to acceptance of the restrictions 
imposed, but also as to reaching an understanding of what 
categories of people His Honour was referring to and why. The 
meaning of the passage is not clear, but I believe it should 
probably read: a shopman and also an assistant in trade (that 
is, not an artificer or artisan who is engaged in manual labour). 
The purport would seem to be that certain non-manual types of 
employment did not fall within the Act, for example, shop 
assistants. The non-manual assistant in trade is less easily
1. Ibid.
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identified. Perhaps it refers to people who handled the 
office or sales side of small industrial or other establish­
ments - a man who wrapped the parcels and took the money in 
businesses where the goods were manufactured or processed as 
well as retailed. Such an interpretation does not really 
relate to a likely situation. These businesses would not have 
had non-manual employees. (The blacksmith would have 
wrapped the horseshoes himself and counted out the change!)
It may be that His Honour was using 'trade' in a more 
specialised way to signify commercial and retail enterprises - 
'tradespeople' as opposed to 'tradesmen', 'trader' as opposed to 
'skilled trades'. Thus 'an assistant in trade' would be mentioned 
as a synonym for, or explanation of, 'shopman'. If the linguistic 
confusion is resolved in this way, there still remains the 
difficulty of accepting the logic of the restriction. Why are 
shop assistants not employees? I think the explanation for 
dicta to that effect is that so-called 'white'collar' employment 
was seen as outside the field of reference of the Act.
e) 1857 Act
The 1857 Act seems to recognise that Section 8 of the 1845 Act 
was unnecessary in view of the wording of Section 2, 1845. In the 
1857 Act, a definition section (S.l) was introduced covering 
'Master', 'Servant', 'Justices' and 'Cattle'. It defined servant 
as including:
all agricultural and other laborers shepherds 
watchmen stockmen grooms all domestic and other 
servants artificers journeymen handicraftsmen 
gardeners vinedressers splitters fencers shearers 
sheepwashers reapers mowers haymakers hired and 
engaged in this Colony either by verbal or written 
contract and all persons engaged in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or in any of
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the British Colonies in the British East Indies 
Possessions or in Foreign Countries by indenture 
or other written agreement as shepherds or laborers 
or otherwise.
Section 2 then provides for the absence or misconduct of 
'any servant [who] shall contract with any person to serve him for 
any time or in any manner or to perform for him as such servant 
a certain work at a certain price...'. Thus the section covers 
time-work and piece-work by its phrase 'for any time or in any 
manner’. This latter phrase, 'in any manner', would, as suggested 
in relation to Section 2 of the 1845 Act, cover hirings to perform 
a certain task, but - for good measure - that is further specific­
ally indicated by the continuation of the phrase 'or to perform... 
a certain work at a certain price'. Section 2 therefore clearly 
includes those workers for whom the insertion of Section 8 was 
thought necessary in 1845, and is clearly wide enough to include 
all servants referred to in the definition section, making that 
definition seem superfluous. The definition in Section 1 does not,
however, completely parallel Section 8 of the 1845 Act, for it 
does not go on to stress that the workers listed have contracted 
'for the performance of a certain work at a certain price'. Why 
then define servants at all, if all those included in the defin­
ition are covered by the phrasing of the substantive section? 
Firstly, perhaps, because only in Section 2 (and marginally in 
Section 3 which relates to fraudulent breach) is this extended 
description of servant given. All the other references are simply 
to 'any servant'. It may, therefore have been thought necessary 
to include the definition so as to make clear that other sections 
covered the same category of worker as Section 2. But if so, 
why not put the description from Section 2 into the definition 
also - that is, 'any servant who shall contract... to serve...for 
any time...'etc., and refer to 'any servant' in all the substantive 
sections including Section 2?
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A second explanation is possible, which might also throw
some light on the apparent superfluous ness of Section 8 in 1845.
Many of the occupations listed - splitters, fencers, shearers,
reapers etc. could have been argued to be independent contractors.
The definition in 1857, and Section 8 in 1845, may have been
making the point that, in the opinion of the legislature, these
types of workers were employees hired for the performance of a
certain work, and not independent contractors. A definition
more openly directed to that purpose, and not specifying other
workers such as shepherds, grooms etc., who are clearly employees,
would have removed the ambiguity. But at least, one can say that
the 1857 Act is a little less confusing in relation to the
types of servants covered than the Acts which preceded it.
Unlike the two cases on the 1845 Act previously referred
to, the judgment in the first case concerning the ambit of the
1857 Act had an expansive tendency. This was the case of
R v Merewether/  an application for a writ of mandamus to compel
the hearing of a charge of absenting by the Australian Agricultural
Co.against a certain Jones who had hired for 12 months as a
collier. Wise J. rejected the magistrate's ruling that a collier
was not a servant within the Act. A collier was, he said, covered
by the reference to 'other laborers', there being nothing to
prevent labourers 'being applied in its ordinary and natural 
2sense'. This decision follows the approach behind Sir Alfred
3Stephen's remarks in Ex Parte Evenett.
1. 1862, 1 S.C.R. 260.
2. Ibid., 261.
3. Op. cit., 814 .
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Sir James Martin took the same line and expanded the 
argument a little further in Ex parte Pyne.  ^ In this case, the 
action arose out of a claim for wages by a man hired as 'an 
assistant in your employment as superintendent of the drapery 
portion of your business'. The employer applied for a writ of 
prohibition against further proceedings under the order, alleging 
that the complainant was not a servant within the meaning of the 
Act. A rule nisi was granted and the matter came before Martin C.J 
for argument whether the rule should be made absolute. The rule 
was made absolute with costs. His Honour was of the opinion that
'an assistant who only hands goods down from the shelves and sells
2them' was not an artificer or labourer nor within the sense
given to 'servant' by the definition in Section 1. He held
this opinion because he believed that the definition did embody
a common element, did indicate a particular category of employment
within which persons must come to be covered by the Act. The
persons described in Section 1 were all, he said, 'persons who
do something either to the ground or to raw materials of different
3kinds or are employed in making or improving goods'. By this 
analysis, the Act would apply to those engaged in direct 
production of commodities, but not to those who were employed in 
either the distribution or sale of commodities or the provision 
of services.
Such an approach is coherent, but not satisfactory. Again, 
the inadequacies are both theoretical and practical. What of 
domestic servants, laundresses, garbage collectors, coach 
drivers, midwives, wetnurses, window cleaners, lamplighters,
1. 1878, 1 S.C.R. (N.S.) N.S.W. 14.
2. Ibid., 15
3. Ibid.
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sailors? Is there a valid reason for excluding these and 
similar occupations from the ambit of the Act? What categorisation 
of the elements of a master-servant relationship would justify 
the division His Honour makes? It is worth noting that Hargrave J. 
gave a different reason for making the rule nisi absolute.
He argued that the definition section 'divides persons into two 
classes - employers and employed. And among the employers, 
agents and superintendents of employers are included'-1 2Therefore 
a superintendent of a drapery department could not be an employee. 
Though this argument has an initial logic, it is also clearly 
a flawed logic for it ignores the fact that employment depends 
on the relationship between employer and employee. If a person 
is hired to superintend a drapery department, he has agreed to 
perform a task for a wage. The task is superintendence. It 
takes its character from the relationship between the person 
who does it and the person it is done for. This situation is 
not altered by the fact that part of the task relates to a 
separate relationship between a shop assistant and a shop owner's 
representative, the superintendent. That cannot destroy the 
character of employee which the superintendent bears towards the 
shop owner.
2Nevertheless a similar approach was taken in Ex parte Hore, 
by Cohen J. who held that a 'working manager' of a merry-go-round 
whose job was to work the engine, take the tickets and do all the 
work was not a servant within the Act.
1. Ibid., 16
2. 1900, 16 W.N. (N.S.W.) 144.
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f) 1902 Act 1 23456
This Act reproduces exactly the definition and the
wording of Section 2 of the 1357 Act, with the one difference
that the definition in 1902 was put into Section 3, and the
section covering absenting and misconduct became Section 4.
2The decision of Pring J. in Moore v Lindsay in 1904 
that an employed carpenter came within the 1902 Act was unavoid­
able. It is mystifying however why the case ever got to the 
Supreme Court, how a magistrate could have dismissed Moore's 
claim for wages on the ground that a carpenter, being a skilled 
labourer, was not a servant within the Act, when Section 3 
specifies that 'servant' includes 'artificers, journeymen,
3handicraftsmen'. The case of Ex parte Barnett is also 
straight-forward. This case was an application for prohibition 
following a conviction for absenting. The applicant argued 
that she was not a servant within the Act. She had been hired 
to serve as a 'lady help' for six months, assisting in all 
household duties except washing, for 10/- per week. Sly A.J. 
argued that 'the question whether a person is a domestic
4servant or not depends on what duties she has agreed to do' ,
and following a motion by Barnett to have the order set aside,
the full court dismissed the motion, and upheld the conviction.
5 6Ex parte Danahey “ and Ex parte Durham are less accept­
able decisions. In the former, Danahey sought prohibition 
against an order for wages of £19/10/- to be paid to Byrnes, a
1. An Act to Consolidate the enactments relating to Masters 
and Servants. Act No. 59 of 1902. (In all subsequent 
references this Act will be referred to as the 1902 Act.)
2. 21 W.N. (N.S.W.) 139.
3. 1907 S.R. (N.S.W.) 788.
4. Ibid.,789.
5. Cl911) 28 W.N. (N.S.W.) 155.
6. (1916) 33 W.N. (N.S.W.) 90.
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clerk. Pring J. based his decision that the writ should be
granted on a general interpretation of the definition which
appears to be similar to that of Sir James Martin, expressed
in Pyne's 1 case. He said one has only to read Section 3 to
2see that it applied to manual labourers and not to clerks.
In Durham's case, Pring J. exhibited the reluctance which 
has been dealt with earlier to extend the Act to piece-work 
operations, the tendency being to identify such workers as 
contractors. Here the cause of action was an order for £25 
wages to be paid to a drover. The employer applied to have 
a rule nisi for prohibition made absolute. His Honour 
demonstrated a very inadequate acquaintance with the facts 
of economic life, for in holding that a drover did not come 
within the classes of servants mentioned in the definition 
section, he asserted that 'All there mentioned are paid by the 
week by the month or by the 6 months... Shearers are an exception;
as far as I know, in this state they have always been paid by the
, 3number of sheep • He was almost right about shearers, but 
totally wrong in the rest of his assertion, so that his grounds 
for excluding a drover because he was paid to perform a particular 
task - here to drive 212 head of cattle to Manilla at £2/10/0 
per day - is unacceptable. There is perhaps a little more power 
in the continuation of the argument, resting on the point of the 
pay of £2/10/0 per day. Such a large sum, it was implied, showed 
that the drover was a contractor who would be employing others 
to assist him to carry out the work. Here again the reasoning 
draws on incompletely examined assumptions about the nature of 
'employment' .
1. 0p^ _ cit., p. 25
2. Op. cit.
3. Op. cit., 91-92.
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There is a further intriguing point to be made about
the actual effect all these decisions had, as opposed to the
logic of their arguments. Of twelve cases where the question of
whether or not employees were servants within the Act arose,
the decision in nine operated against the interests of the
employee.'^ In those nine cases, where it would have been
in the employee's interests to be held to be a servant within
2the Act, he was held not to be covered, and where it would
have been in the employee's interests to be outside the reach
of the Act, he or she was held to come within the definition 
3of 'servant'. Of the three remaining cases, in one - Ex
4parte Erwin _ it was said that apprentices were not covered by 
the Act and that therefore Erwin could not be convicted for 
absconding. But since the apprenticeship was not binding because 
the indenture had not been signed by a party thereto, a contrary 
opinion on the question of ambit would not have altered the 
ultimate result. These figures suggest that an attempt to distil 
out of the decision a coherent legal approach to the nature and 
significance of the employment relationship could be difficult 
or misleading.
1.
2.
3 .
4 .
The twelve cases were Ex parte Erwin (1854) 2 Legge 816;
Ex parte Evenett, op. cit., R. v Merewether, op. cit; Ex 
parte Pyne, op. cit.; Ex parte Sperring, (1890) 11 L.R. 
(N.S.W.) 407; Ex parte Rathbone, (1892) 13 L.R. (N.S.W.) 56;
Ex parte Kimpton, (1900) 16 W.N. (N.S.W.) 144; Moore v
Lindsay, (1904) 21 W.N. (N.S.W.) 139; Ex parte Barnett,
op. ci t . ; Ex parte Williams, (1909) 9 S.R. (N.S.W.) 140;
Ex parte Danahey, op. cit.; Ex parte Durham, op.cit.
Ex parte Pyne, op. cit.; Ex Parte Rathbone, op.cit.;
Ex parte Kimpton, op. cit.; Ex parte Danahey, op.cit.;
Ex parte Durham, op. cit.
R.
Ex
v Merewether, op. cit.; 
parte Barnett, op. cit.;
Ex parte 
Ex parte
Sperring, op. cit.; 
Williams, op.cit.
Op. cit.
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Part III Types of Offences Dealt with by the Act
Whatever the legislators and judges thought about the 
classes of servants covered by the Acts, the attitude of 
magistrates made the question less important, since they applied 
them with little quibble to almost all 'clue-collar' , domestic 
and lower-level 'white-collar' occupations. In terms of the Acts 
as applied in the Courts of Petty Sessions, a more important 
area of inquiry is the offences contained in the Acts. It is 
to offences and penalties that one must turn to discover the 
aspect of the legislation that was of greatest significance to 
master and servant alike.
The offences covered by the various Acts, both British and 
colonial, can be divided into five categories: offences by 
servants against masters, offences by masters against servants, 
offences specifically created by the Act, offences by other 
employers against masters, and offences by other persons against 
masters. Of these, the most important categories are the first 
two.
i) Absenting and Misconduct
a) The English Acts
The breaches of contract of servants which the Masters and 
Servants Acts dealt with were of three broad types - absenting, 
misconduct and loss of or destruction of the employer's property. 
Misconduct is the broadest of these categories and can if necessary 
encompass the others, which in fact it appears to have done under 
the British Act of 1747  ^ which referred to complaints by employers
1. 20 Geo II, c .19.
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'touching or concerning any misdemeanour, miscarriage or
1illbehaviour in...service or employment' but not to
complaints about absenting or injury to property. This Act
was, of course, supplementary to, rather than in substitution
for, earlier legislation, and actions for absenting could perhaps
have been brought under even earlier Acts. However it is clear
that this possibility did not provide a completely satisfactory
procedure, nor did the stratagem of presenting instances of
absenting as 'misdemeanour[s], miscarriage[s] or illbehaviour',
for the 1765 Act specifically brought absenting within its field
by providing that the matter could be heard before a justice if
'any artificer, calico printer... shall contract with any person
for any time or term whatsoever and shall absent himself from
his service. before the terms of his contract be completed, or be
2guilty of any other misdemeanour...'. In 1823, the formula was 
extended: 'if any servant in husbandry or any artificer... shall 
contract with any person... whatsoever, to serve him. ..for any 
time or times whatsoever, or in any other manner, and shall not 
enter into or commence his or her service according to his or 
her Contract (such Contract being in writing) or having entered 
into such service shall absent... from hi s or her service before 
the term of his or her contract, whether such contract shall be 
in writing or not, be completed or neglect to fulfil the same, 
or be guilty of any other misconduct or misdemeanour in the
3execution thereof'. These three Acts laid out the breaches of 
contract for which employees could be proceeded against summarily 
in New South Wales up to 1828 (that is, where the employees were 
freemen and not subject to convict discipline). The notable 
difference between them is that the 1823 Act gave separate
1. Ibid, S.II
2. 6 Geo III, c.25, S.IV
3. 4 Geo IV, c . 3 4 , S.III
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treatment to contracts in writing and to failure to enter a 
contract as opposed to absenting during the term thereof.
b) The 1828 Act
Understandably, in view of the more rudimentary nature of 
the New South Wales labour market in the 1820s, the first colonial 
Act  ^ dispensed with these two British elaborations. It gave 
no special treatment to contracts in writing, and it referred 
only to absenting during part of the time for which the servant 
shall have been hired or engaged. It would not, therefore, by 
strict interpretation, appear to cover failure by workers hired 
by task rather than by term to enter into the contract or
ocomplete the job contracted for. Even the part of the section 
covering misconduct does not strictly apply to task-work, for 
it deals with persons 'who refuse or neglect to work in the 
trade... for which he or she shall have been so hired or engaged 
in a diligent and careful manner...or shall return his or her 
work or desert or quit the same before it shall have been com­
pletely finished without the consent of the person...by whom he 
or she shall have been so employed'. The delineation of 
offences is continually tied back to the hiring or engagement 
'for any time'. It is doubtful that this was intended - again 
the more likely explanation is that the draftsmen did not see 
the implications of their phrasing (though the extended nature 
of this section in the 1823 Act should have alerted them). 
Furthermore, the omission is unlikely to have greatly troubled 
the magistrates of the time, who tended to give a broad inter­
pretation to the words of the statute.
1 . 
2 .
1828 Act. 
Ibid., S.l.
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In the same way, magistrates are unlikely to have given the 
portion of the section covering misconduct the restricted ambit 
which the words seem to have required - is it, for example, 
neglecting to work ' in a diligent and careful manner ' to be 
insolent to one's employer? Strictly speaking, I would contend 
that insolence would not affect the diligence or care of one's 
work; but the early colonial magistrates are not likely to have 
held themselves unable to deal with allegations of misconduct 
based on grounds of insolence. Nevertheless, some magistrates 
were giving the Act the narrow interpretation the wording required. 
In evidence to the 1845 Select Committee, Charles Windeyer, chief 
Police Magistrate in Sydney, said that there had been much 
discussion of the question on the Bench and before the Bench, and 
that in many cases w/ere a servant had given a great deal of 
abuse to the mistress in the absence of the master, the magistrates 
had felt great difficulty as to whether they could punish for 
mere insolence. The course they had recommended was that the 
employer give the servant an order - for example by saying to a 
servant maid 'go to your kitchen'. If the servant refused to 
comply, he or she would be liable for punishment for misconduct 
amounting to disobedience, rather than simply insolence.  ^ Such 
refinements would have been less frequent in the districts beyond 
the limits.
c) The 1840 Act
One of these gaps was filled by the 1840 Act which referred
1 . Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 522
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to both hiring 'for any time or period' and hiring 'for the
execution performance...of any work...taken in task by the piece
or in gross' and to absenting 'during any part of the time for
which he shall have been so hired...' or 'before the work... which he
had been so hired...to execute... shall be fully and perfectly 
, 1executed... . This formula extended the operation of the Act to 
cover absenting during the contract by both time and task workers. 
However, the 1840 Act still does not, strictly speaking, cover 
an initial failure to enter into the contract. Nor does it 
expand the restrictive nature of the wording relating to mis­
conduct. Indeed it restricts the scope of misconduct further - 
providing only for those who 'refuse or neglect to work in a 
diligent manner'. So that, while lack of diligence now provides 
a cause for summary proceedings against task workers as well 
as time workers, neither type of employee appears to be liable 
to summary proceedings for lack of care. (It could perhaps be 
argued that if work is not careful, it is not diligent, but I 
believe the two things are not synonymous, and - if one can draw 
any conclusions on the basis of how the draftsmen used words - they 
did not think they were synonymous either, or the 1828 Act would 
not have referred to both diligence and care).
d ) The 1845 Act
The 1845 Act extended the provisions relating to absenting 
and misconduct, thereby eliminating all these inadequacies referred 
to in the 1828 and 1840 Acts. Section 2 covered failure to enter 
service or absenting from service by any servant who contracted
1. S.2.
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'for any time or times whatsoever or in any manner', and thus 
applied to both time and task workers. It was also applicable 
if these workers were 'guilty of disobedience or of any other 
misconduct or misdemeanour in the execution thereof'. This 
wording would have been sufficient to include numerous instances 
of misconduct, and would certainly have covered insolence. This 
would have gratified those witnesses to the 1845 Select Committee 
who wanted the 1840 Act extended to make insolence clearly 
punishable. Samuel North for example thought insolence should 
attract a fine of up to £2 and in default one month's imprison­
ment.  ^ The Committee's report did not refer to a recommendation 
for such an extension, perhaps because of the suggestion by W.H. 
Suttor that punishment of insolence would require corresponding
provision for punishment of provocation by masters, which, he
2suggested, was frequently very great. But the wording of the 
Bill which they produced, and which became the 1845 Act, certainly 
makes such an extension possible. The Committee would thus 
appear to have been dubious that the altered wording of Section 2 
ensured the inclusion of task workers, for they provided 
specifically in Section 8 for the situation where 'artificers 
splitters sheep shearers and persons engaged in mowing reaping 
or getting in of hay and corn or in sheep washing and other 
labourers... contract for the performance of work at a certain 
price' and absented themselves before the completion of the 
contract.
Ibid., p.539. 
Ibid. , p . 522 .
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e ) The 1857 and 1902 Acts
The section of the 1857 Act dealing with absenting and 
misconduct (S.2) differs in wording from Section 2 of the 1845 
Act, but it has the same ambit, covering:
Any servant [who] shall contract to serve... 
and shall not enter into his service or 
commence his work ... or... having entered into 
such service or commenced such work shall 
absent himself therefrom without reasonable 
cause before the term of his contract shall 
have expired or before the work contracted 
for shall be completed... or shall neglect to 
fulfil the same or be guilty of any other mis­
conduct or ill behaviour in the execution 
thereof...
In this respect,the 1902 Act followed the 1857 Act.
One change that the 1857 Act did make to the operation of 
the 1845 Act with respect to absconding was to reintroduce the 
concept which the 1840 Act had contained of absenting without 
reasonable cause. Section 2 of the 1857 Act provided summary 
proceedings in the event of absenting only where the employee 
'shall absent himself...without reasonable cause before the term 
of his contract shall have expired or before the work, contracted 
for shall be completed*. No such qualification was made in the 
English Acts, nor in the 1828 colonial Act. The 1840 Act spoke of 
employees who 'without reasonable or sufficient excuse... absent 
[themselves] from...service'. There was no such phrase in the 1845 
Act, and the report of the drafting Committee does not give any 
idea why this provision of the 1840 Act was not continued. The 
absence of any record of the deliberations of the Committee which 
drew up the 1857 Act prevents the discovery of why the phrase was 
reintroduced. Its absence did not necessarily mean that employees
1. S.2.
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who absented with good reason would be penalised under the 1828 
or 1845 Acts. Cases such as Spooner v Alexander,^  inquiring 
into the interpretation of the phrase, referred to a number of 
English decisions which imported the requirement of lack of reason­
able cause into the English section dealing with absenting. 
Nevertheless the draftsmen of 1857 and 1902 thought it desirable 
to make specific provision for this aspect.
It would appear, from the small number of cases reaching the 
superior courts, that magistrates had little difficulty inter­
preting the restriction of punishable absenting to absenting
2without reasonable cause. There was a case in 1883 where an 
employee who left because his wages were stopped for bad work 
was held not to have had reasonable cause for absenting, and two 
in 1890 and 1893 respectively. In the first of theses a shearer 
contended that provision in the agreement for payment for all 
sheep shorn subject to certain penalties where the workers left 
before completion of the agreement constituted an implied 
permission to leave, and that he did not therefore absent himself
without reasonable cause. This argument was, however, rejected
3 4by the Court. The 1893 case also concerned a shearer. In this
case the action of the shearer in not returning to work after
lunch on a Saturday was held not to be actionable since it was the
custom in the Bourke-Paroo area to knock off at noon on Saturdays,
and therefore the absence was not without reasonable cause.
1. (1912) 13 C.L.R. 704
2. Re Cameron, Tarl., 181.
3. Ex parte Cameron, (1890) 11 S.R. (N.S.W.) 422.
4. Hebden v Buxton (1893) 10 W.N. (N.S.W.) 69.
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The two remaining cases are 20th century cases, both being 
adjudicated in 1912. Both of them deal with significant 
applications of the reasonable cause argument.. Ex parte Beddoe 
dealt with an allegation of absconding where the worker, Beddoe, 
had given notice of his intention to leave which his employer 
argued was insufficient. The court held that Beddoe's inter­
pretation of the notice requirement was a reasonable one, and 
that he could not be said therefore to have left without reasonable 
cause. Cullen CJ expressed the opinion that the magistrate 'should 
have held that the penal section would not attach in cases where
there was such a dispute between the parties as there was in this
2case'. The decision came too late for the numerous workers 
in the 19th century who had been dealt with for absenting because 
of disagreements between their interpretations of the term of 
their contract or the notice required and the interpretation made 
for their employers. Out of 1739 cases of absconding which I 
examined, 620 of which gave details of the incidents involved,
125 concerned disputes about interpretation of contractual 
obligations, usually the terms of the contract. It is fair to 
assume that a large proportion of the 1119 cases which gave no 
details also would have been of this type, which represented the 
largest single group in the breakdown of the cases with such 
details.
The final case on interpretation of ’without reasonable
3cause' is Spooner v Alexander, a case arising out of a stop-work 
at Hoskins' Lithgow colliery following dismissal of a union
1. Ex parte Beddoe (1912) 29 W.N. (N.S.W.) 21.
2. Ibid., 22.
3. Op. cit.
delegate. It is therefore an important case, since it 
demonstrates and affects the way the application of the Masters 
and Servants Acts reacts with the development and activities 
of a unionised labour force. Griffith CJ and Barton J. gave a 
restrictive interpretation of the notion of 'reasonable cause' 
in the context of union activity. Chief Justice Griffith's 
argument was based on legal technicality and not on the realities 
of the pithead confrontation. The argument for reasonable 
cause was based, he said, on the belief that the delegate had 
been unreasonably refused persmission to attend a union meeting, 
and that this was a breach of an implied term of the defendant's 
contract. Since no evidence was given as to the reasons 
permission was refused, the respondent could not show he had 
honestly and reasonably believed that it had been unreasonably 
refused.  ^ In concluding, however, the Chief Justice interpreted 
the situation in terms that suggest an attitude to the parties 
rather than an analysis of their actions. The miner's position, 
he said,
was not that permission had been unreasonably 
refused to Cairnes, but either that such permission 
was not necessary and that the dismissal was 
therefore wrongful, or that they and not the 
employers were the judges of the matter... They 
said to the employers in effect "We have decided 
that Cairnes should not have been dismissed. 
Re-instate him instanter or we strike". The 
employers refused to 'stand and deliver' on this 
challenge...2
The judgment of Barton J. also indicates a restrictive 
approach to the legitimacy of union activity, being based on the 
relationship between the union claims and the employer's 'right 
to manage'.
1. 
2 .
Ibid, 710-711. 
Ibid, 711-712.
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These considerations give the strongest probability 
to the evidence of the appellant, who gives the 
right complexion to the facts stated for the res­
pondent when he says 'It had been the custom to 
allow the delegates to attend the board meetings 
with permission, but that permission would be 
withheld if necessary'. I take the word 'necessary' 
to mean necessary in the interests of the employer, 
to the best of the manager's judgment. I conclude 
then that the practice is to ask the manager's 
permission, as is stated with practical unanimity, 
but that the manager has a discretion to withhold 
it when he thinks it necessary to do so in the 
employer's interest.^
As so often happened, the dissenting judgment of Isaacs J. 
took a totally different approach, illustrated by the following 
passage:
So far as unreasonableness of attitude is 
concerned, I am unable to see how Alexander is at 
fault. On the other hand, to all appearance 
the dismissal of Cairnes and the refusal to 
restore him were purely despotic and arbitrary 
acts, incapable of reasonable explanation; and 
acts which, as decided in Cairnes' case, he 
was justified in disregarding. 2
The absence of cases questioning the phrases 'misconduct 
or misdemeanour' or 'misconduct or ill-behaviour' suggest that 
there was consensus, at least among employers and magistrates, 
as to the behaviour which would fall within that phrase.
ii) Fraudulent Breach of Contract
Section 2 does not, however, exhaust the Acts' provisions 
with regard to absenting. In addition to the type of absenting 
already dealt with, the legislation (from 1840) dealt with 
absconding after receiving an advance of salary. Since this 
was regarded as a fraudulent breach of contract, it was treated
1. Ibid, 717.
2. Ibid, 731.
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more seriously than ordinary absenting, and attracted a more 
severe penalty. In 1840, for example, when absenting under 
Section 2 made an employee liable to forfeiture of wages and 
payment of a sum up to twice the damage caused, and only in 
default of payment to imprisonment of up to three months; 
under Section 4, absenting after receiving an advance made 
the employee immediately liable to imprisonment for up to 
three months with hard labour. Although the 1845 Act provided 
for a prison term of up to three months for both offences, by 
Section 3 fraudulent breach involved a discretion in the 
magistrates to order that the prisoner be kept to hard labour.
The 1857 Act removed the liability to imprisonment under 
Section 2 except where there was default in payment of the fine, 
for which up to 14 days imprisonment could be ordered, but 
continued to provide for up to three months imprisonment where 
the absenting occurred after an advance of wages; and by the 
1902 Act even the reference to 14 days imprisonment in default 
was removed from ordinary absenting, yet fraudulent breach 
continued to attract a penalty of three months gaol.^
The special provisions for fraudulent breach of contract
are a colonial phenomenon. They do not appear in the British
Acts. The type of behaviour with which they dealt particularly
disturbed colonial employers. Witnesses to the 1845 Select 
2Committee suggested that this type of behaviour was widespread. 
One witness, J.B .Bettington, even suggested that many lived by 
such pursuits; he said he believed there was a class of men who 
obtained a livelihood in big towns by getting advances and 
absconding. He attributed such behaviour to 'an idle and knavish
1. 
2 .
S.5.
Op.cit., p. 519 per C. Windeyer, and p.523 per J.F.Johnson.
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disposition; the parties would rather live by such dishonest
tricks than by honest industry'.^ Undoubtedly, instances of
false pretences of this type did occur, but not all cases of
absconding after advance involved such clear-cut wrongdoing.
The masters were not altogether innocent of 'dishonest tricks'.
Bettington himself described occasions of absconding from his
employ where sympathy is more due to servant than master. He said
most absconders from his stations were engaged in England under
indentures. They absconded on arrival when they learnt what
wages were being paid in the colony. For, while Bettington
hired them in England for £15 per annum, servants hired in
2New South Wales were paid £18 to £20 per annum. Quite apart 
from the dubious acceptability of the employers' stance in the 
actual instances of so-called fraudulent breach, very few 
such cases were litigated at all - only 47 out of a total of 
3096 cases against employees which I examined were for 
absconding after advance. It would seem, then, that the 
inclusion of this provision in the Acts,and the discussion of 
such matters before the Committee to inquire into the workings 
of the Act,tell more about the attitudes and obsessions of 
employers than about the behaviour of employees.
Ibid, p.540. 
Ibid, p.539.
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iii) Loss and Destruction of Property
The third type of breach of contract by employees which 
the Act dealt with was loss or destruction of or injury to the 
property of the employer. This also was a colonial innovation, 
and the figures suggest that it did correspond to the exigencies 
of the colonial situation, though perhaps not in the way that 
the legislators and employers would have argued. The provision 
appeared in the 1828 Act and in every subsequent version of the 
legislation, though a significant change was made in 1857. As 
first enacted, the provision was that if any artificer etc.
'shall wilfully or negligently spoil or destroy any goods...work... 
committed to his or her charge or wherewith he or she shall be 
entrusted by his or her employer or shall negligently injure or
lose any property entrusted to his care*, he or she should pay
1 2 double the value. The 1840 provision was the same.
In 1845 the reference to negligent loss or injury was 
extended and particularised: 'if any servant... shall wilfully
or negligently injure or lose any cattle sheep horses or other 
property...'.^ The particularisation suggests, as the cases in 
fact bear out, that the main object of the section was to deal 
with loss of livestock by stockmen and shepherds, especially the 
latter. The reference to wilful injury or loss does indicate a 
gap in the earlier formulation, for - unless sheep and cattle 
could be said to be 'goods, wares, work or materials for work' - 
wilful loss of sheep or cattle was not provided for by the 
earlier section - though it would obviously come under the
1.
2 .
3.
1828 Act, S.3.
S.7.
S . 4 .
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provisions relating to misconduct. Whether the extension was 
important is difficult to say. Shepherds were an intransigent 
group on the whole, and they may frequently have carried out 
their struggles with their employers in this direct way.
However, the problems of shepherding large flocks in rough country 
were such that losses were common,  ^ and not necessarily the result 
even of negligence, let alone malice. I would be surprised if 
many instances of wilful loss had been detected and yet had gone 
unpunished because of the lack of this wording in the 1828 or 1840 
Acts. Negligent loss was a more likely charge, and of the 94 
actions for loss before 1860, the majority would have been laid 
on that basis.
The 1857 Act, therefore, made a significant change in the
provisions relating to destruction or loss of property. For it
altered the second part of the formula to refer only to wilful
2loss. The section now dealt with any servant who 'shall 
wilfully or negligently spoil or destroy any goods wares work 
or materials for work' or who 'shall wilfully abandon lose or 
injure • any cattle or any other property'('cattle' being defined 
to include sheep, horses, goats and swine). This change thus 
removed from the field of operation of the Act the great majority 
of cases which the section had previously dealt with. The 
absence of a report of the deliberations of the 1857 Committee is 
a great frustration here, .for it might have illuminated the mystery 
of why this change was made. Did the consciences of the legis­
lators prompt them to remove a provision whose effect was 
oppressive, or did the pocketbooks of employers prompt them to 
dispense with a provision that was no longer necessary? The
1. Infra, pp. 260-263.
2 . S. 4
3 . cf. N.S.W. Parliamentary Papers 1856-57, vol. 2, p.467,
where*Bill presented without any record of deliberations 
leading to its formulation.
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history of the Acts and their operation does little to diminish 
the temptation to cynicism.
These four matters (in recurrent groups of three sections) - 
absenting, misconduct, fraudulent breach, destruction or loss 
of property - were the breaches by servants for which the Acts 
provided summary remedies to employers. The breaches by employers 
which servants could litigate under the Acts were non-payment of 
wages, failure to provide proper rations or other ill-treatment, 
detention of property, and failure to provide a certificate of dis­
charge. Only the first two of these were covered by British
legislation. They were contained in the 1747 Act  ^ (and the 1823
2Act in respect of wages), and were therefore in force in the 
colony from its inception.
iv) Claims for Wages
a) The 1828 Act
The 1828 Act had only one provision relating to offences 
against servants. It laid down in Section 4 that 'in case any 
master... shall illuse any such artificer [etc.] it shall be lawful' 
for a magistrate to award such amends to be made to the servant 
as he thought fair and reasonable up to the amount of six months 
wages/and to terminate the agreement. The Act did not therefore 
specifically provide for the failure of the employer to pay wages 
due. It would not be impossible to construe iU-usage to cover 
non-payment of wages, but it is something of a strain on the words 
used. It is also possible that the colonial Act, because of this 
omission, did not completely displace the operation of the British
1.
2.
20 Geo II, c.19, S.I (wages), and S.II (ill-treatment.) 
4 Geo IV, c.34, S.V.
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Acts, and that wages claims could still be brought under those 
Acts.
b) The 1840 Act
Whatever the effect of the 1828 Act, the 1840 Act provided 
specifically for wages claims though it declined to put the 
matter as baldly as a failure to pay wages owing, which in fact 
was what it meant. Instead, Section 3 of the Act referred to 
the fact that 'differences often arise between... employers and 
persons employed... by... them... as to the wages or remuneration 
to be paid.', and provided that two justices could 'determine the 
matter of such difference or complaint... and..order ... such 
sum...of money as to them shall appear just and proper to be 
paid' to the employee within fourteen days. No monetary limit 
to the magistrates' jurisdiction was imposed. The euphemistic 
wording - 'differences as to the wages' - perhaps suggests the 
legislators expected only small sums to be involved.
c) The 1845 Act
The 1845 Act, following the depression of the early 1840s, 
when wages very often went unpaid, had a more direct and 
realistic tone, and backed up that tone by introducing a £ 30 
limit. In the words of the Act: 'in all cases of wages not
exceeding £30 which shall be due and payable to any servant' the 
magistrates could 'make such order to payment of the said wages 
not exceeding £30 with the costs incurred by the servant in 
prosecuting such claim as shall to such justices appear reasonable 
and just'.  ^ The manner of introducing the jurisdictional limit
1. S.5.
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is - and was - somewhat confusing. In the first reference to it, 
did it mean that the total wages of the servant should not exceed 
£30, or that the amount due for which action could be taken under 
the Act should be no more than £30? What of a man whose wages were 
£40 p.a. but who had drawn £20 worth of goods from the store?
Could he sue for £20? The best interpretation is that he could, 
but the cases suggest some magistrates were unsure. The second 
reference is also ambiguous. The confusion already mentioned is 
still possible, though less likely, but a stronger confusion 
occurs as to whether the magistrates could make an order for 
wages not exceeding £30 and for costs, or whether the order with 
the award of costs incurred was, when totalled, not to exceed 
£30. Again, the best interpretation is that the order for wages 
itself could be up to £30, but both readings are quite legitimate 
on the basis of the words themselves. The uncertainty cannot have
caused any serious problems, however, for the 1857 Act did not
alter the wording except to raise the upper limit to £50. This
same limit (and wording) was retained by the 1902 Act.
One aspect of the section which did alter between 1840 and
1902 was the time allowed for payment. The 1840 Act provided
that if the master did not pay within 14 days of the order being
made, a distress warrant should be issued. 1 2 In 1845, the time
2before issue of the warrant was reduced to 10 days, and by
1857 the justices could issue their warrant unless the order was
3obeyed 'forthwith'. The 1902 Act makes no provision for non-
1. S.3.
2. S.5.
3 . S . 5 .
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payment of the order, but leaves the general law in this area to 
take its course.
v) 111treatment
While the treatment of nonpayment of wages was developing 
in this way, the original category of illusage was taking a 
somewhat zig-zag course. In 1840 it was not specifically 
provided for at all, but in 1845 it returned, in two sections. 
Section II authorised the magistrates to order amends if they 
were satisfied of a charge by a servant against an employer 'for 
refusal of necessary provisions or other illtreatment'. S.12
went further, and gave magistrates jurisdiction over complaints 
by 'any artificer splitter fencer... concerning any misusage 
refusal of necessary provision or furnishing provision of bad 
quality nonpayment of wages cruelty or other illtreatment 
whatsoever’. The difference in the sections is unexplained.
It is perhaps surprising in view of the detail of Sections 11 
and 12 of the 1845 Act that in the 1857 version, specific 
coverage of illtreatment is again missing, an omission that the 
1902 Act did not remedy.
The three Acts without direct reference to illtreatment 
did not, however, completely preclude summary proceedings on that 
ground, for from 1840 on, the Acts provided magistrates with a 
broad arbitral jurisdiction. Section 8 of the 1840 Act made it 
lawful for magistrates 'in any case not herein before specifically 
provided for to hear and determine any complaint difference or 
dispute ... between any such artif icer. . . and his or her... employer ' .
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Sectionsl6 of 1845, 10 of 1857 and 13 of 1902 continued 
this jurisdiction. The disappearance of specific provision 
for ill-treatment in 1857 may have been prompted by a belief 
that Sections 11 and 12 were not used sufficiently to require 
continuance. From 1845 on, there were 38 cases alleging 
failure to provide adequate rations and 12 other cases 
alleging ill-treatment. (In addition, 21 cases merely 
alleged breach of agreement by employer without indicating 
the nature of the breach, and these cases may have included 
some breaches in the nature of ill-treatment.) It is 
impossible to tell if cases based on ill-treatment were 
brought under the general arbitral sections and, if so, how 
many. No such separate records, if they were kept, have 
survived. The surviving Bench Books and Charge and Summons 
Books contain only one reference to a case brought under 
this section, and since it is most difficult to believe that 
no other such case was ever heard, one strongly suspects 
that these cases were either recorded in a fashion different 
from that arising from specifically-described breaches, or 
not recorded at all.
vi) Detention of Goods and Failure to Give a
Certificate of Discharge
The two remaining types of breach by employers both 
deal with the termination of the employment. From 1857, the Act 
allowed summary proceedings against employers who 'unlawfully 
detain or refuse to deliver the clothes wearing apparel bedding 
tools or any goods... belonging to a servant'."*' If the claim were
1. S. 8 .
I—I CN ro 
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proved, the magistrates could order return of the goods, and in
default payment of up to £5 and seizure and return of the goods.
The 1845 Act had introduced a requirement that employees be given
certificates of discharge  ^which were to be produced to their
2next employer before rehiring. As a consequence of this
provision, the Act provided that an employer refusing to give a
certificate on termination of the employment should pay to the
r 3servant a sum of up to £5. (It also authorised the magistrates
to provide the certificate in such a situation.) The system of 
certificates of discharge was not successful and the provisions 
relating to certificates were omitted in the 1857 Act and of course 
not reintroduced in 1902.
vii) Offences Concerning Certificates of Discharge
Another group of offences should be mentioned here because 
they all concern the certificate of discharge system. They 
appear only in the 1845 Act (and the 1847 Amendment). In 
addition to the refusal to give a discharge, an employer could be 
fined for hiring a servant without requiring, and receiving, the
4certificate of discharge from the previous employer. The
prosecutor of this charge would be the Crown. It was not 
litigated by the parties to the relationship, but was an external 
requirement. It was also an offence for an employer to give a 
certificate containing any false assertions.  ^ The section which 
created this offence was directed to false assertions by
S. 12 . 
S . 13 . 
S . 12 . 
S. 13 . 
S. 14 .
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employers. Section 4 of the 1847 amending Act introduced a 
penalty for forgery of discharges by servants and for servants 
knowingly using forged discharges. Four cases were brought 
against servants for forgery of discharges or using forged 
discharges. None was brought against an employer for providing 
a false discharge.
viii) Harbouring and Inciting
The remaining categories of offences also do not arise 
directly out of the employment relationship, but concern 
interference with it from the outside. The first covers actions 
by other employers impinging on a particular employment, the secor 
is concerned with actions of other persons not as employers. The 
two categories belong very much together because the type of 
interference is largely the same in both - only the status of the 
defendant varies. The matters that were proscribed are hiring 
the servant of another, harbouring absconders, and inducing 
servants to break contracts of employment. The sections involved 
are therefore directed at actions of outsiders which induce a 
termination of the employment relationship against the wishes 
of the employer. In the first of the matters - hiring the 
servant of another, the defendant will obviously be another 
employer; that is, he will be sued as employer. These matters 
were dealt with from the time of the first colonial Act.
Section 2 of the 1828 Act introduced a penalty of between £5 
and £20 where 'any person shall knowingly receive employ or 
entertain any such artificer... already employed...'. The 
section could therefore cover an employer hiring the servant
52
of another, or a person - not in the capacity of employer - 
harbouring an absenting employee. The 1840 Act dealt with 
the issue in exactly the same way, and so did the 1845 Act Z 
(although the £-5 minimum for the fine was omitted) . The 
three sections were therefore worded the same in their 
description of the offence. It is intriguing that in 
the 1828 and 1840 Acts the marginal note is 'Penalty for 
employing servants already engaged', while in 1845, the note
read 'Penalty for harbouring servants already engaged'. The 
1847 amendment extended the section to cover the receiving, 
employing etc., of servants hired by indenture or other 
written agreement outside the colony which, by the 1845 Act, 
had been subject to the greater inconvenience of an action on 
the case. The extension is clearly a response to the rise of 
'poaching' of indentured workers - Germans and later Chinese.
The formula in the 1857 Act was different. Rather than 
'knowingly receive employ or entertain', it referred to a person 
who should 'conceal employ or retain any servant who shall have., 
absented himself from duty, knowing such servant to have...
4absented. . .' ^This change does not widen the effect of the section 
but the next part does, for the section goes on to refer to any 
■ person who 'shall cause, induce, or persuade any such servant 
by words or any other means whatsoever to violate or attempt
1. S . 6
2. S.15.
3. 11 Vic No. 9, S.7.
4. S.9 .
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to violate any agreement... to serve'. The penalties for 
hiring or harbouring the employees of another are understandable 
provisions to originate from an employer-dominated legislature 
in an era of labour shortages and itinerant workers. The 
provision relating to inducing breach of contract suggests 
that another element was present - feared. For the section 
reproduces and allows a summary proceeding for the common law 
action of damages for procuring a breach of contract, and the 
main use of such a proceeding in relation to employment 
contracts would be against collective action by workers, either 
informally or as organised trade unions. The same formula 
is used in the 1902 Act.^ Perhaps surprisingly, little use 
was made of the facility thus provided for swift action against 
union organisers and shop floor activists. Only 15 such cases 
are contained in the surviving records.
ix) Arbital Jurisdiction
From 1840 onwards, the Acts provided that magistrates 
could arbitrate in disputes between employers and employees over 
matters not covered in the clauses relating to absconding,mis­
conduct ,unpaid wages or any of the other offences discussed above. 
Section 8 of the 1840 Act spoke of the magistrates being 
'entitled 'in any case not hereinbefore specially provided for 
to hear and determine any complaint difference or dispute which 
shall happen and arise' between an employer and an employee.
Cases could be arbitrated under this section whether they 
involved male or female employees, unlike absconding or mis­
conduct charges under Section 2.
1. S . 12 .
While the wording of Section 8 was clearly appropriate 
to an arbitral proceeding, with its references to hearing and 
determining complaints and making orders or awards, Section 16 
of the 1845 Act made the proceedings sound more like the 
prosecutions under Sections 2-5, 8-10 and 11. It provided 
that 'all contracts disputes differences claims and demands 
between masters and servants arising out of their connexion 
as such 1...shall be cognizable in a summary way', and in 
resolution of such disputes, the magistrates could 'make 
orders...and determinations'. The sections differed also in 
that jurisdiction under Section 16 of the 1845 Act could be 
exercised by either one or two Justices whereas Section 8 of 
the 1840 Act required the arbitral hearing to be before two 
or more Justices.
The 1857 Act returned to the formula of 1840, providing 
in Section 10 that 'it shall be lawful for any two or more 
justices to hear and determine in a summary manner any 
complaint difference or dispute... and to make such order or 
award as...shall seem meet...'. The specification of these 
disputes as being not otherwise provided for was, however, 
omitted. Section 13 of the 1902 Act was worded almost 
identically, apart from the addition of any stipendiary or 
police magistrate as being entitled to exercise the jurisdic­
tion, as well as any two or more Justices.
1. The section contained a clear error. It spoke of these
disputes etc. being 'hereinbefore specially provided for'. 
Obviously, a 'not' was omitted before 'hereinbefore' - the 
marginal note describes the section as referring to 'Juris­
diction in cased not specially provided for'.
5 5 .
There is, unfortunately, a complete absence among the 
surviving records of cases brought under these sections. ^
We are left, therefore, without any guidance as to the types 
of complaints or disputes which might have been submitted to 
arbitration. The sections could certainly have covered ill- 
treatment when the 1840, 1857 and 1902 Acts, which did not
specifically cover such a breach of contract, were in force.
It would appear to have also been possible to bring cases under 
these sections when employees were seeking increased wages 
or shorter hours. If such disputes were in fact accepted by 
the magistrates as being within this jurisdiction, then it 
would have constituted an obvious forerunner to the schemes 
of compulsory industrial arbitration introduced later. It 
may have been because of satisfactory experience of this 
voluntary arbitral procedure that employees turned to compulsory 
arbitration in Australia in contrast to their British counter­
parts .
x) Penalties Provided by the Acts
It remains to examine the penalties which the above cat­
egories of offences involved. These changed in several ways 
over the years in response to changing circumstances.
As would be expected, the penalty involved in a successful 
action for payment of wages did not change much. Under the 
1840 Act, which was the first colonial instance of this pro­
vision, the magistrates could order the employer to pay such
1 . Infra, p. 49.
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sum or sums 'as to them shall appear just and proper to be
paid', within 14 days.^ The 1845 Act referred to such orders
for payment 'as shall appear reasonable and just', to be paid
2within ten days. The 1857 Act used the same words, but pay-
3ment was to be 'forthwith'. The 1902 Act removed the refer­
ence to what should seem reasonable or just, and stated the 
point more directly: the court could order the employer 
to pay any wages 'proved to be due and payable'.^
In the case of the provision for complaints relating
to ill-treatment, in 1828 and in 1845 (the only time these
sections appeared) the magistrates could 'order and award
such amends to be made... as... they shall think fair and 
5reasonable'. Such a formula left the complainant very 
much at the mercy of the individual magistrate. The more 
high-handed the magistrate's approach to the obligations of an 
employee, the less amends he would think 'reasonable' for 
a particular act of ill-treatment. A consideration of the 
picture that the cases give of the behaviour of some 
magistrates as employers leads one to the opinion that those 
magistrates would have given employees little satisfaction 
in claims based on ill-treatment.
The development of the penalties for breaches of contract 
by employees is more interesting. In 1828, servants found 
guilty,under Section 1, of absconding or of failing to work
1. S.3.
2. S.5.
3. S.5.
4. S.7.
5. 1828, S.4; 1845, Ss.9 and 11.
57 .
in a diligent and careful manner were to be imprisoned, either 
for up to six months in the common gaol, or for up to three 
months with hard labour in a house of correction; and in 
addition, they were to forfeit such portion of their wages 
'as in the judgment and discretion of such justice or justices 
shall appear just and reasonable'. While the justices had a 
discretion as to what proportion of wages should be forfeited, 
they did not have any discretion as to whether any wages at 
all should be forfeited. This is quite clear from the words 
of the section; the justices were to 'commit every person
convicted of so offending [to gaol or the house of correction], 
and every person convicted of so offending as aforesaid shall 
moreover forfeit all or such part of his or her wages...' .
In the 1840 Act, the initial provision for imprisonment for 
absconding or misconduct was omitted. Those male servants 
who were convicted under the section were to forfeit all or 
part of their wages, the magistrates again having a discretion 
to determine how much, and in addition to pay a sum not 
exceeding twice the amount of damage incurred by the employer 
as a result of the absconding or misconduct. It was only 
if the employee defaulted in payment of the punitive damages 
that he was to be committed to gaol for up to three months 
or until the amount be sooner paid.^
This penalty seems rather draconian (despite the suggestio
1. S. 2 .
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by Leila Thomas that worker agitation at the time of the Bill 
had resulted in a mild Act).1 if the employee vas owed any 
wages, he forfeited them. If he had caused any loss, he had 
to pay up to double its amount. He was unlikely - having no 
wages - to be able to pay the damages, and hevas therefore 
imprisoned for up to three months. It is hard to see that the 
actual operation of the section would have been any milder 
than the operation of Section 1 of the 1828 Act. Nevertheless 
the employers who testified to the 1845 Select Committee 
expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the penalties 
imposed by the 1840 Act, which they considered to be grossly 
inadequate. They complained particularly that where a servant's 
absconding or misconduct produced no actual pecuniary loss, 
the Act did not permit the imposition of any penalty.2 
The penalty for absence or other misconduct was, as mentioned 
above, forfeiture of wages due, and the payment of a sum 
double the amount of damage caused. If this sum were not 
paid, the servant was to serve a prison term in default.
If no damage were caused, and no wages were yet due, then 
there was no penalty - for the prison term applied for non­
payment of the damages and did not cover the situation where 
a forfeiture of wages was unavailable.
— —bcpve-LQPmen't: the Labour Movement in the Svdney
—— -r c t of New South Wales, Australian Society for" the Study of Labour History, Canberra, 1962, pp. 52-53. 
For example per Samuel North, op. cit., p. 539.2.
For reasons discussed later,1the Committee recommended 
that imprisonment be the penalty in such cases, and Section 2 
of the 1845 Act provided that where a servant was found to be 
guilty of absenting or 'of disobedience, neglect or any other 
misconduct or misdemeanour', the justices should commit that 
servant to the house of correction for up to three months, 
or order him to forfeit all or any part of his wages, and 
discharge him from employment if the master so wished. Though 
the employer witnesses would have preferred the provisions for 
imprisonment and forfeiture to be cumulative rather than 
alternative, the section did meet the major part of their 
complaints.
The motivation behind the changes in the 1857 Act are 
unclear in the absence of documentation as forthright as 
the evidence to the 1845 Committee. One cannot, for this 
reason, explain with certainty the omission of the provision 
for imprisonment of servants under the absconding/misconduct 
2section (except in the event of their failure to pay the 
fine of up to £10 which the section introduced as the penalty, 
and the failure of sufficient distress to produce the sum, in 
which case the sentence was limited to a maximum of 14 days). 
It is, however, interesting that at a time of what is claimed 
to have been a serious labour shortage, in 1845,^ the 
employers - through the legislators - should have provided
1. Infra, pp. 81-84.
2. 1857 Act, S.2.
3. See for example, J. V. Cane, 'Ollera', Armidale and 
District Historical Society. Journal and Proceedings. 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1961,.pp. 19-20; and T. A. Coghlan, 
Labour and Industry-in Australia, London, 1918,
Vol. I, pp. 432-436.
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for imprisonment of what labour they had, and that once that 
shortage was alleviated, they should abandon the imprisonment 
provisions.
It is an acceptable argument that the absence of imprison­
ment except for default under the equivalent section of the 
1840 Act was due not to compliance with the wishes of 
protesting workers but to the unsatisfactory nature of imprison­
ment as a penalty when labour was as scarce as it then was.
But in 1845 it was supposedly still scarce. The provisions 
of the 1845 and 1857 Acts with regard to imprisonment seem, 
from that perspective, back to front. (In 1902, the penalty 
remained a fine of up to £10 or at the discretion of the
1magistrates, forfeiture of all or part of the wages due.
No provision was made for imprisonment in default of payment). 
Absconding after receipt of advance - so-called fraudulent 
breach of contract - was subject to the same penalty from 
1840 to 1902: 3 months imprisonment, with a discretion in 
the magistrates to order the prisoner to be kept to hard 
labour. 2
The penalties for loss or destruction of property 
described a somewhat different trajectory from those for 
absconding and misconduct. In 1828 and 1840 the servant so 
convicted was to be ordered to pay double the value of the
1.
2.
S . 4 .1840, S.4; 1845, S.3; 1857, S.3; 1902, S.5.
61.
property and in addition to be imprisoned, for one to six
months under the 1828 Act  ^and for up to three months under 
2the 1840 Act. There was no discretion as to the amount to 
be paid, the Acts holding that a servant so convicted 'shall 
forfeit and pay double the value of such goods...’. The 
extreme nature of the penalty indicates graphically the import­
ance of the work done by shepherds - the main category of 
workers with whom the section was concerned - despite the lack
of recognition of their value by adequate wages and decent
3conditions. In 1845 the harshness of the penalty was 
mitigated. Servants convicted under Section 4 were to
pay ’reasonable damages', and in default of such payment,
were to be imprisoned for up to three months. In 1857 the
4sentence in default was decreased to 14 days, and in 1902
5reference to imprisonment was omitted.
I have already pointed out that the provisions relating 
to the certificate of discharge system appeared only in the 
1845 Act, and in the 1847 amendment, so no analysis of the 
development of the penalties imposed is required. The nature 
of the penalties was deterrent rather than punitive - for 
failure to give a discharge, or for hiring a servant without 
a discharge, the employer was to pay a fine of up to £5 
(the sum usually ordered to be paid was £2).  ^ Ibr giving
7a false discharge, the penalty was a fine of up to £10.
1. S.3 .
2. S.7 .3. The average annual wage of a shepherd in 1845 was £17. 
New South Wales. Statistical Register, 1837-59.
Table 63.
4 . S . 4 .
5 . S . 6 .6. 1845, Ss. 12 and 13.
7. Ibid, S.14.
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This could have been a hardship to the small farmers of the 
South Coast and the Central North Coast, but would not have 
seriously distressed the wealth squatters of Tenterfield and 
Glen Innes. Forgery of a discharge, the offence against 
this system by servants, was more seriously penalised by 
up to three months gaol, possibly with hard labour.^
The offences of hiring, harbouring and enticing the 
servants of another were more important in the scheme of the 
Acts. For the most part, they also carried a pecuniary 
penalty, but a heavier one - not less than £5 or more than 
£20 in 1828  ^and 1840.^ In 1845 the minimum was removed
4and the penalty was simply a sum of up to £20, as was that 
in the 1847 Act for hiring servants employed under indenture 
outside New South Wales. No provision was made in these 
sections for imprisonment in default of payment. However, 
such provision was introduced in 1857 and at the sme time thegpecuniary impost was decreased to £10. One can of course 
only speculate on the reasons for any changes in this 
particular Act, but it is tempting to draw an explanation from 
the contemporaneous inclusion of a reference to causing or 
inducing a breach of the employment contract. If, as I
7suggested earlier, the section was, from 1857, being 
directed against the possibility of collective action by
1. 11 ^c . No . 9 , S . 4 .
2. S.2.
3. S.6.
4. S.15.
5. 11 \ic. No. 9, S.7.
6. S.9.
7. Supra, p. 53.
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workers, a reduction of the pecuniary penalty and a 
provision for imprisonment in default is appropriate. The 
1902 Act retained the £10 fine but omitted the sentence 
in default of payment."^
1. S . 12 .
Part IV The Machinery of the Legislation
The preceding parts of this Chapter have covered the 
most important matters to be dealt with in an analysis of 
Masters and Servants legislation - the parties bound by the 
Acts, the offences and the penalties imposed. There are 
also a number of other largely procedural matters which should 
be examined, if only briefly, for these arrangements for the 
Acts' application can indicate the intentions of the 
legislators, and the success of their designs. The matters 
to be discussed include issues of jurisdiction, procedures 
for payment of fines, provisions relating to summons and 
arrest, methods of enforcing orders and the possibility of 
appeals.
i) Jurisdiction
Three main points arise in the question of jurisdiction.
The first concerns the number of magistrates who could
conduct proceedings under the Act. In 1828, cases under the
Act could be heard by one or more justices.  ^ This was
altered in 1840 to require two or more justices to adjudicate
in Masters and Servants cases. A summons or warrant could
be granted by one justice on complaint on oath of one or more
2credible persons, but the case itself required two justices, 
and in the event of allegations of fraudulent breach, the 
summons or warrant also could only be issued by two justices.
1. 
2 . 
3 .
Ss. 1-4.
SS.2-3 (Summons or Warrant), and Ss.2-4, 6-8 (hearing).
S . 4 .
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The jurisdictional requirement of two or more justices to
hear Masters and Servants cases remained constant from 1840
on. In 1845 the necessity to have warrants or summons for
fraudulent breach also issued by two magistrates was removed,^
and from then on, all actions could be initiated before one
magistrate only, or after 1857 before the Clerk of Petty 
2Sessions. Though it was not expressly stated in the Act
itself till 1902 (Section 11) these rules applied only to
justices of the peace - lay magistrates. From 1853, however,
3by virtue of the Justices' Duties Act, all the powers which
under the Masters and Servants Acts resided only in two
justices, could be exercised by a single Police or Stipendiary
Magistrate. One final item on this aspect of jurisdiction
should be mentioned - in 1845, it was considered necessary
to insert a section providing that nothing in the Act
authorised any justice to act 'in any case of any... servant...
who shall be in the service of any such justice or in any case
4in which any such justice may be directly interested'
The second main limit on jurisdiction was one of time.
No restrictions were included in the 1828 Act, but in 1840 
Section 15 provided that 'no conviction shall be had under 
[the] Act unless the complaint be made weithin 12 months from 
the time the offence shall have been committed'. Section 27 
of the 1845 Act decreased the limitation still further to six 
months. Otherwise it was worded exactly the same. In 1847,
1. S.3.
2. S .12.
3. An Act to amend the Justices Act of 1850 in respect of 
Prohibitions and Amendments and other matters, 17 Vic No.3[ 
S.ll. The English Duties of Justices (Summary Convictions: 
Act, 11 & 12 Vic., c.43, adopted in New South Wales by
14 Vic. No. 43 had, in S.33, given that power to Stipendia: 
Magistrates sitting in Police Courts. S.ll of the 1853 Act 
recited that doubt had arisen as to the powers conferred 
by S.33 of 14 Vic. No. 43.
S . 28 .4
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Section 11 closed the gap which Sections 15 and 27 had 
left by referring only to 'no conviction' being allowed out­
side the time limit. Given the hybrid nature of the Act with 
the quasi-criminal proceedings against employees and the quasi- 
contractual proceedings against employers, a section referring 
only to limitations on 'convictions' meant that cases for 
wages or rations could be brought at any length of time after 
the cause of action had arisen. The inclusion of an amending 
section limiting 'convictions orders or awards' to cases where 
complaint was made within six months of the 'offence breach of 
agreement or cause of complaint', suggests that employers 
disliked being troubled by claims for wages still unpaid 
after more than six months. It seems a little unfair to 
penalise servants for their tardiness in going to court - 
for which a number of very valid reasons could be given - by 
enriching an employer so recalcitrant. No specific limitation 
of time was included in the 1857 or 1902 Acts.
The monetary limitation of the jurisdiction of the
magistrates in claims for wages has already been referred to.
The justices could hear claims for wages only where the amount
of wages claimed was less than £30  ^until 1857 and less than
2£50 thereafter. Where employees had larger claims, they 
had to pursue them by ordinary actions for breach of contract.
3(The Small Debts Recovery Act of 1846 lifted the jurisdictional 
level of Courts of Requests in the Counties of Cumberland and 
Bourke but only from £10 to £30. Monetary limits applied in
1. 1845, S.5.
2. 1857, S.5; 1902, S.7.
3. An Act to amend the' Law respecting the recovery of small 
Debts in all parts of the Colony. 10 Vic. No.10, S.3.
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certain other cases also - all being employee-initiated cases. 
The two instances of provision for complaints of illtreatment 
limited the order of amends the magistrates could make by 
reference to money or wages. Under the 1828 Act, the order 
could not exceed a sum equal to six months wages of the 
servant concerned,'1' and there was similar provision in 
Section 11 in 1845. Section 9 (1845), which referred to 
illtreatment of specified workers (employed by piece rates), 
restricted the order or amends to a sum not exceeding £10.
These restrictions are intriguing. The monetary limit 
on wages claims is explicable. It is intended to provide 
an expeditious procedure for those servants who, on account 
of the low level of their wages, would be oppressed by being 
limited to a more complicated and ponderous form of action, 
or for servants whose level of wages was higher, but who, 
in view of the smallness of the proportion of those wages 
remaining unpaid, would be similarly oppressed. But this 
reasoning does not apply to the ill-treatment situation.
What that section seems to be saying is that the degree of 
turpitude involved in ill-treating a low-paid worker is less 
than that where the ill-treated worker receives higher 
wages. For on what other basis could the magistrates 
arrive at a quantification of the ill-treatment? If it were 
possible to quantify ill-treatment objectively, and if the 
sum arrived at were greater than £10 or six months wages, 
the worker who had suffered ill-treatment of that degree 
should not have been penalised by having to resort to an
S . 41.
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action for breach of contract. And the paucity of a 
person's wages should not have disabled him further by 
preventing an action to recover the full amount of damages 
necessary to compensate for a proved instance of treatment.
There was also a limitation in the arbitral section which,
though expressed as an upper limit on penalty, was more in the
nature of a jurisdictional limit. In 1840 and 1845 the
appropriate sections provided that the magistrates might make
'such order or award against either party... as... shall seem
meet and every such order or award to enforce...by imposing on
either party a fine or penalty proportionable to the offence
but not exceeding the sum of £30'.  ^ The identity of this
sum with the limit on wages claims in the same Acts suggests
that the section was limiting effective jurisdiction in
arbitrations of issues akin to wages claims to the same sum,
for no other type of complaint or offence attracts monetary
penalties of that magnitude. However, the equivalent
2 3sections in 1857 and 1902 make the limit £10 - which is 
the amount which those acts impose as the maximum fine for 
offences by employees. It seems unlikely that the Act would 
have been intended to impose a limit on arbitration of 
wage-type issues so far below the £50 limit which then applied 
to actual wages claims. It may be that the legislators con­
sidered that the wages-type claims could be met by an 
appropriate order, and that the fine or penalty to be imposed 
to enforce the order did not correspond to a monetary award.
1. 1840, S.8; 1845, S.16.
2. S.10.
3. S.13.
This is a sensible interpretation of the words of the 
section, but if applied to the section in the 1840 or 1845 
Acts, it would mean that the greater magnitude of the 
penalties able to be imposed in arbitral-type actions is 
unexplained.
ii) Provisions Relating to Summonses and Arrest
As in many other instances, the position regarding 
summons and arrest can be fairly neatly divided into a pre- 
1857 and post-1857 situation. Before 1857, in the case of 
actions against servants, the Acts required that a complaint 
be made before a justice, (sometimes but not always specified 
as to be a complaint on oath), and the justice would issue a 
warrant for apprehension of the servant, this being sometimes 
stated as the justice 'having the person complained of brought 
before the Court. Actions against employers required
complaint on oath before a magistrate who would issue a 
bummons to the employer to appear.^ The only variation 
to this procedure before 1857 was created by the 1840 Act 
which provided that in cases of action against employees 
uncier Section 2, following the complaint on oath of 'one 
or more credible persons' the magistrate would cause the 
employee to be brought before him. In 1857 the various sections 
dealing with particular types of action did not specify the 
way the cases were to be initiated. Instead, this was covered 
for the whole Act by Sections 11 and 12. Section 11 provided 
that:
1 . 
2 .
1828, S.l; 1840, Ss. 2 and 4; 1845, Ss. 2-3. 
1828, S.4; 1840, S.4; 1845, Ss. 5, 9 and 11.
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no warrant shall issue for the apprehension 
in the first instance of any person... unless 
it be made to appear on oath to the satis­
faction of the justice before whom the 
complaint is preferred that the complainant 
has reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant has absconded or removed or is 
about to abscond or to remove... and that 
the complaint...may be thereby defeated.
Section 12 authorised Clerks of Petty Sessions to issue the
initiating summons. Although these sections introduced
formal equality between employers and employees in this
matter, the actuality of initiation of proceedings depended
very much on the approach of the individual magistrate, for
his attitude to workers and to employment relations would
have a singificant effect on whether or not he was 'satisfied'
that the employer had a 'reasonable belief' that the employee
would abscond unless arrested.
iii) Enforcement of Orders and Awards
In the matter of enforcement of the orders and awards 
made by the adjudicating magistrates, it is again possible 
to see differences between the treatment of employers and 
of employees, and in one aspect to see a post-1857 change.
The first difference relates to the nature and destination 
of the monetary penalties imposed. Before 1857 it was 
common for the sections to provide that monetary penalties 
would be split between the employer and the Crown or some 
other public institution; for example, in 1828 a £5 to £20 
penalty for harbouring servants was to be divided with half 
going to the employer and half to the Treasurers of the 
Benevolent Society,^ while in 1840 - when absconding or
1. S. 2 .
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misconduct was punished by forfeiture of wages and payment
of double any damage suffered by the employer - the money
so forfeited was to go first to indemnify the employer, and
the surplus, if any, to the Crown.'*' The penalties for
hiring a servant without production of a discharge and giving
a false discharge were, in 1845, also to be divided and half
2given to the complaining employer.
Both the 1840 and 1845 Acts recognised the importance 
of these sections directing penalties towards informants by 
providing that all fines not specifically appropriated were
3to be paid to the Crown. This practice had continued into 
the 1845 Act despite the written submission of John Stephen Esq.
4of Melbourne, who referred to the provision of Section 2 of 
the 1840 Act for payment of the excess over the damage 
sustained to be paid to the Crown and said that in the 
Melbourne district, no money had been paid to the Crown from 
the numerous penalties imposed. He alleged that the consequence 
of this provision as to the master's reimbursement frequently 
led an unprincipled master to commit an act of gross injustice, 
maintained through perjury, for the purpose of placing his 
servant's wages in his own pocket. It may have been in 
belated recognition of Stephen's allegations that the 1857 
Act did away with the practice of dividing penalties and 
directing payment of part thereof to the complainants. From
51857 on, only orders for wages and awards of compensation for
1. S.2.
2. Ss. 13 and 14.
3. 1840, S.ll; 1845, S.23.
4. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 515.
5. 1857, S.5; 1902, S.7:
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wilful destruction of property  ^were, understandably, paid 
to complainants. All other fines and pecuniary penalties 
went to the Crown.
The differential treatment of employers and employees
can be seen in the provisions dealing with non-payment of
orders and awards. Where monetary penalties were imposed
on servants, they were either simultaneously sentenced to
imprisonment under the sections relating to destruction of 
2property; or they were sentenced to imprisonment in default
of payment, with provision for levy of distress at the
3discretion of the justices. In contrast, provisions for
payment of pecuniary penalties by masters never allowed
imprisonment without first requiring issue of a warrant for
distress and without the levy of distress failing to satisfy 
4the order. In some cases, the Act provided for levy of
distress against an employer where an order was not met, but
did not authorise imprisonment if the distress were 
5insufficient. In the case of fines for harbouring or 
employing the servant of another, no provision was made 
even for distress if the fines were not paid,^ until 
1857 when the section was redirected against industrial 
activity by employees. The Act then made provision for 
distress and sale, and imprisonment of up to 14 days in
7default of sufficient distress. The sections giving
1 . 1857, S.4; 1902, S.6.
2 . 1828, S.3; 1840, S.7.
3 . 1840, S.2; 1845, S.4; 1857, S.4.
4. 1840, S.3; 1845, S.5; 
for payment of wages.
1857, S.5 - concerning orders
5. 1828, S.4; 1845, 
ill-treatment.
Ss .
V
9 and 11 - regarding amends for
6.
7.
1828, S.2; 1840, 
1857, S.9.
S.6; 1845, S.15.
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magistrates a quasi-arbitral jurisdiction could lead, 
of course, to orders against both employers and employees.
They provided for levy of distress and up to three months 
imprisonment in default.1
iv) Appeal
Appeal was allowed to the next Court of Quarter Sessions, 
2 3 4under the 1828, 1840 and 1845 A.cts, and execution of the
judgment would be suspended till the hearing of the appeal. 
However, the appellant was required to enter into a bond of 
double the amount of the penalty, or a recognisance of £20 
where the penalty was a sentence of imprisonment, and to 
provide two sureties of £10 each. Quite apart from the great 
inconvenience involved because of the distances to the place 
of sitting of the Quarter Sessions Court and the loss of time 
in attendance at the Court sittings, the section made it 
highly unlikely that many employees would be able to appeal 
because of the difficulties they would face in finding 
sureties for a sum of the magnitude (to a workingman) of £10, 
and the risk involved in subjecting themselves to liability 
for the even greater sum of £20. In 1845, the average annual 
wage of a shepherd was £17, so it is not surprising that 
surviving Quarter Sessions records contain only three 
Masters and Servants appeals. After 1857 there was no special 
provision for appeal which would therefore have been available
in the normal way without any special requirements.
1 . 1840, S.8; 1845, S.16; 1857, S.10; 1902, S.13.
2. S. 6 .
3. S . 13 .
4 . S. 25.
5. That is, appeal tov Quarter Sessions on payment into the 
Court of Petty Sessions of the pecuniary penalty imposed 
or (in the absence of pecuniary penalty) on entering into 
a bond - Justices Summary Jurisdiction Act. 1835.
5 Gul IV No. 22, S.3.
Wales Legislature
Despite the fact that there have been five major Masters 
and Servants enactments in New South Wales, the legislation 
has been debated seriously by the New South Wales legislature 
on only one occasion.'*" This fact, on its own, indicates that 
the approach to the control of employment relations, which 
Masters and Servants legislation represents, had been 
continually accepted as a natural and essential part of the 
organisation of work and work relations within the social 
structure which was imported into the colony and developed 
there. This assessment is strengthened by an analysis of 
the approaches and concerns reflected in the one concerted 
examination of the legislation.
In 1845 the amendment of the legislation was preceded 
by a lengthy consideration in Committee. The Parliamentary 
Papers of that year bear witness to the concerns of the 
Colony's employers about the desirable regulation of labour.
In August 1845 a Select Committee of the New South Wales 
Legislative Council inquired into the workings of the 1840 Act 
4 Vic 23, and on the basis of their deliberations, framed a 
Bill for the Act 9 Vic 27.
The Committee was chaired by Mr. T. A. Murray, and 
included the Attorney-General, John Hubert Plunkett, and 
Messrs. Bradley, Cowper, Hamilton, Allen and Suttor. Thirteen
Part V Debates and Deliberations of the New South
1. In 1845.
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witnesses were examined by the Committee,1 all being 
2gentlemen except one - Joseph Frederick Johnson, the 
proprietor of a Sydney Registry Office through which servants 
were procured for properties in the outlying districts.
Seven of the witnesses were magistrates as well as landowners,1 3
and two were Sydney solicitors, one of these being James Martin, 
later to become Attorney-General and then premier.4 567 In 
addition, the Committee received written submissions from 
six other gentlemen, two of whom were magistrates.1 The 
witnesses and writers of submissions included many well- 
known names, such as Charles Campbell, Henry Dangar and 
Edward Blaxland. It is intriguing to reflect that a committee 
to inquire into the operation of the law relating to master 
and servant should listen only to the masters, when another 
report in the Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council 
of 1845, the Report of the Select Committee on the Condition 
of Aborigines, listed as the first witness an Aboriginal of
7the Botany Bay tribe.
1. Charles Windeyer, Joseph Frederick Johnson, Henry Macdermott 
Gilbert Elliott, William Augustus Duncan, John James 
Allman, Samuel North, James Brindley Bettington, James 
Martin, William Ogilvie, George Robert Nichols, Edward Blaxland, Edward Denny Day.
2. That is 'gentlemen' in the sense then understood in the 
Colony - all having 'Esq' after their names.
3. Windeyer, Macdermott, Elliott, Allman, North, Bettington, Day.
4. Martin was Attorney-General in 1856-8, and Premier in 1866-8 and 1870-72.
5. Francis Nicholas Rossi J.P., Henry O'Brien J.P.,
Charles Campbell, Henry Danger, John Stephen, Edmund Lockyer.
6. Select Committee on the Condition of the Aborigines.
New South Wales. Legislative Council. Votes and Proceed­ings, 1845, P.937
7. Mahroot, Alias "The Boatswain'.
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The immediate cause of the appointment of the
Committee was the uncertainty then felt as to whether
magistrates had summary jurisdiction under the 1840 Act.
The doubt as to jurisdiction arose as a result of the
decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Cassell v
Mann  ^ in February 1844, a case under the Distillation 
2Act. The Supreme Court in that case held that the 
Statute 3 Vic No 9 did not give the Justices power to convict 
summarily. The Senior Police Magistrate of Sydney, Charles 
Windeyer, considered that the power to convict summarily 
under the 1840 Masters and Servants Act was therefore 
uncertain, and declined to adjudicate in Masters and Servants 
cases. A number of other magistrates followed his lead.
Such doubts could easily have been settled by a 
simple amendment to the 1840 Act, of course. More serious 
dissatisfaction with the Act was shown by the line of the 
Committee’s questioning and the evidence of witnesses.
This dissatisfaction covered matters which can be arranged 
under three broad headings. The first was concerned with 
the legal administration of the Act, and involved the ques­
tion of jurisdiction (already mentioned), the desirable 
constitution of the court to which Masters and Servants Act 
matters were entrusted, the conduct of Masters and Servants 
Act hearings, and the desirability or otherwise of a right 
of appeal. The second category covered problems of manage-
1. Referred to by the Committee as Cassell v Mann. 
Published as R. v Mann, 1844 1 Legge 182.
2. 3 Vic No 9, S.44.
ment of servants which arose through alleged deficiencies 
in the substantive provisions of the Act. The third 
category related to undesirable aspects of the system of 
employment relations then operating in the Colony which 
the Committee felt should be controlled by the insertion 
of new provisions in the legislation.
The Committee canvassed the opinions of the witnesses 
on two possible changes to the constitution of the Court.
First, they asked whether Masters and Servants jurisdiction 
should be entrusted to one magistrate rather than two, as 
required by the 1840 Act. The reason for this suggestion was 
the obstacle presented to the hearing of cases under the Act by 
the difficulty or, as some witnesses put it, impossibility of 
getting two magistrates together to hear cases in the districts 
outside the boundaries. Those witnesses who spoke on this 
subject all acknowledged this difficulty,  ^but most of them
did not favour entrusting such extensive powers to a single
2 3magistrate. Two, however, did favour such a change, one
of whom was Charles Windeyer, who said he did not think much
advantage resulted from there being two magistrates. However
he did go on to say that where there was not 'a public', there
4should be two magistrates, or even three if possible.
The main suggestion for change to the Court was the proposa
1. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., per Allman at 
p.533 and per Ogilvie at p.547.
2. Ibid., per Ogilvie - 'I think the power rather too great 
to be entrusted to a single magistrate', p.547; Martin - 
'the powers given by the Act are altogether too large
to entrust to one magistrate or even to two 
magistrates...', p.544.
3. Ibid., per Windeyer at p.519 and Allman at p.533.
4. Ibid., p. 520.
78
that Masters and Servants cases should be heard by one 
magistrate and a number of assessors, chosen from amongst 
the class set down for selection of special jurors in Sydney.
The assessors were to decide the issues of fact, and the 
magistrate to decide on questions of law and to pass sentence. 
This proposal was intended to avoid the suspicion and lack of 
confidence which, the Committee feared, were entertained by 
working people concerning the impartiality of a court in which 
the magistrates - who were, almost without exception, employers 
of labour - adjudicated disputes between fellow employers and 
their servants.^ When questioned on this suspicion, Charles 
Windeyer agreed that such was the attitude of the servants.
'It is the general feeling that they do not have justice from the 
bias of the magistrate, who is a master, being against them; 
no doubt that is generally false, but it is the feeling which
I 2is prevalent.' A number of other witnesses supported this
3analysis of the people's feelings. But not all of them 
agreed that the introduction of assessors to the Court presented 
a solution. John Joseph Allman, when asked if the proposed 
Court would persuade servants they were likely to be fairly 
dealt with, said it would have the contrary effect since 
assessors would be drawn from the employing class. He pointed 
out that the servants believed there was a sort of combination 
amongst the squatters against them, 'a disposition on the 
part of the settlers from amongst whom the materials of such
1.
2.
3.
' per Windeyer at p.519 and Allman at p. 533. Ibid., p .522.
Ibid., per North at p.537.
Ibid.
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a Court would be chosen, to what they call "bounce them"'.
In declining to recommend such an alteration of the
composition of the tribunal, the Committee, through the
Chairman, said in the Report that 'the evidence... shows that it
is not the constitution of the Court but the operation of the
present Act which is objected to, and that the errors which
magistrates may occasionally commit, do not proceed from
partiality or consist of denials of substantial justice but
2arise from incorrect interpretations of the law'. The evidence
did not really show that the constitution of the Court was not
objected to. Most witnesses agreed that the working classes
did consider the magistrates biased, though all stoutly averred
3that this impression was definitely mistaken. What caused the 
lukewarm support for the proposed alteration was the difficulty 
to which the Report went on to allude. 'If it be supposed 
that the magistrates, being themselves employers of labour, 
might have a bias in favour of their own class, it should also 
be borne in mind that the same consideration would apply to
4assessors chosen in the manner proposed. The doubtful 
proposition that selection of servants as members of a panel 
of assessors would give balance to the tribunal was quickly dis­
posed of when William Ogilvie Esq.expressed the opinion that no
5servant below the rank of superintendent would be competent.
One of the most serious difficulties in the administration 
of the 1840 Act was the requirement that the complaint - and 
defence - had to be proved by evidence other than that of the
1 . 
2 . 
3 .
4.
5.
Ibid., per Allman at p.533 
Ibid., p . 509.
See supra notes 2 and 3 of p.78.
Select Committee of Inquiry, o p . cit., p.509. 
Ibid., p .548
Ö U
parties themselves. Very often, there was no-one apart from 
the parties who had any real knowledge of the matters in 
dispute. This was particularly so when the agreement between 
master and servant was by parol. Unless some third person 
could give evidence as to its terms, most magistrates would 
not admit the case. The Committee therefore examined all 
witnesses as to their opinions on the desirability of legis­
lating to make the evidence of the parties admissible. Almost 
all were in favour of this change. Several pointed out the 
hardships caused to the servants, under the present system, 
since if they could not find admissible evidence in cases of 
claims for unpaid wages, they had to turn instead to the Court 
of Requests which met only quarterly.'*' Henry Dangar, in his 
letters to the Committee, stressed the hardships caused to 
employers by the requirement of independent testimony, for 
'hundreds thus escape unregarded, a door is opened to fraud
and dishonesty, and pampering the appetites of the levellers
2and equality men seems the whole gist of the present law'.
Admission of the evidence of the parties was recommended in
3the Committee's Report, but the 1845 Act did not include any
new provisions relating to evidence. However, the amending
Act of 1847, in Section 5, made it clear that the magistrates
4had a discretion to admit the evidence of the parties.
The final matter relating to the legal administration of 
the Act which the Committee considered was the right of appeal
1. Ibid., per Windeyer at p.518 and Elliott at p.529.
2. Ibid., p. 514.
3. Ibid., p . 507.
4. '...[I]t shall and may be lawful for any Justice or 
Justices of the Peace acting under the said recited Act 
or under this Act to exercise his or their discretion
as to the examination of any complainant or complainants 
or defendant or defendants under the same'.
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from the decisions of the magistrates to the Court of 
Quarter Sessions. The evidence on this issue stressed the 
cost and delays and inconvenience involved in an appeal to a 
tribunal from which the appellant and respondent would fre­
quently be many hundreds of miles distant.^ The questions 
and answers recognised without exception that the right of 
appeal was nugatory as far as servants were concerned 
because the costs involved were prohibitive. However, 
approval for abolition of appeal came only in the context 
of the assessors' court, many witnesses feeling that, were
such a court established, an appeal would no longer be 
2required. If the present system were to be maintained, 
then so should the appeal be maintained.
The Committee's second category of concerns dealt with 
those problems of controlling servants which the Act failed 
to alleviate. They were much disturbed by the Act's 
deficiency in dealing with misconduct by servants, partic­
ularly by its failure to provide for imprisonment in cases 
of misconduct. There was much dissatisfaction expressed 
that where a servant's misconduct or neglect produced no
3actual pecuniary loss, the Act did not impose any penalty. 
The penalty for absence, or other misconduct, was forfeiture 
of wages due, and the payment of a sum double the amount of 
damage caused. If this sum were not paid, the servant was 
to serve a prison term in default. If no damage were 
caused, and no wages were yet due, there was no penalty, 
for the prison term applied for non-payment of the damages 
and did not cover the situation where a forfeiture of
1. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., per Martin at 
p.544.
2. Ibid., per Duncan at p.531.3. Ibid., per Ogilvie at p.547 and per Day at p.554.
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wages was unavailable. Thus Blaxland, in complaining of
this gap in the Act,said that 'it leaves it in the power
of a servant to give his master infinite annoyance,
and a clever fellow may in various ways, give you trouble
without coming within the cognisance of the Act, such as by
neglect of work, idleness or other misconduct'.'1' Edward
Denny Day regretted that in many cases where servants misbehaved,
the masters could prove no pecuniary loss 'though they may be
2injured very seriously' and the Act provided no punishment.
It is difficult to understand exactly what sort of
conduct was being complained of here. Insolence was dealt
with separately. The masters seemed to be talking of some
kind of misbehaviour in performing the duties allocated, but.
in such cases pecuniary loss could have been quantified, as
Charles Windeyer illustrated when asked if he gave special
damages in cases under Section 2. He said that in such
cases he had always required proof of some damage. For
example, if a servant was absent for an hour when his
master wanted shoes cleaned, the master had to prove he had
sustained damage to the amount of 3d or 6d, the price of
cleaning the shoes. Yet when William Ogilvie was questioned
on this matter and was asked whether in such cases some
damage could not generally be clearly pointed out, he replied
that actual damage could be shown in very few cases though the
employer might be put to great inconvenience. Like all the
others who spoke of this problem, he recommended that the Act
4impose a term of imprisonment for such cases.
1 . Ibid., P- 553.
2. Ibid., P- 554.
3. Ibid., P- 520.4 . Ibid., P- 547.
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One specific example of misconduct causing no loss which 
the Committee put to the witnesses was the case of a shepherd 
who absconded, abandoning his flock in the bush. If the sheep 
chanced to be unharmed till another shepherd took over the 
flock, what penalty should be imposed on the absconder? The 
witnesses again favoured the imposition of a sentence of 
imprisonment, this time of greater severity. 1 But if Win- 
deyer's approach were taken, the loss could have been 
quantified - the master would have lost that amount of 
shepherding which the sheep would have got between the 
first shepherd absconding and the second taking over the 
flock. A pecuniary value, based on shepherd's wages could 
have been placed on that loss. Why then did the other wit­
nesses say that do damage could be shown? The answer is 
probably the simple one that Windeyer, as Senior Police 
Magistrate,brought to the interpretation of the Act greater 
subtlety than the country gentlemen and magistrates.
The Committee's report favoured alteration of the law
such that this sublety would not be required. They wanted
a clearly-stated provision for imprisonment, and supported this
desire by reference to the practice in England where 4 Geo IV
c.34,cl.3 imposed a penalty of three months imprisonment.
Your Committee, sensible that the most stringent 
provisions are necessary in order to enforce 
diligence and obedience on the part of servants 
in this Colony, consider it is their duty to 
recommend that similar provisions should be 
adopted here with reference to similar cases.
If it be necessary to adopt such a course in 
England, where the difficulty of obtaining 
employment and of providing a maintenance 
obliges men in general to be diligent and 
attentive, it must be doubly necessary in a 
country where, 'according to the evidence,
1. Ibid.., per Allman at p.534 and per Bettington at p.540.
8J"
e, /a w*r>
saying to the serving maid 'go to your kitchen'. Refusal
to comply would make the servant liable to punishment for
disobedience, which was definitely covered by the Act. ~
The evidence provides some recognition of the context in
which the insolence of servants might occur. Windeyer was
asked by Suttor if, in the event of provision being made
for punishment of insolence on the part of servants, it
would be necessary to make provision for punishing provocation
by masters. Was that not, Suttor asked, frequently very
2great? Windeyer agreed it was very great. Perhaps it was 
because of this context that the Committee did not, in their 
Report, recommend that any change should be made in the 
conduct covered by the Act so as to make insolence, per se, 
punishable.
The question of insolence was involved in another of
the Committee's more important concerns - the application of
the Act to female servants. The 1840 Act prohibited imprison-
3ment of women under the Act, and it could therefore be 
enforced against them by forfeiture of wages or pecuniary 
penalties only. The masters found this unsatisfactory, for 
the same reason that they found such penalties inadequate 
when applied to male servants - if no wages were due, no 
forfeiture could occur. If a fine were imposed without the 
possibility of imprisonment in default of payment, the women 
could neglect to pay it without fear of any ill consequences. 
The Committee members and the witnesses were most dissatisfied 
with such a situation. However they shrank from recommending
1. Ibid., p. 522; and supra p. 33.
2. Ibid.
3. S.10.
"an extensive summary jurisdiction is 
essential, looking at the general character 
of the servant'1 . . .and where consequences much 
more serious to their employers than those which 
are likely to occur in Great Britain, may ^
result from their disobedience and misconduct...
However, when the Report went on to list the changes
included in the Committee's draft Bill, the recommendations
were couched in words which seemed to suggest concerns
other than those which the witnesses expressed and which
the above passage conveys. The Report read:
In framing a new Bill, the object of your 
Committee is, that the law should equally 
compel the servant to do his duty and his 
master to pay him. With this view, they 
conceive that a forfeiture of wages should 
in no cases be awarded save as compensation 
for damages actually sustained. They consider 
that servants should be liable to imprisonment 
...for the same offences that are punishable 
in that manner by Great Britain.
This passage appears to cast some moral disapproval 
on punishment by means of forfeiture of wages, whereas 
the evidence shows that opposition to it was only tactical.
The point was that through purchases from the store etc, 
servants seldom had wages due that could be forfeited.
Some witnesses wanted the Act extended to make insolence
punishable as well. Samuel North thought insolence should
attract a fine of up to 40/-, and in default one month's 
3imprisonment. Charles Windeyer also referred to the 
discussion of this question on the Bench. The magistrates in 
Sydney, it would appear from thisf were unwilling to interpret 
the current Act as giving such power, and recommended that 
masters should attempt to bring the situation more clearly 
within the Act - by giving the servant an order, such as
1. Ibid., P* 507-8.2. Ibid., P. 508.3 . rbicl. , P. 539.
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imprisonment; in the remote country districts, no separate
gaol accommodation was available: to send the women under
police escort to a suitable gaol would expose them to evils
which were unspecified but easily imaginable, and the gaols
to which they would be consigned would worsen rather than
improve their characters. As George Nichols put it even of
Sydney gaol where the system of order and discipline was
'almost perfect': '[A]ny female going in there comes out
ten times worse than when she e n t e r e d ' H e  was supported
by William Duncan: ' [W]hen a woman gets into gaol, she loses
all regard for herself and becomes wretched, perhaps
2irreclaimable'.
If imprisonment were not possible, some other solution
had to be found, for it was necessary that the master should
have some protection from female servants. All witnesses
3were agreed they were exceedingly troublesome. What they 
were up to to gain such a reputation would be hard to specify. 
The witnesses said that only a few prosecutions against 
female servants were launched, but these, said Duncan, were 
'nothing as compared with the great and universal grievance
4complained of'. The evidence does, however, provide some 
context into which the criticisms can be placed. The women 
would seem to have had the advantage of a favourable labour 
market - more jobs than females to fill them. Johnson, the 
Registry Office proprietor, alleged that female servants were 
'constantly altering their minds and changing their situations;
1. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 552.
2. Ibid., p. 532.
3. Ibid., per Johnson at p. 525 and per Allman at p. 535.
4. Ibid., p. 532.
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even a written agreement is scarcely thought anything of.
From this position of comparative strength, they could
perhaps take steps to better the treatment that in a tighter
employment situation they would have had to accept without
demur. Such an analysis is supported by William Duncan's
reply when asked the most common offences of female servants,
for he said they could 'all be given under the word insolence,
2or impertinence'.
Various suggestions were made as to how the provision
for forfeiture and fine could be made more effective. Perhaps
the fine could be deducted from future wages, or from wages
earned in a subsequent employment. Husbands could be made
responsible, where the women had husbands; .Savings Bank
3deposits could be attached where the women had savings.
All these ideas were found wanting, for they failed to overcome
the basic difficulty. Seldom did female servants have wages
due. Through extravagance or need, their wages were spent
before they were paid, so that the servants were in debt to
their masters. As Denny Day put it, few servants left their
wages in their masters' hands, but were continually applying
for money to buy clothes so that in nine cases out of ten,
there would not be a month's wages left in the masters' hands.
He absolved the masters from carelessness in protecting their
interests - they might be compelled into this position of
weakness. 'She may be so deficient, or may appear to be so
deficient of clothes as to be in an unfit state to appear
4before his family'. The Committee and their witnesses were
1. Ibid., p. 525
2. Ibid.,p .
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 554 .
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defeated in their quest for a solution. 'It is certainly 
difficult, much as we may consider the subject, to frame 
laws for the management of women'. No provisions were framed 
for inclusion in the new Bill. The Committee confined itself 
to pious wishes - 'It is to be hoped that the evil complained 
of will yet be alleviated by the introduction or growth of 
a better class of persons' / and to ineffectual recommendation - 
’[E]mployers should attend to the check upon misconduct 
which they may possess by not paying their female servants
2in full until the periods of their engagements have expired'.
Much time was devoted to discussing the problem of
absconding, and ways of alleviating it. Witnesses suggested
that the practice was prevalent, and that it was exacerbated
by the provision of advances on wages to men hired in Sydney
for work on stations in the interior. One witness even
3alleged that many lived by such pursuits.
Section 2 of the Act made absconding liable to 
penalty, but not only was there the difficulty already 
discussed that forfeiture of wages was useless if no wages 
were due; there was the added problem that the offenders 
had to be found, arrested and taken before a Bench, and 
many employers were unwilling to add this trouble and 
expense to the inconvenience and loss already suffered.
Allman pointed out that on the Barwon River many stations 
were more than 200 miles from the nearest magistrate or 
Police Office.^
1. Ibid., p .509.
2 . Ibid.
3. J. B. Bettington - ibid., p. 540; and supra pp. 41-42.
4. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 535.
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The suggestion put to the witnesses in favour of lessen­
ing the difficulties associated with absconding was that 
employers should issue servants legitimately quitting their 
employ with a certificate of discharge. On signing with a 
new master, a servant would produce his certificate to show 
he was not an absconder. If masters hired only regularly- 
discharged servants, absconders would be deterred from action 
which would prevent them from getting further employment.
It was suggested that refusal to give a discharge, and 
employment of a servant who failed to produce a discharge 
would be subject to penalties. All witnesses to whom the 
suggestion was put favoured it. Charles Campbell, however, 
in his letter to the Committee, opposed the idea. 'To make 
it imperative on free men to carry about with them written 
discharges from their former employers, and on masters to 
hire only such servants as can produce such documents, smacks 
of penal discipline, and implies a strictness of surveillance 
somewhat foreign to the habits and ideas of free-born 
Englishmen'.^ Henry Dangar was more authoritarian. He 
wanted to go beyond discharges to a full-blown pass law, or - 
as he called it - a Passport Law, 'one that will require 
every free man passing out of the district where he is already 
known to carry a passport under the hand of the Police or 
presiding magistrate of the district and upon every removal
to a new district, such pass should be endorsed by a magistrate
2of the district he had left'. The Committee, however,
3recommended the milder solution, and their suggestions 
regarding certificates of discharge were incorporated into the
1845 Act.
1. Ibid., P- 514.2 . Ibid., P- 515.3. Ibid., pp. 508-9
90
The third category of issues dealt with by the Committee 
and their witnesses relates to various features of the labour 
situation in the Colony that were considered undesirable and 
productive of hardship and friction. These were the truck 
system, the payment of wages by orders, and the provision of 
wine as part-payment of wages. All in some way interfered 
with the full payment of wages, which the tenor of the 
Committee’s questions appeared to favour.
Given the nature of settlement in the Colony at this 
time, it can be argued that the establishment of station stores, 
from which servants could draw necessary goods against wages 
accruing, was of benefit to those servants who would other­
wise have had to travel great distances to the towns to buy 
such goods. This argument was put by many witnesses when 
questioned about the practice. They may very well have been 
sincere in putting forward such an argument. But the truck 
system was also of great benefit to those employers who over­
charged grossly for goods supplied. It was of benefit also in 
maintaining a stable workforce, for workers who ended the 
period of their hire in debt to the store would have to sign 
on again with that employer to work off their debt (or else 
abscond). Most of the witnesses questioned on this matter 
agreed that overcharging occurred, and that in some cases it 
was exorbitant. Edward Denny Day spoke of 'instances [which] 
have come under my knowledge of excessive overcharges, where 
the servants upon pressing for their wages, have found in their 
accounts the fair price of articles supplied, doubled against 
them'.'*’ He realised also further ramifications of this 
practice - 'when wages arevdemanded, complaints spring up
1. Ibid., p . 556 .
against servants and trifling occurrences that have taken
place months and months before, and have passed unnoticed
at the time are then brought forward'.^
The Committee would have favoured the disappearance of
station stores, and provision made for men to make their
purchases elsewhere, but they realised that this was not always
realistic in a sparsely settled district. Their next solution
was that wages should be paid in cash so that the servants
could where necessary buy supplies from the master for cash.
Even this would not, of course, prevent overcharging for items
which the men really wanted and could not otherwise get. As
W. A. Duncan said 'They would rather give 20/- a pound for
2negrohead tobacco than be without it'. The Committee 
were exceedingly unwilling to allow avaricious masters to 
charge 20/- a pound for tobacco. They proposed to the 
witnesses that the magistrates should be able to fix the price 
of goods in station stores, at least where dispute had arisen 
as to such prices. This proposal received a mixed response.
3Some were very much opposed to any suggestion of pricefixing.
On the other hand, some of the magistrates admitted exercising
4such a jurisdiction already, 'and I think', said Denny Day,
'we should be perfectly useless as magistrates, acting under
5this law, if we did not do so'. When it came to the Report, 
the Committee expressed itself 'induced to coincide in [the] 
opinion' that prevention of exorbitant charges for suppliesgwas not 'a fit subject for legislation'.
!. Ibid.
2• Ibid., p . 531
3. Ibid., per Macdermott at p. 527 and see Ogilvie at 
p .550.
4. Ibid., per North at p. 536.
5. Ibid., p . 556.
5. Ibid., p . 508.
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The system of payment of wages by orders resulted in
even greater hardship to employees. In the country districts
at this time, cash was a scarce commodity. Goods and
services were paid for by order or promissory note. 'Even
at Muswellbrook it is difficult to get change for a £1 note;
small orders and promissory notes are circulated to a great
extent at that place, which is a post town, having three
large stores and three inns.1 23^ For station owners to have
had enough cash on hand to pay wages when engagements terminated
(or to pay quarterly or other instalments of wages) would
have been inconvenient at best. At worst, as some witnesses
2suggested, it could have led to robbery and even murder.
But if the order system was convenient to the employers, 
it was not so for the workers. The orders were drawn on
3Sydney banks or business houses. Thus, to have the order 
paid, the servant had to journey - sometimes hundreds of miles - 
to Sydney to present it. Allman claimed to know of one man
4who walked 700 miles to have a £10 order paid. When the 
servant arrived in Sydney, his troubles had often only just 
begun. In countless cases, there were no funds to meet the 
order. A case against the master had to be brought in the 
district where the work was done. So the servant had to go 
all the way back, and then summons the master. At this point,
1. Ibid., per Bettington at p.542.
2. Ibid.
3. The banking system did not begin to penetrate the outly­
ing districts until the 1850's. In 1851, an Armidale 
store made an arrangement with the Bank of New South
to issue bank notes and silver at a small premium and to 
change cheques and orders. It was not until 1856 that 
a proper branch of a bank (the Australian Joint Stock 
Bank) was opened in the North East area. See R.Duncan. 
Armidale: Economic and Social Development 1839-71, New
England University College, Regional Research Monographs, No. 6. 1951, p.48.Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 534.4.
9 3
since many magistrates interpreted the actual giving and
receiving of the cheque or order as payment of wages under
the Act, the servant would be told he could not proceed
further under the Masters and Servants Act.'*' The alternative
to the trip to Sydney was to attempt to cash the order at a
store or pub. The storekeeper or publican would insist that
2purchases be made, and even then would discount the order.
The Committee questioned witnesses at length about the
order system, but no alternative to the system was found
satisfactory. It was necessary therefore to attempt to avoid
the worst aspects by giving servants a clear right to recover
wages when they had been paid by a subsequently dishonoured
cheque or order. This was done in Section 10 of the 1845
Act. The other proposed ameliorative measure was to give
servants, where judgments for wages were made, security in
the form of a lien over the wool, stock or other personal
property of the employer. Such security was to rank ahead of
any other lien or stock mortgage the employer may have given.
Two witnesses welcomed this, James Martin saying that 'the
person who by his tending contributes to the growth of the
3wool should have the first claim on it'. At least one person 
was aghast at the suggestion, and said legislation to such 
effect would be a 'vicious enactment, replete with conse­
quences of the worst kind, and at the same time, debasing 
the master, subjecting, as it would do, even the honest 
master to the degradation, expense and trouble of giving
^bid., per Allen to Bettington at p.542. Many of the 
early cases of claims for wages were dismissed because 
the complainant employee had accepted a cheque which 
was later dishonoured.
Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., per Attorney- 
General to Ogilvie at p.549.
Ibid., p. 546.3.
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liens on his property, day after day, to his servants'
The Committee in their Report recommended that servants should
2have such a lien to the amount of six months'wages, but no 
provision was made in the 1845 Act for liens for wages. Martin
pointed out that the establishment of such a lien was not
3 4possible while the Preferable Lien on Wool Act ' was in force.
The Committee were much concerned about the practice 
of supplying servants with 'home-made' wine in part-payment 
of their wages. Permission for this practice was introduced 
as a means of encouraging the growth of a colonial wine 
industry. The witnesses were questioned as to their opinion 
of the necessity of such a provision, and as to the abuses 
which might result. Few witnesses considered the encouragement 
necessary, and some expressed principled objection to any 
special favouring of particular branches of industry. However, 
J.B. Bettington, himself a vineyard owner, gave some very 
interesting information about the effects of the practice on 
the wine industry. Withdrawal of the permission would, he 
said, initially prejudice the wine industry as the market was 
not yet ready for colonial wine which was considered too light. 
If vineyard owners could not sell to their servants in this 
way, most would have to give up their vineyards, or make better 
wines. He thought the permission to supply the produce to 
servants had operated as inducement to establish vineyards, 
and some owners had been enabled by this practice to make vast 
improvements to their estates through sale to servants - in
1. Ibid. , per O'Brien (written submission) at p.512.
2. Ibid., p. 508.
3. 1843, 7 Vic No. 3.
4. Op. cit., p. 546.
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some cases receiving as much as £500 p.a. from that source.
The industry was, in effect, being developed by servants
subsidising the early experimental vintages.
What concerned the Committee more than the development
of the industry were the consequences for the servants of
being paid in liquor. Most of the witnesses did not consider
the practice had ill effects. On the contrary, they claimed
that it lessened the amount of drunkenness and the proportion
of wages spent on drink. If the servnats were not supplied
with wine they would get drunk on rum from pubs or sly grog
2sellers, with worse results. Some witnesses alleged
3drunkenness and violence resulted from the supply of wine, 
but the weight of evidence favoured the claims of benefit.
The Committee appeared to take a less pragmatic approach, 
fearing that the paying of wages, or part thereof, in drink 
would degrade the workers. They also feared that unscrupulous 
employers would encourage drunkenness in their men so as to 
be able to pay wages in this less costly way. To replies 
that it was in employers' interests to have sober servants, they 
responded that the employer could provide alcohol at weekends 
and still have sober servants during the week, and they even 
suggested that employers could possibly afford to lose Monday's 
work through drunkenness where they saved wages by paying in
4wine. The situation they were worrying about is intriguingly
1. Ibid., p. 541.
2. Ibid., per Bettington at p. 541.
3. Ibid., per Macdermott at p. 528.
4. Ibid., per Suttor to Windeyer at p. 523.
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close to that which was allegedly produced on the
Witwatersrand by mineowners1 23 initial support for the
'kaffir' grog trade. 'For the more money the mine workers
spent on liquor, the less they saved; and the less they
saved, the longer they worked before returning to the
peasant economies of their rural homelands. In other
words, mine owners realised that wages spent on liquor
helped lengthen the periods of migratory labour, and
tended to produce a more stabilised labour force - in
short, it facilitated the process of proletarianisation'.^
It is difficult to determine what the actual effect
of supplying wine to servants was. Perhaps it 'prolet-
arianised' them. Perhaps it made them more manageable by
distracting them into drunken quarrelsomeness and away
from a clearer identification of their interests and
grievances. Perhaps, on the other hand, it really did
diminish the amount of drunkenness. If this were so,
it leads to other speculations. One can only guess how
much wine individual servants would have consumed each
week, but if Blaxland who had something between 80 and
2100 workers on several properties was one of the 
largest employers, then the vignerons making £500 p.a. 
out of wine sales to servants would have been unlikely 
to have had many more. Bettington claimed the wine
3cost about 2/- to 3/- a gallon. So £500, if the work-
1. C. Van Onselen, 'Randlords and Rotgut', History 
Workshop, No. 2, Autumn 1976, pp. 33-89 at p.4,1.
2. Select Committe of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 552.
3. Ibid., p. 541.
97
force was 100, would have meant each servant got approx­
imately one-half gallon per week. This is not a large 
amount for one person to consume, even if it was all 
drunk between Saturday night and Monday morning. If 
the workforce was less, the amount per person would have 
been proportionately greater, but even allowing for a 
tripling of the quantity, the servants who would have 
been content with that amount of wine per week do not 
sound like the drunken wastrels the employers so often 
painted them. Perhaps their drunken and violent natures 
resulted from the type of 'rotgut' they were reduced to 
drinking in the absence of wine supplies. It is also 
not clear what sort of wine was involved. Half a gallon 
of light Hunter River claret would almost qualify as 
medicinal. Half a gallon of port might have somewhat 
incapacitating effects. But the possibility that the 
wind supplied was fortified only strengthens the suggest­
ion as to the nature of the rum sold. If the workers 
were in much better condition after a weekend drinking 
a half gallon or more of port than after a weekend 
drinking rum, then they are scarcely to be blamed for 
the actions to which that rum drove them. The Committee's 
Report stated that it was doubtful whether the practice 
of supplying wine was still needed for encouraging viti­
culture.  ^ They said that it had been stated that great 
abuses proceeded from it and recommended that the House
1. Ibid., p . 508.
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amend the statute which allowed it.^
This examination of the Committee hearings and of 
their Report indicates that there was little real question­
ing in the legislature or among the employing class of 
the broader concepts of Masters and Servants legislation. 
The only issues on which any concerted criticism is 
suggested by the tone of the Committee's questioning, 
or by the evidence given in reply, is on the question of 
truck and station stores, the practice of paying by 
order and the practice of paying in wine. Apart from 
that, all accepted the principles whereby severe penalties, 
either criminal or financial, should attach to servants 
who absented themselves or behaved without proper 
deference.
The suggested amendments to the administrative 
structure of the system - such as the provision of 
assessors or the abolition of the right of appeal to 
Quarter Sessions - did not involve any serious doubts 
as to the impartiality of the magistrates' decisions.
It was not because they actually considered magistrates 
were biased that the Committee members canvassed the 
provision of assessors, but only because the employees 
might believe that magistrates, being all of the employ­
ing class, would be biased: '[N]o doubt,' said Windeyer,
'that [belief] is generally false, but it is the feeling
2that is prevalent.' To ensure effective control through
1. 
2 .
Licensing Act, 2 Vic. No. 13.
Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 522.
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the Masters and Servants law, employees had to believe 
that justice was being done. Law controls not through 
the power of the state to enforce it, but through the 
disposition of the citizen to accept it as just. If 
the employees came to believe that the position of employ­
ers under the contract of employment was being given 
privileged treatment, they might go on from suspecting 
the partiality of the magistrates to suspecting the 
partiality of the law itself.
That the Committee members and the witnesses should 
wish to guard against this eventuality was not unjustified 
timorousness. Employees did believe the magistrates 
were partial in their decisions, and they had good reason 
for so believing. The proceedings of many Courts of Petty 
Sessions were like games of musical chairs, with magistrate 
A descending from the Bench to have his case (whether as 
complainant or defendant) heard by magistrates B and C, 
and then resuming his place while magistrate B stepped 
down for his case. The doubt that such a state of affairs 
could cast on the type of justice available to employee 
litigants in such Courts was not lost on the employees.
No, said one Wellingrove worker, he would not take his 
complaint before the Wellingrove Bench, but would take it 
before the Police Magistrate in Armidale where 'he could 
get justice'.^ Furthermore, this suspicion of the magis­
trates carried over into disagreement over the content 
of the substantive law of employment itself. As will be
1 . William Rawson v (John Mohr, Wellingrove, 3/11/1857 .
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seen in Ch. 2, the cases illustrate a divergence between
the employees' view of the terms and obligations of the
employment contract and the masters' view.
Similarly, discussion of the offences provided for
by the Act proceeded on the basis that employees were
inherently disposed to absenting and misconduct, and that
it was within the prerogative of the master to have such
behaviour penalised. Yet if, as so many witnesses believed,
actual loss could only with difficulty be shown, then
it could have been cogently argued that what was at issue
did not constitute a breach of the terms of the employment
contract - that there was no dereliction of the duty to
exercise reasonable care and skill or the duty to act in
the best interests of the employer but that there was
a failure to conform to the standards of servility and
deference belonging to a menial status in a traditional
culture. I have argued elsewhere that these aspects of
status have continued to affect the supposedly contractual
2concepts of employment law. Certainly many employers
in mid-nineteenth century New South Wales thought that the
law should protect and enforce such a relationship.
'Damn your eyes', said Finlay Mclnnis of 'Marouan', 'am
3I not your master?' Such at attitude was not readily 
suffered by colonial employees. 'Must is not a word to
4use to any man', said one. By accepting the arguments
1. See infra pp. 126-130.
2. Chapter 2 .
3. Clark v Mclnnis, Glen Innes, 23/2/1869.
4. John Johnson v ?, Warialda, 17/4/1856.
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of the witnesses and providing in the new Bill for 
imprisonment of intransigent employees, the Committee 
showed their allegiance to the prevailing approach of 
employers to the regulation of labour, ' [Sjensible that 
the most stringent provisions are necessary in order to 
enforce diligence and obedience on the part of servants 
in this colony.
It cannot be denied, however, that a degree of liberal
thinking distinguished the Committee members from many of
the witnesses, and - as the case evidence shows - from
a great number of employers. Some of the questioning by
Committee members, particularly William Henry Suttor,
demonstrates a willingness to acknowledge the existence
of oppressive behaviour by employers and echoes the type
of mildly enlightened insistence on mutual obligation
that characterised the writing of contemporary English
philanthropists and novelists. Suttor's suggestion
that provocation by masters was frequently very great and
should in its turn be punished if insolence was to attract 
2penalties indicates the distance of his thinking from 
that of Henry Dangar, with his fulminations against 
'levellers and equality men'. It was Suttor, too, who 
showed considerable acuity in his interpretation of the 
motivation of, and benefits from, the payment of wages in 
wine.^
1. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 507-508
2. Ibid.,p. 522.
3. Ibid.,p. 514 .
4 . Ibid.,p. 523 .
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Despite such foreshadowing of aspects of the 'new 
management', the Committee's report and its draft Bill 
incorporates a view of the function of the Masters and 
Servants Acts in keeping with the authoritarian aspects 
of employment law and the traditional and hierarchic 
behaviour of most of the employers of the time.
1 outlined in Part III the substantial changes 
made to the system of regulation of employment by the 
1857 Act - the replacement of imprisonemnt by fine, the 
abolition of penalties for negligent loss. One might have 
expected such changes to be accompanied by a great deal of 
debate, explaining the reasons why the new provisions 
were thought to be desirable. There was not, however, 
any lengthy discussion, either of principles or practic­
alities. A Bill was drafted and then referred to a 
Select Committee chaired by G. R. Nichols.^- The Committee 
reduced the Bill from 45 clauses to 11. On 13 December
1856, Nichols moved for a Second Reading of the abbreviated
2Bill. On 31 December, the House went into Committee to
3consider the Bill.
There was no debate in Committee of the definition 
section. Extension of the £10 penalty to £20 and of the 
14 day default sentence to 28 days in Section 2 was moved 
but defeated without recorded debate, the Sydney Morning
1. Sydney Morning Herald, 13/12/1856, p. 7.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 31/12/1856, p. 5.
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Herald report  ^merely saying that 'Mr Nichols defended
the clause'. Similarly, there appears to have been no
debate on the defeated motion (of J. H. Plunkett) to
decrease the penalty for fraudulent absconding from three
2months to one month. A further amendment proposed by 
E. C. Weekes that tender of the sum advanced should 
absolve the absconding servant from liability to prosecu­
tion was also defeated, on the argument of the Attorney- 
General that such provision would have 'opened the way 
to much evasion and wrongdoing. If a servant received 
a certain sum in advance and the servant desired to go 
to another employment, all he had to do to avoid the 
consequences of his breach of faith was to tender or
pay the amount to [the master]. That was evidently a
3bad principle'. While it may have seemed an undesirable 
opportunity in the context of the labour market at the 
time, it can hardly be said to be unacceptable in terms 
of a strictly contractual approach to the employment 
situation. Phrases like 'breach of faith' in such a 
discussion indicate even more clearly that employers, 
through the legislature, were using the Masters and 
Servants Acts to retain an authoritarian, employer-biased, 
non-contractual basis in employment relations.
Given that the penalty for absconding after advance
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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was set at three months, Plunkett then moved to have the 
default sentence available for masters who failed to 
comply with an order for wages increased from 14 days 
to three months, and when that was defeated, to two months. 
In debate on this amendment, Nichols seiid that Plunkett 
had misconceived the meaning of the clause. For a servant 
imprisoned in default would, at the end of that period, 
be free of further liability; but if the master was 
imprisoned for two months, at the end of the period the 
servant would still have his remedy against him for wages.^ 
It is hard to see how this would have been so, unless the 
Attorney-General was referring to a separate action for 
debt. Even then, it would seem the master could claim 
the issue had already been adjudicated, and a court order 
executed by the attempted levy of distress and subsequent 
term of imprisonment.
An attempt by William Forster to have the provision
for penalties for detaining a servant's property struck
out, on the basis that remedies were already available at
law, was defeated. Sir John Robertson replied that poor
people were not always in a position to have recourse to
2the remedy available to them at law.
The Committee report was adopted by the Legislative
3Assembly on 2 January 1857, and - after a Third Reading -
4the Bill passed the Assembly on 6 January. On 29 January,
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 3/1/1857, p.5.
4. Ibid., 7/1/1857, p.4.
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it was raised in the Legislative Council, and a motion 
put for a Second Reading.^- Sir Alfred Stephen said that 
while it was ’expedient to pass some measure for the regu­
lation of masters and servants ... there were several 
things in the bill from which he dissented'. This was 
because he thought ’it should rather be sought to engender 
kindly feelings between the employed and the employer, than 
any ill feeling which would probably be the result when 
a master had it in his power to send a domestic servant
to gaol for any slight neglect of duty - this was one of
2the matters he objected to'. This objection is rather 
curious. For the Bill that had come to the Council from 
the Assembly, as was shown earlier, in fact removed 
imprisonment as a primary penalty against servants and 
substituted the £10 fine. Admittedly, this fine was 
sufficiently large, at a time when average yearly wages 
were £30 for shepherds and £35 for farm labourers, and 
when daily wages for skilled tradesmen such as carpenters, 
smiths and masons were 12/- to 14/- per day (that is, 
approximately £3/10/- to £4/10/- per week, or £150 per 
year of full work), for many servants to be unable to meet 
the fine or have sufficient goods to satisfy a levy of 
distress; and it might therefore have been expected that 
many servants might be subject to the default penalty of 
14 days' imprisonment. But Sir Alfred's remarks appear
1. Ibid., 30/1/1857, p.5.
2. Ibid.
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to be contemplating a primary penalty, and therefore to 
be misdirected. In reply to him, James Norton asked what 
punishment Sir Alfred 'would propose for servants who 
neglected their work and duties to the loss and injury 
of their employer other than that proposed in the bill'.^
The retort is understandable, but one wonders why it was 
not couched in terms that demonstrated that the situation 
Sir Alfred objected to was not one which the Bill en­
visaged. The confusion was not elucidated - the Bill was 
read a second time, and its committal fixed for the follow­
ing day.
It was not, in fact, until 5 February that
2the Council considered the Bill in Committee. No 
discussion of Clause 2 is recorded. As in the Legislative 
Assembly, an amendment to expunge the penalty for negligent 
destruction of property was moved and lost, as was a sub­
sequent amendment to alter the phrase to 'gross negligence'. 
Neither here nor in the Assembly was there any recorded 
discussion of the reasons for removal of the penalty for 
negligent loss nor the attempted removal of the penalty 
for negligent destruction of property.
There was, however, brief discussion of the provision 
to allow summonses to be issued by Clerks of Petty Sessions, 
and of the provision prohibiting imprisonment of female 
servants. After the adoption of the Committee's report
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 6/12/1857, p.4.
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was moved, a further amendment was proposed to limit 
the powers of magistrates exercising the arbitral juris­
diction under Clause 10 to cancel agreements to those 
cases where cancellation was sought by the complainant. 
This amendment being lost on the casting vote of the 
Chairman, the Bill was again reported, and the report
adopted on 12 February.1 2345 On 19 February, the Bill was
2read a third time in the Council and passed.
An amending Bill to give the 1857 Act retrospective
3effect was introduced in November 1857. Objections to
this were raised on the grounds that many servants who
had contracted before the 1857 Act came into force may
have done so on the distinct understanding that they
were not covered by penalties other than those of the
civil law, and it was therefore not right to give the
Act retrospective effect. It was suggested by Edward
Wise  ^that there had been good reason to think, prior
to March 1857, that Masters and Servants legislation
5would not be continued. Others believed employees 
would not have been aware that the legislation had lapsed 
before March 1857. Whether or not some servants entered 
agreements more freely in the knowledge that Masters and 
Servants legislation was not available against them 
cannot be established. Certainly many knew the legis­
lation had lapsed, and there is evidence that some were
1. Ibid., 13/2/1857, p.4.
2. Ibid., 20/2/1857, p.4.
3. Ibid., 3/11/1857, p.5.
4. Ibid., 18/12/1857, p.5.
5. Ibid., for example,^ James Dickson.
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of opinion that they were thus left without protection 
against abuses by masters that Masters and Servants legis­
lation would have provided! “ Whatever the general view 
amongst employees about the desirability of the temporary 
lapse in Masters and Servants legislation, the attempt 
to give the 1857 Act retrospective effect failed.
There is little guidance in the 1856-57 debates as
to the reasons for the changes in the 1857 Act. What does
emerge is that there was no basic disagreement with the
principles of the system of employment regulation embodied
in the legislation. It continued to be regarded as an
integral part of the system of industrial relations which
applied in the Colony. The 1902 re-enactment also
occasioned no re-examination of principle. Though there
had been criticism of the Act by the organised bodies of
2workers during the 1880s, employees resorted to the 
provisions of the Acts until the middle of the twentieth 
century. The lack of discussion in Parliament, and 
the continued prosecution of claims by employees suggest 
strongly that, for the most part, both employers and 
employees accepted the legislation as a viable element 
in the structure of regulation of employment.
1. J. Kay v Margaret Baxter, Stroud, 8/5/1857.
2. See, for example, proceedings of the Intercolonial 
Trades Union Congresses, Sydney 1879, Melbourne 1884, 
Sydney 1885, Adelaide 1886, Brisbane 1888, Hobart 1889.
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CHAPTER 2
Employment Law: Common Law Principles and 
Their Relation to the Masters and Servants 
Acts
In my Introduction, I pointed out that Masters and 
Servants legislation is, to a large extent, procedural - that 
is, it provides a method of procedure for litigating in 
situations designated as breaches of the employment contract 
by established common lav; principles. Because of this 
procedural nature, it is necessary - in order to understand 
fully the effect of the legislation and the way in which it 
was applied - to set out briefly the basic principles of 
employment law with respect to the establishment and 
duration of contracts and the rights and obligations of the 
parties thereto.
What must be done is to examine the principles of law 
on which the legislation was based. How far does the legisla­
tion uphold those principles? To what extent, and in what 
direction, does it depart from them? What light do the 
disputes resulting in litigation throw on employer and employee 
attitudes to the principles of employment law? How correct, 
in terms of common law principles, were the decisions of magis­
trates in Masters and Servants Act cases? This chapter 
attempts to answer those various questions, and thus to 
integrate the application of the Masters and Servants 
legislation into the overall 'rule* of common law in nineteenth 
and twentieth century New South Wales.
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Part I The Nature of Employment Law:
Contract and Status.
For a long time, the burgeoning fields of industrial 
relations and industrial (or labour) law have paid scant 
attention to the provisions of the common law as regards 
employment relations - the law of employment. Yet it is a 
branch of law central to the study of industrial relations 
and industrial relations systems, and, with respect to a 
number of issues, seminal as regards broader areas of law.
It had become the custom to cover the application of ’law' 
to 'work1 23 in multi-sectional courses on 'Industrial Law' , " 
which attempted to deal with all the relevant issues of 
contract, tort and statute. The result is that the 
statutory area has swamped the common law. In Australia,
the importance of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitra-
2 3tion Act and the separate state arbitration acts looms so
large that the common law may seem, at a casual glance, of
merely historical significance. This would also be so in
Britain, where - despite the absence of a system of compulsory
arbitration of 'industrial' disputes - many issues of
employment relations are regulated by statutes perhaps even
1. For example, University of Adelaide - Industrial Law; 
University of Sydney - Industrial Law and Labour 
Relations; University of Tasmania - Industrial 
Relations Law. This custom is now giving way to the 
presentation of more specialised courses; for example, 
Australian National University - Labour Relations, Law 
of Employment; University of Western Australia - 
Employment Law, Trade Union Law; University of New 
South Wales - Law of Employment, Settlement of Industrial 
Disputes, Trade Unions and the Law, Advanced Labour Law.
2. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1980.
3. New South Wales, Industrial Arbitration Act 1940;
Victoria, Labour and Industry Act 1958; Queensland, 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961; South 
Australia, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1972; Western Australia, Industrial Arbitration Act 1979 
Tasmania, Industrial Relations Act 1975.
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more far-reaching than those establishing the Australian system.^
The scope of statute in industrial relations has widened
continually from the early Factory Acts and regulation of hours
and conditions for women and children to the Unfair Dismissals
2and Redundancy legislation of today. The employment area is 
the area most completely saturated by statutory regulation.
This has led many to believe that the common law's place in 
industrial law has shrunk into a role in the introductory 
historical lecture!
This belief is bolstered by the concerns of 'industrial 
relations’. Here, attention centres, understandably, on the 
group dynamics of industrial enterprises - and on the manoeuvring 
and mutual adjustment of 'management' and 'labour', and on the 
plant as a social and political unit. The focus is on groups - 
of workers, shop stewards, foremen, managers - rather than on 
isolated one-to-one relations between an employer and an employee. 
It looks at the visible, day-to-day realities of the relations 
of employers and employees, without paying much attention to the 
underlying structures of legal relations.
Yet, however immediate and realistic this may seem - 
however much the conduct of industrial relations may seem to 
be the regulation by more or less benevolent statute of the 
real work-place relations of groups of participants in the broad, 
social and political area of 'work* - the common lav/, through 
the individual contract of employment and the individual and
1. Industrial Relations Act 1971, Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act 1974, Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, 
Employment Protection Act 1975, Industry Act 1975, Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976, 
Redundancy Payments Act 1965.
2. See supra note 1.
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personal master-servant relationship, continues to control
the scene. The industrial legislative structures in
Australia such as the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Act are based on and centred around the common law contract,^
and its concepts are, in a number of ways, written into the
legislation, restricting moves to take up broader, more socially
responsible approaches. This sort of limitation runs right
through arbitration legislation in Australia, its most
fundamental and far-reaching thrust being through the very words
of the industrial head of power and its reference to 'industrial 
2disputes' underwritten by the definition of 'industrial
3matter, in the major piece of legislation under placitum xxxv, 
the infinitely-amended Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
Yet, uneasiness about the relevance of the common lav/ to 
present-day industrial relations is well-founded. There is 
increasing recognition that within the common law concepts and 
underlying them are assumptions - a whole philosophy which fits 
ill with the tendencies gaining sway in industrial relations 
today, based on concepts which are inappropriate because they 
are obsolete, relics of the high water mark of laissez-faire.
But it is not a totally laissez-faire philosophy, and it can be 
traced back past the decisions of the early nineteenth century - 
the heyday of laissez-faire in industrial law. It represents,
1. See for example, the effect of S.4(l): '"Industrial matters" 
means all matters pertaining to the relations of employers 
and employees...; "Industrial Dispute" means (a) a dispute 
... as to industrial matters...'; and S.18: 'The Commission 
is empowered to prevent or settle industrial disputes' .
2. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, S. 51 -
'The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government 
of the Commonwealth with respect to:- ... (xxxv) Concilia­
tion and Arbitration for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one 
state.' ’
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, S.4(1)
- see note 1 supra.
3.
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to a large extent, the attitudes of the precapitalist era, 
when notions of status still dominated work relations. These 
notions were filtered through the interstices of contract 
principles into modern employment law. As I show later in 
this section, beneath the contractual form status still pre­
dominates, creating tensions with the principles applicable 
to that contractual form and with the even broader formula­
tion of contractual rights put forward by litigating employees. 
Varying interpretations of particular contracts of employment 
resulting from the conflicting approaches of employers and 
employees to the abstract employment contract sometimes led to 
disputes resulting in Masters and Servants Act prosecutions.
The Masters and Servants Acts are a focal point for the 
examination of these tensions within the law for they 
represent clearly the manoeuvring by 'law-in-action’ between 
the hierarchic, status-based attitude to the regulation of 
employment relations and the full application of contractual 
principles based on the theoretical equality and independence 
of employer and employee as unfettered juridical persons. The 
Masters and Servants Acts can be accepted without qualms only 
by the adoption of one or other of two inconsistent but mutually 
supportive views: one can either accept them as instruments for
the regulation and control of labour in such a way as to 
preserve the dominance of the employer and the full expression 
of his right to manage;" or one can accept them as giving 
equal rights of action to employer and employee for litigation
1. See for example, Bugden v Styles, Dungog, 28/11/1845
where the magistrates imposed a fine of £5 for absconding, 
' It]his as an example to all others'; and Hall v Walters, 
Dungog, 4/6/1846 where an absconder was imprisoned for 
three months 'trusting this will be an example to others 
of his class who have been exceedingly troublesome to the 
A.A. Company'.
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of disputes arising out of freely-negotiated contracts between
parties who approach one another from bargaining positions of
balanced advantage and disadvantage.1 23
The contract of employment, or 'of service' as it is
more commonly designated in legal texts, is acknowledged to be
a contract to enter into the relation of master and servant.
Therefore the foundation of modern labour law inevitably
involves the character of the master-servant relationship, and
2that character is one of status. The necessity of the
master-servant relationship to the employment contract is not
balanced by a necessity of contract to the establishment or
continuation of a master-servant relationship. '[T]he
contractual basis of the master-servant relation is not part
of its legal definition, the relation may, but it need not,
3be based on contract...'. It would, of course, be unlikely 
in practice for a modern-day master-servant relationship to 
arise other than by a contract of service, but the fact that 
the contract is not essential to the relationship whereas the 
relationship is the fundamental constituent of the contract 
makes the relationship the dominant element. Its characteristics 
overpower those of the contract so that the law of employment is
1. As did members of the Victorian Parliament in debates on 
the 1891 Act in that colony, which was referred to as 
'putting the law of master and servant generally on a 
sound and just basis', and 'on a foundation of fairness 
and justice' by the Hon.H.J. Wrixon in his second reading 
speech. Victoria. Parliament. Parliamentary Debates 1891, 
Vol.67, p. 1950; and as did E. Theodore in his second 
reading speech on the bill for the Queensland Wages Act,
9 Geo V No 19, 1918, which, he claimed, brought about 'a 
scheme of fair play where penalties are on a similar basis 
and obligations mutual'. Queensland. Parliament, Legis­
lative Assembly. Parliamentary Debates, 1918, p. 526.
2. 0. Kahn-Freund, 'Blackstone's Neglected Child : The
Contract of Employment', 93 Law Quarterly Review 1977, 
p. 508 at 512. :
3. Ibid., p. 511.
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imbued much more with principles based on status than with the 
concepts of contract theory.
Legal text-writers are, on the whole, unwilling to admit 
the status-based nature of employment law,1" but the reality is 
that many - if not most - of the questions which arise in the 
course of the employment are not determined by reference to any 
contractual terms. These may govern duration, wages, hours 
etc.; but matters relating to the relative behaviour of 
employer and employee, and the day-to-day control which the 
employer exercises - his 'right, to manage' - are (in my conten­
tion) settled by reference to the allocated roles, the status 
of the parties as employer and employee, and not to the 
establishment or otherwise of certain rights and duties by 
contract. It is because he is an employer that the employer 
gives the orders as to how the day's work will be done, and 
because the worker i_s an employee that he obeys and that the 
employer expects him to obey.
The concentration on the status-contract tension is of 
academic interest, but it has other, more pressing justifications. 
An examination of cases brought under the Masters and Servants 
Acts involves the dissection of disputes in which the opposing 
parties argue from positions based, on the employer side, on 
notions of status, and on the employee side on radical (if often 
incompletely formulated) interpretations of unfettered contractual
freedom, of which the most frequent manifestation was a claim to
2be bound only by expressly-negotiated and agreed terras. The
1. For example, ibid., p. 523-4; and G.H.L. Fridman, The 
Modern Law of Employment, London, 1963, pp. 30-32. But 
contrast B. Brooks, Contract of Employment : Principles 
of Australian Employment Law, Sydney, 1979. p. 24 -
' [the] master-servant relationship ... while it is entered 
into by contract, ripens into a status-relationship with a 
consequent bundle of rights and duties reposing on the 
employer and the employee*.
2. See infra pp. 175-176.
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ring is held by the common law principles which represent an 
amalgam of the two approaches. For this reason, an 'unpacking' 
of the status and contract elements in employment law is 
important to an understanding of the operation of Masters and 
Servants legislation. At the same time, the development of 
groups of employees and employers and the more overt role of 
the State through compulsory arbitration represents the shift of 
the old status-contract tensions into a new arena.
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Part II The Basic Principles of Employment Law
It is not only in its historical development that the 
employment contract is a creature of status. It is still 
fundamentally imbued with aspects of status through the rights 
and obligations which are its incidents. The very establishment 
of an employment contract entails the identification of attributes 
referable to issues of status. In this section, I analyse these 
features of the employment contract.
How does one identify a contract as an employment contract 
- a contract of service?^ Various tests and indicia have been 
enumerated, but beneath them all is the same essential require­
ment. One must show within the contract a relationship of 
master and servant. One must show, that is, that the parties 
stand vis-a-vis one another in roles bearing the necessary 
incidents of the status of employer and employee. The basic 
ingredient sought for the establishment of those roles is still, 
despite a century of judicial questioning, the existence of a 
power of control in the alleged employer over the work to be done 
and the way in which it is to be done. 'Control' need not, it 
is said, be incompatible with the possession by the alleged 
employee of special skills or expertise such that he must 
exercise considerable initiative in the performance of his 
duties.^
1. It becomes important to determine whether a contract 
relating to the performance of work is a contract of 
service rather than, for example, a contract 'for services' 
where the worker is an independent contractor, because 
different rights and obligations at common law and under 
various statutes (such as the Workers' Compensation Act) 
will attach to the different types of contract.
2. For example, Cassidy v Minister for Health [1951] 2 K.B.
343 - a case concerning a surgeon.
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This issue of 'control' will arise where one is faced with 
the undoubted existence of a contract relating to the 
performance of work. Is it a contract of employment,^ and 
therefore one to which the rules of the common law of employ­
ment (and statutory provisions such as the Masters and Servants
2 3Act, the Industrial Arbitration Act, the Workers' Compensation
4 5Act, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act ) apply? It will
be an employment contract if it establishes a master-servant
relationship. If then one looks to 'control' as an indication
that a master-servant relationship is present, it becomes
obvious that 'control' must have some clear connection with
the status of master and servant. Control does not relate to
skill or knowledge - it relates to obedience - it involves
the right to give orders and demand obedience to them. The
employment relationship thus entails a person who is in a
posi lion of power to command and a person who is in a position
of obligation to obey.
Despite the dominance of the status element, the law 
treats the employment relationship as a contract, and the rights 
and duties of the parties as contractual terms. The contractual 
iorm is in many ways a fiction, but it is enshrined in venerable 
decisions, and it is necessary to the assertion of the possession 
of the rights of employer or employee, or the imposition of the 
correlative duties, to establish the existence of a service
in a manner in keeping with general contract principles. 
Ihe contractual form in employment law may be either totally
See supra note 1, p. 1 1 7 ,
New South Wales, 1902.;
New South Wales, 1940.
New South Wales, 1926.
5. Commonwealth, 1904.
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illusory or so specialised as to indicate a sui generis contract 
involving a completely independent branch of law and rubric of 
principles. The reality of the situation is still, however, 
that it is treated by the courts as part of the general law of 
contract,'*' and that is how employment law was handled by the 
superior courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
That is therefore how employment law should be approached in 
order to delineate the principles to which Masters and Servants 
legislation must be related.
The existence of an employment contract may be demonstrated 
by express acts, or it may be implicit in the conduct of the 
parties - that is, that the parties' conduct can be explained
2only on the basis that they entered into an employment contract.
Implication of contracts from conduct is more frequent in the
employment area than in any other, and it would have been even
more frequent still in the nineteenth century. Even where
the employment contract is 'express', that is - where there is a
verbal agreement, either written or oral, it may still be a
very shadowy entity. The verbal agreement need not utilize
any special formulae or terminology. It need not be in writing.
All that is necessary is that there should be an offer of
4employment and an acceptance thereof.
1. See Denmark Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd 
[19 69] 1 Q.B.719, per Winn L.J. at 732 .
2. Where one party works for another and accepts remunera­
tion from that other in circumstances where the work is 
normally done by an employee, the conduct of the parties 
in providing and accepting the work and the remuneration 
will give rise to the inference that they have entered 
into an employment contract.
3. Unless the contract is one for a fixed term of more than a 
year, in which case the Statute of Frauds requires that it 
be in writing : see Adams v Union Cinemas [1939] 3 All E.R.136
4. There must, of course, be 'consideration' - to be enforce­
able at common law and in equity, an agreement must be 
other than gratuitous. A party will not be held to the 
performance of a promise for which he has not been 'paid' 
by the promisee by the giving of some benefit or the under­
taking of some detriment (unless the agreement is under 
seal in which case it is enforceable at law but not in 
equity).
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Of course, to postulate the formulation of an employment 
contract in this way is to take the application of the contractual 
form to its most unreal extension. While there is an undoubted 
value in breaking down the actions of contracting parties into 
formal elements for the better analysis of their assigned legal 
attributes, it is important when attempting to differentiate the 
contractual and non-contractual aspects of employment, to identify 
the real nature of the parties' actions. The act of parties in 
entering an employment relationship will very rarely take the 
form of an actual offer to employ, followed by an acceptance 
of that offer, and the parties would probably be most surprised 
if told that the discussions between them as to the details of 
their prospective relationship were the actual 'contract of 
employment'. If they regard the relationship as contractual 
at all, they would think of the contract as residing in the 
day-to-day carrying on of the employment - the doing of the 
work, giving and receiving orders, paying and being paid wages. 
Many of the cases show that employees, at any rate, did not 
regard these initial discussions as forming part of their 
contract. Yet in law these introductory negotiations are 
usually binding. This is the moment when the terms of the 
contract must be settled, and if terms establishing duration, 
wage rates, period of notice etc. cannot be shown to have been 
expressly agreed at this time, they will be inferred out of 
the parties' conduct. Subsequent negotiations will be inadmiss­
ible attempts to vary the contract unless a fully-constituted 
variation with its own offer, acceptance and consideration can 
be shown.
1. See A.G. Guest ed., Anson's Law of Contract 25th ed.
Oxford, 1979, pp. 487-9; M.R. Freedland, The Contract of 
Employment, Oxford, 1976, pp. 40-76. See also Marriott v 
Oxford and District Co-operative Society Ltd (No. 2)[1969]
3 WLR 984.
The methods of coping with this requirement that the 
terms of the contract be established with sufficient certainty
at the time of contracting supports the suggestion that the 
attachment of the contractual form to the employment relation­
ship is forced. In Appleby v Johnson (1874),  ^Grove J. said 
'If the acceptance is not clear and certain, but leaves some­
thing to be arranged, something for future discussion and 
decision, the parties are not ad idem' - that is, a binding 
contract has not been concluded. But in the majority of real- 
life situations, a lot of matters pertaining to employer and 
employee relations are simply not referred to when the parties 
indulge in the 'preliminary negotiations' which constitute the 
contract. The difficulty posed by this silence is solved (as 
so often before) bv the implication of terms.
This [i.e. the necessity of unequivocal acceptance 
with nothing left unsettled] does not mean that all 
the terms have to be expressly and fully set out in 
the contract in order for it to be binding. It is 
clear that in a contract of employment, as in any 
other contract, the courts may imply such terms as 
are reasonably necessary to give effect to the 
contract, even though nothing has been said on the 
specific point.3
The terms which the courts most consistently imply into the 
employment contract are the features of the master-servant 
relationship. While it does not always matter whether the 
rights and duties of an employer and employee arise because of 
the relationship in which they find themselves or as a result 
of their actual agreement on particular terms in an employment 
contract, the Masters and Servants Act cases show that the
1. L.R. 9 C.P. 158 at 164.2. Many employment contracts are entered into with the 
minimum of discussion - 'a wink and a nod' at the 
factory gates. At that stage, probably only the wage 
and the hours are expressly agreed.
3. Fridman, op. cit., p. 35.
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source of the obligations can affect the actions of the 
parties.'*' These duties and rights of the parties to an 
employment relationship which the law introduces through the 
creation of implied terms of the contract of employment are 
aspects of a status-based relation differing little in its 
basic elements from pre-industrial master-servant relation­
ships. An analysis of these corresponding rights and duties 
shows that little has really changed, so far as the legal 
theory goes.
The fundamentally hierarchic nature of the employment
relationship can be demonstrated by comparing the basic
obligations of the master with those of the servant. The
master is regarded as having impliedly, if not expressly,
agreed to employ the servant and to continue him in his employ
until the due date for expiration of the contract (whether
that date be settled by express agreement or by implication),
or until he is justified in discharging the servant. Smith's
Law of Master and Servant states: 'It is obviously the duty
of every man who has engaged another person as a servant, to
2receive such person into his service', and 'It is also the
duty of a master to retain the servant during the whole time
3that he has contracted to do so'. This is the limit of the 
employer's basic obligations - the obligation to employ is all 
that the law sees as flowing from the fact of the existence 
of a contract of employment. It is important to note how
1. In that employees attempted to deny alleged obligations 
not founded in expressly-agreed terms of their contracts - 
see infra, pp, -/7~y • See also He^es v Williamson, 
Armidale, 6/1/1865 and Carroll v Bayley, Merriwa, 16/3/1869 
- shepherds denying a duty to compensate for lost sheep on 
the ground there was no express term relating to 
n n m n e n s a t i o n .
2. E.M. Smith ed., Smith's Law of Master and Servant,
5th ed., London, 1902, p. 152.
Ibid., pp. 154-155.3.
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narrow that obligation is. To 'employ' means to continue 
the relationship of employer and employed, of master and 
servant. In other words, the only obligation which the 
master-servant relationship imposes on the master is to 
continue the relationship: that is, it imposes no basic 
positive obligations on the master at all. It is true that 
a lot of actual employment contracts give rise to an oblig­
ation to pay wages. Some also give rise to a duty to pro­
vide work; but this is the result of construction of the 
particular contracts. Where, for example, the employment 
involved is of a type that makes it important for the 
employee to engage in public appearances or to display his 
skills to the public (as in the case of actors and singers) 
the contract may be construed as obliging the employer to 
find work of that type for the employee.'*' If the contract 
involves an express or implied agreement to employ a person 
to do a specific task, it could be argued that the employer
did not fulfil his agreement unless he provided the employee
2with the opportunity of doing the task. A very fine line 
separates the existence of such an obligation from its non­
existence however. If the contract provides that the employee 
be paid by commission (or possibly piece-rates for work done ) 
the courts might construe it as creating an obligation on the
employer to provide work which would enable the employee to
3earn that commission or those piece-rates. However, this 
point raises the issue of the existence or non-existence of
1. Marbe v George Edwardes Daly's T ireatre Ltd, [1928] 1 K.B.
269; White v Australia and New Zealand Picture Theatres 
Ltd, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 2~66.
2. Collier v Sunday Referee [1940] 2 K.B. 647; Shindler v
Northern Raincoat Co., [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1038.
Devonald v Rosser [1906] 2 K.B. 728.3.
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any fundamental obligation to pay wages. An obligation to 
employ not only does not of necessity incorporate an 
obligation to provide work - it does not even involve an 
obligation to pay wages.1
Where a type of employment normally involves an agreement 
to pay wages, it will be inferred that the parties intend to 
contract for payment of wages in the manner normal to employ­
ment of that type. It would be exceedingly unlikely that 
courts today would fail to find a way to make such an inference 
But the point at issue is not whether a way could be found to 
infer a promise to pay in specific cases, but what are the 
implications of the absence of a fundamental obligation to 
pay as regards the nature of the relationship. Though the 
absence of that obligation can be explained in terms of the 
structure of the employment contract and the application 
thereto of general contractual principles, it can be traced 
to the origins of the master-servant, relationship and to its 
continuing status-oriented nature. For it is a relationship 
between one who serves, and one for whom service is performed. 
The obligations of the party for whom service is performed 
can be simply expressed as the acceptance of the service - 
by the continued provision of 'employment', the continued 
willingness to treat the other as occupying the role of servant
1. The absence of such obligation - absurd in practice - is 
explained in law by the operation of the rules relating 
to formation of the contract: the requirements of offer, 
acceptance and consideration. Consideration (the price 
of each promise) need not take the form - from the employ­
er's side - of an agreement to pay wages. It could, in 
appropriate circumstances, be construed out of a promise 
to provide work or accommodation. In most cases, the 
consideration for one party's promise will be the promise 
of the other : the employee's promise to work will be the 
consideration for a promise by the employer to pay wages, 
and those promises may be either impliedly or expressly 
made.
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When one turns to the person who serves, one will find, 
as would be expected, much more elaborate types of obliga­
tion, which can - moreover - be fitted into a framework of 
contractual terms only with great difficulty. Two of these 
obligations parallel the master's obligation to employ; the 
servant must enter into the employment, and continue therein 
for the agreed period or until justified in leaving. While 
the first obligation is definitely contractual, all the other 
obligations of the employee are more clearly aspects of a 
status-based relationship than of a contract. One has 
already been mentioned - the obligation to continue in the 
master's employ until its expiration or until departure is 
justified otherwise.1 23 Lapse of time is an issue which calls 
forth another bevy of implied terms - presumptions of yearly 
hiring,^  presumptions of duration based on the period for 
which wages are expressed, and so on. These implications 
disguise the fact that the parties seldom advert to such 
questions. They wish their relationship to continue for as 
long as it remains congenial to them. Furthermore, the 
presentation of the issue in the guise of contract with its 
overtones of mutuality obscures the fact that the party who
accepts service is given a much greater opportunity to bring
3the relationship to an end than the party who serves.
1. That is, until the expiration of a fixed term; or until 
the expiration of the required period of notice; or 
until the employer commits a breach of an essential 
term of the contract, which,by amounting to a denial of 
obligations, entitles the employee to treat himself as 
discharged from any further performance.
2. Healy v The Law Book Co. of A/sia Pty Ltd (1942) 66 C.L.R.
252. Now displaced by the presumption of reasonable 
notice - Richardson v Koefod [1969], 1 W.L.R. 1812;
Thorpe v S.A.N.F.L. («1974) 10 S . A . S . R. 17.
3. Because the greater positive obligations of the employee 
involve many more occasions for misconduct or lack of 
care entitling the employer to discharge him.
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Apart from these obligations to enter into and
continue in the master's employment/ the servant's duty can
be comprehensively described as a duty 'of faithful service’:
that is, he is bound 'to obey all the lawful orders of his
master, and to be honest and diligent in his master's
business' /  or 'to act faithfully and in accordance with the
2interests of his employer'. It is a breach of this duty
3of faithful service to disobey an order, be guilty of other
4misconduct, fail to exercise reasonable care and skill in
5the performance of duties, disclose information which - in 
the master's interest - should be kept secret. Thus the 
party who serves must give faithful, careful, competent, 
prompt service to the master (who is obliged to accept such 
service only if he requires and requests it).
1. Smith, op. cit., p.99.
2. Fridman, op. cit., p.446. See also Robb v Green,
[1895] 2 Q.B. 315; Kirchner v Gruban [1909] 1 Ch. 413; 
Wessex Dairies Ltd v Smith [1935] 2 K.B. 80; Ormonoid
Roofing and Asphalts Ltd v Bitumenoids (1931) 31 S.R.
(N.S.W.) 347; Ansell Rubber Co. Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber
Industries [1967] V.R.37; Hivac Ltd v Park Royal 
Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] 1 Ch. 169.
3. Turner v Mason (1845) 1 M. & W. 112; Adami v Maison de
Luxe (1924) 35 C.L.R. 143; Pepper v Webb [1969] 1 W.L.R. 
514; contra Laws v London Chronicle, [1959] 2 All E.R.
285.4. Clouston v Corry [1906] A.C. 122; Orr v University of
Tasmania (1957) 100 C.L.R. 526; Tomlinson v L.M.S.
Railway [1944] 1 All E.R. 537; Sinclair v Neighbour 
[1967] 2 Q.B. 279.
5. Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co.Ltd [1957]
A.C. 555; Kashemije Stud Pty Ltd v Hawkes (1978)
1 N.S.W.L.R. 143.
Ormonoid Roofing and Asphalts Ltd v Bitumenoids, op. cit.; 
Ansell Rubber Co. Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries, 
op. cit.; Bents Brewery v Hogan, [1945] 2 All E.R. 570.
6.
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The extent of these duties obviously testifies to the
status element. An example of this is the duty of obedience.
The law states this as a duty to obey all lawful orders.^
Provided an employee is not ordered to perform an illegal act
2or one which will endanger his life or health, the order
must be obeyed. Obedience is required even in situations
where the employee would never have intended an agreement 
3to obey. The process of implication of terms is thus
selective. Can it really be argued that an employee would
have intended to agree to obey a master so totally that she
would be unable to visit a dying mother if the master ordered
4her not to, or - rather - refused her permission to do so?
The servant's duty to exercise appropriate skill and 
competence is another obligation demonstrating the failure of 
the 'contract of employment' to comply with the underlying 
philosophy of contract, and the unreal nature of the terms 
implied into the employment contract. The employee is bound 
to exercise the skill requisite for the task because, it is 
argued, his contracting to perform that task involves a 
warranty that he possesses the appropriate skills as well as 
a promise to use them. This doctrine is traced back to the
1. It is sometimes stated as a duty to obey all lawful and 
reasonable orders. There does not, however, seem to be 
a right to disobey an order which, though lawful, is 
unreasonable. For evidence of a trend towards the 
establishment of such a right, see Laws v London Chron­
icle , op. cit., and Federated Liquor and Allied Indus- 
tries Employees' Union of Australia, N.S.W. Branch v 
North Bondi R.S.L. Club Ltd, in the N.S.W. Industrial 
Commission, No. 288 of 1980, 15 April 1980 (unreported).
2. Robson v Sykes [1938] 2 All E.R. 612; Bouzourou v 
Ottoman Bank [1930] A.C. 271; Ottoman Bank v Chakharian 
[1930] A.C. 277.
3. Turner v Mason, op. cit.
4. Ibid. ~
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case of Harmer v Cornelius in 1859,  ^where a man, who was 
engaged after answering an advertisement for scene-painters, 
was found not to have the desired skills, and was discharged. 
Willes J. said:
if an apothecary, a watchmaker or an attorney be 
employed for a reward they each impliedly undertake 
to possess and exercise reasonable skill in their 
separate arts. The public profession of an art is 
a representation and undertaking to all the world 
that the professor possesses the requisite ability 
and skill. An express promise or express representa- 
tation in the particular case is not necessary. It 
may be, that if there is no general and no particular 
representation of ability and skill the workman 
undertakes no responsibility.
The last sentence of the passage from Willes J., read
in conjunction with his reference to 'skilled labourer,
artisan or artist ' [italics mine] might suggest that it is
only persons who take on jobs requiring a particular art or
skill who will be held to have impliedly represented the
possession of a competence appropriate to the employment.
If this were so, a pantry-maid, general servant or labourer
would not be bound by such an obligation. The likelihood
of that interpretation is, however, lessened by the
continuation of the passage:
If a gentleman, for example, should employ a man 
that is known never to have done anything but sweep 
a crossing to clean or mend his watch, the employer 
probably would be held to have incurred all risks 
himself.3
Thus the absence of a 'general and... particular representation 
of ability and skill' will be found only where a person is
1. 5 C.B. (N.S.) 236.
2. Ibid., p. 247.
3. Ibid.
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hired for a job for which he is known to have no qualifications. 
Given that this representation or warranty of skill is in most 
cases purely a legal fiction, the implication and the resulting 
obligation indicate clearly the oppressively hierarchic nature 
of the master-servant relationship. Much hiring today takes 
place with only the sketchiest preliminary negotiation about 
the duties to be performed and the skill required to perform 
them, and this was even more common in the nineteenth century. 
Some employers have often a very vague idea of the tasks they 
will expect carried out; others will expect the employee to 
turn his hand to everything he is directed to do. Again this 
was particularly true in the nineteenth century where the 
habit of hiring 'generally useful servants' eventually led to 
the development of a new description for such a worker: simply
a 'general useful'. Added to these broad requirements of 
employers are the economic exigencies that prevent many workers 
from being as selective about the jobs for which they apply 
as a strict application of the concept of a warranty of skill 
would suggest. The need to accept employment thus forces an 
employee into a relationship where he can be penalised for any 
inadequacy in his skill for the jobs to which he is put 
(except in outlandish cases of known street sweepers being set 
to clean watches). Meanwhile the other party is not held to 
have warranted any skill in the operation of his business - so 
that if the master's business fails through his lack of skill 
as manager, the employee has no recourse against the master for
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the loss of his job; but if the employee's work does not 
demonstrate an acceptable standard of skill, the employer 
can discharge him  ^and sue him for any pecuniary loss he 
can show to have flowed from that lack of skill.
Another element of the employee's duty of faithful 
service is his duty to preserve confidentiality. A lack of 
mutuality in the obligations of employer and employee can 
again be observed when this duty is compared with the 
employer's duties as to the employee's 'character'. The
employee's obligation means he must not disclose his
2 3employer's trade secrets nor the name of his customers,
nor divulge any information about his employer's business
which might be damaging to the employer. The employer's
duty as regards the employee's character or reputation is
in no way commensurate. Unless he expressly agrees to
give a character reference when the employment ends, he is
under no duty to do so. The limit of his duty is that if
he does choose to give a reference, it must be true. If not,
4he can be liable for defamation. Thus the employer is at 
liberty to give the employee an unfavourable reference 
providing it can be shown to be true, but the employee may 
not divulge unfavourable information about the state of 
the employer's business, however true it may be.
1. Provided the lack of skill amounts to a breach going
to the root of the contract. If not, the employer will 
be limited to an action for damages - the contract 
remaining for the moment on foot.
2. Ansell Rubber Co. Pty Ltd v Applied Rubber Industries, 
op. cit.
3. Wessex Dairies Ltd v Smith, op. cit.; Robb v Green, 
op. cit.
Liffen v Watson [1940] 1 K.B. 556.4.
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Part III. Variations from Common Law Principles in the
Masters and Servants Acts.
In this section, I want to look at the degree to which
the Masters and Servants Acts incorporated the common law,
and the extent to which they altered common law principles
and requirements. The main offences by servants against
1 2masters dealt with by the Acts were absconding, misconduct,
and loss of property; the main offences by masters against
4 . 5servants were failure to pay wages, illtreatment, andgdetention of property. These can all be distilled out of
common law obligations.
The offences by servants are clearly related to the
7basic common law duty of faithful service. A servant who, ghaving commenced his employment, absented himself therefrom, 
would clearly be in breach of that duty. A servant who failed 
to enter into a master's employ when he had contracted to do so 
would be in breach of the obligation to enter the employment 
relationship and continue therein for the stipulated period,
1. 1828, S.l; 1840, S .2; 1845, S.2; 1857 , S.2; 1902 , S.4.
2 . Ibid.
3. 1828, S. 3; 1840, S.l; 1845, S.4; 1857 , S.4; 1902, S . 6 .
4 . 1840, S . 3 ; 1845, S .5; 1857, S.5; 1902 , S . l .
5. 1828, S . 4 ; 1845, Ss. 9 and 11.
6. 1857 , S. 8; 1902, S.10.
7 . Supra , PP. 126-127.8. Supra , note: 1.
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discussed in Part II of this chapter.
The various activities which were prosecuted in terms 
of 'misconduct' would all amount to breaches of the duty of 
faithful service. The law says, as seen earlier, that the 
duty can be breached by disobedience or misconduct. Charges 
of disobedience, insolence, refusal to work, and negligence 
would correspond to breaches resulting from disobedience 
or misconduct. Where charges for 'misconduct' under the Acts 
were based on 'uselessness' or 'incompetence', they would 
relate in common law terms not to breach of the duty of 
faithful service by misconduct, but rather to breach resulting 
from failure to exercise reasonable care and skill. 
Prosecutions for wilful loss of the master's property would 
relate to breaches of the common law duty by misconduct; 
prosecutions for negligent loss (before the elimination 
of that offence in 1857) would involve breach of the duty 
to exercise reasonable care and skill. Thus the Masters 
and Servants Acts provided for litigation of offences 
constituted by breaches of the basic implied obligations 
of a servant at common law.
It was suggested in Part II of this Chapter that there 
is not, of necessity, a basic obligation on an employer to 
pay wages, but that in the majority of cases, if there 
is not in fact an express term to that effect, the court 
will imply such a term as having been obviously within 
the contemplation of the parties. Therefore, the provision
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for prosecution of employers for failure to pay agreed wages
would base itself on that common law obligation - express or
implied. It is worth noting that the statistics show an
intriguing recognition of the suggested imbalance between
implied obligations of employee and employer. It was
shown that the duty of faithful service is basic and
incontrovertible while the duty to pay wages though usual
is not essential. It is arguable that this explains in
part the fact that there were far more instances of wages
claims being dismissed (as unsubstantial) than there were
absconding and misconduct charges so disposed of.^
After wages claims, the most common charge laid by
employees was an allegation of failure to provide the
2rations agreed on. This charge was not provided for
in those actual terms in the legislation, except in the
provisions in the 1845 Act allowing for prosecutions where
3an employer ill-treated his employee. In the absence 
of an ill-treatment provision, it could have been argued 
to have been covered by the section dealing with wages
4claims on the basis that the wage included agreed amounts 
of money and goods. Such an interpretation would, of 
course, be subject to the possible application in the colony
5of the Truck Acts which prohibited the payment of wages in 
any form other than money.
1. The number of claims for wages (or rations) dismissed was 
755. The number of charges by employers against employees 
dismissed was 135.
2. 38 charges of failure to provide proper rations were made. 
(This compares to 4,608 claims for wages).
3. 1845; Ss.9 & 11.
4. 1840, S.3; 1845, S.5; 1857, S.5; 1902, S.7.
5. Great Britain - 1831, 1 & 2 Gul. IV, c.37; 1887, 50 & 51 Vic 
c.46; 1896, 59 & 60 Vic c.44. The first New South Wales 
Truck Act was Act no. 55 of 1900.
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Detention of a servant's property was made an offence
under the Act.“1 2' This would have to be based on an implied 
2term that the master was bound to deliver up to a departing 
servant any property of that servant in his possession or 
control. Since the detention could have amounted at least 
to a tortious act (detinue or conversion) if not in fact 
to a criminal one (larceny), the implication of such a term 
would seem to be an obvious area for judicial creativity.
Thus it can be seen that the offences covered by the 
Masters and Servants Acts follow the obligations imposed by 
the contract of employment at common law. It is in the 
area of penalties for such breaches that the Masters and 
Servants Acts departed from the common law. Not all of 
the variations in penalties imposed are in fact sanctioned 
in clear terms by the legislation, but one obvious variation 
was made in the early Acts - that was the provision for 
imposition of prison terms on offending employees. At 
common law, actions for breach of the employment contract 
resulted, where the breach was established, in an award of 
damages. Under the Masters and Servants Acts until 1857 , 
breaches by employees made them liable to a term of up to 
three months' imprisonment. The Acts therefore imported 
criminal penalties into the civil law. If employment 
contracts are freely entered by parties calculating the 
advantage to themselves of the performance by the other
1. 1857, S.8; 1902, S .10.
2. Implied from the circumstances of the particular case 
(that is - 'implied by conduct') rather than implied 
as a generally-applicable term like the duty of, 
faithful service (that i§ - 'implied by law').
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of the contractual obligation - as other contracts are
thought to be'*' - then it seems unwarranted that if one of
the parties rethinks the calculation, and decides to 'buy
his way out' by a compensable breach, he should be subjected
to punishment by the State for his repudiation of a private
bargain. In 1967 in Coulls v Bagot1 234s Executor and Trustee 
2Co. Ltd , Windeyer J. said that performance of a contract
was the primary right of a promisee, and damages an
3ancillary right, (thus suggesting that the equitable remedy 
of a decree of specific performance was available as of 
right and whether or not damages were an adequate remedy ) .
4It was argued by many, and justifiably so in strict legal 
theory, that His Honour was indulging in unfounded heresy. 
Yet the Masters and Servants Act provisions for imprisonment 
impose not just a duty to perform (the duty correlative to 
the promisee-plaintiff's alleged right to performance) but 
a liability to imprisonment in place of an obligation to pay 
damages, which - Windeyer J. dissenting - is the primary 
legal remedy in contract.
Furthermore, this introduction of a punitive element 
into an area where the basic common law principle is one
1. Though contract theory still upholds this interpretation, 
in practice there are an increasing number of inroads 
being made into the free operation which contracts may 
have - as, for example, through consumer protection 
legislation, and the Unfair Contracts jurisdiction of the 
Industrial Commission under S.88F of the New South Wales 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940.
2. (1967) 119 C.L.R. 460.
3. Ibid., at 504.
4. For example, R.P. Meagher, W.M.C. Gummow and J.R. Lehane, 
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, Sydney, 1975, p.417.
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of compensation operated selectively. Only employees
were punished for breach of contract by imprisonment. Where
employers were charged under the Acts and the charge found
to be proved, the magistrates would order that outstanding 
2wages be paid. In an action at law for breach of contract 
by an employer in not paying wages, if the allegation of 
non-payment were proved, he would be ordered to pay a sum 
of damages which would be equivalent to the amount of wages 
not paid. The penalty imposed on the employer thus had a 
very similar character to the compensatory nature of a 
common law damages action.
Even when the 1857 Act eliminated imprisonment as 
the primary penalty and provided for initial imposition
3of a fine, the interposition of criminal sanctions continued,
for fines are criminal penalties - pecuniary criminal
penalties, essentially punitive rather than compensatory.
Although debates in the various colonial legislatures praised
the substitution of fines for imprisonment as creating
equality of treatment under the Act in regard to employer 
4and employee, this can be seen not to be so when one looks 
to the nature of the processes involved. For employees 
were still subject to criminal penalties and employers only 
to civil ones.
As well as imprisonment and, later, fines, the Acts
1. See H. McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 14th ed., London, 
1980, pp.10 and 21; and A.I. Ogus, The Law of Damages, 
London, 1973, pp.17-18 and 283-375.
2. 1840, S.3; 1845, S.5; 1857, S.5; 1902, S.7.
3. S.2.
4. See supra notel, p.114.
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provided for forfeiture of wages'^ by employees. The 
meaning of this provision is not totally clear. It 
could mean (i) that wages owing to the employee were 
forfeited and should, instead of being paid to that employee, 
be paid by the employer to the Revenue; or (ii) that the 
wages owing were forfeited and that the employee was 
relieved of the obligation to pay the wages. It is 
probable that the second interpretation is the correct 
one. The first interpretation would result in a situtation 
no different from the imposition of a fine, and there would 
seem to be no purpose for the provision or use of two over­
lapping sections.
In one way, forfeiting wages so that the employer 
was freed of the obligation to pay is much closer to the 
compensatory nature of a damages claim than the requirement 
that the employee pay a fine to the State. There is, 
however, some conflict between the provision for forfeiture 
and the principles of common law in relation to employment.
At common law, where an employee has committed a breach 
of his contract - for example, by leaving without proper 
notice- if there are outstanding wages, the employer cannot 
keep those wages or an appropriate portion thereof to cover 
the damages he would have received had he sued for breach 
of contract. And if the employment is covered by an industrial 
award, that sort of self-help is a breach of the award and
1. 1840, Ss. 2 and 7; 1845, S.2; 1857, Ss.2 and 4.
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makes the employer liable to a penalty.
While it is true that the employee who fails to give 
the proper notice is in breach of his contract the 
employer cannot deduct this as an amount from the 
total money owed to the employee nor can the 
employer withhold money where he anticipates that 
the employee may be about to walk off the job. 1
Yet a sentence of forfeiture of wages directs the employer
to deduct a sum from wages owing. As for the withholding
of wages where an employer anticipates the employee leaving
- at common law, it is a repudiatory breach of contract
by the employer and would justify the employee in leaving.
But in the context of the regulation of employment in
nineteenth century New South Wales and of the Masters and
Servants Acts, it was behaviour practised by perspicacious
masters, and recommended by the 1845 Select Committee:
your Committee conceive that employers 
should attend to the check upon misconduct 
which they may possess by not paying... 
servants in full until the periods of 
their engagements have expired. 2
The pecuniary penalties imposed on employees were 
limited by reality and by the jurisdiction in fact granted.
3The magistrates could impose fines of up to £10 only.
The orders for forfeiture of wages could cover the whole
4or any part of the wages owing. They were thus circumscribed 
by the limited funds available to employees. Provision for 
larger fines would often have been pointless, unless what 
was wanted was frequent recourse to the default sentences
1. Brooks, op.cit., p.60
2. Select Committee of Inquiry, op.cit., p.509
3. 1857, S .2; 1902, S.4.
4. 1845, S .2; 1857, S.2; 1902, S.4.
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of imprisonment for non-payment of fines.
Reality did not dictate the limitation of the pecuniary
obligations of employers who (for the most part) had funds
to meet the full claims for wages or amends for ill-
treatment; nor did the limitations of their obligations
fit the basic principles of law relating to contractual
damages. As seen in Ch. 1, Part III, where claims for unpaid
wages were made, there was a jurisdictional limit of 30 
2 3in 1845 and £50 in 1857 and 1902. The order for payment
of 'amends' - something which sounds much more in character
with the compensatory nature of a damages award than the
punitive nature of a fine - after a successful claim for
4ill-treatment under the 1845 Act was limited to a maximum 
of £10 in the case of piece-workers under Section 9 and to a 
maximum of the equivalent of six months' wages for workers 
hired for a fixed or indefinite period under Section 11. This 
limitation reflected the policy of the Acts, and the concerns 
of the legislators and the interests they represented rather 
than the legal doctrines relating to contract. For the basis 
of measuring contractual damages is the establishment of a sum 
which will put the plaintiff in the position in which he 
would have been if the contract had not been broken but had
5been fully and properly performed. Thus, where a shepherd 
in the 1850s who was handling two flocks was owed a year's
1. 1857,Ss.2 and 4.
2. S .5.
3. 1857, S.5; 1902, S.7.
4 . S s. 9 and 11.
5. Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850 per Parke B.
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wages at the end of his (normal) twelve-month agreement, 
that would have amounted probably to between £60 and £80;^ 
so that if the employer had refused to pay, the shepherd's 
damages in contract would have been £60 - £80. By limiting 
the order to £30 (or £50), the Acts flout this principle of 
compensating for the loss flowing from the breach.
The arbitral jurisdiction under S.16 (1845) and S.10
(1857) has been described in Ch.l Part HCL. It appears
(in the absence of records of its exercise) that this
aspect of the jurisdiction under the Acts partook a little
more closely of the character of common law actions than
did the prosecutions under the absconding, misconduct and
loss of property sections and even the wages and ill-treatment
sections. The decision of the magistrates was to be by 
2 3'order' or 'order or award' (although the 1857 'order or 
award' was to be enforced by imposition of 'a fine or penalty'). 
The 1845 provision did not impose any limit in money terms 
on the order to be made, and thus would have enabled proper 
compensation according to contractual principles. The 1857 
section however introduced a £ 10 limit.
Another penalty or order directed frequently at 
absconding employees was the requirement that they should 
return to their service. This is completely contradictory 
to common law principles, but since it is nowhere provided
1. New South Wales. Statistical Register, 1837-59.
Table 63. Rates of Wages. The average annual wage of 
a shepherd was calculated on the basis of one flock, 
usually of 1,500-3,000 sheep. Where a shepherd was given 
two flocks (as often happened), the wage was doubled.
The average wage for one flock in the 1850 s was £30-£35.
2. 1845, S.16.
3. 1857, S.10.
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for in the actual sections of the Acts, it appears to be 
a variation on the common law introduced by the magistrates 
rather than by the legislation, and will therefore be 
dealt with in Part IV.
Those sections of the legislation which covered 
harbouring, employing and inciting the servants of another1 
(see Ch.1 Part III) have a clear relation to the provisions 
of common law with respect to criminal and civil conspiracy 
and other 'economic torts' such as intimidation and inducing 
breach of contract, and an examination of that relation 
would - I suspect - be a most valuable and illuminating 
exercise. Here my concern is with the employment relationship 
itself - as dealt with by the common law, the Acts, and the 
magistrates - and not with interference with that relationship 
by persons not parties thereto.
It can be seen from this analysis that the offences 
covered by the Acts included most breaches of their common 
law duties by employees, but only some breaches of common 
law duties by employers. For, despite the limited nature 
of the implied duties of employers, particular employment 
contracts might in fact subject employers to a number of 
express duties. Of these, only the duties to pay wages, 
return the employee's property and (in 1845) refrain from 
ill-treatment of the employee were actionable by the 
summary procedures of the Masters and Servants Acts.
1. 1845 , S. 15 ; 1857 , S. 9 ; 1902 , S.12.
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It has also been shown that, whilst these offences conform 
to (though they do not exhaust) common law breaches, the 
penalties provided by the Acts involved considerable 
departure from the practices and principles of ordinary 
contract law.
These legislative alterations to the common law 
were carried even further by the magistrates in their 
application of the Acts - sometimes, probably, as a 
result of settled practice, sometimes through inadequate 
acquaintance with the law.
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Part IV Variations from the Common Law and the
Provisions of the Acts in the Decisions 
of Magistrates.
The records of cases heard under the Acts show that 
magistrates were not always fully cognisant of the principles 
of the common law of employment as sketched in Parts I and 
II of this chapter, nor were they consistently correct in 
their interpretation of the Acts. This is not altogether 
surprising. As to the first area of default, most magistrates 
were not trained in law, being simply Justices of the Peace 
appointed on their standing in the community, and those 
decisions which were in error were for the most part made by 
such Justices rather than by the Police (later Stipendiary) 
Magistrates who were career personnel; and even the Police 
Magistrates occasionally gave faulty decisions,"1' while many 
of the decisions of even the lay magistrates demonstrated a 
commendable grasp of legal principle. As to the second issue - 
incorrect interpretation of the Acts - the analysis in Chapter 2 
shows that the legislation incorporated complexities and other 
obscurities sufficient to tax even highly-trained legal 
minds.
Probably the most common and most outstanding 'error'
was the imposition of sentences not provided in the legislation. 
One such sentence was cancellation of the agreement.
Section 16 of 1845 and Section 10, 1857, which created the 
arbitral jurisdiction, provided for an order cancelling an 
agreement, but this was not included in the powers given under 
Sections 2, 3 and 4. There were 82 cases out of the 8199
1 . Infra, p.p. 158 and 160-161.
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I have examined in which an order of cancellation of agree­
ment was made, and they all appear from the records to have 
been brought under Sections 2-4 rather than Sections 10 or 
16. The power to cancel agreements was in fact given to 
magistrates in the Statute 5 Eliz c.4 but the 82 instances 
of the order were all made in cases brought under the separate 
Masters and Servants Acts passed by the New South Wales 
legislature. These orders were therefore not justified by 
the provisions from which the magistrates' jurisdiction over 
the cases arose.
Even more unjustified was the imposition of a sentence 
requiring an employee to return to his service. There is no 
provision anywhere in the Acts for such an order, and it 
runs counter to one of the most fundamental principles of the 
common law - that one cannot get, directly or indirectly, 
specific performance of a contract of employment.  ^ Yet 
that is exactly what an order to return to service amounts 
to. Despite the total lack of judicial or legislative 
authority for such orders, their occurrence was sufficiently 
widespread as to suggest a settled practice. In 140 cases 
a direction to return to service was the sole order made in 
decision of the dispute. In a great many other cases where 
a sentence of imprisonment was imposed or an order to pay a 
fine or forfeit wages made, this was accompanied by an order 
to return to service.
This practice involved both breach of common law 
and a departure from the jurisdiction conferred by
1. Johnson v Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co. (1853)
3 De M.G. and G. 914. Contrast Hill v C.A. Parsons 
and Co. Ltd [1972] Ch. 305. See also I.C.F. Spry, 
Equitable Remedies, 2nd ed., Sydney, 1980, pp.109-112.
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the Acts. The other instances of error which can be 
detected in those cases where the records contain sufficient 
detail erred against either the legislative provisions or the 
common law.
Those cases which were misapplications of the legislation
were mostly denials of jurisdiction. For example, there were
two cases which the magistrates declined to hear on the grounds
that,, as the parties' agreements stated no specific term, they
did not come within the Act.  ^ Yet the Act said it covered
'any servant [who] shall contract with any person to serve
2him for any time or in any manner...' [italics mine]. The contract 
of general hiring or indefinite duration was firmly established 
at that time, being subject to the presumption of a yearly 
hiring - that is, that where no term was specified, the contract 
was presumed to be for a year (and therefore, in the absence 
of contrary agreement, a year's notice was required).
There are several cases where the Bench denied juris­
diction, without their reasons being recorded in the report.
In Bennett v Starr, a wages claim in Armidale on 20/1/1863, the 
plaintiff alleged he was entitled to payment for 31 days 
work at £2 per week. The contract was oral and no express agree­
ment had been made as to the rate of wages, but the plaintiff 
had worked at the same task for Starr the previous harvest 
and had received £2 per week. It was perfectly open to the 
Court to rule that a wage of £2 per week was a term of the 
contract to be implied from the circumstances. If they did
1. Hyam v Hughes, Shoalhaven, 4/5/1858 and Sheppard v Burke, Merriwa, 14/2/1866.
1857, S.2. :2 .
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not think that the circumstances justified implication of
that term, then the parties’ conduct would have supported
implication of a term that the employer should pay a
reasonable wage, and it would have been for the Bench todeter-
mine what a reasonable wage was. Yet their finding was that
they had no jurisdiction in the case.1 23 The Nowra Court also
declined jurisdiction in the case of Blayney v Longfield on
28/10/1862. Blayney gave evidence he was employed drawing
timber at 2/6 per 100 ft, and also employed by the day at
15/-, 16/- and 18/- per day. The reason that the magistrates
dismissed the claim as not being under the Act is unclear.
Possibly the amount claimed was over the £50 limit on wages 
2claims. Alternatively there may have been evidence not
recorded which showed Blayney was not employed for wages but 
hired as an independent contractor. On the face of the record, 
however, the refusal of jurisdiction seems unwarranted.
The denial of jurisdiction by the Tenterfield Bench in
3the case of Murray v Hammerman is even more clearly in 
error. The charge was 'Inducing C. Buchie to abscond', and the 
Court said the case was 'not within the Masters and Servants 
Act', yet Section 9 of the Act4 said 'If any person... shall 
cause induce or persuade any such servant...to violate any 
agreement... which he may have entered into to serve with any 
master, such person so offending shall... forfeit and pay a 
penalty not exceeding ten pounds...'.
1. See also Starr v Feny, Armidale, 9/10/1863 for refusal 
of jurisdiction.
2. 1857, S.5.
3. 8/4/1865.
4. The 1857 Act. 1
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The case of Russell v Flynn in Warialda on 31/7/1854 was 
another instance of misapplication of the legislation. The 
case was remanded until the 17th August for the attendance of a 
second magistrate. Section 2 of the 1845 Act did specify that 
the cases be tried by 'two or more Justices', but the Justices 
Act provided that a Police Magistrate could exercise any 
jurisdiction conferred on two justices  ^ and Police Magistrate 
Bligh was the single magistrate before whom Russell v Flynn 
had been called on.
Understandably, cases where magistrates were incorrect 
in their application of common law principles were more 
numerous than those where they misapplied the Acts; for copies 
of the Acts would have been provided in the court houses, but 
volumes of law reports and treatises would have been unlikely 
to be available even had the magistrates known where to look 
in them for the law. The error in decisions was often to 
convict parties for absconding or misconduct when that was 
justified by a prior breach of contract by the employers. For 
example, many contracts of the nineteenth century, particulary 
where the employee was a rural worker, involved an agreed 
obligation on the employer to supply rations. So common was this 
that there came to be a standard ration of so many pounds of 
meat, flour, sugar, tea and salt. Where that obligation 
existed, a failure by the employer to supply the rations 
regularly was a breach of the contract amounting to a 
repudiation, and entitled the employee to treat himself as no 
longer bound. If an employee left because he had not received
►
1. 14 Vic No. 43, S.33.
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rations, he was not absconding. He was exercising his 
right of rescission, and he would have had an additional right 
to sue his employer for damages for breach of the contract.
Yet magistrates sometimes fined or imprisoned employees for 
absconding when they had left after the employer had failed 
to supply the agreed rations. In Wagga on 17/6/1851,
J.G. Church prosecuted George Green for absconding. Though 
Green said in his evidence that he had a right to 'abscond' 
because of the irregularity of his rations, he was sentenced to 
two months imprisonment in Goulburn gaol. Alexander Ross, 
a shepherd for F.R.C. Master of Tenterfield, brought his 
flock in to the head station and left because he was frequently 
left without rations. However on 13/1/1854, he was sentenced 
to two months imprisonment. Not only did magistrates ignore 
the contractual rights of employees in such a situation; some 
even ignored the employees' rights under the Acts themselves, 
as in the case of William Vivors v Carl Hamberg in Wellingrove 
on 9/9/1856. Hamberg was out of rations and left to get a 
summons against his master for the breach. He too was convicted 
of absconding and ordered to be imprisoned in the lock-up on 
bread and water for a week.
Another way in which magistrates failed to give employees 
their contractual rights was to uphold a refusal to work as 
misconduct when what the employee had refused to do was work 
outside the terms of the contract. At common law, the employee's 
duty to obey is limited to orders relating to the work contract­
ually agreed upon. Yet when John Callaghan, who was hired as 
a shepherd by William Vakins of Wellingrove, was ordered to go 
to the head station and sink- a well, and declined - saying he 
did not understand that sort of work - he failed in his claim 
for wages on 23/L/1851 before the Wellingrove Bench.
149
Magistrates frequently failed to appreciate that, even
where an employer had grounds for a charge of misconduct against
an employee, that did not in law entitle the employer to hold
back wages already earned. The employer's rights are to bring
an action for damages, or to lay a charge under the Masters
and Servants Acts, but the obligation to pay wages is not
displaced. “ Employers sometimes justified such withholding
of wages by arguing that they believed the employee was about
to abscond and that they kept back the wages to ensure that
the employee would continue at his work. This approach had
2been recommended by the 1845 Select Committee but it was 
nevertheless a breach of contract. Its acceptance by 
magistrates, as in Pocock v Campbell, Wellingrove, 3/2/1852 and 
Donoghue v Felgate, Wilcannia, 14/9/1883, was therefore an 
erroneous application of law. Similarly, the Hill End Police 
Magistrate, G.W. Lees, was in error when on 19/8/1873 he 
dismissed George Brinchley's claim for £13/7/6 in wages against 
John Cahill Jr. Cahill had defended his failure to pay on 
the grounds that Brinchley owed money to his [Cahill's] father. 
That fact had no bearing on Cahill Jr's obligation to pay 
Brinchley the wages earned fencing, and Lees should have 
realised that it did not.
The principles of common law regarding notice of termination 
of the employment contract were also set at naught by some 
magistrates. When J. Atkinson sued T. Coupland for wages in 
Young on 21/4/1863, he gave evidence that he had been given
1.
2.
See, in relation to failure to give notice, Brooks, op.cit.,
p. 60.
Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 509.
J--> KJ
only £1 after a week's work. He had been hired at 25/- 
per week and then discharged without notice at the end of 
the week. Though he claimed that Coupland should have given 
him a week's notice, Police Magistrate Pearce only ordered 
Coupland to pay 5/- (the balance unpaid for the week worked) 
and costs. But on the evidence, Atkinson was entitled to a 
further 25/- wages in lieu of notice, for in the case of a weekly 
hiring there is a prima facie entitlement to a week's notice 
on either side. In that case, the failure to apply correctly 
the law as to notice disadvantaged the employee. The same error 
was made, to the disadvantage of the employer, in Barry v 
Salisbury in Kiama on 10/1/1861. Catherine Barry claimed 
£15/3/6 owing in wages. J. Salisbury admitted the amount was 
owing but said he was entitled to a week's notice. The Bench - 
Waugh & Kendall, JsP - decided the hearing was by the week and 
that therefore no notice was required. They were wrong.
Therefore when they awarded Catherine Barry her wages, they could 
have also made a finding of breach by her in not giving notice 
and set off against the £15/3/6 the damages for her breach, 
which would have been a week's wages.
There are other instances where magistrates' errors 
in the application of common law worked to the advantage of 
the employee. One such case was Jones v Kirkwood, a wages 
claim in Armidale on 29/5/1860. Jones was employed by Kirkwood 
attending an engine and flitching (squaring timber). He 
claimed £8/5/6 which Kirkwood refused to pay. Kirkwood's
1. Macken, McCarry and Moloney, op. cit. , p. 50.
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attorney argued that as Jones was a weekly servant, and what 
he claimed was part of a week's wages, the week not having 
expired, Kirkwood was under no obligation to pay. He was 
right,  ^ but the Bench ordered Kirkwood to pay the sum 
claimed, less an amount to be subtracted for rations.
In another case, Julia Banks sued George Grey for wages
in Kiama on 28/7/1859. She had been hired by Grey's agent
in Sydney at 10/- per week but when she arrived at Kiama, Grey
said he would pay only 8/- and after a week, when he asked
if she would accept 5/- per week, she said 'she knew nothing to
prevent it.' Whatever the morals of holding her to this
admission - a lonely and unprotected woman in a strange town
a sea voyage from Sydney - at law there was a variation of the 
2contract and the decision by the Kiama magistrates that she 
was entitled to the extra 2/- per week for the four months 
she worked was, strictly, incorrect.
Also wrong but commendable was the decision of the 
Tenterfield magistrates in the case of Susan Shapland v A.Telfer 
for wages on 26/4/1870. Susan was the domestic servant of 
W.B. Christian and claimed to have been unjustly dismissed 
after three months of a twelve month engagement - being put 
out of the house at 11 at night. She said in evidence she 
wanted at least six months' wages because of wrongful dis­
missal. Few cases in the nineteenth century dealt with an 
employee's rights to notice, and therefore to damages for failure 
to give notice, in the case of 12 month hirings, but it is very
1. Taylor v Laird (1856) 1 H. & N. 266; and see Macken,
McCarry and Moloney, ibid., pp. 102-104.
Guest, op. cit., pp. 487-488.2.
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doubtful that the courts would have held employees entitled 
to six months notice, even though employers may have been en­
titled to twelve. Yet the Tenterfield magistrates held 
Susan was entitled to the verdict claimed, and awarded 
£•18/10/0 and costs (including, significantly, professional 
costs - in other words Susan had had legal representation!).
There seems also to be error in the decision of the 
Tenterfield Bench in the case of Meiling v Meiling for wages 
on 7/7/1868. The plaintiff was the son of the defendant and 
employed by him at £1 per week. In evidence the plaintiff 
said that he was born on 19/3/1847 and was therefore over 
21 years. But the bench dismissed the claim on the grounds 
the plaintiff was not of age when the hiring finished. The 
contractual rights of minors have been exhaustively determined 
by law, and employment contracts are undoubtedly within their 
capacity. It would therefore seem that this was a flawed
decision. However in a number of cases, minors sued through 
their next friend  ^ and it may have been the procedural problem 
of Meiling Jr suing in his own name that confused the Bench. 
They were in error there because the provision for suit through 
the next friend relates to a minor’s incapacity to approach the 
court, and Meiling when he brought his action was of age and 
therefore of full legal capacity.
J. Burke ed., Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary 6th ed., 
London, 1976, p. 231 : 'A minor...who desires to bring
an action must as a rule do so through the intervention 
of a person called a next friend, generally a relation...'.
1 .
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The final instance of error by magistrates in their 
decisions is fascinating because of the insights it gives 
into the employees' knowledge of, and insistence on, their 
contractual rights. In Warialda on 1/6/1846, Dr. Adams sued 
Charles Macdonald for misconduct. In evidence Adams said 
that the insolence which apparently constituted the misconduct 
was probably caused because he refused to write out a copy 
of the agreement for Macdonald. Despite that admission, the 
Bench - which included Police Magistrate Richard Bligh - 
ordered Macdonald to pay a fine of £4/15/6 and costs or, in 
default, to be imprisoned for two months. In 1858 there were 
petitions by the townspeople of Armidale that led to Bligh's 
removal from his then office of Clerk of Petty Sessions. *
His earlier treatment of the law and claims to rights under 
the law evidenced in this case make such agitation plausible.
1 . R. B. Walker, Old New England, Sydney, 1966, pp.57-58.
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Part V Further Issues of Law in the Decisions of
Magistrates
The point of the previous part of this Chapter was not 
to suggest that magistrates were habitually wrong or partial 
in their decisions. An examination of the cases to assess 
the verdicts is of importance in an analysis of the 
application of the legislation because we need to see how 
the legislation operated as a system of regulation of 
employment relationships. Its purpose was to bring the 
control mechanisms of the common law closer to the point 
of impact - the work-place. In assessing the effect of 
that, we must examine not only whether that process 
sometimes involved a distortion of the legal principles, 
but also whether it could be achieved by a correct application 
of those principles, and what some of the associated problems 
were.
The cases show that magistrates often were actively 
aware of the technicalities of the Acts and the scope of 
common law principles, and many decisions display a competence 
unexpected in nineteenth century rural New South Wales.
When Duncan Menzies, Superintendent for Thompson and Armytage 
of Wagga sued George Bates for absconding on 30/12/1851,
Bates denied having entered any agreement with Menzies. He 
said he had hired with Charles Armytage on account of 
Thompson and Armytage. The Bench found there was no proof 
of hiring and dismissed the case. The charge would not stand, 
for Menzies had no authority to appoint Charles Armytage to
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hire for Thompson and Armytage nor would Thompson and Armytage 
be thus brought into contractual relations with the person 
hired; they could have refused to pay Bates' wages. This 
was undoubtedly true - delegatus non potest delegare: 
unless authorised, Menzies, as the agent of Thompson and 
Armytage, could not delegate the authority they had delegated 
to him.
On other occasions, magistrates correctly refused to
hear cases on the grounds that they did not come within the
Acts. Armidale magistrates dismissed claims by employers for
negligent loss of property by employees in the 1860s, pointing
out that following the 1857 Act negligent loss was no longer
an offence.x When claims were laid simply for loss of
property, they dismissed these also: the Act required that
2the charge be for wilful loss.
In 1868, when Ebenezer Keats sued John McMaster for 
wages in Glen Innes, McMaster's attorney objected to the 
claim as being out of time, on the grounds that the information 
was not laid within six months of the matter on which it was 
based arising. Keats replied that the information was within 
time since the refusal to pay constituted the offence. This
was not so under the Act; the failure to pay the wages when
3they accrued would have been the offence, and the magistrates 
were correct in holding the objection fatal and dismissing 
the case.
1. Delfield v Fitch, Armidale, 12/3/1866
2. Starr v Nelson, Armidale, 12/3/1866
3. 1857, S.5: 'In all cases of wages not exceeding fifty
pounds which shall be due and payable to any servant...'.
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The Armidale magistrates were aware of the requirements 
of the legislation when they dismissed, on 28/8/1878, the 
charge laid by James McLean against Mary Ann Brady for 
'employing and harbouring John Day'. Section 9  ^made harbour­
ing etc. an offence in relation to 'any servant who shall have 
deserted from the service of any master' if the person who 
harboured or employed him had knowledge that he had 'deserted, 
or otherwise absconded, or absented himself from his duty'. 
McLean's information did not allege that Day had absconded nor 
that Mary Ann Brady knew that he had, and it therefore dis­
closed no offence under the Act.
Magistrates had on occasion to grapple with the problem 
of who was a servant within the meaning of the legislation. 
While some heard without quibble cases involving employees who 
would not have come within the ambit given to the interpret­
ation of the legislation in cases like Ex parte Evenett and
2R v Merewether, others gave decisions more in keeping with 
the reasoning of the superior courts. One such issue arose in 
Murray v Buckie in Tenterfield on 8/4/1865. The complainant, 
a comedian, had hired the defendant Buckie as a musician. 
Buckie had been with Murray for six months when Murray laid 
an information against him for absconding. In evidence,
Murray said the arrangement was that Buckie was to be paid 
only for the nights on which he played. Cowper and Willson 
JsP decided that the case did not come within the Masters 
and Servants Act and cited Ex parte Evenett. This decision
1.
2.
1857 Act.
Supra pp. 19-22 and 24.
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was certainly a proper application of the principle laid
down by Sir Alfred Stephen C.J. who had said that the Act
would not even cover 'a singer hired by the week and receiving 
1board’, though as I argued in Chapter 2, Stephen's decision 
was highly questionable.
In Mooney v McPherson in Glen Innes on 22.9.1868, the
magistrates dismissed a wages claim by a travelling teacher
on the grounds that a teacher was not within the Act. This
also was a faithful application of the decisions of the
Supreme Court. The finding by the Wilcannia bench that the
claim of a groom for payment for riding a losing mount in
the local races (Eastham v Hammatt, 18/6/1886) did not come
under the Act can also be justified by reference to the
2authority of the superior court decisions. It would
appear that the magistrates in Eden were less aware of the 
authorities or found some way to distinguish them, for on 
6/11/1860 they upheld the claim of Henry Seekamp for wages 
earned as editor of the Telegraph newspaper, and ordered 
W. Shaw to pay him £12 (less £9/7/6 for board).
These cases all concerned persons who were employees - 
the question was whether they were also 'servants' within 
the meaning of the legislation. A number of other cases 
where the magistrates declined to adjudicate turned on 
whether the worker was an employee or an independent contractor. 
If he came within the latter category, he was not covered by
1. Supra, p.20.
2. This case makes an interesting parallel to Parsons v Southern
Tablelands and South Coast Racing Association (1978) 1
N.S.W.L.R. 47, which was concerned with whether a jockey 
riding in the Goulburn picnic races was a deemed employee 
for the purposes of the Wörkers' Compensation Act. That 
question involved a finding as to the status of payments 
normally made to jockeys at such races.
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the Masters and Servants Acts, and his claim for payment 
under the contract would have to be brought in the Court of 
Requests (later the Small Debts Court) as an action for work 
and labour done. Defendant employers frequently argued 
that the complainants were contractors. The argument did 
not always succeed with the Bench, though it is impossible 
to say whether this was because they rejected the point of 
law or because they did not find it made out on the evidence. 
Such a case was McKinn v Hay in Wilcannia on 24/10/1883. The 
complainant was hired to cut posts and clear scrub at 12/6 
per 100 posts and £4/10/- per mile of scrub. Hay's attorney 
objected that McKinn was a contractor and not under the 
Masters and Servants Act. This was over-ruled, but the report 
did not indicate whether that ruling was a finding of fact 
or of law.^ In Hill End on 16/8/1872 Frank Goff claimed £1 
from Charles Harris for two days work sending slabs down 
Hawkin's Hill for Johnson's claim, of which Harris was
2manager. Harris refused to pay saying it was a 'contract' , 
but he was ordered to pay Goff 'wages due and costs'. Again 
it is not clear whether this was a finding of fact or a 
rejection of the point of law, but it was a decision of 
Police Magistrate Lees and therefore probably based on an 
assessment of the evidence as to the nature of the contract.
It is quite clear, on the other hand, that the decision of 
the Glen Innes Bench to dismiss Daniel Wolf's wages claim
1. The attorney then gave Notice of Prohibition against 
enforcement of the decision. The amount claimed by McKinn 
was only £ 12/1/10.
2. That is - that the agreement was a contract for services 
between a principal and independent contractor, rather 
than a contract of service between an employer and an 
employee.
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against John Proctor on 27/10/1868 was a finding of law. 
Proctor's attorney said the money claimed by Wolf was owed 
to him as a 'contractor on the Road' which did not come under 
the provisions of the Masters and Servants Act. The report 
states that the Bench held the objection fatal and therefore 
dismissed the case.
The decision as to whether a worker was an employee 
or independent contractor was probably even more difficult in 
the nineteenth century when so much more work was done by 
individual independent artisans and tradesmen than today. 
Mason v Gill/ a case from Hill End in 1872 illustrates the 
complex situations which could arise to bedevil magistrates. 
Mason claimed that he had been employed by Gill to tack 
calico on walls and put down floor boards;"^ but Gill said he 
had employed Wilson who employed Merry who employed Mason 
to do the calico work. The case was dismissed because Gill 
was not Mason's employer. Of all the parties mentioned only 
Mason was an employee in law and under the Act.
Examination of the cases shows that magistrates were 
often confronted with interesting, and sometimes difficult, 
points of employment law. Their decisions on these points 
were not always legally sound, but the cases confirm the 
relevance of the principles of the common law to the exercise 
of this statutory jurisdiction. Many of the disputes that 
culminated in Masters and Servants prosecutions resulted from
1. Calico lining was used as a cheap method of lining house 
walls, and as a ceiling.
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a difference in opinion as between employer and employee about
the time at which the contract was concluded and, therefore,
the terms settled. This will be analysed in more detail
later.^ One example, or set of examples, is relevant here.
It arose out of the commencement of the shearing season in
Wilcannia in 1880, a period of considerable industrial action
in the area which foreshadowed the development of the
2Shearers' union. On 13/8/1880, T.W. Barnes, Manager of 
Tarella Station, sued W. Chambers for disobedience. Chambers 
and five other shearers were sued for refusing to shear.
Their reason for doing this was a dispute over the shearing 
agreement under which they were to work. Barnes said he 
had given a copy of the agreement to H. Ollis, a spokesman 
for the shearers at Tarella, who had returned it with certain 
clauses marked as unacceptable. These concerned the rate 
to be paid to those shearers who left of their own accord 
before the shed 'cut out'. The rate in that situation was 
15/- per 100, whereas the full contract rate was £1 per 100. 
The underlying question was whether a binding contract, 
including the penalty clause, was concluded when the shearers 
accepted a pen at Tarella, or whether it would have been 
concluded only when shearers and graziers reached agreement 
over the terms to be included. On that analysis, the return 
of the agreement with the clause struck out would have been 
a counter-offer by the shearers and no binding contract would
1. Infra pp.168-173.
2. The unions which amalgamated to form the Australian 
Shearers' Union (later the Australian Workers' Union) were 
formed in mid-1886. See J.A. Merritt, 'W.G. Spence and 
the 1890 Maritime Strike'j Historical Studies, Vol.15, 
1971-73, p.596.
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have come into existence until Barnes accepted the counter-offer. 
Had that interpretation been adopted, no charges could have 
been laid because the shearers would not have been in 
contractual relations with Barnes. By fining Chambers and 
the others, the magistrate (Steel P.M.) indicated that he 
considered the contract had been concluded earlier. His 
decision raises the question how the terms of the written 
agreement could have been incorporated into that earlier 
contract.
The question of what obligations the employment contract 
imposed on employees can be considered in a number of different 
contexts. It has been raised already in this Part, and will 
be considered later as well.^ It is relevant here also in 
relation to the way it was handled by magistrates. The case 
of Dumaresq v Hughes, Glen Innes, 2/11/1858, is a good example. 
Hughes was hired by Dumaresq as a shearer. He would probably 
have organised a number of consecutive contracts at different 
sheds, on the basis of the time at which shearing was to start 
at each station,so that he could proceed from shed to shed as 
each cut out. When he arrived at Dumaresq's property he could 
not be employed because of wet weather. The delay in 
commencing shearing there meant that it would not be completed 
before his next engagement was due to start. In the meantime, 
Hughes received no wages but only rations. Understandably he 
wished to leave and go elsewhere so that he could earn.
1. Infra, pp. 174-175, 328-335 and 373-374.
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Dumaresq sued him for refusing to carry out his agreement 
and the Bench ordered him to fulfil his agreement or be 
arrested for absconding. In strict law, they were probably 
right since an employer has no obligation to provide work, 
but it is arguable that since he received wages only for 
sheep shorn, this case was within the exception where an 
obligation could be found to provide work enabling an 
employee to earn wages.^
It is a fundamental principle of employment law that 
employee and employer must be free to choose their relationship - 
that one cannot be forced to employ a particular person,
2or to be employed by a particular person, against one's will.
It is for this reason that the sale or winding-up of a business
3ends the employment contracts associated with it, and that
rules have developed about the status of the lent or borrowed 
4employee. The finer points of law on this issue were not 
always followed by the magistrates. When Anne Blakeley sued 
J. Pearce of Young for wages in 1863 she gave evidence that 
she worked for the defendant for 10 weeks and was then told 
that 'someone else was coming from Maitland' and that Mrs.
Pearce wanted her to go to Mr. Lawless. Anne did not agree 
to this alteration in her employment but while the matter was 
being settled she worked at Lawless' for six weeks at 
Mrs. Pearce's request. She claimed the wages earned there 
from Mrs. Pearce to whom, it had been agreed, Lawless was to
1. Ibid.
2. Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] A.C. 1014
3. Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services, [1974]
1 Q.B. 468.
4. See H.H. Glass, M.H. McHugh and F.M. Douglas, The Liability 
of Employers, Sydney, 1979, pp.79-85.
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give them. Her claim was dismissed. Yet because she had not 
agreed to enter into a new employment relationship with 
Lawless and because, with knowledge of that, Mrs. Pearce 
had requested her to work there and had received from Lawless 
money attributable to wages for her services, Anne Blakeley 
was a lent employee, and remained the servant of Mrs. Pearce. 
She should, therefore, have received the wages earned during 
the period she was lent to Lawless.
In Part II of this Chapter, I sketched briefly the 
content of the employee's duty to exercise reasonable care 
and skill. I will discuss later the disputes that arose 
between employer and employee over the standard of work done. 
But the content of the duty is a question of common law, and 
it is therefore a matter which fits within an examination 
of the magistrates' application of common law. One feature 
of the search for the content of the duty is the relation 
to it of 'incompetence'. Charges for incompetence were laid 
on a number of occasions. The Acts did not deal separately 
with this, and the charges were presumably based on the 
provisions dealing with misconduct. Though I have questioned 
the justice of such a view, the cases establishing the dutyx 
would appear to support the argument that incompetence is a 
breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill. On 
14/12/1858, A. Falkiner, one of the whaling masters at Eden, 
charged W. Rin under the Act with incompetence. He had hired
1. Harmer v Cornelius, op. cit., Lister v Romford Ice and 
Cold Storage Co. Ltd, op. cit.
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him as a cook and 'generally useful'. He gave evidence 
Rin could not cook but appeared willing to obey commands.
He asked for the agreement to be cancelled and an order was 
made to that effect accompanied by an order that Falkiner 
pay wages due to Rin. If incompetence does come within 
the common law duty and the provisions of the Act relating 
to misconduct, Rin could have been ordered to forfeit his 
wages. The magistrates were therefore commendably lenient 
in their application of the law and the Act.
The cases analysed in this Part demonstrate that, 
though the Masters and Servants Acts established a separate 
statutory jurisdiction over the regulation of employment, 
their application was an integral part of the common law 
of employment, and they must be incorporated within the 
operation of that law. Examination of the Acts cannot be 
properly undertaken in isolation from the common law, 
nor can their effect be understood without seeing them as 
part of a broad and over-arching structure which controlled 
labour relations by application of a set of principles 
thrown up by the development in Britain of an industrial 
capitalist society. These principles contain and direct 
the realities of the power situation in the labour market 
by the philosophy of the law of contract.
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Part VI Differing Interpretations by Employers and
Employees of the Principles of Employment Law 
and the Terms of Employment Contracts
Employers' and employees' perceptions of the rights 
and obligations created by their legal relationships were 
often markedly different, both as to technicalities and as 
to fundamentals. This was one of the important causes of 
tension and dispute leading to involvement in the processes 
of the Masters and Servants Acts. While these more 
fundamental issues involved in the parties' roles affected 
many of the matters discussed in Chapter 7, the parties' notion 
of their roles influenced the way they initiated and defended 
prosecutions, and the contractual terms they believed to bind 
them. Employees put forward a much broader interpreation of 
the contract than employers. Understandably, they saw the 
contract as incorporating a much more balanced distribution 
of rights, less restricted by the implications of the survival 
of the status-oriented master-servant relationship, and much 
closer to the theoretical equality of the freely-negotiated 
contract. In this, they often went beyond the boundaries of 
the principles developed by the courts in interpreting the 
common law of employment. At the same time, the employees' 
conception of their rights often involved an even more narrow 
contractual form than the common law had accepted. Furthermore, 
despite their arguments for rights not upheld by the current 
state of the law, employees were in general well aware of 
the rights which the law did allow, and well able to argue for 
those rights in a legally meaningful way. The extensions of 
legal principle for which they contended were also coherently
formulated, and in keeping with the broad framework of 
the law of contract. If anything, it was the particularities 
of employment law which we could characterise as displaying 
idiosyncracy and illogicality.
In conducting negotiations and working out disputes - 
which arose from the realities of the power structure of the 
workplace - through the established medium of contractual 
action and Masters and Servants Act provisions, the parties' 
arguments worked over the basic aspects of employment law 
discussed in Part II of this Chapter. Many cases involved 
disagreement as to whether a legal relationship had in fact 
arisen between the parties. Sometimes this involved the 
claim by a defendant employer in a case for wages that the 
complainant had not been hired but taken in and given keep 
out of charity or because of family ties. For example,
A. McKay in Wilcannia on 19/2/1886 denied owing wages and 
said he ’took the old man out of charity’. Sometimes it 
was workers charged with breach of the Act who denied that 
there was any proper agreement. In so doing, they 
demonstrated a formal approach to the process of contracting 
which was far more 'legalistic' than that accepted by the 
common law with its recognition of employment contracts 
entered by 'a wink and a nod'. Since it was the employee 
who stood to lose by legal enforcement of contracts entered 
with minimal formality and fleshed out by unequal implied 
terms, their attempted insistence on agreements concluded 
only after full discussion and acceptance of express 
provisions demonstrated a keen grasp of the way in which 
the law could be used to protect their interests within
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labour relations. In arguing that an employment contract 
involved greater formality than was required by the courts, 
they also posited other more informal agreements not legally 
binding, or not completely so. This argument was based on 
a demand that there must be in fact, and not just in legal 
fiction, an intention to create legal relations.
When workers acted on their (arguably sound) view that 
they were not legally bound, they ran the risk of prosecution 
for absconding by employers who insisted a contract had been 
created. In May 1858, Barclay in Eden prosecuted 
Higginbotham for absconding. He said he had hired him in 
April to repair a fishery and that Higginbotham had absconded 
after a few days and hired with Falkiner, the whaler. 
Higginbotham agreed that he had gone to repair the fishery 
but said he had 'made no agreement'. Unfortunately for him, 
his acceptance of the repair job had at law implied a fully 
fledged agreement and he was sentenced to 14 days 
imprisonment.'*' William Gill also defended himself against 
an absconding charge by denying a formal agreement when 
prosecuted by John Jenkins of Gundagai on 13/12/1858. He 
denied he had any agreement of service with Jenkins, saying 
he 'had made some sort of an agreement but it wasn't a 
regular agreement'. He escaped a penalty because the bench 
'discharged [him] from custody at the solicitation of his 
master'. In defending their insistence on fully negotiated 
contracts, employees placed great importance on written and 
signed agreements. It would appear to be as much due to the
1. Note that the sentence imposed was no longer provided for 
in the Act - 1857, S.2; . supra pp. 59-60.
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desires of employers as to any supposed lack of 
sophistication by employees that so many contracts were 
oral only. One man even crossed swords with a solicitor 
employer on the significance of a signed agreement. When 
S. Scott was charged by Manby, a solicitor in Eden, with 
absconding on 8/10/1867, he said he had never signed an 
agreement with Manby and had in fact refused to do so.
But since the law did not insist on a written and signed 
agreement to establish a contract of service, Scott was 
fined £ 5.
Perhaps the most contested aspect of employment
contracts litigated through the Masters and Servants Acts
was the question of duration: had the contractual term
been brought properly to an end or had it been wrongfully
terminated? In law, the contract was terminated lawfully
if a fixed term had expired or if the proper period of
notice was given and served.^ Disputes arose over each of
these methods of termination. The contract could also be
terminated where the employer was in breach of its terms
and the employee accepted the breach as a repudiation
2discharging him from further obligations,~ and there are 
cases where an employee accused of absconding gave evidence 
he regarded himself as having been relieved of further 
performance in this way. At other times/ employers told 
employees to leave as a result of disputation in the 
workplace and later alleged absconding or refusal to work.
1. Macken, McCarry and Moloney, op. cit., pp. 49-53.
2. Guest, op. cit., pp. 523-526.
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In this situation also, the employee argued the contract 
had already been brought to an end by the employer.
Employees charged with leaving without notice sometimes 
argued that there was no provision for notice within the 
agreement. This argument would usually fail because of 
the implied terms as to notice. But different results were 
sometimes reached. In 1859, Frederick Bardell sued Richard 
Cornish of Merriwa for discharging him without notice. 
Providing the contract did not clearly show that notice was 
not required, the process of implication would support such 
a claim at common law, but it was not provided for in the 
1857 Act. The decision should therefore have been that 
there was no jurisdiction since no offence was disclosed.
The magistrates held, however, that 'there being no agreement 
as to notice' the case should be dismissed. If there were 
simply no agreement as to notice, such a provision could have 
been implied. To support the decision, a positive exclusion 
of a requirement of notice was needed. Another doubtful 
decision on the question of notice resulted to the advantage 
of the employee again in Starr v Murray, a misconduct charge 
in Armidale on 4/10/1864. Murray was a shepherd hired for 
twelve months, and Starr claimed there was no agreement as 
to notice. The yearly hiring generally implied, however, 
a requirement of a year's notice. He said Murray gave 
several days' notice and left. He defended himself by saying 
there was no signed agreement - as has been seen, an 
inadequate defence. He had, he said, 'hired to suit himself 
and do the plaintiff's work and left to suit himself. He 
alleged the oral agreement had provided for a month's notice
170
and he had given it. The charge against him was dismissed. 
If the bench accepted his evidence, then their decision 
was right. Presumably, they did so, but a month's hiring 
for shepherds was distinctly unusual.
Haverty v Deaven, East Maitland 8/2/1864, was an 
instance of an unfavourable decision for an employee in 
a case turning on the notice requirement. Margaret Haverty 
sued for a fortnight's wages and her employer defended his 
refusal to pay on the grounds that she had not given the 
requisite week's notice. Haverty said she would have given 
it if she had been well. The bench awarded her only a 
week's wages.
The comment of one Bendemeer employee sums up neatly 
the views of employees as to the mutuality of obligations 
to give notice. In the case of Easton v Jackson for wages 
on 2/1/1864, Easton said he had been hired by the week and 
told by Jackson he could not leave without a week's notice. 
He was discharged without warning on a Monday morning, and 
told Jackson 'it was very strange [he] should say that 
without giving a week's notice or paying wages'. The bench 
ordered Jackson to pay Easton his wages immediately. As 
this case and Bardell v Cornish  ^ show, employers were not 
always willing to accept that notice requirements bound 
both parties. Nor did they always accept the effect of 
notice given by employees, though they did not hesitate to 
treat the effect of employees' failure to give notice as
1. Merriwa, 25/5/1859.
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actionable breach. In Power v Stephens, Armidale 29/1/1862, 
the complainant - a mail driver - was hired by the week 
and gave the requisite week's notice. When this expired 
his employer asked him to stay, that is - to enter a new 
agreement.^ Power agreed to do so if the employer he had 
arranged to go to was willing and able to find someone else. 
He went on to the new job and wrote back to Stephens saying 
the new employer could not get anyone else. Power had 
therefore acted completely in accordance with the old 
contract and was now proceeding to comply with the new, 
but when he went back, to get his wages from Stephens, the 
latter refused to pay. He said in evidence before the 
bench he had tried to get a warrant against Power for 
absconding but it was not issued because Power had a 
summons against him for wages. Stephens obviously was 
unhappy that Power had been able to release himself by a 
week's notice.
It was common for employers to ask employees to enter 
a new agreement on the completion of an old one. In these 
circumstances, employees frequently agreed to contract for 
a shorter period, for example - a three month hiring 
following a yearly one, or they might agree to stay for a 
few days as a favour until the employer found a replacement. 
Disputes sometimes arose when the shorter hiring or period 
of grace ended, the employers arguing that the employees 
had entered a new fully-fledged contract which they would 
attempt to enforce through the Acts. Norman, a Shoalhaven
1. Since the previous engagement was terminated by 
expiration of the notice given.
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employee, claimed the wages earned in such a period. He 
had completed his agreement and refused to hire for another 
12 months but agreed to stay a few weeks till his employer, 
Mackay, got a replacement. He then claimed the wages earned 
during that time. Mackay argued Norman had agreed to stay a 
further six months, but on 20/8/1860, the magistrates 
accepted Norman's argument and ordered Mackay to pay the 
wages claimed. However, the employee who did not ask for 
a settlement and leave immediately the contractual term 
expired, thus ran the risk of being told he had impliedly 
entered a new agreement to which he could be held by the 
processes of the Acts. On 24/1/1860, Doherty of Mudgee 
sued Prussian Dickson for absconding. When Dickson had 
asked Doherty for a settlement, it was refused and Dickson 
left. Doherty said he would have settled with Dickson if 
he had approached him at the end of the quarter's hiring 
but Dickson had entered on another quarter and must work 
the three months out. The Bench agreed that a new agreement 
had been created by conduct, and fined him £1.
Just as employers attempted to disregard notice given 
and to extend periods of grace allowed by employees, 
probably to protect themselves against the problems of 
periodic shortages of labour, they often tried to escape 
the effects of hasty discharges resulting from arguments 
and disputes in the workplace. They sometimes resolved these 
disputes by ordering an employee to leave, and then when 
the employee did so, denying that he had been discharged 
and trying to hold him to working out the agreement in 
full. The employees were legally entitled to accept the
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order as a discharge and leave, and the magistrates 
generally upheld their right to do so, but not always.
When Lea sued W. Radford of Mudgee for wages on 31/12/1856 
he gave evidence Radford had told him 'he had better go if 
he didn't work' and ordered him off the premises. Lea had 
acted on that as a discharge and claimed his wages. The 
bench ordered Radford to pay. P. Kane, a farmworker in 
Nowra, had his agreement with Ryan discharged on 27/4/1859 
after Ryan had reacted in anger to Kane's visiting the 
workers on the next farm after finishing work one evening.
He told Kane to go away and not bother him, saying that 
Kane need not resume his duties, and locking Kane's hut.
But when a similar situation had occurred in Warialda 
ten years earlier and the employee, James Naughten, sued 
his employer Richard Wiseman for breach of contract, having 
been ordered 'to be off about his business', the claim was 
dismissed.^
The provision of the contract (express or implied) 
setting its duration, was the single most contentious term, 
leading to numerous disagreements between employer and 
employee. Disputes arose frequently over various other 
terms of particular contracts. In the case of contracts 
concerning shepherds, one such term related to the 
obligation - or absence thereof - to compensate the 
employer for lost sheep. Shepherds would argue that they 
were not liable to make compensation because there was no 
term in the agreement providing for it. The practice of
1. Warialda, 15/2/1849.
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requiring shepherds to pay for sheep lost was particularly
oppressive to them, and their attempt to escape it by this
example of employee insistence on an express agreement was
understandable, though doomed. The very fact that the
practice was so widespread meant that it was almost certain
to be incorporated into the contract as a term implied by
custom,1 23and even if that was not done the obligation to
pay compensation could be upheld as following from the duty
to exercise reasonable care and skill. Bolstering these
implied terms was express provision for compensation in the
2sections dealing with loss and destruction of property.
3The cases where the argument was tried therefore failed.
The actual work contractually agreed on was also an 
area of contention. Employers attempted to construe this 
term of the contract broadly while employees obviously 
favoured a strict application of the agreement. This raises 
questions about the parties’ approach to their roles within 
the employment relationship which I will discuss in greater 
depth in Chapter 7 but it needs to be raised here also for 
it did result in arguments between the parties in court as to 
the content of the contract and the interpretation to be 
placed on its terms. Rose Pearce put forward an argument 
for a strict interpretation of the terms covering her work. 
She was hired as a parlourmaid and was ordered to scrub the
1. Guest, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
2. 1828, S.3; 1840, S.7; 1845, S.4; 1857, S.4.
3. For example. Heyes v Williamson, Armidale, 6/1/1865; Carroll v Bayley, Mernwa, 16/3/186 9.
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bar. She refused saying it was not her work, and brought
a claim for wages.1 2 Elizabeth Simmons, a general servant,
took a similar approach. She was discharged for refusing
2to work, and responded by a wages claim in which she gave 
evidence she had not refused to work - it was part of her 
agreement, she said, not to do any washing up on washing day. 
Such claims are understandable from employees professing 
some recognised trade. They are not surprising either in 
hierarchically divided areas of domestic service, such as 
parlourmaids, where the status and privileges of the various 
positions would have been jealously guarded and where the 
nature of the working environment encouraged deference from 
the lower ranks of servants not only to the employer but also 
to the 'senior' servants. Many of the occupations of colonial 
and rural society were, however, inherently general and 
diffuse, as witnessed by their appellation: 'general servant'
and 'generally useful'. Yet even amongst these employees, there 
was clearly a keen appreciation of the bounds of the contract 
and the legal effect of terms regulating work, as Elizabeth 
Simmons demonstrated.
The disagreements over obligations imposed by the 
employment contract discussed in these pages show that on 
the whole, employers relied on the terms implied by common 
law out of the master-servant relationship, whereas 
employees looked to the express provisions of their 
agreements, either to enforce those provisions or to deny 
obligations not covered in express terms. Such a denial 
meant in effect a rejection of the view that implied terms
1. Pearce v Felgate, Wilcannia, 8/1/1884.
2. Simmons v Penrose, Wilcannia, 3/7/1883.
could insert obligations into the gaps left where no express 
provision was made. By contesting these implied obligations, 
they were in many cases claiming implied rights, for the 
absence of an obligation could create a right. Thus the 
approach of both groups to employment contracts, though in 
one sense contradictory in that a contract based on implied 
rights and duties was set against a formal agreement on 
expressly negotiated terms, had this similarity: that both
attempted to gain legal recognition for a theory of 
employment law. Both sought to set up what was a political“*" 
conception of the respective roles of employer and employee 
in labour relations. Many of the elements at issue are 
still the subject of struggle today; some have been 
established as the result of the collective action of workers 
in the intervening period and of legislative response to that 
action. ^
The establishment of a 'right to work' in its various
manifestations is a case in point. Inroads have been made
3into the law's previous denial of such a right, and its
4related enforcement of the rule of 'no work, no pay'.
Without these advances, nineteenth century employees fell 
back on arguments based on the particular terms of their 
contracts. For example, in Hines v Chapman, Maitland 7/10/1853,-
1. That is, political in the broad sense.2. For example, British legislation on dismissal, re­
instatement and redundancy - see note 1 of p. 111. 
Australian legislation on reinstatement - see Common­
wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, S.5, New South 
Wales Industrial Arbitration Act, S.20A.
3. Ibid.; and see Hill v C.A. Parsons and Co. Ltd, op. cit. ,
and Langston v A.E.U., [1974], 1 All E.R. 980 in the
judgment of Lord Denning M.R.Gapes v Commercial Bank. <)f Australia Ltd, Federal Court 
of Australia, Industrial Division, No. VII of 1979 
(unreported) .
4 .
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the complainant claimed wages for 11 days work. He had in 
fact worked nine days, and was enforcedly idle on two 
further days 'because of bricklayers drinking'. Chapman 
jibbed at paying for those days, and Hines argued there 
was no agreement he was not to be paid if other workers 
were absent. He was thus, in effect,arguing for the insertion 
into the silence of the contract of a right to be paid for 
readiness to work. The bench upheld his argument and 
ordered Chapman to pay the full amount claimed.
While employees consistently sought to achieve their 
goals in the establishment of principles regulating 
employment by relying on the formalities and express terms of 
the contract, gains were made in the field of employment 
relations by the creation,little by little,of practices 
built on concessions won in struggle and negotiation. In 
guarding and consolidating these gains, employees used then 
an equivalent combination of strategies to those used today - 
industrial action and legal consolidation. Today, such 
concessions, over-award payments and conditions, are 
introduced by employee organisations into logs of claims 
and, if successful, incorporated into future industrial 
awards. In the nineteenth century, employees sought to 
have them incorporated into their individual contracts as 
terms implied by custom. One such custom was that shearers 
stopped work early on Saturdays. In Yass in December 1870, 
shearers working for P. Bernard stopped at 3.15 p.m. on a 
Saturday and left the station 'because invited to go to a 
spree'. Bernard attempted to reduce their wages on account
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of the several hours work lost (the normal hours were 6.00 
a.m. to 6.00 p.m.) and to treat them as having repudiated 
their contracts. In a claim by J. Payne for wages on 
14/10/1870, a reduction of £2/2/0 in wages was upheld.
This early blow in the move towards a shorter working week 
was thus deflected.
The rights of employees unable to work through illness 
or injury were frequently at issue. Today the situation 
has been resolved by legislation providing compensation 
for injury at work'*' and by clauses in industrial awards. 
Nineteenth century employees attempted to establish their 
rights through contract. In his wages claim against 
J.M. Doyle of Maitland on 27/10/1862, J. Carroll admitted 
having left work on a Tuesday afternoon to see a doctor and 
returning the next day. He had asked permission to go but 
Doyle had said he could not spare him, and had told 
Carroll if he left without permission, he need not return. 
Doyle then refused Carroll a settlement. Carroll told the 
Court he knew he had done wrong but said he was ill. Doyle 
was ordered to pay £1/6/1 wages. Since the report does 
not disclose the amount of wages claimed, it is not possible 
to tell whether they were reduced because of Carroll's 
unauthorised trip for medical attention. Other employees 
were less apologetic about their claim to a right to time 
off for illness or injury. E. Bowd of Mudgee broke his leg 
when bringing in a horse and was eight weeks in hospital.
When he left hospital, he went to his employer, John Dickson, 
and asked for his wages. Dickson refused them, saying he
1. For example, New South Wales, Workers' Compensation Act, 192 6.
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would pay the money to the hospital. Bowd sued for the 
money on 15/7/1857, arguing he had not asked Dickson to 
send him to hospital and should therefore not have to lose 
his wages to pay for the treatment. Dickson was ordered 
to pay Bowd the amount claimed. The view of an employee's 
contractual rights implicit in the arguments put in these 
cases was presented as an explicit formulation by William 
Todd, a carpenter and joiner,who was sued by Philip Sullivan, 
a Tenterfield innkeeper, on 19/11/1858 , for refusing to work 
through illness. Sullivan gave evidence that Todd had asked 
for wages for a month during which he had been ill for a 
fortnight. To Sullivan's suggestion that it was 'rather 
unreasonable to expect wages for that time', Todd replied 
that the employer would have to pay if his employee was ill 
for twelve months. Developments in the common law have not 
borne Todd's contention out. Arguably, illness of long 
duration would result in automatic frustration of the contract/ 
though in the case of shorter illnesses the employer would 
be bound to pay wages unless the contract specifically 
provided that wages would not be paid for time not worked.
But today Todd would have statutory rights.
1. 'Frustration occurs whenever the law recognises thatwithout default of either party a contractual obligation 
has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which performanee is called for would 
render it a thing radically different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract': per Lord Radcliffe in Davis 
Contractors v Fareham U.D.C. [1956] A.C. 696 at 729.
Not even welfare legislation, however, could be expected
to establish the sort of relationship contended for by
Ephraim Gimbert which takes to its limit the radical view
of the contract on which the employees' claims discussed in
this Part are based. Gimbert was a shepherd for R. & W. Lowe
of Mudgee, in charge of two flocks. At the end of his
twelve-month term when he gave up the flocks and applied for
a settlement, the Lowes said they had lost £300 through the
bad condition of the sheep which they attributed to
unsatisfactory shepherding by Gimbert. Gimbert did not deny
this. He simply told the Lowes 'when a master hires a man
he takes him for better or w o r s e T h e r e  is a sense in
which this claim, far-reaching though it is, can be supported
if one treats the employment contract as one of equal rights
expressly negotiated. The duty of care and skill is
essentially a fiction. A worker engaged in contractual
negotiation, asked by the officious bystander if he understood
that he would be liable in damages to the employer for failure
to do his work with skill, would never give the testy reply
'Of course' on which the implication of a term allegedly 
2depends. While liability for damage caused by negligence 
can be justified, the law's insistence on the mutuality of 
choice by employer of employee and by employee of employer 
logically involves the result that the employer has taken 
the chosen employee with whatever lack of skill and incapacity 
he may have - taken him 'for better or worse'. But though 
logical, this is still not the law, and the duty of reasonable
1. Gimbert v R. & W. Lowe, Mudgee, 2/9/1857.
2. Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 K.B.
206 at 207.
care and skill, and implied warranty of skill on which 
the duty is based, leave no room for the interpretation 
of the contract Ephraim Gimbert put forward.
These cases demonstrate the fundamentally different 
perceptions of the employment contract held by litigating 
employers and employees, based on opposing views of the 
rights and obligations appropriate to their roles within 
the employment relationship. The tensions thus created 
are still unresolved in the common law of employment, 
despite inroads being made through the courts into the 
breadth of the employer's rights, and advances achieved 
through legislation creating not individual rights in 
contract but collective rights attaching to the status 
of employee. The use of the Masters and Servants Acts 
surveyed in this thesis was a major part of the ongoing 
process of settling the legal rights and duties of 
employers and employees which has been conducted on a 
number of fronts, of which industrial 'warfare', the passage 
of protective legislation and the system of compulsory 
arbitration are more visible examples.
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CHAPTER 3
Masters and Servants Act Prosecutions -
The Methods of Statistical Analysis
The material available for an analysis of Masters 
and Servants Act prosecutions is uneven and sometimes 
extremely sketchy. The primary source of information is 
the records of the benches of magistrates and Courts of Petty 
Sessions. In the nineteenth century, magistrates' court 
proceedings were recorded in Bench Books. The reports of 
Masters and Servants Act cases were often very full containing 
details of the parties' occupations, the particulars of the 
contract and a summary of evidence about the dispute leading 
to litigation, as well as the charge and sentence. Some Bench 
Book reports were however extremely brief. At about the turn 
of the century (earlier in some court districts than in 
others), Bench Books were superseded by Police Charge and 
Summons Books. Here the cases were recorded in ledger form with 
the parties' names, the charge, sentence and magistrates' 
names but no details of occupation and no record of evidence.
The sort of analysis made in this chapter and the next two 
chapters and later in Chapter 7 is therefore based on Bench Book 
records only. Cases from the Charge and Summons Books can be 
used in some of the general statistical analyses in Chapters 3 
to 5 and in the analyses of multiple appearances in Chapter 9 
The type of record thus limits several categories of information 
to the nineteenth century. Analyses of occupation, behaviour 
leading to absconding and misconduct charges, and issues under­
lying the litigation are all based on the nineteenth century
cases.
183
Within the types of analysis allowed by this alteration 
in the method of recording, there are further limitations.
Not all the original court records are still in existence - 
fire, flood, insects have all taken their toll. Many volumes 
have perished or been intentionally destroyed.  ^ Others have 
been lost. As a result, there are no surviving records at 
all for a large number of court districts, including some areas 
of considerable importance. The most serious gap is created 
by the inexplicable loss or destruction of all the Sydney 
records with the exception of three years from 1848-1850, 
thus creating a sizeable rural imbalance in the figures 
obtained from the recorded cases. As well as these unrepresented 
districts, there are an even larger number for which only 
incomplete runs of records exists. Appendix I lists the 
seventy-two districts for which some records survive, and shows 
the periods they cover.
Further gaps exist in the incomplete runs of records, 
not as a result of missing volumes but, apparently, because 
of a failure to enter the details of court business into the 
records for months or years at a time. It is clear from the 
Bench Books that the standard of reporting varied widely between 
particular Clerks of Petty Sessions, and at the bottom of the 
scale seem to have been Clerks who failed altogether to keep 
written records. Sometimes, though the court records of 
Petty Sessions proceedings continue, there is a sudden and 
unexplained absence of any Masters and Servants Act cases.
1. I was informed by a former Clerk of Petty Sessions (who, 
for obvious reasons, must remain anonymous) that when 
floods threatened but^did not quite reach his Court House, 
he had some of the old Bench Books and Charge and Summons 
Books carried out and thrown into the floodwater to provide 
an excuse for getting rid of them.
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This was the situation in Armidale from 17/7/1849 to 14/10/1851.
Up to July 1849 there were frequent reports of prosecutions
under the Act, but in that month they ceased entirely until
October 1851. It is possible that gaps such as this resulted
from changes in the way particular magistrates organised the
court business, involving treatment of Masters and Servants Act
prosecutions separately from other Petty Session matters, though
why they would have done so is unclear. Such an explanation
is of more likely relevance to the arbitral jurisdiction ^
and may explain the very small number of cases relating to
2exercise of that power.
The figures for Masters and Servants Act prosecutions 
obtained from these incomplete records can be supplemented by
3the tables of Judicial Statistics in the Statistical Registers, 
but only from 1881. In that year separate listing of pros­
ecutions under the Masters and Servants Acts commenced. These 
figures can be used to produce a tentative estimate of the total 
number of prosecutions for the whole period of this survey.
This estimate is based on the assumption that the relation 
of total prosecutions to those for which court records have
1. Supra pp. 53-55.
2. Only one case in the surviving records was brought under 
the provisions relating to this jurisdiction.
3. New South Wales, Statistical Register. 1881-,
From 1881-1887, the appropriate figures appear, in Part II 
Religion Eduction and Crime. From 1888 onwards,the 
Part is entitled Law and Crime and its number varies.
From 1881-1896 the appropriate Table is headed Return 
showing the Number of Persons of both Sexes taken into 
custody and summarily dealt with, committed for trial or 
discharged, specifying the Various Offences. From 1896 
the Table was headed Offences charged against Persons 
brought before Magistrates; from 1907 - Offences exluding 
Multiple Charges; and from 1921/22 Total Offences Charged 
and Punishments Imposed.
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survived would have been roughly the same in the period 
up until 1881 as it was in the period for which numbers 
of total prosecutions are available. Such an assumption 
is obviously impossible to test, but it provides the only 
way of arriving at any idea of the full extent of the 
use of Masters and Servants legislation. The following 
Table shows the total number of prosecutions from 1881 - 
1930 taken from the Judicial Statistics. The Table is 
in two parts because in 1894 there was a change in the 
method of presenting the Masters and Servants Act 
figures. Up to 1894 the categories used were 
’Apprenhensions' and 'Summonses'. 'Apprehensions' would 
cover cases which proceeded by way of arrest, 'Summonses' 
those where no arrest was necessary.^ From 1895, these 
categories were replaced by 'Persons charged before 
Magistrates’ and 'Adjudications and Orders of Justices'. 
This division appears to recognise the distinction between 
the criminal nature of proceedings against employees, which 
were initiated by Information and resulted, if successful 
in a criminal penalty of fine or forfeiture of wages, 
and the more contractual nature of the civil proceedings 
against employers, which were initiated by Complaint and 
resulted, if successful, in an order to pay wages owing 
or to return goods detained. The 'Adjudications ... of 
Justices' might refer to cases brought under the elusive 
arbitral jurisdiction.
1 . Supra, pp.69-70.
Table 1
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Persons dealt with Summarily under the 
Masters and Servants Acts
(a) 1881 - 1894
Year Apprehensions Summons To ta 1
1881 69 69
1882 4 301 305
1883 17 383 400
1884 3 379 382
1885 3 426 429
1886 2 472 474
1887 56 1119 1255
1888 42 1435 1477
1889 47 1201 1248
1890 47 2599 2646
1891 - - -
1892 99 1162 1261
1893 86 1535 1621
1894 37 45 82
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(b) 1895 - 1930
Year Persons charged before 
Magistrates
Adjudications and 
Orders of Justices
Total
1895 89 1253 1342
1897 143 1066 1209
1898 176 938 1.114
1899 86 921 1007
1900 263 837 1100
1901 225 746 971
1902 197 848 1045
1903 105 674 779
1904 96 696 792
1905 197 633 830
1906 375 673 1048
1907 308 641 949
1908 561 704 1265
1909 568 704 1272
1910 404 732 1136
1911 721 648 1369
1912 475 628 1103
1913 258 631 889
1914/15 937 700 1637
1915/16 1089 561 1650
1916/17 1010 563 1573
1917/18 141 429 570
1918/19 213 670 883
1919/20 133 946 1079
1920/21 195 857 1052
1921/22 377 197 574
1922/23 669 292 961
1923/24 596 185 781
1924/25 423 200 623
1925/26 328 156 484
1926/27 310 154 464
1927 247 : 137 384
1928 231 64 295
1929 193 63 256
1930 415 222
. _____
6 37
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Table 2 compares these yearly totals of Masters and 
Servants Act prosecutions from the official statistics with 
the numbers of prosecutions in the surviving court records 
for those years, and shows the percentage of total prosecutions 
in the records.
Table 2 Surviving Prosecutions as Percentage of Total 
Prosecutions from Judicial Statistics
Year
JSurvivals Totals Percentage
1881 81 69
1882 72 305 23.6
1883 97 400 24.2
1884 137 382 35.8
1885 130 429 30.3
1886 89 474 18.7
1887 203 1255 16.1
1888 64 1477 4.3
1889 133 1248 10.6
1890 130 2646 4.9
1891 108
1892 91 1261 7.2
1893 154 1621 9.5
1894 136 82
1895 87 1342 6.4
1896 48
1897 35 1209 2.8
1898 64 1114 5.7
1899 70 1007 6.9
1900 39 1100 3.5
1901 20 971 2.0
1902 40 1045 3.8
1903 53 779 6.8
1904 15 792 1.9
1905 40 830 4.8
1906 24 ; 1048 2.3
1907 15 949 1.6
1908 13 1265 1.0
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IYear
1
Survivals
r
Totals Percentage
1909 28 1272 2.2
1910 15 1136 1.3
1911 14 1369 1.0
1912 16 1103 1.4
1913 26 889 2.9
1914/15 19 1637 1.2
1915/15 11 1650 0.6
1916/17 24 1573 1.5
1917/18 5 570 0.8
1918/19 3 883 0.3
1919/20 3 1079 0.3
1920/21 5 1052 0.5
1921/22 8 574 1.4
1922/23 8 961 0.8
1923/24 10 781 1.3
1924/25 11 623 1.8
1925/26 5 484 1.0
1926/27 9 464 1.9
1927 1 384 0.3
1928 3 295 1.0
1929 256
1930 5 637 0.8
One can see from Table 2 that cases in the surviving
records range from 0.2% to 35% of the total number of Masters and]Servants Act prosecutions launched. In only four years
2were they more than 20% of the total, and in only seven years 
more than 10%. The average relation was less than 5%. If a 
5% survival rate is chosen as the most appropriate (a 
conservative compromise to avoid overestimating the notional 
total by hypothesising too small a survival rate), the 
total of cases with survival records in the 1845 - 80 period 
can be converted into estimated totals, as shown in Table 3.
1 . 
2 .
1882-1885. 
1882-1887, 1889.
Table 3 1880 and
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Surviving Cases 1845 - 
Notional Total Cases
Year Survivals Notional Totals
1845 17 340
1846 34 680
1847 103 2060
1848
%
270 5400
1849 333 6660
1850 240 4800
1851 171 3420
1852 132 2640
1853 220 4400
1854 253 5060
1855 189 3780
1856 242 4840
1857 168 3360
1858 248 4960
1859 248 4960
1860 204 4080
1861 147 2940
1862 120 2400
1863 162 3240
1864 180 3600
1865 143 2860
1866 141 2820
1867 166 3320
1868 147 2940
1869 89 .1780
1870 169 3380
1871 187 3740
1872 239 4780
1873 241 4820
1874 57 1140
1875 55 1100
1876 71 1420
1877 79 1580
1878 100 : 2000
1879 103 2060
1880 114 2280
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This gives an official total between 1881 and 1930 
of 44,772 and an estimated total between 1845 and 1880 
of 115,640, so that on that basis the total for the whole 
period would be 160,412. These figures point to considerable 
use of the Masters and Servants Acts.
In assessing the importance of litigation under the Acts, 
the total, or estimated total, numbers of prosecutions need 
to be set into a social and economic context by attempting 
to determine the proportion of employers and employees who 
engaged in litigation, the industries and occupations in which 
the strategy was more frequently relied on, and the parts of 
the period surveyed when greatest use was made of the Acts.
It is, however, difficult to make such assessment because of the 
uneven distribution of districts and years in the surviving 
records. The haphazard nature of survival means that certain 
areas, period and occupations are over-represented and this 
produces considerable distortion in the figures. The assess­
ment is difficult also because of the unsatisfactory nature 
of statistical material relating to population and occupation, 
resulting from the idiosyncratic compilations of the New South 
Wales census in the colonial period.
In order to compare the number of Masters and Servants 
cases in a given court district with the working population 
of that district, the first requirement is to obtain 
population figures for areas which correspond to or approximate 
the areas of the particular court districts. The initial 
difficulty in finding such figures is to establish the 
boundaries of the court districts. However, information 
clearly delineating these boundaries is unavailable. The
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boundaries of court districts were gazetted when the Courts
were established, and changes to the boundaries were gazetted
as they occurred, but it is not possible to transfer the
descriptions in the gazettal notices onto a map so as to
present a picture of the distribution of court districts
throughout the colony, for the points of reference used were
ephemeral - 'and thence in a line running due west to the
woolshed on Patterson's place and from there due north...'.
Even if it were possible to reconstruct these landmarks and to
chart the court district boundaries, one would still need to
find a compilation of census figures for those districts or
approximate ones. The Census of New South Wales presented
population statistics divided according (inter alia) to
police districts in 1846, 1851, 1856, 1861 and 1871.^ The
21881 Census is available only in a very summary form.
From 1891, the geographical breakdown was altered, the smaller
3units being then Municipalities, Counties and Electorates.
I have assumed that police districts had boundaries approx­
imating those of court districts, but it can only be an 
assumption because of the uncertainty as to the boundaries of 
court districts. It is likely, however, that the two types
1. Census of the Colony of New South Wales. 1846, New South 
Wales Government Gazette, Vol. 2, pp.1327-1388; 1851,
New South Wales Government Gazette, Vol. 2, pp.1799-1849; 
1861, separately published; 1871, New South Wales, 
Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, Session 1872, 
Vol. 2, pp. 780-1207, and Session 1872-3, pp.1103-1484.
2. The rest of the Census was destroyed by fire before the 
detailed tables were published.
Census of New South Wales, 1891, separately published.3 .
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of district would have coincided, for obvious reasons. In 
some sparsely settled areas, a single court district may have 
included several police districts. A further problem in the 
search for population statistics is that not all of the court 
districts were allied to police districts separately included
in the census figures.
The following Table shows court districts for which 
records survive from census years. The underlining indicates 
those districts with statistics based on police districts 
provided in the census.
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Table 4 Court and Police Districts for which Records
are Available in Census Years
—]
1846 1851 1856 1861 1871
Braidwood Armidale Armidale
I
Armidale Armidale
Camden Braidwood Balranald Balranald Balranald
Dungog Camden Bega Bega Bega
Eden Cooma Bendemeer Bendemeer Bendemeer
Moruya Dungog Braidwood Camden Berry
Mudgee Eden Camden Cooma Broughton Ck
Parramatta Kiama Cooma Cundletown Binalong
Queanbeyan Maitland Dungog Dungog Bungendore
Tenterfield Merriwa Eden East Maitla:id
Wagga Moruya Grafton Eden Cundletown
Warialda Moulamein Gundagai Gundagai Dungog
Yass Mudgee Kiama Kiama East Maitland
Sydney Numba Maitland Lismore Eden
Parramatta Merriwa Maitland Gladstone
Picton Moama Merriwa Grafton
Queanbeyan Moruya Moama Gundagai
Scone Moulamein Moruya Lismore
Stroud Mudgee Moulamein , Michelago
Tenterfield Numba Mudgee Moama
Wagga Parramatta Nerrigundah Moruya
Warialda Picton Newcastle Moulamein
Wellingrove Queanbeyan Nowra Nerrigundah
Yass Scone Numba Newcastle
Sydney Sofala Oberon Nowra
Stroud Parramatta Oberon
Tenterfield Picton Parramatta
Wagga Queanbeyan Picton
Warialda Raymond Tee Sofala
Wellingrove Scone Tambaroora
Yass Sofala Taree
Stroud Tenterfield
I --------------------------------------------
Tambaroora Tinonee
Taree Uralla
Tenterfield Walcha
Uralla Warialda
1
Wagga Wellington
I
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18 4 6 1851 1856 1861 1871
1------- ------
Walcha
Warialda
Wellinqrove
Wellingrove
Wingham
Wollombi
Winqham
Wollombi
Yass
Young
Yass
In order to fill the gap created by the absence of 
certain police districts from census figures, I occasionally had 
recourse to other geographical divisions of the census 
(1846-1871), namely 'Census or Registry Districts' and 'Towns 
and Villages'. Again it is not possible to make a comparison 
of their boundaries with those of court districts, though one 
is entitled to assume that Registry districts would have 
utilised the existing (embryonic) administrative structure of 
the areas, and would therefore have approximated adequately to 
court districts. The areas of 'Towns and Villages' would 
have been much smaller than the covering court districts; 
and the populations,therefore,also smaller. They have some use, 
however, in those areas where the major economic enterprises, 
and those from which most of the litigants in the surviving 
records were drawn, were town-based. They would therefore be 
of little use in predominantly pastoral areas like New England 
or the Western Division, but much more valuable for mining 
areas like Hill End, Gulgong and Tambaroora. The following
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analysis of population is therefore based primarily on figures 
for police districts with some recourse to'Registry Districts' 
or *Towns and Villages’.
The figures used from the five censuses between 1846 and 
1871 have, where possible, been narrowed by age and occupation.
I eliminated all persons under 14 by use of the Age Tables.
Though there would in fact have been numbers of children 
under 14 employed, particularly on farms, I have assumed for 
the purpose of these calculations that, even in the nineteenth 
century, the majority of children under 14 were not in paid 
employment. Furthermore, those who were employed would have 
been unlikely Masters and Servants Act litigants. They would, 
of course, have been unable to bring cases themselves, and 
the exigencies which led their parents or guardians to place 
them in paid employment would have discouraged those parents 
from risking antagonising the children's employers by prosecuting 
them. Where the employer had a complaint against the children, 
the parents would probably have attempted to placate the 
employers, thus minimising further the likelihood of pros­
ecution .
For the 1846, 1851 and 1856 censuses, I have had to rely 
on the Age Tables alone. From 1861, occupational breakdown 
makes it possible to concentrate on an even more specific 
section of the population. This can be done by subtracting 
from the total figures of persons of 14 ano over in 1861 
women engaged in domestic duties (other than as hired servants), 
and by subtracting from the 1871 figures for the whole 
population both women engaged in domestic duties and scholars
1 . See note 1, p.152.
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at home or at school. (The children under 14 in 1871 
were included in 'domestic duties' or 'scholars' since 
'domestic duties' in that census covered infant children 
not yet eligible for the 'scholars' category1). This 
refinement of the figures allowed a (tentative) calculation 
of th$ 'working' population - those persons who were 
likely to be either employees or employers of labour.
The method of calculation is not completely satisfactory.
It excluded, for example, women who were engaged in 
domestic duties in their own homes but employed one or 
more domestic servants to assist them; and one cannot tell 
from the definition of the Domestic Service category 
whether women of a higher socio-economic status who left 
all the work of the house to servants would have been 
included in the category of women engaged in domestic 
duties or whether that category included only women who 
did actually engage in household work, leaving their more 
fortunate sisters to be counted in the residual categories 
of 'others' or 'not stated'.
These figures can be a rough guide only, and the type 
of comparative analysis to which they can be applied is 
also admittedly rough. I began by calculating an 'average
1. Census of the Colony of New South Wales, op.cit;
Occupational Tables, 1872 Vol.2 pp.860-9911 1872-3, 
pp.1166-1204. 'Domestic Duties' was defined in the 
tables as covering 'Persons assisting in Housework, 
Children (not under Tuition), Persons incapacitated 
from work (not in Hospitals or Asylums etc.)'.
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working population’ for the various court districts for 
which records exist, covering the period when police 
district populations are given in the census. This 
’average working population' was arrived at simply by 
adding the 'working population' of districts for each of 
the census years between 1846 and 1871 and dividing the 
total by the number of censuses. In Table 5, I have 
compared that 'average working population' to the number 
of litigants^" in the average number of surviving Masters 
and Servants Act cases (arrived at by dividing the number 
of cases in a district between 1846 and 1871 by the number 
of years covered by the cases), and have expressed this 
number of litigants as a percentage of the 'average working 
population' to show the proportion of the population 
involved in Masters and Servants Act cases in any one year. 
The averaging process is designed to eliminate sudden 
fluctuations in litigation or population resulting from 
extraneous causes, and to incorporate the gradual increase 
in population which most districts experienced during 
these years.
The number of litigants will be the number of 
cases multiplied by two, since each case had two 
parties. This ignores, for the moment, multiple 
litigants - see infra pp. 376-417.
1 .
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Table 5 Litigants in Masters and Servants Cases as
Percentage of 'Average Working Population'
District
(Average
Working
Population
Total
Litigants
1846-75
Average 
No. of 
Litigants 
Per Year
)
Litigants 
as Percent­
age of 
Population
Years
Covered
North-East
Armidale 3233 458 20 .6 1845-67
Glen Innes 959 694 32 3.0 1847-71
Tenterfield 727 658 26 4.0 1847-74
Warialda 5 31 436 18 2.0 1848-70
Central North Coast
Dungog 1196 226 10 .8 1845-66
Grafton 4514 28 28 .6 1875
Maitland 7323 280 26 . 3 1853-63
Newcastle 5 717 180 90 1.5 1870-71
Scone 629 234 26 4.0 1851-59
Wollombi 750 26 4 . 5 1864-69
Central West
Binalong 2193 72 12 . 5 1870-75
Gundagai 1822 226 38 2.0 1856-61
Mudgee 1434 452 30 2.0 1846-60
Tambaroora 2579 126 9 . 3 1862-75
Wagga 1136 266 66 6.0 1848-51
Wellington 3977 26 6 .2 1870-73
Yass 2184 184 6 .3 1848-75
Sydney and Cuniberland PlanIn
Camden 3295 310 16 . 5 1847-65
Parramatta 7449 200 44 .6 1847-52
Picton 2860 202i 20 .7 1852-62
Sydney 21251
|_
820 205 opH 1848-50
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Table 5 (Continued)
District
Average
Working
Populatior
Total
Litigants
1846-75
Average 
No. of 
Litigants 
Per Year
l
Litigants as
Percentage
of
Population
Years
Covered
South Coast
Bega 1317 234 20 1.5 1858-69
Eden 721 272 10 1.0 1847-75
Kiama 1780 330 30 2.0 1852-62
Shoalhaven 1413 176 16 1.0 1853-63
Southern Table lands and Me naro
Braidwood 1229 154 8 . 6 1852-56
Cooma 1381 260 37 3.0 1854-60
Queanbeyan 1376 48 8 .6 1855-60
Western Divisi on and River ina
Balranald 779 92 4 . 6 1850-69
Moama 346 64 10 3.0 1857-62i
Moulamein 466 106 4 .8 1847-75
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The percentages arrived at are small, but they 
underestimate the effect of Masters and Servants Act 
litigation which cannot be gauged simply by looking at the 
number of prosecutions in any one year. It is also necessary 
to incorporate the cumulative effect of year after year of 
use of the Acts. Masters and Servants Act cases occurred 
with sufficient frequency to produce a keen consciousness of 
the Acts and their operation. Furthermore the actual pro­
secutions were only the most dramatic of the various uses 
to which the Acts could be put - threatened prosecutions and 
mere references to the Acts by disgruntled employers or 
employees could also be said to be uses or applications of the 
Acts.^ Finally the records of exercise of the arbitral 
jurisdiction have not survived, and are not included in the 
percentages calculated. This additional jurisdiction would 
have reinforced the effect of the 'standard' prosecutions 
on the population of the various areas.
The actual volume of litigation gives an initial 
indication of the influence of Masters and Servants Act 
litigation, but to understand the way the Acts operated as 
a method of conducting and regulating employment relations, 
the patterns of offences and sentences and the outcome of 
initiated prosecutions must also be examined in greater depth. 
I have done this by statistical analysis of a number of 
variables extracted from the case records. These variables
Because they were ways of introducing the regulatory 
influence of the Acts into the bargaining and disputation 
between parties to the employment relationship. On 
bargaining, see infra pp.297-321.
1.
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are listed below. Asterisks mark those for which information 
exists in both Bench Book and Charge and Summons Book reports. 
The unstarred items relate to information which can be 
discovered about cases reported only in Bench Books.
1. Court District *
2 . ’ Area *
3. Date *
4 . Type of complainant *
(i.e. employer, employee, the
Crown)
5 . Type of defendant *
(i.e. employer, employee, other
6 . Employer's name *
7. Employee's name *
8. Employer's occupation
9 . Employee's occupation
10. Offence charged *
11. Type of misconduct (in misconduct
charges)
12. Type of absconding
(in absconding charges)
13. Verdict ★
14. Sentence *
1. 'Other' covers defendants to charges of employing, 
harbouring or inciting an employee of the plaintiff.
203
The area divisions which I have made to facilitate 
analysis of the 71 court districts represented in the records 
are based on traditional geographical categories allied to 
social and economic factors relevant to the nineteenth 
century ^. I have postulated eight areas. The number of 
cases from these areas is as follows:-
Table 6. Numbers of Cases for which Records Survive
Area No. of Cases Percentage of Total
North East 1578 19.2
Central North 158 1.9
Central North Coast 1275 15.6
and Hinterland
Central West and 1538 18.8
South West Slopes &
Plains
Sydney and Cumberland Plain 1385 16.9
South Coast 1036 12.6
Southern Tablelands 263 3.5
and Monaro
Western Division 946 11.5
and Riverina
1. The area divisions represent economic units, generally
characterised by a particular form of primary production. 
One of the main factors in the creation of these economic 
units was the available sources and routes of transport. 
This economic cohesibn was followed by an administration 
cohesion - cases were frequently remanded from court 
district to court district within an area, less frequently 
outside it. i>he division is recognised by the main 
statistical divisions of New South Wales - see, for 
example, in J.R. Linge, Industrial Awakening. A 
Geography of Australian Manufacturing 1788-1890,
Canberra, 1979, Figure 12.6, p.527; and see 
extended twentieth century division in Official 
Yearbook of New South Wales, No. 63, 1974, pp.16-
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Within those areas, the court districts are distributed 
as shown below.
Table 7. Court Districts with Surviving Records
Divided according to Area
North - East Central North
Armidale
Bendemeer
Drake
Glen Innes  ^
Lismore 
Tenterfield 
Uralla
Goodooga
Walcha 
Warialda
1. The seat of the Court of Petty Sessions was moved 
from Wellingrove to Glen Innes in 1858. Cases in 
these two courts therefore come from the same district.
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Central North Coast and Hinterland
Cundletown
Dungog
East Maitland
Gladstone
Graftön
Maitland
Merriwa
Morpheth
Newcastle
Raymond Terrace
Scone
Stroud
Taree
Tinonee
Wingham
Central West and South West
Slopes and Plains
Binalong
Gulgong
Gundagai
Hill End
Molong
Mudgee
Oberon
Sofala
Tambaroora
Wagga
Wellington
Yass
Young
Wollombi
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Sydney and Cumberland Plain South Coast
Camden Bega
Newtown „ 1 Berry
Parramatta Candelo
Picton Cobargo
Sydney Eden
Kiama
Moruya
Nerrigundah
Nowra
Shoalhaven
Southern Tablelands & Monaro Western Division and Riverina
Araluen Balranald
Braidwood Milparinka
Bungendore Moama
Coorna Moulamein
Michelago Tibooburra
Queanbeyan Wilcannia
The next two chapters set out the results of my analysis 
of the variables listed on p.202. It must be remembered, 
however, that because of the erratic survival of records 
and the small number of cases in many court districts, the 
figures and percentages obtained are frequently distorted, 
and though the crosstabulations have descriptive value, they 
cannot be accorded much statistical significance.
1 . The same procedure took place in 1889 when the Bench 
which previously sat at Broughton Creek moved its 
place of sitting to Berry.
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CHAPTER 4
Types of Offence, and Penalties Imposed - 
a Chronological, Geographical and 
Occupational Analysis
Part I Types of Prosecutions
This Part describes the distribution of particular 
offences for which prosecutions were .launched, according 
to area, period and occupation of the participants.
The following Table shows the frequency of the main 
offences for the whole period of the survey.
Table 1 Distribution of Main Offences
Offence No. of Prosecutions %age of Total Prosecutions
Absconding 2041 24.9
Misconduct 570 7.0
Loss of Property 107 1.3
Wages 4652 56.7
Enticing etc. 49 .6
Failure to Employ 5 .1
Illtreatment 12 .1
Disobeying Summons 6 . 1
Arbitration of Dispute 1 . 0
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These figures can be reduced to four categories of
offences:-
Offences by Employees against Employers 2718
Offences by Employers against Employees 4783
Offences against the Employment Relationship 49
Other 2
The most important types of offence are clearly the first 
two. Though the Acts covered matters like harbouring 
and enticing, and forging discharge certificates, 
over 99.9% of prosecutions were between the two 
parties to an employment contract for alleged breaches of 
that contract, and within prosecutions of that type actions 
by employees against employers greatly outnumber actions 
by the employers against their employees.
Analysis of surviving records demonstrates a 
definite pattern in the distribution of prosecuted 
offences over time. Absconding charges made up 39.7% of 
surviving cases in the 1845-60 period, 17.8% from 1.861-80, 
13.4% from 1881-1900 and 17.4% from 1901-30. As the 
percentage of absconding cases fell, so that of wages cases 
rose: 29.4% of cases from 1845-60, 69.3% from 1861-80,
78.4% from 1881-1900 and 71.9% from 1901-30. These 
figures are colony-wide. When area is introduced as a 
control into a threeway crosstabulation, the percentages 
alter, as the following tables show.
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While the changes are in part exlained simply by 
the uneven distribution of surviving records amongst the 
areas at particular times, they also demonstrate 
differences in the economic situations in the various 
areas. The patterns can be compared more easily by the 
graphs of absconding cases and wages cases in Graphs 1 and 
2. Graph 1 shows that absconding cases were generally 
between 10% and 30% of total cases for the particular 
areas, with the exception of certain periods of more 
dramatic activity - 1854-55 in the North East and 
the Cumberland Plain, 1850 in the South Coast and 
Southern Tablelands/Monaro, 1871-80 in the same areas, 
and 1896-1920 in the Western Division. It would be unwise 
to make facile conclusions from the timing of these peaks 
without supporting evidence based on case details of 
absconding (where that is available). For at first 
sight, two of these peaks might appear to be explained by 
the goldrushes of the 1850s and early 1870s enticing 
workers away from their jobs. Yet the evidence in the 
cases, as seen a bit later,'*’ does not suggest that the 
goldrushes had any major direct influence on abscondings.
1 . Infra p .257 .
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The graph of wages cases (Graph 2) shows a rather 
different pattern from a simple reverse of the absconding 
case pattern. Most areas register a steady increase of 
wages cases after an early decline in 1850. However on the 
South Coast there was a dramatic drop in 1871-80, paralleling 
the increase in absconding cases, as there was in the 
Southern Tablelands/Monaro district also. The drop in the 
Southern Tablelands/Monaro followed a high point in 1866-70 
when all cases in surviving records were wages cases, and the 
area returned more rapidly to an increasing trend than did 
the South Coast, with the graph rising by 1876. Both the 
Southern Tablelands/Monaro and the Western Division regist­
ered another drop in 1886-90, the Western Division also 
showed a fall in the percentage of wages cases from 70% in 
1891-95 to 30% in 1901-10, after which the numbers increased 
again to 78% in 1930. It is difficult to see any obvious 
reason for these drops in the graph. The 1880s were a 
period of increasing industrial agitation by pastoral 
workers, particularly in the Western Division,^" and it may 
be that employees had more success through collective action 
leading them to pay less attention to contractual remedies 
for disputes over wages, or that employers were more 
punctilious about their obligations in the face of the 
increasing 'muscle' of newly-organised labour. The drop 
from 70% in 1891-95 to 30% in 1901-10 might suggest that
1. During the 1880s, the newly formed Shearers' Union 
(see note 2, p. 160.) began an organisational drive 
in the Western Division.
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with the introduction of compulsory arbitration, employees
sought redress there until the inadequacies of the new 
1
system led them to return to the tried and tested processes 
of the Masters and Servants Act.
1. lor example, many unions experienced great difficult­
ies in getting a log of claims before the Arbitration 
Court - as did the Federated Ironworkers1 Association 
see J.A. Merritt, *A History of the federated Iron- 
workers1 Association of Australia 1909-19521, Ph.D. 
thesis, A .N . U. 196 8, unpublished, Ch. 1.
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In looking at the effect of period and area on the 
types of offences prosecuted, we are still dealing with 
issues which, though clearly influential, are extraneous to 
the employment relationship itself. An examination of 
prosecutions according to the occupations involved enables 
the analysis to draw more deeply on the internal character­
istics of the relationship. A total of 58 employer occupat-
1
ions are detailed in the cases which can be divided into 
10 main groups, as follows:-
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1. Pastoral
Sheep station proprietor
Sheep station manager, overseer, superintendent or agent 
Cattle station proprietor
Cattle station manager, overseer, superintendent or agent
2. Agricultural 
Farmer 
Vinegrower 
Dairy Farmer 
Farm overseer
3. Mining
Mine manager (mining)
Mine manager (legal)
Mine owner
4. Proprietors of Skilled Trades Businesses 
Coach builder
Shoemaker
Wheelwright
Blacksmith
Sawyer
Saddler
Carpenter
Bricklayer
Stonemason
That is, in those cases which contained such inform­
ation. Only Bench Book reports would have had inform­
ation on occupation, and even there, many reports 
failed to record this.
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5. Retailers of Foodstuffs, Groceries etc 
Butcher
Baker
Publican
Storekeeper
Chemist and Druggist
6. Contractors and Persons engaged in Construction 
Contractor (unspecified)
Surveyor
Contractor's Agent 
Builder
Railway Contractor 
Building Contractor 
Tunnelling Contractor 
Telegraph Contractor 
Road Contractor
7. Owners or managers of manufacturing or processing establishments 
Sawmill owner/manager
Tobacco merchant 
Woolwashing company manager 
Woolwashing company owner 
Newspaper owner, manager etc 
Soft Drink manufacturer 
Brewery owner 
Brick manufacturer
8. Dealers in Commodities 
Timber merchant
Cedar dealer
9. Service Occupations 
Coach line operator
Sea captain (or owner of line)
Government official 
Medical practitioner 
Postmaster 
Mail contractor 
Carrier
Municipal official 
Drover
Riverboat captain 
Boarding house keeper 
Whaling master 
Pound keeper 
Solicitor
10. Performers etc 
Circus proprietor 
Comedian
The number of cases recorded as being brought by 
employers of these various occupations is shown in the 
following Table.
►
Table 3
Numbers of Cases divided by Employer Occupation
Sheep Station Proprietor 838 
Sheep Station Manager 350 
Farmer 240 
Publican 116 
Mine Manager (Mining) 114 
Mine Owner 73 
Road Contractor 54 
Mail Contractor 30 
Storekeeper 27 
Butcher 19 
Whaling Master 19 
Contractor (unspecified) 11 
Woolwash Owner 11 
Baker 10 
Riverboat Captain 9 
Cedar Dealer 8
There were the following lesser numbers of cases for the 
occupations shown below.
Blacksmith
Cattle Station Proprietor
Dairy Farmer 6 cases each
Newspaper Proprietor 
Railway Contractor
Carrier 
Farm Overseer
Shoemaker 5 cases each
Telegraph Contractor
Vinegrower
Builder
Circus Proprietor 4 cases each
Drover
Saddler
Surveyor
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Mine Manager (legal)
Sawyer 3 cases each
Sea captain
Building contractor
Cattle station manager
Coach line operator
Contractor's agent. 2 cases eachGovernment official
Pound keeper
Timber merchant
Wheelwright
Boarding housekeeper 
Brewery owner 
Bricklayer 
Carpenter
Chemist and druggist
Coachbuilder
Comedian
Medical Practitioner
Municipal Official 1 case each
Postmaster
Sawmill owner
Soft drink manufacturer
Solicitor
Stonemason
Tobacco Merchant
Tunnel Contractor
Woolwash proprietor
Information about employer's occupation is, however, 
available for only 19.7% of cases. In 6152 cases, employer's 
occupation is not recorded, and the division of occupations 
above cannot be said to prove the existence of any community­
wide patterns. It is possible that overall trends would not
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have varied markedly from those suggested by the preceding 
breakdown, but a number of qualifying factors must be noted. 
Since only Bench Book records would give an employer's 
occupation, the occupations which are shown in the Tables 
are those which figured prominently in districts for which 
Bench Book records survive. The main occupations of districts 
for which we have only Charge and Summons Books, in so far 
as these were different from those in Bench Book areas, would 
be unrepresented. The silence of Charge and Summons Books 
on occupations also means that information on this factor 
relates to the pre-1900 period when Bench Books were the 
way in which Petty Sessions records were kept. The partic­
ular occupations recorded may be representative of a 
community-wide pattern despite the incomplete records, 
because those records which do survive come from districts 
scattered throughout all the geographical areas, though the 
absence of Sydney records must mean that industrial and, to 
a lesser extent, retail occupations are under-represented. 
Pastoral occupations may be over-represented, as a result of 
the survival of Bench Books from the main pastoral areas - 
the North East, the Liverpool Plain, the Western Division; 
but of course, one would expect a large number of pastoral 
employers because of the major part played by the pastoral 
industry in the economy of the nineteenth century. Similarly, 
mine owners and managers are over-represented because of the 
Hill End Bench Books. Though goldmining was a major industry 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, it is 
not as likely as the pastoral industry to have produced a
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significant proportion of Masters and Servants cases, since 
much of it was alluvial mining, done by self-employed miners. 
The deep-lead mining of the Hill End and Tambaroora quartz 
reefs produces a distortion in the figures.
It is not surprising, however, to find 240 farmers, 
since farming was an occupation spread throughout all areas 
and involving the type and size of enterprise likely to 
result in Masters and Servants Act cases. The 116 cases 
involving publicans are also probably representative in view 
of the important part played by publicans in the economic 
and social life of the small and isolated townships. The 
number of road and mail contractors - 54 and 30 respectively 
also reflects the circumstances of a colony of scattered 
settlement at a time of rapid economic expansion. One would 
expect that, if complete information was available for all 
areas, the relation of the various occupations 
listed would remain very much the same, with fairly large 
numbers of cases involving pastoralists, farmers, the main 
retail occupations (butchers, bakers, storekeepers) but with 
the numbers of small-scale manufacturers and skilled trades­
men and artisans greatly increased by the Sydney cases.
In the table below, I have set out the distribution of
cases involving the four main offences amongst the various
1
categories of employer occupation.
1. That is, the offences most frequently litigated.
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Table
n-i Qtr i bution of Offences according to Employer Occupation
Occupation Abscond Miscond. Loss of Prop. Wages
^Pastoral 4 1 .6% 1 7 .6% 6 .8% 2 8 .0%
*Agricuiture 31.1 16.3 0.8 44.6
*Mining 1.1 0 0 98.9
Skilled Trades 37.5 4.2 0 5 0.0
*Food & Allied 34.1 11.2 1.8 49.4
*Constr. & Bldg , 24.7 3.4 0 70.8
Manufacturers 14.3 4.8 0 76.2
Dealers 37.5 12.5 0 37.5
^Service Occups . 38.6 22.9 0 38.6
Performers 50.0 25.0 0 25.0
(The occupation categories marked by asterisks are those
with the greatest actual numbers of cases.)
While comparisons from occupation to occupation are 
subject to reservations because of the effect of uneven
selection as to time and area, the distribution of the
offences within each occupational group is a more reliable 
indicator, and since the figures are given as percentages 
of total surviving cases, these can be compared with some 
confidence. Two main points can bo made about the table. 
Firstly, absconding is the main employer-initiated charge 
in almost all occupational groups. Of the starred groups, 
only Service Occupations have a total of misconduct cases 
approaching the number of cases for absconding. Secondly, 
probably because these figures come from Bench Books and 
therefore from the first half of the period surveyed, the 
number of employer-initiated charges outweigh the wages cases 
in half the occupations listed. The predominance of wages
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casesfor Mining relates to the special circumstances of 
Hill End and Tambaroora.  ^ However it is more difficult to 
explain why/even in the earlier Bench Book period, wages 
cases outweigh cases initiated by employers in skilled 
trades, food retailing, construction and building or manu­
facture. This is probably the result of a period of indus­
trial growth punctuated by economic crises during which small 
manufacturers and craftsmen and large contractors would 
experience liquidity problems leading them to be tardy in 
paying wages.
Within any one of these employer occupations, many
different types of employee were engaged. There are
altogether 131 different employee occupations referred to
in the cases with information on occupation. Again that
is a small proportion of the total - 2015 cases out of
28110 involving an employee as a party. The following 
list shows the number of cases identifiably involving these 
occupations. These occupations can be gathered into 
fifteen groups. The following Table shows the groups, 
the occupations included,and the number of cases in which 
a worker was identified as following that occupation.
1. Where deep-lead mining involved large-scale enterprises 
instead of the self-employed, miners of the alluvial 
fields, and where under-capitalization of the mines 
resulted in frequent failure by the Sydney-based 
companies to transfer funds to the gold fields for 
wages. See A.H. Hodge, The Hill End Story, Book 1, 
Forrestville, 1973, in particular, pp. 41-44.
That is - excluding cases between the Crown and an 
employer, or between an employer and a party inter­
fering with the employment relationship.
2 .
222
Table 5
Employee Occupations and Groups of Occupations
1. Workers on Pastoral Properties Total: 906
Shepherd 470 Lambing shepherd 11
Shearer 128 Overseer 5
Drover 38 Rouseabout 4
Hutkeeper 17 Woolpresser 3
Sheepwasher 15 Boundary rider 1
Stockman 13 Woolroller 1
2. Workers on Farming Properties Total: 176
General farm servant 94 Mower 3
Reaper 29 Dairywoman 2
Ploughman 17 Farm Labourer (female) 2
Thrasher 9 Farm Overseer 2
Vinedresser 8 Wheatgrinder 2
Dairyman 8
3. General Bushcrafts and Occupations Total: 112
Fencer 41 Tank sinker 5
Clearing land 30 Burr cutter 2
Horsebreaker 12 Bush h and 1
Well sinker 10 Charcoal burner 1
Rough carpenter 7
4. Occupations in the Timber Industry Total: 96
Timbercutter, splitter etc 81 Sawmill employee 2
Shingle splitter 9 Logger 1
Timber rafter 3
5. Mining Occupations Total: 183
Miner (gold) 182 Tinminer 2
Mine manager 6 Miner (coal) 1
Claim minder 5 Prospector 1
Miner (other) ; 5 Tunneler 1
223
6. S k i l l e d  A r t i f i c e r s  & T r a d e s m e n T o t a l : 151
C a r p e n t e r 71 S a d d l e r 3
B l a c k s m i t h 16 W h e e l w r i g h t 3
S t o n e m a s o n 9 C o a c h  b u i l d e r 2
B r i c k l a y e r 7 C o o p e r 2
P l a s t e r e r 6 C h a n d l e r 1
S h o e m a k e r 6 C u r r i e r 1
S l a u g h t e r e r 5 D r e s s m a k e r 1
B a k e r 5 M i l l e r 1
B u t c h e r 4 T a n n e r 1
C o m p o s i t o r 3 S h i p w r i g h t 1
P a i n t e r 3
7. T r a d e s m e n ' s  A s s i s t a n t s T o t a l : 3
H a m m e r m a n / S t r i k e r 3
8. O t h e r  O c c u p a t i o n s  in B u i l d i n g  a n d C o n s t r u c t i o n T o t a l : 151
L a b o u r e r 78 C h a i n m a n 1
R o a d w o r k e r 37 B r i d g e  B u i l d e r 1
B r i c k m a k e r 13 F o r e m a n  B u i l d e r 1
B u i l d e r 13 B u i l d e r ' s  l a b o u r e r  1
S t o n e b r e a k e r 4 S h i n g l e r 1
C a l i c o  w o r k e r 1
9. R i v e r  a n d  S e a  T r a n s p o r t a n d  F i s h i n g T o t a l : 32
D e c k h a n d  (riverboat) 13 S a i l o r 1
W h a l e r 12 S e a m a n 1
P u l l i n g h a n d 2 S h i p 's m a t e 1
P u n t  o r  B o a t m a n 2
10. Domestic Service
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Total: 208
General servant 93 Pub Manager 2
Cook (male) 47 Yardman 2
General house servant (female) 27 Barman 1
Gardener 7 Billiard marker 1
Laundress 6 Pantryman 1
Cook (female) 4 Parlourmaid 1
Housemaid 4 Porter 1
Nurse 3 Wetnurse 1
Waiter 3
11. Employees in Retail Establishments and Offices Total: 25
Station storekeeper 8 Clerk 2
Bookkeeper 5 Hawker 2
Butcher's assistant 4 Shop assistant 1
Shop assistant (male) 3 (female)
12. Transport Total: 153
Bullock Driver 58 Mailman 12
Groom/ostler 21 Coachguard 1
Carter and Drayman 18 Postman 1
Coach driver 16
Horse driver 16
13. Employees in Industrial Manufacturing and Total: 17
Processing Establishments
Woolwasher 13 Cordial maker 1
Tinplate worker 2 Tobacco worker 1
14. 'Mechanics' Total: 14
Engine driver 
Fireman (engine)
8
6
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15. Miscellaneous Total: 7
Teachers 3 Journalist 1
Musician 2 Policeman 1
Thus the relative distribution of cases amongst groups of 
employees is:
Pastoral occupations 906 
Domestic occupations 208 
Mining occupations 183 
Farming occupations 176 
Transport occupations 153 
Skilled occupations 15.1 
General Bush occupations 112 
Timber related occupations 96 
Water Transport 32 
Office and Retail 25 
Industrial and Manufacturing 17 
Mechanics 14 
Miscellaneous 7 
Tradesmen’s Assistants 3
As with employer occupations, the frequency of 
employee occupations is affected by the uneven representations 
of place and period, and therefore, any analysis of cases 
based on occupations must be treated cautiously. The 
unavailability of records for Sydney could mean that 
domestic, industrial and skilled occupations are under­
represented. On the other hand, the absence from the 
sample of large numbers of Court districts throughout all 
areas of rural New South Wales may offset this imbalance 
by subtracting significant numbers from rural occupations 
as well; the occupation distribution may in fact exhibit a
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pattem appropriate to the colony/state as a whole.
Table 6 (p.2 31 ) shows the relationship between 
employee’s occupation and type of offence prosecuted.
A number of features of this Table are worth noting.
In relation to charges of absconding, the extremely small
number of cases involving mining employees is striking.
Only’0.5% of mining employees were charged with absconding
(which represents 0.2% of all absconding cases where
employee's occupation is known). As a corollary, 99.5%
of mining employees engaged in litigation were suing for
wages. This distribution of figures is determined by the
fact that the majority of these miners were gold miners
from the deep-lead mines of Hill End, Gulgong and
Tambaroora. Though they were simply employees working for
a wage (until financial difficulties caused the mine
1
owners to work their mines by tribute ) they were caught 
up in the zeal of the search and were unlikely to abscond 
or even 'misbehave'. There was a large area of mutuality 
in motivation of the miners and their employers. Under­
capitalisation of the mines and the ill effects of the 
boom meant, however, that many had to resort to law for 
the wages earned at the seam.
Office and retail workers are also distinguished by 
a comparatively small percentage of absconding cases - 
in this case, only 10%. It could be argued that in
'Tribute' was a system whereby workers in mines 
of doubtful profitability agreed to take a share 
of the value of whatever gold was extracted rather 
than to receive regular wages.
1.
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the case of these workers, their white-collar status
made them less likely to absenters. Absence is more a
strategy of blue-collar or manual workers than of white-
collar workers. Though this might be presented as the
result of a more 'responsible' attitude by white-collar
employees, it is more likely to involve a recognition
of the vulnerability of their position, which would in
most cases involve a small working unit; in fact most of
the workers in this group were probably sole employees,
or at least the sole employees in the particular section
of an establishment in which they worked. Allied to their
low rate of absconding is a relatively sizeable rate of
misconduct charges (15%). Two factors are likely to
have contributed to this. The first is the degree of
control - to modern eyes, an oppressive degree - which
nineteenth century employers exercised over clerical and
other white-collar workers. Given such a regimen, it is
understandable that in carrying out their duties, such
workers would have been frequently involved in situations
which the employer would have considered to amount to
misconduct. The second factor relates to the view of use
of the Acts as a tactic within the broader strategy of
the employment relationship between an individual employer
1
and an individual employee. Where anemployer desired to 
resort to this tactic, he would utilise whatever ground
1. Infra pp. 297- 321 .
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for a charge was most favourable - easiest to prove, most 
likely to result in the desired type of sentence etc.
If white-collar workers were not in the habit of absenting 
from work, an employer wishing to use the Masters and 
Servants Acts tactic would turn to Misconduct as the most 
appropriate charge. A further intriguing factor about 
office and retail employees is the large number of charges 
by employees for failure to employ them according to 
contract (which would include Wrongful Discharge) - 15% of 
the cases in this group are for that type of offence.
This also is explicable in the light of the higher status 
which, for one reason or another, was accorded to white- 
collar work. Whereas a shepherd, farm labourer or road 
worker might accept a failure to employ or a wrongful dis­
charge with a shrug and move on to the next pastoral 
property or farm, a clerk, bookkeeper or shop assistant 
would be more likely to take steps to keep a job once he 
or she had been hired.
Mechanics - engine drivers and firemen - also encount­
ered a very large percentage of misconduct cases. These 
were mostly men working on threshing machines and river- 
boats. In these situations, the speedy progress of the 
enterprise and the efficient employment of other labour 
depended on the troublefree working of the machines.
These employees were thus in a position to exert consid­
erable pressure on employers by the way in which they
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performed their work, and employers would have kept a
1
close eye on their performance.
Mechanics are noticeable, for allied reasons, for 
the large number of cases alleging loss or destruction 
of property: 7.7% of cases. This compares closely with
the 10% involving pastoral workers, which arose largely 
from loss of sheep by shepherds. Water transport workers 
also were frequently involved in such charges, which 
represented 6.7% of their cases. Once again, the central 
importance and vulnerability of the equipment with which 
they dealt made this a likely cause of cases.
Table 7 (p.232 ) show the percentages of types of 
cases for each group of employees as distributed through­
out the four main periods of the survey - 1845-60, 
1861-80, 1881-1900, and 1901-30.
The most notable feature of this analysis is the 
increase in absenting cases in the 1881-1900 period over 
the preceding two decades. There is a predictable drop 
in absenting cases in almost all groups between the 
1845-60 and the 1861-80 periods, but this is followed 
by a sometimes dramatic rise im many employee groups; for 
example,absenting cases among pastoral employees rose 
from 24.3% in 1861-80 to 70.1% in 1881-1900, while the 
rise for skilled workers was from 8.9% to 18.8%, and for
1. As did Samuel Craik, superintendent of the Australian 
Agricultural Company's sheep station, 'Warrah', on the 
boilerman at the Warrah washpool - letter from Craik 
to General Superintendent Merewether, 15/10/1869. 
Archives of Business and Labour, Australian National 
University. Australian Agricultural Company.
Warrah Letterbooks. 1861-75. 1/246
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office and retail workers from 0 to 50% . One need not 
look past the organised industrial activity of the 1880s 
accompanying increased unionisation and the large strikes 
of the 1890s for an explanation for the rise.
Some groups of employees experienced a massive drop 
in absconding cases for those years: e.g. farming, which 
went’ from 17.6% to 2%. This is because of the scarcity 
of records from farming districts in the 1881-1900 period. 
The same is true in the case of timber workers, though 
the drop in their number would also be influenced by the 
disappearance of various crafts and occupations - the 
switch to wire fencing from the 1870s on meant that many 
post splitters would have turned to other pursuits, as 
would the shingle splitters with the rise in use of 
other forms of roofing. In water transport also, there 
was a decline as improved roads caused a move away from 
the riverboats.
1. Though that 50% represented only one employee, 
and the percentage rise is therefore misleading.
547 
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Part II Penalties Imposed by Magistrates
In Chapter 2, I detailed the penalties which were 
provided in the legislation, and in Chapter 3 I indicated 
some further sentences which, though not expressly author­
ised in the Acts, were frequently handed down by the 
magistrates. In this Part, the frequency and distribution 
of various sentences are set out. Obviously, sentences of 
imprisonment are concentrated in the 1845-60 period, before 
the changes introduced by the 1857 Act made imprisonment 
available only where fines were not paid or orders for 
payment of wages not complied with. The sentences approp­
riate to cases initiated by employers were more varied than 
those applied in prosecutions by employees. There were a 
number of possible charges by employees, and in almost all 
of these, where the magistrate decided the charge had been 
proved, only one sentence was imposed. If the charge was 
not upheld, the decisjon would be - of course - that the 
case be dismissed, and sometimes costs would be awarded 
against the complainant employee. Where the charge was one 
of detention of the employee's goods, if upheld, the 
employer was ordered to deliver the goods to the servant. 
Where the charge was thadt an employer had failed to give a 
certificate of discharge, he was ordered to give the
discharge. In wages cases, however, orders took a variety 
of forms. The magistrates might order the employer to pay
a specified amount of wages, or they might order him to 
pay the wages claimed. If wages had been paid into court , 
the employer might be ordered to pay an identified sum 
over and above the amount paid already, or to pay the
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balance of the employee's claim. Where the report does not 
specify the amount claimed, it is not always possible to 
calculate whether an order to pay an identified sum meant 
complete success for the employee or whether his claim was 
reduced through acceptance by the Bench of aspects of the 
employer's defence.
There were 23 cases alleging failure or refusal to 
give a discharge certificate and only three orders against 
the employer to give the discharge - thus, in 20 of these 
cases,the employee was unsuccessful. Of 11 cases of 
detaining an employee's property, however, nine resulted 
in orders that the employer deliver the goods to the 
complainant. Non-payment of wages was the charge in 4608 
cases. In 2183, the magistrates ordered the employer to 
pay a set sum to the employee. In 85 cases, the employer 
was simply ordered to pay the wages claimed, and in only 
six cases was he ordered to pay wages over and above a sum 
paid into court before the hearing. Thus in wages cases, 
the verdict was apparently directly for the employee in 
just under half the cases brought. In Chapter 6, I explain 
how a number of indirect results can be taken as favourable 
to the complainant. Since there were only 755 cases where 
a claim for wages or rations was dismissed, the addition 
of cases with indirect results to the cases where an order 
was made in the employee's favour means that employees were 
successful in approximately 84% of the total number of 
claims for wages or rations.
The total numbers of charges of absconding, 
misconduct and loss were as follows:
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No. of Cases
Absconding 1739 
Absconding after Advance 47 
Misconduct 570 
Loss of Property 93 
Absconding/Loss 4 
Absconding/Misconduct 36 
Misconduct/Loss 13
There were 1470 guilty verdicts spread amongst these 2502 
cases, and only 135 recorded dismissals. In addition there 
were 101 cases where the parties were present at the hearing 
but the employer plaintiff went on record as declining to 
prosecute. Again a large number of charges involved 
indirect results.
While in the wages cases decided for the employees, 
the sentence was basically an order to pay the wages, in 
employer-initiated cases, a variety of sentences were 
recorded. These, and their frequency, are set out below:-
Imprisonment 464
Fine 391
Forfeiture of wages owing 318
Payment of sum in compensation 51
Order to return to service 140
1
Agreement cancelled 82
Caution 56
1. These are cases where cancellation of the agreement
was the only penalty (if it was in reality a penalty 
at all - it would have been to the advantage of 
employees bound by a long agreement to employers 
they found hard masters). In a number of cases 
where a fine or forfeiture of wages was imposed, 
the magistrates ordered that the agreement be 
cancelled as well.
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Cancellation of ticket of leave"'- 1
Discharge - having been sometime in 11
custody awaiting hearing
The following Table shows the distribution of the 
most significant of these sentences according to the time 
at which the cases were heard.
Table 8 Distribution of Sentences Imposed on Employees
according to Time
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 370 152 186 50 151 30
( 39%) (15%) (20%) (5%) (15%) ( 3%)
1861-80 40 124 71 8 19 8
(15%) (46%) (26%) ( 3%) (7%) ( 3%)
1881-1900 5 106 49 4 9 5
( 3%) (59.5%) (27.5%) ( 2%) (5%) (3%)
1901-30 1
(3%)
26
(74%)
5
(14%)
0 3
(8.5%)
0
Total 416 408 311 62 182 43
(29%)j-------------- (29%) (22%) (4%) (13%)
( 3%)
1. This case belongs, obviously, to the very early part 
of the period studied, when some ex-convicts, still 
bound by the Ticket-of-Leave regulations, were 
working under contracts of service.
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The figures in brackets show what percentage of all 
sentences against employees in each period is represented 
by each sentence listed. Clearly imprisonment, fine and 
forfeiture of wages were the most important sentences 
numerically, and though imprisonment was the most common 
sentence only in the early period from 1845-60, it still 
accounted for almost a third of all sentences over the 
whole period from 1845-1930. Of the two monetary penalties, 
the fine predominated except from 1845-60, when 15% of 
sentences were orders for fines and 20% orders to forfeit 
wages owing. In the later periods, wages would have been 
paid at more frequent intervals as terms of hiring became 
shorter, and it would have been less likely that accrued 
wages would be held by employers and available for forfei­
ture .
In Table 9, I have divided these colony-wide figures 
according to geographical area.
1. I have rounded percentages up and down to the closest 
whole number, and therefore the total of a row may 
occasionally be slightly more or slightly less than 100%.
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Table 9 Distribution of Sentences in the Geographical
Areas
(a) North-East
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 125 81 58 0 22 7
(43%) (28%) (20%) (8%) ( 2%)
1861-80 23 49 31 4 1 3
(21%) (44%) (28%) (4%) ( .9%) (3%)
1881-1900 0 4 0 0 1 0
(80%) (20%)
Total 148 134 89 4 24 10
(36%) (33%) (22%) d%) (6%) (2%)
(b) Central North
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1881-1900 0 13
(52%)
10
(40%)
0 0 2
(8%)
1901-30 0 9
(90%)
1
(10%)
0 0 0
Total 0 22
(63%)
11
(31%)
0 0 2
(6%)
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(c) Central North Coast and Hinterland
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 74 17 43 1 31 5
(43%) (10%) (25%) ( .6%) (18%) ( 3%)
1861-80 4 19 12 3 3 2
(9%) (44%) (28%) (7%) (7%) (5%)
1881-1900 0 2 2 0 0 1
(40%) (40%) (20%)
1901-30 1 2 0 0 0 0
(33.3%) (66.6% >
Total 79 40 57 4 34 8
(35.5%) (18%) (26%) (2%) (15%) (4%)
(d) Central West
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 22 21 24 16 11 7
(22%) ( 21%) (24%) (16%) di%) (7%)
1861-80 2 18 13 0 2 0
( 6%) ( 51%) ( 37%) ( 6%)
1881-1900 1 4 4 1 0 0
(10%) (40%) (40%) (10%)
1901-30 0 5 0 0 0 0
(100%)
Total 25 48 41 17 13 7
(16.5%) (31%) (27%) (n%) (9%) (5%)
(e) Sydney and Cumberland Plain
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 97 13 32 16 50 6
(45%) ( 6%) (15%) (7%) (23%) ( 3%)
1861-80 0 1 2 0 0 0
• ;33.3%) (66.6%)
1881-1900 0 3 5 0 0 1
[33.3%) (55.5%) (11%)
Total 97 17 39 16 50 7
(42%) (7.5%) (17%) (7%) (2 2%) (3%)
(f) South Coast
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 21 9 18 11 33 3
(22%) (9%) (19%) (11.5%) (35%) ( 3%)
1861-80 11 25 9 0 12 2
(19%) (42%) (15%) (20%) ( 3%)
1881-1900 2 5 5 1 6 1
(10%) (25%) (25%) (5%) (30%) (5%)
1901-30 0 1 1 0 1 0
(33.3%) (33.3%) (33.3%)
Total 34 40 33 12 52 6
(19%) (22.5%) (19%) (7%) (29%) ( 3%)
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(q) Southern Tablelands and Monaro
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 25 10 11 4 3 1
(46%) (18%) (20%) (7%) (5.5%) ( 2%)
1861-80 0 0 1
(33.3%)
1
(33.3%)
1
(33.3%)
0
1881-1900 0 1
(100%)
0 0 0 0
1901-30 0 0 0 0 2
(100%)
0
Total 25 11 12 5 6 1
(42%) (18%) (20%) ( 8%) (10%) (2%)
(h) Western Division and Riverina
Imprisonment Fine Forfei­
ture
Caution Return
to
Service
Other
1845-60 6 1 0 2 1 1
(54.5%) (9%) (18%) (9%) (9%)
1861-80 0 12 3 0 0 1
(75%) (19%) (6%)
1881-1900 2 74 23 2 2 0
(2%) (72%) (22%) (2%) (2%)
1901-30 0 9 3 0 0 0
(75%) (25%)
Total 8 96 29 4 3 2
(66%) (68%) (20%) ( 3%) (2%) d%)
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When the figures are broken down in this way, 
several district variations in the pattern of sentencing 
appear, though one must be careful not to give too much 
weight to those percentages based on very small numbers of 
actual cases. While the colony-wide figure for imprisonment 
in the 1845-60 period when it was a primary penalty was 39%, 
the percentage of sentences involving imprisonment in that 
period in the North East, Central North Coast, Southern 
Tablelands and Cumberland Plain was higher: 43% in the
North East and Central North Coast and Hinterland, 45% in 
Sydney and the Cumberland Plain, 46% in the Southern Table­
lands and an impressive 54.5% in the Western Division and 
Riverina (though this last represents only six cases). In 
some areas in that early period, fines were more common 
than forfeiture of wages - the North East and the Western 
Division and Riverina, though again the figures for the 
latter area are too small to rely on. The areas with above- 
average rates of imprisonment took in mostly pastoral 
economies, although part of the Central North Coast was a 
small farming area where employment relations between 
farm labourers and their employers were acrimonious.
In the farming districts, the social distance between 
employer and employee was objectively small, and this fact 
seems to have resulted in a greater effort by employers to 
enforce their status and privileges than in areas where 
employers were wealthier and better established. However, 
not all wealthy employers exhibited tolerance. In the 
North East especially, employment relations in this early
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period (and also in 1861-80) were very bad. Employers
adopted an extremely authoritarian attitude, to which
1
employees responded rebelliously. Since magistrates were 
drawn from amongst the employing class in each area, these 
attitudes could be expected to be reflected in their approach 
to sentencing. This helps to explain the otherwise anomalous 
predominance of sentences of imprisonment in the North East 
and Southern Tablelands in the 1845-60 period, a time when 
an alleged shortage of labour for pastoral properties in the 
districts 'beyond the limits of settlement' led to schemes 
for the importation of foreign labour - German, Chinese and 
Indian. If labour was really short, one would not have 
expected employers to allow their workers to be gaoled for 
up to three months at a time for what were often trifling 
offences. The figures on sentencing in those areas suggest 
both that the shortage was much more unevenly felt than 
contemporary accounts allow, and that the shortage was 
not always handled rationally when issues of status and 
prerogatives intervened to distort the employers' judgment.
Also noteworthy are the figures for imprisonment 
after the 1857 Act made it available only against employees 
who failed to pay fines. There is a colony-wide figure of 
15% of sentences of imprisonment in 1861-80. This is drawn 
mainly from the North East and South Coast areas, with 21% 
and 19% respectively. These percentages are supported in
1. See cases discussed infra pp.324-325 and 327.
247
the computer-based frequencies of 'Results of Orders for
Wages or Fines': there were 31 cases of imprisonment in
default of payment and 12 cases where the issue of a warrant
1
to levy distress was noted. The remaining 15 cases where
imprisonment of the employee was the recorded sentence do
not indicate whether it was a default sentence, or whether
the magistrate was in error in believing imprisonment was
2
still available as a primary penalty. But after 1881 
there were only six sentences of imprisonment recorded, 
and we may surmise that by then the provisions were known 
and that fines were being met.
1. That is, those of the 46 cases after 1850 (see Table 
9) not accounted for by the 31 cases which specified 
that imprisonment was for default in payment of fine. 
Since some magistrates failed to notice that S. 4 of 
the 1857 Act omitted negligent loss of property 
(supra p. 267 ) it is not impossible that they were 
also unaware of the alteration to available penalties.
2.
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CHAPTER 5
Absenting, Misconduct/ and Loss of Property 
- a Classification and Analysis of Employee 
Conduct*
In an effort to relate the offence categories 
(examined in Chapter 4) more closely to actual work 
experience, I have classified employer-initiated cases 
on the basis of the details of the disputes, where 
details were given, 
a) Misconduct : -
There are a total of 639 misconduct cases, and in 
164 of these no details of the misconduct are given. The 
remaining 475 cases can be divided amongst the following 
headings:-
Disobedience 204
Refusal to work 118
Drunkenness 38
Work done badly 36
Insolence 29
Loss of property"* 15
Illtreating animals 6
2'Dogging' sheep 4
1. These are charges for misconduct, where the details 
in the case indicate that the misconduct complained 
of involved loss of property. They are not charges 
under the sections relating specifically to loss or 
destruction of property.
2. Ringing the flock too closely with sheep dogs - see 
infra pp. 261-262 .
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Failure to shift hurdles 4
Refusing or neglecting work 
through sickness or injury 3
Temporary absence from work 3
Threatening employer 3
Admits charge 2
Disputes with other workers 2
Theft 2
Leaving sheep alone 1
Leaving sheep in yard^ 1
Negligence 1
Negligent use of employer's property 1
Other 22
The main causes of misconduct cases, or the main pretexts 
therefor, can thus be seen to be: -
Disobedience 204
Refusal to work 118
Drunkenness 38
Work done badly 36
Insolence 29
Of these, drunkenness is the odd category. It is interesting, 
however, in view of contemporary and historical views of 
Australian workers of the nineteenth century, that only 38 
cases out of 639 charges of misconduct referred specifically 
to drunkenness. The other four high-scoring categories, 
which amount to 387 cases, are inter-related, and point 
clearly to the way in which, I believe, employment
1. That is, putting the sheep in the camping yard 
constructed of portable brush and sapling hurdles, 
and failing to take them out during the day to graze.
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relationships, particularly in the small-scale work 
situations of the nineteenth century, were conducted.
They appear neatly connected to the issue of job control 
with which I deal in Chapter 7. From this categorisation 
and from the evidence in those cases where detail is recorded, 
though it is often tantalisingly brief, one can develop a 
picture of frequent confrontations between master and 
servant in which the parties were concerned to emphasize 
and enforce their separate views of their rights. The two 
groups operated according to different sets of guidelines, 
different blueprints for the relationship. When these clashes 
occurred, they would have been frequently resolved by 
compromise. The cases that ended up in the magistrates' 
courts were those where no compromise was reached, and 
where the master appealed to the law to bolster his view 
of the relationship. This would appear on the face of it 
as a charge of misconduct. The worker had refused an order 
or been insolent. Yet underneath, we can discern the 
reality of the worker chafing at the boundaries imposed 
on his integrity by the employment relation. This inter­
pretation is strengthened by an examination of the various 
issues of misconduct involved. For the important groups 
mentioned above relate to varieties of insubordination 
rather than to specific defaults, such as ill-treatment of 
animals, theft, failure to shift hurdles, negligent use 
of property. The main characteristic of the cases was a 
rebelliousness, an unwillingness to accept authority. This 
was coupled with an insistence on the nature of the work 
contracted for and an alacrity to object to insolence or
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slights by the employer. A good example of insistence on
observance of the letter of the contract as regards nature
of work is Dunbar v. McIntosh.^  McIntosh refused to flesh
a sheep, or to take a sheep as part of his rations. McIntosh
said it was not his business to kill a sheep, and that it was
not in his trade to flesh a skin with the wool on - he was a
tanner, not a furrier and flesher. While this could be said
to be simply an example of craft exclusivity, that does not
exhaust the impression that comes out of the case. Furthermore,
the same sort of response was made even by shepherds - regarded
(quite wrongly) as unskilled - so that when one Callaghan's
flock was taken from him and he was sent to the head station 
2to sink a well,.“" he objected that he did not know how to 
sink a well, it was not his job. He asked for a discharge.
And in 1856 in W. Vivors' case against Carl Hamberg for 
absconding, the plaintiff alleged that Hamberg had refused 
to give an account of the sheep that died, and had said his
3agreement did not specify it. As to objection to slights 
from the employers, an example can be seen in Robertson v.
4Dawson. Dawson was charged with neglect of duty. In 
evidence, Robertson claimed that Dawson had refused to look 
after his horse. Dawson explained that he had had blight 
and could not see, being nearly blind when the plaintiff told
1. Wellingrove, 28/12/1855.
2. Callaghan v. Vakins, Wellingrove, 23/1/1851.
3. Wellingrove, 9/9/1856.
4. Wellingrove, 7/5/1856.
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him to look after the horse. However he admitted that on 
one occasion he had refused to look after the horse. He 
said he had been out at work all day^  and then was told to 
take care of the horse in an abusive manner. He would have 
done so if asked properly! Individual cases like this 
could be explained away as good stories thought up to 'get 
off the hook' in Court. But, taken together, they can amount 
to a view of the employees' rights as workers and persons, 
b) Absconding:-
1957 cases concerned absconding charges (or charges 
of absconding allied to some other offence such as loss of 
property). In 587, details were given which can be 
classified. The categories of absconding situations 
and the numbers of cases involved are as follows
Dispute about contract (mainly term) 125 
Admitted absconding 72 
Absconded for drink 46 
Absconded after dispute with employer 34 
Absconded in debt 23 
Left because of illness (self or family) 22 
Left because rations not given or bad 19 
Left on previous occasions as well 19 
Absconded leaving job unfinished 18 
Absconded leaving sheep out 15 
Suspected of absconding 13 
Absconded because of ill-treatment 12 
Absconded then returned 11 
Absconded after receiving rations 11 
Absconded because wages unpaid 11 
Brought sheep to yard and left 11
253
Absconded before commencing job 10
Absconded to another employer 10
Failed to complete agreement after 
advance 10
Absconded leaving sheep in hurdles 9
Absconded to get summons 9
Left work temporarily 9
Refused to work anymore 9
Denied having absconded 8
Refused to enter agreement after advance 7
Claimed to have given notice 6
Absconded taking property of employer 6
Absconded because station etc. 
impossible 5
Absconded because job difficult or 
impossible 5
Absconded with wages owing 4
Refused to take sheep 4
Absconded after settlement refused 3
Absconded to lodge complaint with
employer 3
Absconded because of ill-treatment from 
other workers 3
Claimed told to go 3
Refused to return 3
Absconded to diggings 2
Absconded during lambing 2
Absconded after incomplete notice 2
Absconded after losing property 2
Given permission for short absence - 
didn't return 2
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Absconded after boxing sheep 1
Absconded leaving animals uncared for 1
Absconded with no wages owing 1
Called home 1
Doubt as to who is defendant's employer 1
Failed to complete to satisfaction 1
> Left because job not ready 1
In a further 1370 cases, the details of the absconding 
were not recorded.
These categories are based on the evidence of the 
parties, and are therefore sometimes cryptic, and also 
sometimes not exclusive. However they can be grouped into 
a few broader classes of situation, and the picture which 
then emerges is as follows
Table 1.
Absconded Leaving Duties Undone, or
After Failure etc.
Absconded leaving job unfinished 18 
Absconded leaving sheep out 15 
Brought sheep to yard then left 11 
Absconded before commencing job 10 
Absconded leaving sheep in hurdles 9 
Refused to take sheep 4 
Absconded during lambing 2 
Absconded after boxing sheep 1 
Absconded leaving animals uncared for 1 
Failed to complete to satisfaction 1
74
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Absconded After Dispute as to Terms, or Left
Where Absconding in Doubt or for Valid Reason
Dispute about contract 125
Absconded after dispute with employer 34
Left because of illness 22
Left because rations not given or bad 19
Left because of ill treatment 12
Left because wages unpaid 11
Absconded to get summons 9
Denied having absconded 8
Claimed to have given notice 6
Absconded because station impossible 5
Absconded because job difficult or 
impossible 5
Absconded because settlement refused 3
Absconded to lodge complaint with 
employer 3
Absconded because of ill-treatment from 
other workers 3
Claimed told to go 3
Doubt as to who is defendant's employer 1
Left because job not ready 1
270
Absconded in Debt etc.
Absconded in debt 23
Absconded after receiving rations 11
Failed to complete agreement after 
advance 10
Refused to enter agreement after advance 7
51
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Temporary or Minor Absconding
Absconded for drink 46
Absconded then returned 11
Left work temporarily 9
Absconded after incomplete notice 2
Given permission for short absence etc. 2 
. Called home 1
71
Absconding involving Misconduct 
Admitted absconding 72
Absconded on previous occasions as well 19 
Absconded to another employer 10
Refused to work any more 9
Absconded taking property of employer 6
Refused to return 3
Absconded to diggings 2
121
Other
Suspected of absconding (unfounded) 13
Absconded with wages owing 4
Absconded with no wages owing 1
18
This classification shows that the bulk of the cases 
fall within a class which involved basically justifiable 
absences. Two hundred and seventy of the 587 cases for 
which an explanation of absconding is given are in this 
group, that is - almost half, and within it the largest, 
single category covers cases where there was dispute between
the parties as to the actual terms of the contract, 
particularly as to the date on which the engagement would 
expire. To these 270 'justified' absentings can be added
71 cases of temporary absence or of minor infringements of 
the term of the agreements, as - for example - leaving after 
incomplete notice. While 46 cases in that class are for 
'absconding for drink', this could include not only week-long 
'sprees', but an hour at the inn of an evening for company and 
a convivial glass. The three remaining classes involve more 
culpable absenting situations, though it should be noted that
72 of the 121 cases of Absconding involving Misconduct are 
simply cases where the employee admitted absconding and 
mounted no defence. It could well be that in many of these 
cases there was an explanation which would have qualified the 
case as a justified or minor absenting but which the 
employee for whatever reason did not bother to state to
the court (or which the magistrate or clerk did not bother 
to record). The impression gained from this analysis of 
absconding cases is rather different from the employer- 
oriented view of nineteenth century employees as an 
irresponsible, shiftless lot. In this context, it is also 
noteworthy that only two cases alleged absconding to the 
diggings, a great contrast to the popular picture of streams 
of workers walking away from their jobs in search of gold.'*'
As to the cases where employees did actually leave and not 
return, a complete understanding requires that we look at 
them, not as showing the irresponsibility of workers, but
1. The small number of cases alleging absconding to 
the diggings could, rn part, have resulted from 
difficulties in finding the absconders and bringing 
them before the appropriate Bench.
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as evidence of rational reactions to a particular
employment situation. Undoubtedly they usually amounted
»
to breach of contract. But nowadays breach of a contract 
of employment is not a crime, and not even necessarily 
thought of as morally wrong. From our vantage point, we 
should ask why workers at that time, in their manipulation 
of their employment relations,so frequently considered that 
the appropriate course of action in a situation was to 
leave an employer before the contract was completed - and 
in doing so forfeit whatever wages they had so far earned.
c) Loss of Property:-
There were only 94 cases where the formal charge was 
loss or destruction of property under Section 4.1 (However, 
as seen earlier, misconduct charges were sometimes based on an 
incident involving loss, and there were 15 cases where evidence 
of the misconduct showed that this was the foundation of the 
prosecution) . Almost all these cases came from the major 
pastoral districts of the early period (1845-60) - the North 
East, and the hinterland of the northern coastal strip, where 
the grazing lands of the Liverpool plains supported large 
sheep stations. For charges of loss of property were 
directed mainly at shepherds.
The following Table shows the distribution of charges 
of loss of property across the geographical areas.
1. 1845 and 1857 Acts.
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The possibility of a charge of losing sheep was an 
ever present danger for the shepherds. They grazed their 
flocks in country quite devoid of fences. The fencing 
done in the outlying districts, up until the 1880s, was 
of stockyards around the home station, cultivation paddocks 
and paddocks for the bullock teams. The shepherds were dotted 
across the runs at out-stations. The sheep were kept in 
hurdles at night, with the shepherd himself or his watchman 
keeping guard in a watchbox^ close by the protect the sheep
from dingoes. Each morning - probably when the dew was off 
2the grass - the shepherd would take his flock out to graze 
over the pastures surrounding his hut. Some of this country 
would have been quite wild and thickly timbered. The only 
means of containing the flock which the shepherd had was his 
dog or dogs. The flocks were generally large. Cane says 
North East flocks were about 1000 - 1200 compared to the
3colonial average which, he alleged, was 500 - 600. However,
the evidence in Masters and Servants Act cases shows that
the 'Ollera' flocks of which Cane was speaking were themselves
not large by the standards of the North East district.
From the Wellingrove-Glen Innes cases, we can find records
4of flocks of, for example, 3345 (1850) and 3021 ewes and
1. A type of glorified dog-kennel. See photograph of 
replica in Walker, op.cit., facing p. 86.
2. When the grass is wet with dew, stomach worms come 
out of the earth and up onto the grass stalks. Sheep 
grazing at that time are more susceptible to becoming 
infested. In the days before drenching, infestation of 
worm could be partly controlled by keeping the sheep 
folded in the hurdles at night and not taking them out 
to graze until the grass had dried. See H.G. Belschner, 
Sheep Management and Diseases, 5th ed., Sydney, 1957, 
p.655 re methods of infestation and control.
3. Cane, op. cit. , p.17.1
4. Bothwell v. Graham, Wellingrove, 5/11/1850.
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lambs (1857) . ^ The Armidale reports show somewhat smaller
2flocks , for example, 1398 lambs and wethers (1863) . In
other cases, though the individual flocks were within the
1000 - 1200 size mentioned by Cane, one shepherd would be
responsible for two or even three flocks, each of that size.
For example, in 1863 an Armidale shepherd was looking after
one flock of 1044 and another of 1481. The flocks in other
3pastoral areas were also large. The records do not show 
how many dogs a shepherd would have had for a large flock. 
Today a flock of 2000 would require about six dogs.
It is unlikely that nineteenth century shepherds had that 
number. The shepherd would be almost completely dependent 
on his dogs to keep sheep from straying away. Where a 
shepherd was handling two large flocks, the skill required 
to keep each flock together and moving quietly over the 
pasture without getting the flocks boxed would be very great. 
A nice judgment was required to provide exactly the right 
amount of control through the dogs. If the shepherd kept 
too tight a control on the sheep, and had the dogs ringing 
them closery to avoid any straying off, the sheep would 
become anxious and would lose condition. It was not unknown 
for shepherds to be sued for negligent shepherding consisting
McMaster v. Kent Glen Innes, 25/2/1867.
Starr v. Snell, Armidale, 24/2/1863.
For example: Macleay v. Shiel, Wagga, 19/2/1848 - 
800 lambing ewes; Firebrace"v. Donovan, Balranald, 
26/6/1854 - 2030; Blackman v. Bowers, ~Mudqee, 8/2/1859 
- 1075; Patient v. Cleane, Balranald, 2/8/1854 - 3600 
lambing ewes.
That is, mixed together.4.
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of dogging the sheep.^ If the shepherd kept a looser control 
through the dogs, sheep might stray and get lost, or injured, 
or provide dinner for the numerous dingoes or occasionally 
for a group of Aborigines. It must have been very difficult 
for the shepherds to strike just the right balance between 
dogging and losing sheep.
With today's perspective, we might say that losing
sheep in conditions like that was unavoidable, however
diligent the shepherd. I would strongly suspect that at
least some employers took that approach and did not penalise
2shepherds who exercised reasonable care. Others were more 
difficult to please, and regarded loss of sheep as proof in 
itself of negligent shepherding. It seems also that the 
shepherds were held responsible by such employers not only 
for sheep w1 2*7ho were 'lost' in the 'Bo-Peep'sense, but also for 
sheep who died from disease or were attacked by dingoes.
Dingo attacks could be said to be partly the shepherd's 
responsibility - he should have been on his guard against 
them. But if he let his sheep graze freely and did not keep 
them tightly ringed together by the dogs, it would have been 
very hard to avoid one or two at least wandering among trees 
or shrubs that could have hidden a waiting dingo. The 
contemporary descriptions of the North East area and the
1. Infra note 1, p.341.
2. Because a number of large employers seldom appear as
litigants, for example the Irbys of 'Ollera' appear
only once. The Warrah papers indicate that Craik,
a very careful and competent manager, controlled the
standard of his shepherds' work by constant supervision 
and disdained the use of Masters and Servants Act
prosecutions. See Warrah Letterbooks, op.cit., letters 
from Craik to Merewether 29/11/1867, 10/10/1872 and 
3/11/1875; letter ffom Merewether to Craik, 14/10/1872, 
1/41A/20.
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hinterland of the North Coast suggest dingoes were very
numerous and that they made enormous depredations on the
sheep population. Today, with widespread use of dingo—proof
fences, studies suggest that dingoes cause considerable stock
losses in the North Eastern area.^ Even the most vigilant
shepherd could not have completely protected his flock. Where
a shepherd had no watchman to watch over the sheep in the
hurdles at night, he could not have been blamed if, while he
attempted to doze yet still keep guard, a dingo slipped
through the hurdles. Yet charges of loss due to 'bites from
native dogs' were taken to the Court. For example in 1850,
William Vivors sued John McGuiness for neglect of duty
consisting in loss of 21 sheep and the death of 26 sheep
2and 16 lambs from bites from native dogs. McGuiness 
forfeited the £8/4/10 wages owing to him and had to pay 
Vivors a further £8/10/2 to compensate. In 1847, in
3Burgess v. Hastings, the complainant said he had found 
sheep at the defendant's out-station which had been attacked 
by native dogs. Hastings was ordered to forfeit the balance 
of his wages.
Even if dingo attacks were on occasion the fault of 
shepherds, it seems unfair to penalise the shepherds for 
'losing' sheep through disease. The disease problem was 
quite a serious one for New England sheep owners. Coupled 
with the primitive state of veterinary knowledge was an 
unhealthy environment, largely as a result of the extreme
1. New England Rural Development Association. Dingoes
in New England : report by study group. Armidale, 
Department of University Extension, 1965.
2. Wellingrove, 16/4/1850.
3. Armidale, 20/4/1847.
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wetness of the area in the years before extensive clearing
opened out the pastures and allowed greater evaporation of
surface water.^ Sheep suffered from footrot, catarrh, fluke
disease, haemonchosis. There is evidence in the cases that
shepherds were sometimes held responsible when sheep died
2from such causes. In 1865 in Broom v. Starr, a claim for 
wages, Starr denied liability to pay until Broom brought in 
the skins or wool of 50 missing sheep. Broom said he could 
not be answerable for the sheep because they were dying so 
fast - at the rate of two or three a night. Evidence was given 
that the sheep were in good condition before Broom took them 
but that he dogged them all the time. It is quite likely 
however that the sheep were dying as a result of chronic
3liver fluke disease, for the timing is right. The sheep 
would have looked in good condition some months before, but 
as the disease progressed they would have become anaemic and 
lost condition, and then succumbed to the cold winter of the 
tablelands - the case was heard in early August. In another 
case where the evidence (of 'Bottle-jaw1 2345) clearly points to 
liver fluke disease, the sheep were also dying in August in
4large numbers. Again, in 1871 in another wages claim, Ross
5v. Gordon, the employer tried to avoid his liability to pay 
wages on the grounds that Ross had lost 20 sheep. Ross gave 
evidence he had brought his sheep in because they were dying
1. R.B. Walker, 'Economic Development of New England in 
the Nineteenth Century' in R.F. Warner ed., New 
England Essays : studies of environment in Northern 
New South Wales, University of New England, 1963, p.79.
2. Armidale, 8/8/18 6 5.
3. H.G. Belschner, op.cit., pp.650-663.
4. Corly v. Hooke, W7elli.ngrove, 15/8/1849 .
5. Glen Innes, 28/3/1871.
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but had left some on the road because they were too lame 
to cover the distance to the head station. This suggests 
that the sheep were suffering badly from footrot. However 
Ross got his wages, unlike Broom whose claim was dismissed.
These last two cases are interesting for another 
reason, for they are examples of another aspect of the 
'losing sheep' problem. In both cases, the employer did not 
actually sue the shepherd for losing the sheep. He simply 
put the loss forward as a defence to a claim for wages. This 
defence was used frequently by employers when sued for wages. 
While in the two cases mentioned above, the wages claim and 
therefore the defence followed fairly soon after the loss 
occurred, quite often there was a considerable lapse of time 
between the loss and its use as a defence. On 22/1/1852,
Edward Burke sued William Vivors for his wages."*- He said 
that during the first six months hiring he had lost nine sheep. 
Vivors promised to forgive the loss if Burke hired again 
for a similar term. During the second term Burke lost 15
sheep. Again Vivors agreed to disregard the loss if Burke 
would hire again. When Burke refused to hire for a third 
term, Vivors charged him for 24 sheep. The Court held that 
Burke should pay for the 15 sheep lost during the second term 
of employment. Even more blatant was the case of Hue Bow (a
2Chinese shepherd) v. Hugh Gordon of 'Strathbogie' on 20/4/1857. 
The complainant had been employed by Gordon for a five year 
term. When it expired on 29 March, and he applied for his 
wages, Gordon refused to pay, saying he had lost 44 sheep.
The Court decided that Hue Bow should forfeit the £11/7/- due 
to him in wages after deduction of his store account. In
1 .
2 .
At Wellingrove. 
At Wellingrove.
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evidence, the defendant’s overseer said that Hue Bow was 
told he would receive wages provided he behaved well! Further 
insight into this particular situation comes from another case 
on the same day in which Hugh Gordon charged Hue Bow with 
absconding. Hue Bow said that the overseer had gone to his 
station five weeks before and asked him to hire again when 
his five years' term expired. Hue Bow said he would see when 
his term was up. He denied that he hired again. He was, 
however, judged guilty of absconding and fine £4. Just as 
in Burke v . Vivors, it seems that the employee accepted the 
loss of sheep as a normal hazard of sheep-farming, until the 
employee chose to bring the employment to an end. Only then 
did he complain. One is tempted to wonder why, if the loss 
was due to negligence, the employer was so keen to have the 
negligent shepherd sign on again!
Fortunately for the shepherds, the 1857 Masters and 
Servants Act did not make negligent loss of sheep etc. an 
offence. As seen in Chapter 1, Section 4 (1857 Act) provided 
a penalty where (as before) a servant 'shall wilfully or 
negligently spoil or destroy any goods wares work ...' etc., 
but only if he 'shall wilfully abandon, lose or injure any 
cattle or any other property ...'. The negligent loss of 
property was thus omitted from the conduct attracting the 
sanctions of the Act. Why this should have occurred is not 
clear. The change appears to represent a fair assessment 
of the realities of the shepherd's work and of the amount of 
care that could reasonably be required of him, but from what 
quarter this assessment was put before the Committee we have 
no hint. It seems unlikely to have been from the sheep-owners
of the North East area.
267
In fact, it seems to have taken some time for the
change in the Act to be noticed by employers and even by
the Bench. In 1858 Fred Roseth, overseer for Dangar at
Paradise Creek, sued Thomas Creal for negligently losing
22 sheep, and the Bench found Creal guilty of negligently
losing sheep and fined him £11.^ In 1867 there was another
2case where a shepherd was fined for losing sheep. The 
evidence does not contain anything to sustain a charge of 
wilful loss. In 1868,^ 1870^ and 1871^ there were three 
more cases. All three were dismissed, but nothing in the 
reports suggests that the Bench dismissed them for failing 
to show wilful loss. In fact in the 1871 case the evidence 
tended to show that the loss was not even negligent. The 
sheepyards were only 18 inches high in places, and the 
shepherd had continually complained to his employer that 
the yards were inadequate. This in itself would have 
justified dismissing such a case even under the wider 1845 
legislation. This analysis of the grounds for dismissal of 
the case is strengthened by another case three weeks later - 
Finlay Mclnnes v. J. Thompson - where Thompson was fined 
39/- (3/- per head) for losing 13 sheep. Again there was 
no evidence of wilful loss. Benches in other districts 
appear to have adapted better to the change in the legislation.
1. Wellingrove, 12/10/1881.
2. Mclnnes v. Duggan, Glen Innes, 27/6/1867.
3. Mclnnes v. Bode, Glen Innes, 22/9/1868.
4. Mclnnes v. Bennett, Glen Innes, 2/8/1870.
5. McIntyre v. Gould, Glen Innes, 10/1/1871.
6. Glen Innes, 31/1/1871.
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d ) Types of Misconduct and Absconding according to
Time', Place and Occupation : -
Further insight into the character of employment 
relationships can be gained by correlating these various 
types of absconding and misconduct with chronological period, 
with area, and with employee occupation. The following Table 
shows the distribution of the various groups of Types of 
Misconduct over the basic chronological periods.
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The Table shows clearly the substance of the claim made 
on pages 249-250 that the bulk of the Misconduct cases 
concerned issues of job control - that is, that they involved 
some struggle over the degree to which the employer could 
direct the manner in which an employee did his or her work 
and conducted him or herself towards his/her employer. The 
overwhelming preponderance of these Insubordination cases in 
the Table could be even greater if many of the cases 
classified as shepherding offences were included, on the 
grounds that they would have involved a shepherd insisting, 
against the orders or desires of his employer, in doing his 
job his way - in using his own judgment as possessor of what 
he (rightly) saw as a genuine skill in the performance of 
certain duties. The allegation of 'dogging sheep', for 
example, may have been true in many cases, but - equally - 
in many cases the shepherd had made a considered judgment 
that the amount of control over the flock he exercised 
through the dogs was necessary or advisable , and that it 
was not of such a degree as to be detrimental to the sheeps' 
conditon.
The low number of drunkenness charges, and then 
their disappearance, gives rise to several hypotheses. One 
is that the increasedly organised character of militancy in 
that period led to a more serious spirit among workers, whose 
strategies for handling their employment relations became 
even more concentrated on issues of job control. The other 
hypothesis is that this increased militancy, or the habit­
uation of employers to the insistence by workers on their 
rights as they saw them, led those employers to refrain from
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actions which seemed to relate more to the character and 
private lives of their employees than to their contributions 
to the particular economic enterprise.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the Misconduct 
categories according to area. This Table shows the South 
Coast and the Western Division and Riverina to be the 'hotbed' 
of Insubordination, as the strikes of the 1880s and 1890s again 
make an impact. A drunkenness charge was more likely in the 
Central North Coast and Hinterland, and a charge of negligence 
more likely in the Southern Tableland and Monaro. Despite 
the 'lead' of the South Coast and Western Division in 
Insubordination cases, the variation in percentage for all 
areas in relation to such charges is not great - from a low 
of 75.7% in the Central North Coast and Hinterland area to 
the 90.8% of the South Coast. The variations in the other 
two areas mentioned are greater, with a range in drunkenness 
charges of from 15.7% in Central North Coast to 3.3% in the 
Western Division, and in negligence cases from 15.4% in the 
Southern Tablelands and Monaro to 2.8% in the Central West 
and South West Slopes and Plains and 0% in Sydney/Cumberland 
Plain and the South Coast. (The figures on occupation v. 
type of Misconduct should help to explain this: 'Insubordinatio
was a greater threat perhaps to the Western Division pastoralist 
desperate to start shearing than was drunkenness, which would 
have worried the small, 'niggling' cocky'*’farmers of the Central 
North Coast farmlands, anxious to demonstrate their status 
vis-a-vis farmhands whose standard of living was little lower
1. Australian idiom for; farmers struggling at an almost 
subsistence level of operation.
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than that of the employers and who perhaps aspired to 
stand before long in a position of equality with the 
employer.
Table 5 presents a three-way crosstabulation of 
Area and Misconduct categories controlled by the major 
chronological divisions of the period.
The next Table (Table 6) presents the various 
misconduct groups individually, internally crosstabulated 
by area and time.
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Chronological and Geographical Distribution 
of Types of Misconduct Charges
Insubordination
arp3 1845—60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East 78 o 6 77 o 1 lOOoO
Cent, Nthu Coast&Hinto 75 o 0 78 o 6 0
C/Westo & SoWo Slopes 85o 5 91.7 100o0
Svdo & Cumb. Pin. 82 o 4 80.0 lOOoO
Sth. Coast 92 o 7 89 o 5 80 o 0
Sthno Tbl.& Mpnaro 76.9 0 0
Wc Divu & Riv0 75 o 0 90 u 0 93 o 8
Drunkenness
Area 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East 7 o 6 8 o 6 0
Cent. NthoCoast & Hint i—1 0<£) i—l ◦ 140 3 0
c/w & SoW0 Slopes 3 o 6 Qo 0
Svdo & Cumbo Pin. 13 o 7 o0 0- — ■ -  — — ■ — ------j
Sth0 Coast 409 5 o 3 0— -------------------------  ■■ "1
SthnQ Tl,l, & Monaro0 7 o 7 0 0
W, DiVo & Riv, 0 10o0 0 ________1
Neqlicjence
Area 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East 6.1 5 o  7 _______________________0_________
Cent.NthoCoast & Hint 3 0 6 . 0 0
C/W & SoWo Slopes 1 o  8 8 «  3 0
Svd„ & Cumbo Pin. 0 0 0
Sth. Coast 0 0 0
Sthn. Tbl.Si Monaro, 15 o  4 0 0
W. D i V o  & Riv, 25 o  0 0 0
Shepherding Offences
Area 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East 4.6 5 o 7 0
CentoNth0Coast & Hint, 0 0 0
C/W. & S.W0 Slopes CO 0 i—1 P 0
Svdo & Cumbo Pin. 2 o 0 20 o 0 0
Stho Coast ; o 5.3 20 o 0
Sthn« Tbl. & Monaro 0 0 0
W/DiVo & Riv, 0 0 0
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Fighting
1845-60______ 1861-80______ 1881-1900Area .. __
North East 1 o 5 0 0
CentoNthoCoast & Hint. 0 0 0
C/W & S •W Slopes 0 0 0
SvcL & Cumb. PlnQ 0 0 0
Sth0 Coast 0 0 0
Sthn0 Thl.& Monaro 0 0 0
W„ Div. & Riv, 0 0 0_________
Area 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East o c 00 2 0 9 0
CentoNth.Coast & Hint. 0 0 0
C/W & S,tW. Slopes 0 0
0
Svd. & Cumbo Pin. 0 0 0
Sth. Coast 0 0 0
Sthn. Tbl.& Monaro 0 0 0
W- Div. & Riv, 0 0 0
Temporary or Justifiable Absence
Area 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East o 0 00 0 ________0_______
CentoNthoCoast & Hint. 0 7.1 0
C/w & S.W. Slopes 5 o 4 0 0
Svd. & Cumbo Pin. 2 0 0 0 0
Sth. Coast 0 0 0
Sthn. Tb.l. & Monaro 0 0 0
Div» & Riv. 0 0 0
Admits Charge
Ar^ 1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900
North East 0 0 0
CentoNthoCoast & Hinto 0 0 0
C/W & S. W.Slopes 0 0 0
Svdo & Cumbo Pin. 0 0 0
Stho Coast 2 o 4 0 0
Sthn. Tbl.& Monaro 0 0 0
Wo Div« & Riv- 0 • 0 1 6.3
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Thus it can be shown (where cases exist) that 
Insubordination cases increased consistently in all areas 
except the Souch Coast, where they fell from 92.7% to 89.5% 
to only 80.0% in 1881-1900. Drunkenness had a much less even 
progress, increasing in the North East, South Coast and 
Western Division between 1845 and 1880, and decreasing in the 
Central North Coast, Central West and Sydney/Cumberland Plain. 
Negligence charges decreased over this 1845-80 period every­
where except the Central West, where they increased from 1.8% 
to a much greater 8.3%. Shepherding offences are not really 
susceptible of serious analysis on this basis since the 1861-80 
period saw the development of fencing unevenly spreading from 
area to area and within areas. The seemingly anomalous 
increase between 1845-80 in the well-established area of the 
Cumberland Plain, no longer (by 1880) a sheepfarming area, and 
the continued increase between 1845-1900 in the small farming 
area of the South Coast can be discounted because of the 
insignificance of the raw figures from which the percentage 
increases are calculated.^"
Turning from Misconduct to Absconding or Absenting, 
the nature of employment relations can be illuminated by the 
same types of tabulation. The next Tables set out the 
relationship between chronological periods and the various 
types of absconding. The 1900-1930 period included only two 
cases where details were given, and the figures for that 
period cannot therefore be included. The numbers of cases 
analysed for each period in fact drops dramatically period
1 . Only two cases for;the entire period.
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by period as Charge and Summons Books become the dominant 
form of record, and as employee-initiated cases take over 
from employer-initiated charges such as absconding. Allowing 
for this drop in absolute numbers, the percentage of 
Justifiable Absence cases shows a persistent rise between 
1845 and 1900 from 41.9% to 47.5% to 59.1%. Cases of 
'Absconding involving Misconduct' also rise over the whole 
period from 20.2% in 1845 to 27.3% in 1900 though there is 
a slight drop in 1861-80 to 17.5%. All the other categories 
decline in the 1845-1900 period.
When a three-way cross tabulation is done to introduce 
Area as a variable, certain geographical variations emerge.
In the overall period 1845-1930, three areas stand out as 
having more 'Justifiable Absence' cases than the others - 
the Central West and South West Slopes and Plains had 54.5% 
of its Absconding cases falling into that category, the 
South Coast had 52% and the Western Division and Riverina 
57.4%. The area with the least such cases was the Southern 
Tablelands and Monaro with only 12.5%. This Southern Tableland; 
figure was paralleled by a reverse score of 46.9% in the cases 
of 'Absconding involving Misconduct'. The three areas with 
high 'Justifiable Absence' rates did not, however, have the 
lowest rates of cases involving Misconduct. The lowest 
scoring areas for that group were the North East area and 
the Central North Coast and Hinterland, along with the 
South Coast. The following Table shows these figures.
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These patterns did not show any important changes 
over the course of the period. The rate of 'Justifiable 
Absence'cases on the South Coast dipped noticeably from 
approximately 54% up to 1860 to 39% between 1861 and 1880, 
and rose in the Western Division in the same period to 75% 
(though that 75% represented only six cases). Below is a 
Table showing the variation over time in Absconding types 
in the eight areas.
Table 9 Chronological and Geographical Distribution
of Types of Absconding Charges
Unsatisfactory
1845-60
Performance
1861-80 1881-1900 1901-30
North East 19.4 16.9 0 100.0
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint. 15.9 21.4 0 0
C/W & S.W.Sl. 6.9 13.3 0 0
Syd. & Cumb. Pin 7.4 0 0 0
Sth Coast 7.1 4.9 0 0
Sthn.Tbl. and Mon . 6.9 0 0 0
W. Div. & Riv. 40.0 0 0 0
Justifiable Absence
North East 41.1 48.1 75.0 0
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint. 30.4 50.0 50.0 0
C/W and SiW SI. 54.2 53.3 100.0 0
Syd. & Cumb. Pin 33.3 42.9 100.0 0
Sth Coast 60.7 39.0 100.0 0
Sthn.Tbl. & Mon. 13.8 0 0 0
W. Div. & Riv. 40.0 75.0 57.6 0
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1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900 1901-30
Temporary or Minor Absence
North East 14.5 00 0 0
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint 13.0 7.1 0 0
Q/W and S . W SI. 15.3 26.7 0 0
Syd. & Climb. Pin 11.1 28.6 0 0
Sth Coast 5.4 2.4 0 0
Sthn.Tbl. & Monaro 27.6 0 0 0
W. Div. & Riv. 0 0 0 0
Debt
North East 8.9 9.1 0 0
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint. 5.8 7.1 50.0 0
C/W and S.'W SI. 2.8 0 0 0
Syd. & Climb. Pin 14.8 28.6 0 0
Sth Coast 7.1 26.8 0 0
Sthn.Tbl. & Monaro 10.3 0 0 0
W. Div. & Rivt 0 0 0 0
Involving Misconduct
North East 15.3 18.2 25.0 0
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint. 17.4 10.7 0 O
C/W & S/W.SI. 20.8 6.7 0 0
Syd. & Cumb. Pin 33.3 0 0 0
Sth Coast 17.9 24.4 0 0
Sthn.Tbl. Sc Monaro 41.4 10.0 100.0 0
W. Div. Sc Riv, 0 25.0 27.3 100.0
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1845-60 1861-80 1881-1900 1901-30
Other
North East 0.8 0 0 O
Cent.Nth.Coast & Hint 17.4 3.6 0 0
C/W & S. W. SI. 0 0 0 0
Syd. & Cumb. Pin 0 0 0 0
Sth Coast 1.8 2.4 0 0
Sthn. Tbl. & Monaro 0 0 0 0
W. Div. & Riv. 20.0 0 3.0 0
The next set of Tables cross tabulate types of
Absconding with employees' occupations within each of the
Absconding-type groups. Only a few of the groups of
occupations have sufficient numbers of cases with details 
of absconding to make analysis worthwhile - pastoral workers, 
farming workers, bush workers, construction workers and 
domestic servants. In these groups, the major type of 
'Justifiable Absconding' was 'Dispute concerning Contract'.
The only occupational group numerically worth considering 
as to 'Minor' Absconding is pastoral workers. There the 
main type of absconding was 'for drink'. This does not 
necessarily disturb the point made with respect to Type of 
Misconduct that few misconduct cases were based on drunkenness. 
Absconding for drink often meant that a worker had left his 
place of work to go to the local public house. In the case 
of shepherds, station hands and farmworkers, absence during 
non-working houses for an after-work glass was nevertheless, 
officially, absconding. The comparatively high proportion 
of cases under this heading -reinforces the analysis that 
most Masters and Servants Act cases arose where an employee
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insisted on doing his work his way, in his time and according 
to his interpretation of the contract.
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CHAPTER 6
Use of the Masters and Servants Acts as
a Method of Industrial Bargaining
Patterns of involvement in Masters and Servants Act 
prosecutions and motivations for that involvement cannot 
be explained simply in terms of the legislation itself nor 
of the common law of employment which was applied, with 
greater or lesser correctness, through the hearing of cases 
under the Acts. The prosecutions arose out of disputes and 
tensions within the employment relationship over concerns of 
parties to that relationship which reflect the positions of 
employers and employees in the structure of a developing 
capitalist economic system. The employment relationship is 
the most basic relationship of a capitalist society. It is 
scarcely surprising /then /that the law should develop various 
mechanisms for the control of that relationship. In his 
Report on the deliberations of the 1845 Select Committee into 
the working of the laws relating to Masters and Servants, the 
Committee's chairman, landowner T .A . Murray, said 'all 
operations of civilised life are carried on through the 
medium of masters and servants'.1 2 Over a hundred years later 
in 1952 Everett Hughes wrote that 'In our particular society, 
work organisation looms so large as a separate and specialised 
system of things, and work experience is so fateful a part of 
every man's life, that we cannot make much headway as students
of society and of social psychology without using work as one
2of our main laboratories.'
1. Select Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p 507.
2. Foreword to Special Issue on Work, American Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. LVII, p.5.
ZV 8
If we wish to understand how law operates in society 
as an active and reactive agent, how it serves and rules 
society and the class structure of society, we must focus 
our attention on the employment relationship. And in 
examining any one of the constituent sections of employment 
law, we must see that element as part of an overall system 
of regulation. It is to their function in controlling and 
directing employment relationships and to their utility in 
serving the interests of parties within those relationships 
that Masters and Servants Act prosecutions must be related, 
for the battlelines of the struggle in that arena gave 
rise to the battle plans contained in the legislation 
and the skirmishes and engagements represented by the cases.
Part I The Nature of Indirect Results.
Parties to an employment relationship regulate their 
interests in a number of ways, ranging on the employee's side 
from complete deference to the employer to outright defiance 
of the employer's instructions, and on the employer's side 
from merely a strongly authoritarian attitude to direct 
chastisement of the employee or refusal of rights. The 
final point in this spectrum would be a complete rupture 
of the relationship: 'absconding' or 'the sack'. The
Masters and Servants Act procedure was used by employers 
and employees as one way of operating their relationship; 
it was a possible move in the game, a way of threatening, 
cajoling, showing firmness, showing unwillingness to be 
overborne etc. - whatever the initiating party considered
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the situation demanded. To be sure, it was sometimes a 
direct means to a specifically-desired end; a wages claim, 
for example, could be a sure means of getting the money owing, 
where all else had failed - here the move is Checkmate. But 
on many occasions, the employer and employee 'players' were 
simply moving the pawns around, or perhaps making menacing 
gestures with the knights.
So one must ask, in examining the records of 
prosecutions, was the Act being used as a bargaining 
technique to indicate the seriousness of a complaint, or 
was it actually used to gain a result that out-of-court 
negotiation had failed to achieve? To answer that question 
in all cases is difficult. We cannot tell to what extent 
initiation of prosecutions was in reality a means of handling 
disputes, nor can we guess how many prosecutions were 
threatened without any summons or warrant being eventually 
sought. However, it is at least possible to discover from 
the records the occasions on which commencement of an action 
was perhaps used as a means of bargaining or a measure of 
control, by dividing the cases according to the manner in 
which they were resolved or concluded. Instances where the 
information was withdrawn before hearing or where no parties 
appeared at the hearing when the case was called on are very 
likely to be the result of this sort of use of the Acts. So, 
on many occasions, are instances where the case was settled 
out of court, the 'settlement' being the conclusion of the 
dispute into which the information was inserted by one or 
other party - sometimes both - as a step in the negotiations. 
In claims for wages, payment of money into court can indicate 
the same situation. The employee bargaining for his or her
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wages used the summons as a weapon in the struggle. It may 
have been sufficient to cause the employer to concede defeat, 
and pay the wages into court. If it did not achieve that 
result, the employee had the option of taking the further 
step of appearing at the hearing and presenting his or her 
case.
This 'persuasive' use of the Acts had, of course, a 
somewhat different character in disputes for wages from that 
in disputes over 'misconduct' of one kind or another. In 
a wages claim, where the initiation of proceedings provoked 
payment of the sum claimed, the employer was in effect 
admitting that the claim against him was well-founded - that, 
if it came to a hearing, he would lose. Whereas, in a case 
of 'misconduct', the employee did not necessarily make any 
response to the employer's initiation of proceedings. It 
was the employer who decided that the threat of conviction 
was what he sought, and it was up to him to determine whether 
that threat had achieve the desired result. In some cases, 
it may have been clear that the initiation of proceedings 
had provoked an amendment of behaviour by the employee to 
comply with the employer's aims. For example, where a 
shepherd had refused to take out his flock, but - on his 
master initiating proceedings - had taken it and returned 
to his station, the use of the procedures of the Acts had 
resulted in a win for the master, on the face of things, 
in the dispute between him and his servant. But an 
amendment of behaviour might not always have been so clear. 
Where a charge based on insolence or general disobedience
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was withdrawn, no immediate change in attitude by the servant 
need have occurred - the master would have calculated that 
his action was likely to affect the employee's behaviour in 
the future. Moreover, it is not possible to prove that a 
decision to initiate a case but not to take it through to 
hearing was really based on calculation as definite as 
described of the effect of the mere commencement of the 
action on behaviour. The resort to the threat of legal 
proceedings may not have been the result of an attempt to 
achieve a particular behavioural response to a specific 
order or prohibition, but rather it may have been the use 
in a particular outburst within a continuing struggle of 
a weapon readily available, and seen by user and used-against 
alike as a type of force which, for whatever reason, favoured 
one side of the relationship - an indication to the other 
party that legitimate power was in the hands of employers, 
that might (and, by their definition, right) was on their side.
The device of initiating prosecutions but not proceeding 
with them could also have been motivated by a more cynical 
approach amongst employers to the powers available to them 
under the Acts. Where employers laid charges of absconding, 
misconduct, refusing work etc., it was open to them under 
section 2 of the 1845 Act to have the employee concerned 
arrested on a warrant issued by one Justice. The employee 
would then be imprisoned in the local lock-up until two 
magistrates were in attendance to hear the case. The 1857 
Act"1' stipulated that the information should only proceed by
1. Section 11.
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warrant where the complainant showed on oath 'to the 
satisfaction of the Justice' that there was reasonable 
cause to believe the defendant would abscond if merely 
summonsed. The prevalence of proceedings by warrant after 
the passage of this provision would have depended very much 
on how easily various Justices were 'satisfied' that summonsed 
workers would be likely to abscond. (Unfortunately very 
few of the court records indicate how informations proceeded 
- whether by warrant or summons ) . It was therefore possible 
for an employer to have a worker arrested on a charge of 
misconduct and imprisoned for several weeks awaiting the 
constitution of a Bench, and then - before the hearing - 
to withdraw the information. Unless the hearing took place, 
there was no way of establishing that the employer had a 
good case against the apprehended employee - or any case!
The Acts did not require that the complainant applying for 
a warrant to be issued for the apprehension of a party 
complained of should show to the satisfaction of the Justice 
that there was a prima facie case, but merely (and then only 
after 1857) that if charged with the offence by summons, the 
defendant was likely to abscond.^ (Even if there had been 
some requirement in the legislation to satisfy the Justice 
that there were grounds for the charge, how would this 
satisfaction have been provided? Merely by the employer- 
complainant alleging that the worker had disobeyed orders or 
whatever). Thus where an employer was involved in a dispute 
with an employee, the moves at his dispoal included short­
term imprisonment of the employee without trial.
1 . Ibid.
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Quite apart from the 'cautionary* use of the Masters 
and Servants Act procedures described in the preceding pages, 
instances of withdrawal of prosecution or failure by a 
prosecuting employer to appear at the hearing in cases of 
absenting or misconduct sometimes represented a more direct 
victory than merely influencing employee behaviour in a 
troubled employment relationship. This was so where the 
prosecution arose out of a strike. As one proceeds through 
the Petty Sessions records for the second half of the 
nineteenth century, particularly the records of court 
districts in the Western Division, evidence of strikes is 
more frequently found. They can be identified even where 
the only records available are Charge and Summons Books.
The identifying marks are simple - a number of prosecutions 
for absconding (or sometimes misconduct) on the one day 
brought by the same employer. For example, in Wilcannia, 
E.B.L. Dickens sued five employees on the 17th August 1880, 
A. Desailly sued 18 men on the 11th September of the same 
year. On 2 September 1905, Hourigan of Wilcannia sued 
10 men. Young sued another 10 on 20 September 1909, and 
on 26 July 1916, Walsh sued 14. These are all likely to 
have been strikes by shearers, for shearing started between 
July and September in the Western Division (later in the 
colder country of the Monaro and New England).^  Where 
prosecutions such as these were withdrawn or otherwise not 
proceeded with, the suggestion is that the legal action had 
been successful in persuading the strikers to resume work.
1. Merritt, 'W.G. Spence and the 1890 Maritime Strike',
op. cit., p.594.
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The Act was in this way quite often used to ’break' strikes,^" 
and where such use was successful, as witnessed by withdrawal 
of the informations or failure of the prosecutor to appear, 
the result was clearly a victory for the prosecuting employer.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I would suggest
that wages cases were resolved in favour of the employee, not
only where an order to pay wages was made, but also in most
cases where the case was recorded as settled out of court,
where the amount claimed was paid into court before the
hearing, where the information was withdrawn before the
hearing, or where there was no appearance at the hearing
by the prosecuting employee. If these cases had not been
already resolved to the satisfaction of the employee
complainants, the employees would have been in court to
continue their efforts to get their wages. Of course, there
are other possible explanations for the 'no appearance' cases:
the complainant may have been prevented from attending by
illness, bad weather or some other unexpected circumstance;
he may have given the claim up as a lost cause through a
belief the defendant could not pay in the event of an order 
2being made. He may have got another job elsewhere and 
decided it more prudent to take that job than to wait to get 
the wages owing from the last job. In most cases, however,
1. See W.G. Spence, Australia's Awakening, Sydney, 1909 
pp.180-184 re use of the Act during the strikes of 
1890. The A.S.U. paid £9000 in fines and costs on 
behalf of members convicted under the Act.
2. A large number of wages cases which proceeded to hearing 
included evidence that the employer had no funds to pay 
wages - see for example, Waiklin v. Ward, Warialda, 
3/11/1848; Davis v. Pearson, Mudgee, 11/11/1858;
Brauer v . Kemp, Tenterfield, 7/7/1865; Jones v. Brown, 
Hill End, 4/12/1871; Hooten v. Hughes & Jackson, 
Tenterfield, 28/6/1878; Baylon v. Kelly, Drake, 6/8/1896.
JU^)
complainants did wait, often for months, to get wages owing,^ 
and the number of times workers gave up a claim unsatisfied 
after service of a summons would not have been great.
In employer-initiated cases, on the other hand, outcomes 
other than an actual verdict for either party are - despite 
the reconstruction of the process of disputation on pages 
300-3Q1 not so obviously in favour of the complainant as they 
are in wages cases. They could even, on occasions, have been 
indirectly in favour of the defendant employee. In the case 
of withdrawal of an information for absenting, for example, 
the termination of proceedings may have indicated that the 
employee had returned and agreed to go back to work. If so, 
the employer had his worker back, but the worker suffered no 
penalty for his absenting and was not subjected to the 
imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of wages which might have 
been the outcome of a verdict for the employer. This 
differing character of indirect results arises from the 
contradiction inherent in the legislation between the 
authoritarian concepts of the old master-servant relationship, 
represented by the criminal sanctions against employees,and 
the equality of juridical subjects implied in the principles 
of the contractual form with which that relationship has been 
clothed by the common law of employment. A case by an employee 
for wages was a claim for something contractually owing to 
that employee. Whether he or she got it by order of the 
magistrate or by voluntary if reluctant payment by the 
summonsed employer, the employee had achieved what he had set 
out to do when laying the information - he had got
1. See for example Melvin v. Vickery, Hill End, 24/3/1873
and Austin v. Vickery, Hill End, 24/3/1873.
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his wages. But where an employer sued an employee for 
absenting or misconduct, the motivating idea was rather 
that of the master-servant relationship than of the contract 
of employment. What was sought was sometimes an advantage 
in disputation, but sometimes that the servant be punished, 
be disciplined, be taught not to breach the boundaries of 
the relationship again. If the case did not go forward for 
decision - if there was no 'verdict' - while the master's 
authority may have been enhanced by the power of the law 
and the spectacle of impending legal sanctions, and the 
scales of the dispute thus tilted in the employer's favour, 
the employer had not achieved that advantage by punishment 
of the recalcitrant employee but only by the threat of 
possible punishment.
This distinction between indirect results in employer- 
and employee-initiated cases cannot of course be taken too 
far. As suggested earlier, use of the Acts could have a 
cautionary effect and could serve to reinforce the ideology 
of the master-servant relationship. An employee arrested 
or summonsed for breach could be made aware of the employer's 
power and of the need to obey and to show proper deference 
either by the imposition of a sentence, or by the employer 
choosing to exercise his 'prerogative of mercy' and withdraw 
the information. The servant had still been disciplined, had 
been shown 'who was boss'. This possibility of the use of 
the Acts as sanction has similarities to the situation 
described by Hay in his essay in Albion's Fatal Tree/  where
1. D. Hay, ' Property, Authprity and the Criminal Law',
in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh and E.P. Thompson, eds.,
Albion's Fatal Tree, London, 1975.
JU /
the use of the pardon and the prerogative of mercy bolstered 
the efficacy of the law in eighteenth century England in 
controlling the people. As he says there: 'Their political
and social power was reinforced daily by bonds of obligation 
on one side and condescension on the other, as prosecutors, 
gentlemen and peers decided to invoke the law or agreed to 
show mercy'.^ For this reason, I suggest that in assessing 
the outcome of prosecutions, indirect results in employer- 
initiated cases should be regarded as favourable to the 
employer.
1 . Ibid., p .48.
308
Part II Patterns of Indirect Results.
The Tables and discussion following show the 
distribution throughout the period and the geographical 
areas surveyed^f the various indirect outcomes of 
prosecutions described and analysed above.
Table I gives the figures for the total numbers of 
cases between employers and employees, area by area. This 
includes only cases directly arising out of the employment 
relationship. Charges relating to the provisions concerning 
discharge certificates, charges of harbouring, enticing or 
employing the servant of another, are omitted as not relevant 
to a discussion which focuses on bargaining techniques.
Also omitted for obvious reasons are all cases where the 
charge was not recorded. The Table divides the cases into 
those where the prosecution was concluded by a direct verdict, 
and those with the indirect results discussed earlier.
The total of indirect results in each area is also shown.
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(g) Southern Tablelands & Monaro
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In Table 2 I have set out area by area the cases with 
indirect results, divided according to whether they were 
initiated by employer (part a) or employee (part b), as a 
percentage of all cases between employers and employees, in 
each of the subdivisions of the 1845-1930 period.
It can be seen from this Table that the high point of 
indirect results occurred at different times in different 
areas. For employer-initiated cases, the high point in the 
North-East and the Southern Tablelands/Monaro was the 
1861-80 period. In the Central North, Central North Coast 
and Hinterland, the Central West it was 1881-1900; and in the 
South Coast and the Western Division it was from 1901 to 1930.
The peaks in bargaining proceedings by employees 
occurred at the same times as in the case of employers except 
in the South Coast where there were 61% of cases by 
employees with indirect results from 1881-1900 and only 52%
between 1901 and 1930.
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Employer - Initiated Cases - Percentage Indirect Results
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There are no obvious explanations for this variation.
The problem is to relate this use of Masters and Servants Act 
prosecutions as a method of applying pressure within the 
individual employment relationship to the development of 
other regulatory mechanisms, in particular the growth of 
unionism and the establishment of state and federal systems 
of compulsory arbitration. To do this, one would need 
information on union membership and activity in the various 
geographical areas, and on the process of approach to the 
Arbitration Commissions by unions from industries represented 
in those areas.
The significance of the bargaining aspect of Masters 
and Servants Act prosecutions to the wider context of industrial 
relations can be seen even more from Table 3 which gives a 
colony-wide breakdown of indirectly resolved cases as a 
percentage of all prosecutions between the primary parties 
to the employment relationship.
Table 3 Percentage of Cases with Indirect Results,
Employer-Initiated Employee-Initiated
1845-60 18% 16%
1861-80 28% 27%
1881-1900 36.5% 37%
1901-30 41% 46%
Total 24% 27%
There are two factors about this Table which are of 
particular interest. One is the close correlation between 
percentages for employer- and employee-initiated cases, with
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only 0.5 -5% difference. The other is that on this state 
or colony-wide spectrum, the percentage increases steadily 
from a not insignificant 16-18% in 1845-60 to 41-46% between 
1901-30. Why, when collective methods of solving disputes 
and institutionalised arbitration of differences was 
developing rapidly did employers and employees continue 
to use.the Masters and Servants Acts in this way, and even, 
on a percentage basis, increase their reliance on this 
technique? Two possibly related hypotheses can be drawn - 
first, that the Masters and Servants Acts were valuable 
weapons in the industrial struggle and ones which the 
participants would not rashly dispense with; second, that 
despite previous concentration on union growth as a catalyst 
in the betterment of wages and conditions, and as a 
protection for workers, the unions and their organised 
industrial activity left unsolved problems from which workers 
turned to the tested processes of the Masters and Servants 
Acts. The figures, both actual and estimated, have established 
that, contrary to earlier belief, the Acts were widely used.
The patterns of indirect results give some indication why.
There is a further aspect of bargaining by way of 
Masters and Servants Act prosecutions which emerges from 
an analysis fo the cases. I have entitled this process, 
somewhat loosely, a 'counter-claim'. Sometimes a single 
employer-employee dispute gave rise to more than one 
Masters and Servants Act case. I have tried to show in 
this Part that it is a mistake to regard prosecutions under 
the Acts as being the inevitable result of unambiguous 
breaches of the employment contract. There were often 
situations where, following generalised disagreement
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between employer and employee, one or other party escalated 
the level of conflict by announcing his intention to bring 
a Masters and Servants Act prosecution. This sometimes would 
have produced conciliatory behaviour by the other. On the 
other hand, it sometimes intensified the other party's 
intransigence. One way in which a party thus threatened 
could Retaliate was to initiate proceedings himself. Thus, 
where a conflict situation resulted in a summons for unpaid 
wages, the employer might respond by bringing a charge 
alleging misconduct; or where the employer had launched 
the first prosecution by claiming there had been misconduct 
or perhaps loss of his property, the employee might respond 
with a claim for wages or a charge of ill-treatment.
Although these 'counter-claims' involved multiple 
appearances by each party, the situation was very different 
from that of a number of separate disputes, each resulting 
in a Masters and Servants Act charge. I have run programmes 
on the data to identify counter-claims. I did this by 
extracting from the data base all instances of cases 
involving the same parties on the same day. An examination 
of the offence codes in the extracted cases enabled me to 
see how many were counter-claims. A total of 112 instances 
of multiple appearances were identifiable as counter-claims - 
involving 224 prosecutions. Though this is only a small 
section of the 8,199 cases surveyed, it makes a sizeable 
enough block of cases to establish the counter-claim as a 
recognisable strategy within the broader field of employment 
disputes.
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CHAPTER 7
Sources of Conflict in the Master-Servant 
Relationship
This chapter examines some of the main questions at 
issue between litigating parties - questions still at issue 
today, though different tactics are being tried and different 
battlemachines have been brought into the field - the Arbit­
ration systems/ Sections 45D and E of the Trade Practices 
2Act, nationwide rolling strikes, the creation of immense
amalgamated trade unions. The two most central issues - their 
intractability arising from their mutual inconsistency- are 
job control and the employer's right to manage. An under­
lying, irresolvable conflict in philosophy causes this 
continuation of the focus of struggle. Though both parties 
may speak in scarcely differing terms about the aims that 
motivate them, their words take on very different meanings.
In the field of industrial relations, perhaps the commonest 
word is 'fairness'. Yet the demand for fairness is 
ultimately at the core of all industrial conflict. Certainly 
it motivated Masters and Servants Act prosecutions as the 
evidence in the rest of this chapter shows.
1. Established by the Commonwealth Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904 and the New South Wales 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940.
Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974.2.
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Part I Disputation on the issue of Deference.
In Chapter 2 I suggest that the device of implied
terms imported into the employment contract much of the 
old law of master and servant, protecting employers from 
the potentially explosive effect on their prerogative of 
the full-blown notion of freedom of contract. Alan Fox 
wrote of the nineteenth century developments in employment 
law:
Once the contract was defined as an employment 
contract the master-servant model was brought 
into play - though of course not all the 
original aspects of it. The notion of the 
employee's diffuse obligations was distinctly 
in decline. What was most important for the 
propertied classes was that element which 
legitimised the employer's prerogative. But 
along with this there was also carried over 
into contract an expectation that personal 
status relations characteristic of the master- 
servant model would remain.
He quoted the Webbs in Industrial Democracy:
The capitalist is very fond of declaring that 
labor is a commodity, and the wage contract a 
bargain of purchase and sale like any other.
But he instinctively expects his wage earners 
to render him, not only obedience, but also 
personal deference. If the wage contract is 
a bargain of purchase and sale like any other, 
why is the workman expected to touch his hat 
to his employer, and to say 'sir' to him 
without reciprocity ....2
The demand by employers for deference in keeping with 
the old status of master, and their high-handed attitudes to 
their employees, when met by the resistance of employees who 
relied on their rights under voluntary and freely negotiated
1. Beyond Contract, Work, Trust and Power Relationships, 
London, 197 4 , pTl88. ;
2. Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, London, 
1902, p.842n.
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contracts, created simmering tensions within employment
relationships. The positions of each side are aptly summed
up in two remarks taken from evidence in Masters and Servants
Act cases: 'Damn your eyes, am I not your master' said Finlay
Mclnnis to James Clark;'*' and Tuckett of Kiama told his employer
2'A man is as good as his master ' .
• Disputes over deference issues often came straight into 
court in the guise of charges of misconduct or insolence, or 
as alleged justification for an employee's refusal of a 
settlement. This was the situation when the employer objected 
to the employee's lack of deference. Peremptory treatment and 
abuse given by employers who acted out the role of master 
often resulted in an employee leaving and being charged with 
absconding where his departure was without notice, or in his 
giving notice and bringing a claim for his wages. The reports 
of these cases, though often tantalisingly brief, are 
evocative of the atmosphere of disputation. In some 
cases, one sees the lordly approach of the pastoralist and 
would-be squire. In others, small farmers of the coastal 
belt were endeavouring to assert their position against 
the hired help, and take on the status of master.
While many employees may have accepted their lowly 
station, or at least bowed to economic realities, and let 
such treatment pass, those in ;he cases did not. When 
F.R.C. Master of Mungoola station in Tenterfield gave 
orders to John Hughes, a lambing shepherd, Hughes said he
1. Clark v. Mclnnis, Glen Innes, 23/2/1869.
2. T. Black v. H. Tuckett, Kiama, 8/12/1859.
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'would not be ordered about by an understrump like Master'.
The disagreement originated when Hughes objected to Master's
beating his son who worked in the homestead.^ Even more
radical in its impact was the message of another shepherd in
the North East, John Johnson, who when told by his master
that his 'hut must be kept clean' replied 'must was no word
to be'used to any man'. The employer reiterated that he must,
2or take himself off, and Johnson took himself off. Mary Ann
Trevellian also objected to the way in which she was given
orders, refusing instructions from her employer's wife but
saying she 'would do anything to oblige anyone if asked in
3a proper manner'. A similar dispute led to a charge of 
detaining goods by Louisa Carter against Benjamin Hampton. 
Carter left because Mrs Hampton scolded her and said 'she 
was not proper'. When Carter asked for her things, Mrs 
Hampton refused to give them to her until Mr Hampton came 
in. She would not wait, and in evidence explained that
4her father had told her 'to ask once and no more'.
While these instances demonstrate the employee's 
response to what was seen as failure to accord the same 
respect and consideration as the employer claimed by virtue 
of his status, others illustrate the attitudes of employers 
which evoked such responses. In 1854 Oswald Bloxsome sued 
one Martin for enticing his servant Matilda Hetherington 
away from service. She had been employed for six months 
and, on expiration of the term, agreed to stay on until some
1. Master v. Hughes, Tenterfield, 3/3/1854.
2. John Johnson v. ?______  , Warialda, 17/4/1856.
3. Sheppard v. Trevellian, Merriwa, 23/10/1867.
4. Hampton~~v. Carter, Stroud, 21/12/1860 .
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time in 1854, but in December 1853 she gave notice she
was leaving in January to get married. Bloxsome protested
she was marrying without his consent, and sued her husband
for aiding, abetting and enticing her to break her contract.'*'
Mercifully, the case was settled out of court. The case of
2Labatt v. Kralak in Warialda in 1855 could almost have 
inspired the Webbs' comment quoted earlier. Kralak was 
charged with disobedience for entering his master's parlour 
with his cap on, contrary to instructions. His arms were 
full of the load of wood he was bringing in for the fire, 
and - understandably - when ordered to remove his cap, he 
refused with an asperity Labatt labelled insolence. The 
Bench cautioned him as to his future behaviour.
Employers' views of their prerogatives coloured not 
only their manner of speaking and the behaviour they expected 
from employees, but affected their interpretation of the 
strength of their basic contractual obligations. Service of 
a summons for wages was an affront to their status which 
should be shown to be counterproductive. H. Kemp summonsed 
J. Drysdale for £6/5/- wages in Tenterfield in 1874 and was 
told the summons 'would not hurry it a bit, on the contrary.
1. Bloxsome v. Martin, Wellingrove, 18/2/1854. The magistrate 
delayed the case for the opinion of the Attorney-General
as to whether an annual agreement (i.e. a yearly hiring) 
was renewed by continuation of service [which in law it 
was], and if so, what notice would release the 
employee from service before expiration of the second 
year's service.
2. Labatt v. Kralak, Warialda, 17/5/1855.
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[He] had lost all chance of getting it by so doing.' The
magistrate, however, thought otherwise.^ But magistrates
were, almost without exception, employers themselves, and
certainly they were members of the employing class, holding
the same beliefs on the deference owed to employers by their
workers, as their decisions often showed. When W. Morris
was sued by M. Norton, agent for J.P. Sheahan of Gundagai,
for neglect of duty, following disagreement over Norton's
authority to give orders on Sheahan's behalf, the Bench
imposed a sentence of forfeiture of 1/- wages only, noting
'the prosecution having been instituted simply to show the
defendant and his fellow servants their proper position
[italics mind - and that he or they are to obey the orders
2of the agent appointed by their employer'.
It was this 'proper position' of servants that the 
employees disputed. They saw their position not as subservients 
but as contractual equals, entitled to courtesy and respect, 
and recognition of skills and services provided. Many 
abrogated their contracts if they received less. The case 
of Conway v, Dunkin sums up their attitude neatly. Conway 
left his employment and sued for his wages when, on his asking 
for his rations, the defendant weighed out the flour (instead 
of leaving Conway to take it himself). Conway said he would 
not work for Dunkin under such conditions; he objected to 
having the flour weighed out to him 'as he had never been
3treated that way before ' .
1. Kemp v. Drysdale, Tenterfield, 5/1/1874.
2. Norton v. Morris, Gundagai, 29/4/1859.
3. Conway v. Dunkin, Armadale, 31/5/1867.
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Part II Disagreements concerning the Extent of the
Parties' Contractual Obligations*
Within the common law relating to the contract of 
employment, the retention of concepts based on the old law 
of master and servant meant that the law itself contributed 
to the tensions in the employment relationship. One way of 
characterising these tensions is to contrast the diffuse 
obligations of the old law with the specifically defined 
obligations of contract. By the employer's definition, 
bolstered as has been shown by the so-called 'implied terms' 
of the contract/ the work contract was employer-specific 
- an agreement to perform diffuse and undefined services for 
a particular employer. Employees on the other hand regarded 
their contracts as job-specific - an agreement to perform 
specifically defined services for a particular employer.
This involved a claim by employees to equal rights in the 
determination of the content of the contract, a claim which 
struck at the heart of the employer's 'prerogative', his 
'right to manage'. What the employees were asserting was 
a right to some measure of job control. Fox wrote of this 
inherent conflict:
Since no employment contract could anticipate 
all relevant contingencies arising in work 
relations, many issues had to be settled 
during the every day conduct of business ....
But who was to settle them? How were the 
empty boxes of the contract clauses to be 
given the necessary content? The damaging 
implication of pure contract doctrine for 
the employer would have been that it could 
not allow him to be the sole judge of 
whether his rules were arbitrary or exceeded 
the scope of his authority .... [The employers']
1. Supra pp. 121-130.
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needs were met by infusing the employment 
contract with the traditional law of master 
and servant, thereby granting them a legal 
basis for the prerogative they demanded. ■L
This infusion was not total. The courts could not
completely over-ride the pressures of contractual doctrine,
and a certain degree of job specificity was established - as,
for example, by the rule that a servant was not bound to obey
2orders to do work other than that contractually agreed on,
3but even today that rule is sometimes honoured in the breach 
and in nineteenth century New South Wales it was even less 
rigidly adhered to by magistrates. The underlying claims by 
employees to a share in control over the content of the 
contract and over the manner of doing the work agreed were 
pressed, however, and generated constant disputation with 
employers.
The Wilcannia 'belly-wool' dispute of 1880 is a good 
example of this type of conflict situation. In that year, 
the shearing agreements in Wilcannia stipulated that shearers 
should take the belly wool off first. Previous practice was 
to take it off last. A number of shearers for J.W. Brougham 
and T.W. Blumenthal objected, saying they could not 'earn
4wages' if they had to take off the belly wool first - that 
is, they would be unable to shear each sheep as quickly, and 
since their wages were calculated by the number of sheep shorn 
(£1 per 100 that year), the new technique would have the 
effect of enforcing a cut in wages.
1. Fox, op. cit., pp.183-184.
2. Price v. Mou.at 1862 11 C.B. (N.S.) 508.
3. See, for Example, Secretary of State v. A.S.L.E.F. (No.2)
[1972] 2 All E.R. 9T6\
4. Brougham v. Dean, Wilcannia, 7/8/1880;
Brougham v. Shields, Wilcannia, 7/8/1880;
Blumenthal v. Lawrence, Wilcannia, 19/8/1880.
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The dispute illustrates neatly conflict between
the employers' interests and those of their employees.
Taking the belly wool off first would give a much better
fleece, since the dirty wool from the belly and legs could
be 'skirted' off leaving the cleaner, longer back wool in
one piece. It would also have made the work of skirting and
rolling quicker, meaning probably that the employer would
need fewer men to perform those tasks. The employer would
therefore achieve a more valuable clip and would reduce the
wages bill involved in obtaining it. The shearers, however,
would need to work either longer or faster to safeguard their
wages. It may very well be that the 'long blow' was developed
as a response to the pressure on wages created by this demand,
for the long blow, which was introduced at an undetermined
time in the second half of the nineteenth century,'*' enabled
shearers to shear faster. Until that method was recognised
as available, shearers who objected to the pastoralists'
demands were asserting their right to control the manner of
doing their work. They were saying, 'We have agreed to
perform a particular service for you, and we have equal
rights to determine the way that service should be performed ' .
The employer, on the other hand, claimed as Blumenthal did,
that the agreement bound the shearers 'to shear to the full
satisfaction of the person in charge'. The magistrate (Steel
2P.M.) supported the employers' prerogative.
1. Information supplied by Dr. J.A. Merritt, History 
Department, S.G.S., A.N.U., from his work on the history 
of pastoral unions.
2. Blumenthal v. Lawrence, op. cit.
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Disputes over the method of work were not always the 
result of employees' protecting established techniques 
against demands for change. Sometimes it was the employees 
who asserted a right to alter the established techniques to 
their advantage. An early instance of this occurred in 
Mudgee in 1857 when shearers for C.B. Lowe attempted to 
introduce a practice of having the sheep brought up to the 
pen for them,"*" instead of driving the sheep up to the pens 
themselves as had been the custom in the past, for 17 or 
18 years according to Lowe. He sued R. Little for neglect 
of duty as a result but said in evidence that Little was 
not the only one who objected - 'it was a dead set against 
me by all the shearers in the shed'.
These conflicts concerned the contents of contractually 
agreed duties: what obligations were involved in an agreement
to shear, and who should determine them? They therefore 
confronted head-on the tensions between the right to manage 
and the right to job control, the diffuseness or specificity 
of the employee's obligation; their solution was far more 
a matter of bargaining power in the work-place than of legal 
principle. Where an employee was required to do work 
pertaining to a job other than that for which he contracted, 
the issue should have been, in legal terms, more clearcut.
But this was not always the case. I have already touched, 
in Chapter 2, on instances of employees refusing orders to 
do work outside the contract description. This refusal is 
clearly related to the question of whether the contract was
1 . Lowe v. Little, Mudgee, 11/11/1857.
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an employer-specific one or a job-specific one and it is 
therefore relevant to the discussion here. Not only an 
insistence on freely and explicitly negotiated contracts 
was at issue, but also in some cases the jealously guarded 
prerogatives of craft and trade.
When A. McIntosh was charged with neglect of duty
by Frederick Dunbar of Wellingrove for refusing to kill and
skin sheep, he retored ‘it was not in his trade to flesh a
skin with the wool on - he was a tanner, not a furrier and
flesher'.~ He said he was ready to tan all the skins if the
complainant had the tools ready for him. He explained his
absence for a day or so at the Inn by saying he had never
refused to do his work, but the complainant had nothing for
him to do. Despite this reasonable explanation (the factual
basis of which was accepted by the Bench), McIntosh was
ordered to forfeit all his wages, and the magistrates decided
that 'as there seems not to be sufficient work for him',
the agreement should be cancelled. A very similar situation
arose between A. Rudd, fireman on the riverboat 'Bantam' and
2G. Lewen, the Bantam's master in 1885. Rudd objected to 
getting his own wood from the forehold for he said it was not 
fireman's work. He then went ashore because the engineer told 
him there was 'no work at present'. He was sued by Lewen 
for refusing to work, and fined £2.
These disputes about the content of the employee's 
contractual obligations were not confined to workers professing
1. Dunbar v. McIntosh, Wellingrove, 28/12/1855.
2. Lewen v. Rudd, Wilcannia, 31/1/1885.
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a recognised craft or clearly defined occupation. Even
shepherds and general servants insisted on their rights as
contracting parties to a say in the determination of their
duties. One of the issues which shepherds took up frequently
was their alleged responsibility for lost sheep. Though it
was customary for employers to require compensation for
losses, and though this was enshrined in the 1845 Act,
shepherds resisted it where they could. J. Stewart, a
Mudgee shepherd, objected to paying compensation to Thomas
Lee in 1857 because the sheep lost were from a flock he was
instructed to keep camped out, and he considered his dismissal
for losses from such a flock unjustified. He sued Lee for
breach of the agreement, and Lee was ordered to pay him
£32/10/4g. 1 2 It is not clear whether this sum was simply
the wages owing at the time of dismissal or whether it
included a sum to compensate Stewart for breach of the
agreement. Other shepherds asserted a right to the exercise
of personal judgment in the performance of their tasks - like
Edward Standon - who brought his flock into the hurdles
an hour before sunset, because the day was rainy and dark
and he was carrying a sick ewe. His employer considered
2this disobedience and sued him, but Standon was exercis­
ing control over the manner of performing his job of 
grazing sheep - a control to which the Wagga magistrate who 
fined Standon 2/6 apparently denied him the right.
1. Stewart v. Lee, Mudgee, 17/12.1857.
2. Menzies v. Standon, Wagga, 5/6/1849.
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Workers hired as 'general servants' would seem to 
have less chance than any others to enforce a right to 
share in the determination of their duties but it was a 
right they sought, nevertheless, and sometimes with success.
Such a case was that of Skinner who hired as general servant 
with Reid, a Kiama farmer, in 1860. He was dismissed 
summarily, because he could not milk, and Reid said he 
was therefore of no use to him. Skinner sued Reid for 
refusing to let him serve under his agreement, in which —
Skinner said - there was nothing about milking. Skinner 
said he could plough, reap and mow, but would not learn to 
milk. Reid was ordered to pay Skinner £1 in compensation 
for the failure to employ, though (in accordance with strict 
contractual principle whereby contracts of employment cannot 
be specifically enforced and a discharge, however wrongful, 
terminates the employment relationship) the agreement was 
held to be cancelled.^
Not only the actual duties to serve were contested
in this way, but also managerial rights of employees. These
are, in a way, analogous to rights to job control whether of
shepherds and the like or of craftsmen and skilled tradesmen,
but even harder to establish and define. Such for example
were the managerial rights of L. Pöttinger, a billiard marker
at Mrs Sullivan's hotel in Tenterfield who was 'given' the
table, and left after a dispute over Mrs Sullivan's interference
2in his management. He was sued for absconding, but the
1. Skinner v. Reid, Kiama, 8/10/1860.
2. Sullivan v. Pöttinger, Tenterfield, 2/3/1869.
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issue seems to have presented the magistrate with 
difficulties in bringing it within the confines of a Masters 
and Servants Act prosecution, and the case was dismissed.
Such also was the type of freedom claimed by Harriet Wrench, 
hired as working housekeeper for publican Henry Dwyer of 
Hill End, who left after being ordered to stop sweeping the 
bar which she considered dirty and in dire need of cleaning.x
While most of these disputes sprang from an insistence 
by employees on confining their obligations to their 
employers, some related to the assertion of obligations 
owed by the employer. Whether or not these existed in the 
formal job-specific contract for which employees contended, 
they could certainly have been argued to be the counterparts 
of the diffuse obligations employers wished to enforce on 
employees. But, as Fox pointed out, 'not all the original 
aspects' of the diffuse employer-specific work contract
2were taken up by the nineteenth century law of employment.
However the law might have regarded such obligations, 
employees saw them as reciprocally owed, and acted and 
litigated accordingly.
It is hard to define and categorise these claims 
within a traditional legal framework. They relate to 
the degree of respect and assistance an employer owed 
to his workers, and — more in keeping with the employee s 
view’s of the job—specific contract — the restriction.^ which 
should be put on unfettered managerial prerogatives. The 
cases involve issues like an employer refusing a servant 
the right to go to Chapel -in the evening even though her
1 . 
2 .
Dwyer v. Wrench, Hill End, 30/3/1881. 
Fox, op. cit., p .188.
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work was done,'*' an employer insisting that a farm servant's
2sons work for him also, an employer failing to provide a
hut for a shepherd's wife even though on hiring he had agreed 
3to do so, an employer failing to call a doctor for a worker
4injured by being kicked by a bullock, an employer refusing 
to approve retrospectively an employee taking two days away
5at Christmas, an employer objecting when a servant came home 
at 10 p.m. instead of 8 p.m. on a free evening,^ an employer
7keeping a worker's newspapers, an employer forgetting to 
get money to pay wages at the end of the week as he hadgpromised to do - to which the employee in question responded 
by saying to his wife 'Damn and bugger it, old woman, pack 
up and let us go'. They left and were convicted of absconding, 
forfeiting the wages their employer had conveniently forgotten 
to provide. While the magistrates for the most part upheld 
the employees' rights in these cases, from today's viewpoint 
the employers were at least indulging in bad industrial 
relations practices which could call down the wrath of organised
1. Dickson v. Readford, Mudgee, 12/7/1858.
2. Harris v. Sandry, Mudgee, 18/11/1857.
3. Hethenngton v. Roberts, Wellingrove, 6/11/1849.
4. Darby v. Clarke, Wellingrove, 6/7/1848.
5. Anderson v. Kensley, Wellingrove, 10/2/1848.
6. Howard v. Flaherty, Kiama, 9/5/1861.
7. Lawson v. Finlay, Tenterfield, 16/5/1871.
8. Dickinson v. Simpson, Eden, 25/11/1856.
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labour.^ The power of the trade unions can to some extent
protect twentieth century workers in situations where the
unorganised are vulnerable to what a witness in an 1897
2case described as 'petty tyranny'.
1. Similar disputes and difficulties will, of course- 
still arise today in unorganised areas of the workforce.
2. Clancy v. Collins, Tenterfield, 18/2/1879.
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Partlll Disputes about the Standard of Work Done
Employees who disputed with their employers about the 
content of their contractual obligations could point to the 
custom of their craft or trade or to the alleged terms of 
their agreements. Less clear-cut were disputes about the 
standard of work which the employers expected workers to 
achieve. Yet this was a constant source of friction between 
the parties. In some cases, the issue seemed to be an 
obvious instance of bad workmanship or laziness, but even 
more often the dispute arose out of disagreement over the 
manner in which the work should be done, and the core of 
this dispute was the conflict already examined between the 
employee's claim to control over his job and the employer's 
insistence on his prerogative to control the enterprise.
This conflict lies at the centre of the law's scheme for 
regulating employment relations, and it is not surprising 
that it looms so large not only in industrial practice but 
also in legal theory.
The concept of control is the keynote concept in 
employment law. It supplies the most widely accepted test 
for the establishment of the existence of a contract of 
employment and though today this is interpreted as the 
right or authority of ultimate control/ in earlier versions 
the Courts specifically relied on the right of a master to
2command 'the manner in which [a servant] shall do his work.
1• Zuijs v. Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 561.
2. Yewens v. Noakes (1850) 6 Q.B.D. 530 at 532, per
Bramwell L.J. ;
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Within the contract of employment thus established, the two 
most crucial obligations as regards the subservient position 
of the employee are the duty to obey orders and the duty to 
take reasonable care and exercise appropriate skill in the 
performance of his duties. Of these the latter is probably 
the more significant for it gives to the employer not only 
the right to demand full compliance with the express 
contractual obligations but an open-ended power to determine 
what will qualify as satisfactory compliance, from hour to 
hour and day to day. Given the existence within the contract 
of this implied term, the employee’s obligations are undefined 
and unrestricted - he must perform his duties to the full 
satisfaction of his contractual partner.
Clearly such a power in the employer denies the 
employee any right to job control. Thus disputes and 
disagreements about the standard of performance go to the 
intractable core of the legally-enshrined tension within 
the employment relationship; and a system which regulated 
that relationship through private litigation about individual 
employment contracts, as the Masters and Servants legislation 
did, would have produced many cases arising out of such 
disputes and the duty of care and skill in which they
received legal form. One might have expected that this 
sort of dispute would have been most vigorously conducted 
by those employees who could rely on the established skills 
of a recognised craft or trade to provide a reference point 
for the standard of performance that could be required of 
them. Yet it was not they but the allegedly unskilled who
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featured most in such cases. It seems, then, that the
possession of skills protected the skilled workers - their
disputes were about the nature of work required but not the
standard to which they executed that work. It was shepherds,
bullock-drivers, general servants and farm labourers who were
most at risk from an open-ended duty of 'reasonable care',
for there were no generally accepted standards for such work.
This gives an ironic twist to the development of the duty,
for in its classical exposition by Willes J. in Harmer v.
Cornelius  ^ it was based on an implied warranty of possession
of craft skills and it was described with reference to skilled 
2occupations. Unskilled workers were thus questionably
3exempted from its full application.
In the cases in surviving New South Wales court 
records, however, shepherds were the main employee 
protagonists in disputes about the standard of work. Dogging 
sheep has already been discussed as a matter which raised 
the conflict between a shepherd's assessment of the 
requirements of the workplace situation for the proper 
performance of his task and the employer's view of the same.
A number of cases arose out of disputes where shepherds
1. (1858) 5 C.B. (N.S.) 236.
2. Ibid. at 246-247. Or - more accurately - to 
independently-contracting artisans and professionals 
Ibid, at p. 246.3.
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were accused of dogging.^ When such a charge was made,
they had little recourse, for it was a matter of judgment,
of degree, whether what they were doing amounted to dogging
or not, and in Court it was the employer's word against
the shepherd's - not a strong position to be in before a
Bench composed of employers.
Another aspect of shepherding which caused even more
(litigated) disputes than dogging was the shifting of the
hurdles - portable brush and sapling folds. Requirements
as to shifting the hurdles varied from station to station,
depending on climate and pasture, the purpose being to
avoid camping the sheep on muddy or dirty ground. Employers
generally considered the hurdles should be moved more
frequently than shepherds thought necessary, and though in
part the shepherds were motivated by a desire to avoid the
work involved, they were also in a better position than the
home-station based employer or overseer to decide whether
or not the situation actually called for a change in camping 
2ground. Their failure to comply with instructions was,
thus, often an assertion of the right to control the job
according to their independent judgment, or to the practice
of shepherds in the area. Sometimes, too, it was the dirty
state of the camping grounds that led shepherds to disobey
3instructions about folding the sheep, and sometimes they
1. For example, Little v. Mielehall, Scone, 17/4/1855; 
Havard v. Burns, Walcha, 22/3/1862.
2. For example, Beaumont v. Maguire, Wagga, 29/2/1848; 
Rawson v. Gager, Wellingrove, 20/5/1866; Baker v. 
Campion , Tenterf i e l d 24/5/1849 .
Fitzalwinn v. Claytorr, Oberon, 8/10/1877 .3 .
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disagreed with pastoralists about orders to camp the sheep
out in country in which dingos were bad.'^
The time for taking the sheep out to graze and bringing
them back to camp was another issue where shepherds wished to
be unfettered by general orders. A Glen Innes shepherd was
2sued by his employer for refusing to take sheep out early, 
yet thät was one way of avoiding exposing the sheep to worm 
infestation in days before drenching, and the shepherd was 
doing his work wisely by refusing. He retorted that the 
employer knew nothing about sheep, and in this case he seems 
to have been right. Disease amongst the sheep was also a 
source of conflict, with shepherds protesting being held
3responsible for losses caused by footrot and liver fluke, 
and the difficulties of handling flocks slowed down by the
4presence of numbers of sick sheep. William Hines, when suing 
for wages from Maxwell of Uralla, gave evidence he had 
repeatedly requested Maxwell to draft 200 crawlers - sheep
5crippled with footrot - out of his flock of 1600.
These arguments for the most part fell on the deaf 
ears of employers and magistrates. The employers made little 
allowance for the difficulties shepherds encountered through 
disease in the flocks, or even through their own ill-health.
1 * Ibid.
2. McMaster v. Finley, Glen Innes, 27/4/1855.
3. For example, Corly v. Hooke, Wellingrove, 15/8/1849;
Pearson v. Lamotte, Warialda, 4/10/1866; Broom v. 
Starr, Armidale, 8/8/1865; Ross v. Gordon, Glen Innes, 
28/3/1871.
4. Hines v. Maxwell, Uralla, 28/4/1869.
5. Ibid.
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John Roberts of Wagga sued James Fitzpatrick for misconduct
in not taking his sheep out, though Fitzpatrick gave
evidence of an opthalmic condition which made him unable
to see his flock; and though a doctor directed by the Bench
to examine Fitzpatrick confirmed that he had cataracts
forming and should not be exposed to sunlight, the magistrates
ordered him to forfeit his wages.^  Given attitudes like that
to a shepherd's obligations, a plea of inability would
obviously fall on deaf ears. John Huns, a German shepherd,
who could not cope with the requirements of shepherding in
Australian conditions, asked to be released from his duties -
'he had too many to shepherd and watch and when removing
the hurdles ... the sheep walked away and he could not find 
2them'. He was sentenced to three months'imprisonment for 
'gross neglect and carelessness', but despite this he was 
ordered to return to service after his release to serve out 
his term. If he was so grossly careless, one wonders why 
his employer would want him back.
This survey of disputes about the standard of work 
has concentrated on shepherds, but though they were to the 
forefront in this area they were not alone in the arguments. 
Another group who frequently were involved in such contests 
were builders - carpenters, shinglers, bricklayers and so on. 
It was not uncommon for employers to refuse to pay when 
building work was completed on the ground it was not up to
Roberts v. Fitzgerald, Wagga, 4/12/1849. 
Bloxsome v. Huns, Wellingrove, 28/12/1855.
1.
2.
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standard,^ although as the workers sometimes pointed out,
the employers had expressed themselves as being quite
2satisfied until the time for payment came.
As these cases suggest, an allegation that work was 
not up to standard was often a move in an on-going dispute 
about other issues, rather than a serious charge. Furthermore, 
actual instances of bad work were sometimes employee moves 
in a dispute situation - these cases show evidence of early 
'go-slow' campaigns and other concerted efforts to pressure 
employers about wages and conditions by deliberately 
unsatisfactory work. At the start of the shearing season 
in Moulamein in 1887, a rouseabout was sued for deliberately 
going slow in collecting fleeces from the shed floor and
3skirting them. The man, William Dale, did not refuse any 
orders and stayed at his work all day, but worked much more 
slowly than normally, thus causing a build-up of fleeces 
and slowing the shearers and woolpressers,
Deliberately bad work was thus one of the tactics 
which employees could use in industrial disputes. It could 
be a tactic for other workers too - for the ticket-of-leave 
men still among the workforce at the beginning of the 
period surveyed. There were a number of prosecutions of
1. For example, Hart v. Johnstone, Merriwa, 7/6/1864;
Finn v. Trearon, Hill End, 29/7/1872; and Ball v. 
Greene~ wilcannia, 15/1/1884 where Ball was dismissed 
for not being a competent bricklayer though on hiring 
(as a bricklayer and plasterer), he had admitted
he was not a first-class bricklayer. This case makes 
an interesting comparison with P.I.E.U. v. Jackson and 
O'Sullivan Pty Ltd, (1957) 1 F.L.R. 175.
2. Compare the experiences of Jimmy in the North East area 
in the early 1900s, in T. Keneally, The Chant of 
Jimmy Blacksmith, Sydney, 1979, pp.22-23.
3. McVean v. Dale, Moulamein, 10/8/1887.
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these men for 'uselessness'. Employment was a condition 
of the ticket-of-leave in the rural areas, and the men 
were thus motivated to retain their jobs but to do as little 
as necessary. They were therefore 'civil but useless', and 
one employer at least was aware of what was going on.
Williams of Uralla said Hugh Baird 'didn't refuse to work 
but never did any work giving the impression he is just
2trying to get over the time as easily and idly as he can' .
Though there were recognisable cases of such deliberate 
idleness or bad work, for the most part, cases concerning the 
standard of work appear to have arisen out of genuine attempts 
by the employees to do the work properly as they saw it.
They considered that, as workers, they had a right to say how 
the work for which they were hired should be done.
There were, of course, a number of other issues 
frequently disputed. Though the provisions of the Acts 
were not concerned with ill-treatment, except in 1845, or 
with general breaches of contract by employers, and though 
the Acts gave an action only for unpaid wages and did not 
create any procedures for attempts to increase wages, 
disputes over rates of wages, hours and conditions often 
ended up in prosecutions for absconding, misconduct or 
refusal to pay wages owing. This reinforces the interpretation 
of the Acts and cases thereunder as means in industrial 
bargaining rather than as an avenue to the end of charging 
and sentencing for breach of contract.
1. Williams v. Carson, Warialda, 21/2/1850; Williams v.
Baird, Warialda, 21/2/1850; Williams v. Southwell, 
Warialda, 21/2/1850; Williams v. Wiggs, Warialda, 
21/2/1850.
Williams v. Baird, op. cit.2.
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CHAPTER 8
Use of the Acts by and Against Female Employees
Among the 8199 collected cases covering the period 
1845-1930, 420 cases involved female employees.^ There were 
also 16 cases where there was a female litigant, but where 
the lack of specific detail on the offence or sentence 
imposed makes it impossible to determine whether the woman 
was an employer or an employee.
I have prepared Tables showing the break-down, cross- 
tabulated according to Offence and Verdict, of the cases 
involving female employees. The Tables are arranged in two 
(reverse) ways. Tables 1 and 2 show the figures with Offence 
as column and Verdict as row. Tables 3 and 4 reverse the 
layout.
1. There were also 148 cases involving female employers.
That does not mean 568 cases involving females. In some 
cases, there was both a female employer and a female 
employee, and these would therefore be counted once in 
the 420 employee cases,- and again in the 148 employer 
cases.
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TABLE 3 
Absolute Numbers
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The Offence categories used in the Tables are fairly 
straightforward, except those groups entitled 'Other Employer' 
and 'Other Employee'. This means 'other than the main 
offences litigated by' employers and employees. Thus,
'Other Employer' cases are cases brought by employers other 
than charges of absconding, misconduct or loss of property. 
Sometimes an 'Other Employer' case may in fact be an 
absconding or misconduct charge, but it was entered in the 
court record simply as 'breach of Section 2', and since 
Section 2^ covered both absconding and misconduct, the case 
cannot be allocated to one charge or the other. A case in 
the 'Other Employer' group might also be one where no offence 
was mentioned at all, and it is therefore not clear on the 
face of the record whether the plaintiff was an employer or 
employee, but where I have been able to discover from 
regional histories, Crown Lands Department records, or 
other Masters and Servants Act records that the charge was 
employer-initiated: therefore it becomes an 'Other 
Employer' case.
In relation to the groups of Verdicts used in the 
Tables, the categories needing explanation are 'Settled etc.' 
and 'Other'. 'Settled etc.' covers those cases where the 
records indicate that, in one way or another, the parties 
resolved their differences without the need for a decision
1. 1840, 1845 and 1857 Acts
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as to relative merits by the magistrates. This was explored 
in Chapter 6. For reasons explained there, I have 
provisionally included 'Settled etc.' cases with those 
in which the verdict was in favour of the female employee 
if the case was employee-initiated and with verdicts for 
the women's employers if the employer initiated the case.
As can be seen from Table 3, that inclusion alters a figure 
of 105 verdicts for employers to 125 verdicts, and 133 
verdicts for the female employees to 227.
The second Verdict category needing explanation is
'Other'. This category includes cases where no decision
was handed dowrn nor was any agreement reached outside the
court in the ways covered by 'Settled etc.'. 'Other' thus
included all the following descriptions of the outcome of
the case: Referred to Arbitration, Postponed for Second
1 2Magistrate, No Jurisdiction , Out of Time , Remanded to 
Another Court, Warrant Issued for Arrest of Non-Appearing 
Defendant, Insufficient Service, Defective Information,
Fresh Summons Issued, Bench Declined to Make Order, Decision 
Reserved, Bench Divided and therefore Case Dismissed,
Adjourned for Attorney-General's Opinion, Adjourned for 
Further Evidence, Discharge on Recognisance. These 'verdicts' 
can be seen to concern basically procedural hitches or 
false starts in the prosecution process. Certain of these
1. Because the employee was not a 'servant' within the Acts, 
or because the offence charged was not covered by the 
provisions of the Acts (for example, negligent loss of 
property after 1857).
2. That is, the Information was laid more than six months 
after the date of the offence. See 1845 Act, S.27.
353
results are more important than others; the most important 
numerically are - Postponed for Second Magistrate, No 
Jurisdiction, and Remanded to Another Court.
The Tables do not produce particularly exciting 
revelations, but some patterns emerge. The first and most 
obvious is, of course, the massive preponderance of 
wages claims. Out of 420 cases involving female employees, 
only 84 were employer-initiated (48 absconding charges,
26 misconduct charges and 10 'Other') and 325 were 
employee-initiated.^ Thus, in percentage terms, 77.4% 
of cases involving female employees were employee- 
initiated. The relationship of employer-initiated cases to 
employee-initiated cases for the total 8199 cases is:
Employer-Initiated (against Employees) 2718 (36.3%)
Employee-Initiated 4777 (63.7%)
with 97 cases between employers and other persons for 
harbouring etc., or between the Crown and parties to the 
employment relationship for breach of the discharge 
regulations. This provides a percentage relationship of 
63.7% of cases employee-initiated, that is - a little under 
2/3 as opposed to over 3/4 for women only. Allowing for the 
fact that the women's cases are present within the 8199 from 
which that 63.7% is calculated, the figure for cases 
initiated by male employees is lower still - 62.9%. The 
initiation rate of female employees is therefore substantially
1. In the cases involving female employers, there is -
strangely - the same disparity: 32 employer-initiated 
(against employee), 115 employee-initiated, and one 
'harbouring' case. Yet; most of the employees here 
were male.
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higher than that of male employees.
Women, being employed in much smaller workforce 
units than men, would have had less opportunities for 
acquiring information about the procedures of the Acts.
The close and hierarchical nature of the domestic service 
in which the majority of female employees were engaged 
would also have been a disincentive to prosecution because 
of the acrimonious relations likely to have resulted - more 
easily borne by a shepherd in his hut or a carpenter or 
roadworker than by a parlourmaid or general servant living 
and working side by side with her employer. Thus, the 
greater difficulties which female employees would have 
encountered in bringing cases in comparison to male 
employees, when set against the women's greater rate of 
approach to the courts, might suggest a considerable level 
of oppression of female workers.
There was, however, an operative factor which could 
have depressed somewhat the number of prosecutions of 
female employees, particularly in the pre-1857 period, and 
that was that some employers regarded prosecution of women 
as of little value since the Courts' orders could not be 
enforced by imprisonment. On the other hand, most of the 
cases concerning women were post-1857. The time distribution 
of cases involving women is as follows
Cases involving Cases involving 
female employees Female employers
1845-57
1858-80
92
156
154
18
25
53
45
11
1881-19001901-30
35 5
The heaviest concentration of cases involving female 
employees is in the 12 year period following introduction 
of the 1857 Act.
As well as the comparative rates of initiation of 
proceedings, the relative rates of success in litigation 
of male and female workers must be considered in order to 
appreciate the significance of the large proportion of cases 
initiated by female employees. Did women employees win more 
cases than men? In what type of cases where they most 
successful, in what type least successful? Tables 1 and 
2 show the comparative verdicts most clearly. These 
Tables evidence a low success rate for the women in 
absconding and misconduct cases. Twenty-one absconding 
charges (or 32 if 'Settled etc.' cases are included) were 
decided in favour of the employer, and 11 (or possibly 16) 
misconduct cases resulted in conviction of the female 
employee. In the 'Other Employer' cases, all clear 
verdicts represented failure for the female employee, though 
perhaps some of the four 'Settled etc.' cases may have 
meant in reality a retraction by the employer. On the 
other hand, in wages cases brought by women, only 64 
employers won as against 117 employees (or 211 if 'Settled 
etc.' verdicts are included). Female employees won all 
the three detention of goods cases, but fared less well in 
the discharge and refusing to employ cases (five employer 
verdicts, two employee verdicts). Table 4 (above) showed 
the percentage success rates of litigants in the various 
types of offence.
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Tables 
and verdict
5-6 indicate the relationship between offence 
in the complete data base.
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TABLE 6 
(ii) 
Comparative Verdicts - All Cases 
(Row Percentages) 
- Verdict as Column
360
Table 6 (ii) shows an overall success rate of 36.7% for 
employers and 31.3% for employees, with 21.4% of cases 
’Settled etc.' and 10.6% receiving 'Other' verdicts. When 
the charges are grouped into employer-initiated cases and 
employee-initiated cases (and cases by employers against 
non-employees: 'Other' , i.e. Harbouring etc.) , the figures
are as follows: 70.4% of employer-initiated cases were 
decided for the employer and 17% Settled (a possible success 
rate of 87.4% for employers) as against 0.26% decided for 
employees, and 12.3% receiving 'Other' verdicts. In the 
field of employee-initiated cases, 17.1% were decided for 
employers and 49.4% for employees (which can be increased 
to 73% if the 24% 'Settled etc' verdicts are included) and 
9.4% were within the 'Other' category.
The main figures for comparison with the women's cases 
are the 'For Employer', 'For Employee' and 'Settled' totals 
in both employer-and employee-initiated cases. If 'Settled' 
verdicts are added to verdicts 'For Employers' in employer- 
initiated cases to give a 'Possible Employer Success 
Percentage', and if 'Settled' verdicts in employee-initiated 
cases are similarly allotted to employees, the comparative 
results of cases involving all employees and cases involving 
female employees only are as set out below: 
a) Employer-Initiated Cases:
For Employer For Employee Settled Possible
etc. Employer
All Cases 70.4% 0.26% 17.0% 87.4%
Female Cases 41.6% 11.9% 23.8% 65.4%
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b) Employee-Initiated Cases:
For Employer For Employee Settled Possible
etc. Employer
All Cases 17.1% 49.4% 24.1% 73.4%
Female Cases 21.5% 37.8% 28.9% 66.7%
The general pattern is the same in the women's cases 
as in the undifferentiated group, but there are important 
variations. Women employees won a much higher proportion of 
cases brought by their employers than did men, though this 
is offset somewhat by the higher percentage of 'Settled etc.' 
(and therefore possibly pro-employer) verdicts in employer- 
initiated cases involving females. Nevertheless, the 
'Possible Employer Success' rate is considerably lower in 
employer-initiated cases where there was a female employee 
than in the composite group of cases. This trend is 
reversed in employee-initiated cases: in cases brought by
female employees, there is a higher employer success rate 
and a lower employee success rate than in cases not 
divided according to sex, and the 'Possible Employee Success' 
rate is lower also, since the higher rate of 'Settled etc.' 
verdicts in cases initiated by women does not compensate 
for the lower rate of 'For Employee' verdicts.
The comparison of cases involving females with the 
total group of cases thus produces the somewhat anomalous 
result that the very high percentage of cases initiated 
by female employees was not balanced or apparently 
provoked by a correspondingly high percentage of success
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for female litigants.
The figures and description presented so far situate
the small group of women's cases within the overall analysis
of the application of the Masters and Servants Acts.
However, in order to assess the meaning of the patterns
discerned, the cases must also be situated within the
context of the female workforce, by attempting to discover
what proportion of women employees were involved in
2Masters and Servants Act litigation.
This is very difficult to ascertain, because of the 
unsatisfactory nature of occupational statistics in the 
nineteenth century in New South Wales, and because of the 
incomplete nature of the Masters and Servants Act records. 
First, as to the occupational statistics - the adult 
female population (i.e. over 14 years) of New South Wales 
in 1845 was 42,448; by 1861, it had reached 89,841, rose to 
130,343 in 1871 and to 302,598 by 1891.^ Even the lowest 
figure - 42,448 - makes 420 cases look insignificant.
But of course, a large proportion of that adult female 
population was neither employer nor employed, and therefore 
not within the reach of the Acts. Not until the 1856 census 
were sex-differentiated occupational figures prepared.. In 
1856, there were apparently 119,098 females coverd by the 
occupational tables. This is, however, the entire female
1. On the other hand, the fact that employers did not 
initiate a greater proportion of the cases involving 
female workers might be explained by their comparative 
lack of success against female defendants.
2. One possibility that cannot be ignored is that the high 
percentage of female employee-initiated cases does not 
mean that proportionately more women sued their 
employers than did men, but that fewer women were sued.
3. Census of New South Wales, op.cit.
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population of the colony in that year. Therefore, the
residual 'Not Stated' category of 98,315 must contain many
of the 59,982 female children^ (most of whom would not have
been employed), and all other unemployed women, as well as
employed women whose particular occupation was genuinely
'Not Stated'. If 'Not Stated' and also 'Almspeople and
Paupers' are excluded from the total, the number of women
whose employment was specified and the number in what was
entitled 'Miscellaneous' occupations comes to 20,469. In
the 1861 census, the category of 'Domestic - Not Hired'
was introduced into the occupational tables, the female
children and women not employed were included under that
heading. The employed female population can therefore
be placed at 69,127 in 1861, and (apparently) at 27,553 
2in 1871. Equivalent figures from the 1891 census are
not available, despite the extremely detailed occupational
breakdown which T.A. Coghlan introduced when he became
Statistician because his categories do not consistently
differentiate between employers and employed in a manner
appropriate for use in connection with the Masters and 
3Servants Acts.
1. The 1846 Census and the 1851 Census specify only female 
domestic servants: 6455 in 1846 and 6594 in 1851.
2. This apparent fall in the employed female population 
between 1861 and 1871 must be the result either of 
some undetectable change in the manner of collecting 
the statistics or recording the categories or of a 
simple error of addition by the Statistician.
3. For example 'Domestic' Occupations included 'Barber, 
Hairdresser' and 'Wigmaker' as single categories; and 
'Industrial' Occupations included 'Bark-mill proprietor, 
Vtforker', 'Cooper' and 'Marble Mason'. Census of New 
South Wales, 1891, op♦cit., pp.672 and 691.
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The size of the female workforce disclosed - at least 
some twenty to seventy thousand - still dwarfs the number of 
Masters and Servants Act prosecutions involving women.
But a further realignment of the figures remains to be made.
As I explained in Chapter 3, the 8199 collected cases 
represent only a small percentage of actual Masters and 
Servants Act prosecutions, and could be increased by a 
factor of between 5 and 200. Taking the same conservative 
compromise factor of 20 (i.e. 5%), the 420 cases become
8,40g ,1 and that figure makes the women's cases for which 
records survive much more worthy of consideration as 
examples of an influential body of litigation, involving a 
sizeable proportion of the female workforce.
The occupations of the 420 women litigants remain for 
the most part unknown since only Bench Book records can 
contain that sort of detail, and not all Bench Books do 
so. From those cases where occupational information is 
given, I have compiled the following figures:
Table 9 Female Employees: Occupations
General or general house servants 59 (including 21 'probable') 
Other Domestics -
Housemaids 5 )
Kitchenmaids 2 )
Laundresses 5 )
Cooks 5 )
Children's nurses 2 )
Woman to assist in confinement 1 )
Hotel Housekeeper 1 )
Wetnurse 1 )
1. Assuming also that the^proportion of male to female
litigants in surviving and lost records was the same.
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Other skilled or white collar female occupations -
Dressmakers 
Shop Assistants
1 )
3 ) 4
Rural Occupations
Married couples
Shepherds
Hutkeepers
Farm Servants 
Dairywomen
5 ) 
1 ) 
1 ) 
1 ) 
1 )
14
This results in a total of 81 of the female employees
whose occupations can be established being domestic
servants of some kind and 14 being farmworkers. Only four
were in 'white collar' employment or skilled non-domestic
work. I have included 21 'probable' general domestic
servants. In some cases, while it is not positively
stated in the record that the woman is engaged as a
domestic servant, this can be fairly safely assumed from
some of the details given. For example, in one case,
an employer accused a woman of being responsible for the
2loss of a silver spoon - this suggests that the woman was 
engaged in domestic employment. Out of 32 cases, where 
details of the employment are given but the actual 
occupation is not stated, it is most likely that in 21 of 
them the employment was in domestic service. This 
preponderance of domestic servants among the women whose 
occupations were recorded is not surprising, since 
domestic service was the largest area of female employment
1. Where husband and wife were both employed (generally 
at a single wage) on a;property.
2. Bridget Keefe v Mrs. Remmington, Yass, 13/7/1870.
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in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Special considerations surrounded the sentences which
could be imposed on females convicted under the Masters and
Servants Acts. The 1845 and 1857 Acts contained prohibition
on imprisonment of women found to be in breach of contract,
or women who failed to comply with an order to pay a fine
or compensation. Section 22 of the 1845 Act read:
Provided always and be it enacted that nothing in 
this Act contained shall be deemed or taken to 
authorise the committal of any female servant to 
any gaol or House of Correction for any offence 
committed under the same.
Section 14 of the 1857 Act achieved the same effect more
briefly - 'Nothing in this Act shall authorise the
imprisonment of any female'. The 1902 Act reproduced this
section as its Section 17, but prepended the proviso
'Subject to the provisions of the Justices Act 1902'.
The prohibition of the committal of women employees to
gaol had also been included in the 1840 Act} which had
moreover limited the application of the sections covering
2absconding and misconduct to male employees only, but had 
included females in the section providing for claims for
3wages, the section which gave magistrates a general 
arbitral jurisdiction over disputes between employers and
4employees, and - significantly - in the section covering
1. S. 10 
2 . Ss . 2 and 4.
3. S. 3
4. S. 8
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loss or destruction of property.1 *3 The penalty for female
employees under this last section was forfeiture of wages.
The 1840 Act had provided forfeiture as the initial
penalty for male employees also, with imprisonment only
as a sentence in default, except in cases of 'fraudulent'
absconding, in which cases the male employees could be
imprisoned outright. The issue of penalties able to be
imposed on women employees was, as described in Chapter 1,
Part V, one of the main matters for discussion in the
hearings of the 1845 Select Committee, the employers who
gave evidence complaining bitterly of the inability to
control female employees which resulted from the
prohibition on imprisonment. The tenor of their complaints
and their obvious lack of faith in orders for forfeiture
of wages as a viable means of enforcing verdicts against
female employees strongly suggest that, as Edward Denny 
2Day claimed, women rarely had accured but unallocated 
wages to forfeit. But if forfeiture was so unsatisfactory 
as a penalty for women, why did the 1840 Act subject them 
to prosecution for loss or destruction of property and
3provide forfeiture of wages as the sentence to be imposed.
I venture the hypothesis that it was exactly this widespread 
practice of penalising female employees for so-called loss 
or destruction of property - breakages, etc. - as well as 
the difficulties arising where they had to buy their 
necessities from over-priced station stores which resulted 
in the women having, as the witnesses to the 1845 Committee
1. S. 7,
2 . Supra , p. 87 .
3. S. 7.
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complained, no wages to forfeit. The situation would have 
paralleled that in w7hich shepherds found themselves as a 
result, as the cases strongly suggest, of pastoralists - 
in effect if not in intention - subsidising themselves 
against the costs of improving their properties by 
'docking' shepherds' pay for the value of sheep lost 
through dingo attacks, diseases such as footrot and liver 
fluke or theft by aborigines. Similarly, the difficulties 
of setting up a domestic establishment in a new, rough 
country and meeting the costs of staff when wages were 
higher than those of a more tradition-bound and 
deferential mother-country were partly overcome by putting 
the servants' wages towards the expenses of the establishment 
through so-called 'fines' for all manner of breakages and 
losses which might otherwise have been regarded as an 
inevitable aspect of household operation. This suspicion 
is borne out by many of the cases.
Despite the expressions of doubt about the efficacy 
of fines and forfeiture of wages when imposed on female 
employees, the 1845 Committee made women subject to 
prosecution for absconding and misconduct as well as loss 
of property in the 1845 Act.^ It is possible that, after 
the new Act, continued employer distrust of the value of 
prosecuting women contributed to the low rate of employer- 
initiated cases against women. I am sceptical of the 
influence of this factor, however.
Firstly, the cases suggest that, after 1857, when the
1. S . 2 .
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Act reduced imprisonment to a default sentence for male 
employees, there was little need to resort even to the 
issue of warrants for distress - fines were paid as 
ordered or wages forfeited. Though women may have been 
more intransigent, knowing that imprisonment was not in 
their cases a last resort for the authorities, it is 
unlikely they would have surrendered themselves cheerfully 
to the experience of distraint upon their goods - and 
distress and sale was available against women even though 
they could not ultimately be imprisoned in the event of 
the sale failing to produce a sum sufficient to satisfy 
the fine. Moreover, the women appear, from the court 
records, to have paid their fines. Secondly, concentration 
on the success or otherwise of the Court1s sentence 
overlooks the question of the type of manipulations of 
the employment relationship intended by the prosecuting 
employer. In many instances, employers would have sued 
regardless of how much difficulty they expected the Court 
might have in getting a fine paid or of how pointless they 
regarded the Court's permission to forfeit the female 
employee's wages, because they were using the prosecution 
as a bargaining technique, rather than as a means to a 
verdict. Thirdly, whether or not the employer witnesses 
really believed that their female employees were the 
insolent draggletails they painted them in their evidence 
to the 1845 Committee and often in evidence to the 
magistrates' courts, the records of the cases do not 
support the conclusion that the female working population
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of the nineteenth century was quite such a reprehensible 
lot. Most would have obeyed a court order to pay a fine if 
they had the means. Of course, to be able to pay a fine, 
one must have initially received one's wages: in that 
context, it is necessary to remember the 67.8% success 
rate of women claiming wages owing!
The incidents or behaviour precipitating litigation 
(in cases for which details of evidence were kept) can be 
divided into four main categories. The first category 
covers generally insubordinate behaviour. Within this 
heading are three subgroups: Insolence, which generated
nine cases; Refusal to Work, or to Carry Out Particular 
Orders - 18 cases; and Arguments, Disagreements and
Ongoing Friction with Employers - 15 cases. Of the
cases in this first category, 24 were decided for the 
employer, 10 for the employee, one was Settled and nine 
had 'other' verdicts. In the second category, the 
subgroups are Drunkenness - three cases, Negligence, etc. - 
five cases, Staying out at Night, Going out Without 
Permission, Carrying on with Men, etc. - six cases, and 
Loss, Suspected Theft etc. - six cases. Of these 23 cases, 
12 were decided for the employer, seven for the employee 
and three had 'Other' verdicts. The third category 
covered cases where the employee alleged Improper Treatment, 
that is - sexual advances etc., of which there were three 
instances, and Ill-usage, for example beating, of which 
there were two cases. Also included here are cases where 
under-age girls were 'Called Home' by their parents to look 
after younger children etc« - again three instances. Six of
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these eight cases were decided for the employer, one for 
the employee, and one had an 'Other' verdict. Finally, 
in the fourth category (all of which were claims for wages), 
the employer denied that a contract existed at all and 
alleged that the plaintiff was merely housed out of 'charity'. 
In three of these cases, the employer's argument was 
successful; in the fourth, the employee won.
While a quantative analysis of these few cases 
concerning details of the disputes may not be particularly 
valuable because of their scarcity, an examination of the 
details themselves helps to illustrate the texture of the 
employment relationships of females in nineteenth century 
New South Wales. The possible lack of typicality of the 
small number of cases is offset by the fact that even a 
very small number of cases of hardship and oppression - 
or, on the other hand, of misbehaviour or wantonness - 
would have been widely discussed, and would have had an 
influence which extended well beyond the immediate 
vicinity of the particular work situations.
These cases support, in a way, the comments made by 
the witnesses to the 1845 Select Committee who, as 
mentioned earlier, referred to a 'great and universal 
grievance' and to the possibility of summing up all the 
offences of female employees 'under the word insolence 
or impertinence'. Certainly, employment relationships 
involving female employees seem to have been marked by 
bickering and hostility and by a fairly constant resistance 
to at least some aspects of the employer's authority. Whether
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or not this hostility and resistance is characterised
as 'insolence' and a 'great and universal grievance', or
whether it is interpreted from the employees' viewpoint as
a reaction to intolerable conditions and unwarranted
provocation, the Masters and Servants Act cases involving
female employees suggest that women workers did not
readily take abuse from their employers, or even criticism
or direction if they considered it uncalled for or unduly
harsh. Thus, Amelia Brown, who was summonsed in January
1858 in Kiama for refusing to wash the milk dishes, said
in evidence that there was 'no satisfying her master -
the more she does the more she may do: she will not do
any more'.  ^ Louisa Carter left her employment in Stroud
in 1860 and summonsed her employer for refusing to deliver 
2her belongings. She said she had been put to work for 
Mrs. Hampton by her mother and had worked for two months 
but left 'because [Mrs. Hampton] said she was not proper 
and scolded her.' Alice Mary McNamara also left work, and
3sued for her wages when her mistress told her 'to go to
the devil', and her employer 'abused her and ordered her
to get tea as if he were speaking to a dog'. Mary Ann
Trevellian, hired as a cook, laundress and dairymaid, and
'generally useful' to William Sheppard of Merriwa showed
4the same spirit of independence when, in October 1867,
1. T. Black v Amelia Brown, Kiama, 28/1/1858.
2. Louisa Carter v Benjamin Hampton, Stroud, 21/12/1860.
3. Alice Mary McNamara v T. Brown/ Stroud, 13/4/1863.
4. William Sheppard v Mary Ann Trevellian, Merriwa, 23/10/1867.
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she (according to her mistress) said she would not be 
ordered by anybody. In her own evidence, she said she had 
told Mrs. Sheppard she would do anything to oblige anyone 
if asked in a proper manner. Mary Maguire, cook for Mr. 
Remmington of Yass in 1871, left in mid-week because she 
'could not stand Mrs. Remmington's tongue'.^ This 
independent spirit in women employees did not mark them 
apart from men. The same attitudes are evident in cases 
involving male employees. It is, however, worthy of noting 
that the vulnerable position in which nineteenth century 
women employees arguably found themselves did not always 
dampen their militancy7.
Women workers who appear in Masters and Servants
Act cases showed another characteristic which can be seen
in their male counterparts, for they resisted attempts
to extend their work into areas outside the specific
2tasks contracted for, and a common defence to charges of
misconduct was that the work ordered to be done was not
the woman's duty. In this way, in 1864 Ann Gates refused
3an order from her employer Matthew Kennett of Camden to
wash out the schoolroom, saying it was not her duty;
and in 1867, Maria Maguire, a housemaid to J.B. Bettington
of Merriwa, refused to wash the dining room or do the
4bedroom or to wash her employer's son, on the grounds that
1. Mary Maguire v Remmington, Yass, 3/5/1871.
2. See supra pp. 329-334.
3. Matthew Kennett v Ann Gates, Camden, 30/1/1864.
4. J.B. Bettington v Maria Maguire, Merriwa, 8/5/1867.
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it was not housemaid's work. Or the other hand, in 1881
Harriet Wrench insisted that a working housekeeper for
Henry Dwyer, publican of Hill End, she should decide
whether the bar needed sweeping, and left after Dwyer
ordered her to stop.~ In view of the wide range of duties
to which domestic servants were supposedly subjected and
the rights of supervision to which employers of domestic
2servants laid claim, it is intriguing that as far back 
as 1864 women were prepared to go to Court to insist on 
compliance with specificity of job description for 
parlourmaids, housemaids, dairymaids, and 'generally usefuls'.
An examination of these cases involving female employees 
highlights a fact that concentration on the development of 
unions and on organised protest such as strikes has 
obscured. In the nineteenth century, most working class 
action was spontaneous, occurring in very small employment 
units, without any organisation beyond the work-place 
itself. Because of the bias towards an institutionally- 
based study of labour, a tendency has developed to see only 
union-organised industrial activity as militancy, and - 
as a corollary - it is believed that women, who through 
the nature of their work were generally isolated and 
un-unionised, were unlikely to be militant. The cases 
examined in this chapter show that militancy is not 
necessarily allied to unionisation, and that women employees
1. Henry Dwyer v Harriet Wrench, Hill End, 30/3/1881.
2. B. Kingston, My Wife, My Daughter and Poor Mary Ann, 
Melbourne, 1977, pp.29-45.
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in the nineteenth century, despite their vulnerability in 
small, highly-supervised work units, resisted determinedly 
any interference with the rights which they believed were 
owing to them as workers.
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CHAPTER 9
Masters, Servants and the Law: Changing
Patterns of Case Initiation
By analysing prosecutions which did not proceed to a 
hearing and/or verdict, and by examining the nature of 
disputes which led to prosecutions , I have shown that 
Masters and Servants Act litigation was part of the overall 
and continuing management of tension and conflict within 
the employment relationship. From that conclusion, a 
further question arises. If use of Masters and Servants 
Act procedures was one out of a number of tactics open to 
the parties in the pursuit of their separate interests 
within the relationship, what motivated and determined 
the choice of that tactic? Why, at a particular stage 
in an individual dispute situation, did a party turn to the 
Masters and Servants Act rather than to the adoption of one 
of the other methods of negotiation and pressure available?
The question is of obvious relevance to an understanding 
of the operation of the legal constituents of the industrial 
relations system. Given the inadequacies of the case 
reports, the answer is elusive. It is possible, however, 
to proceed part of the way towards the answer by investigating 
the way in which individual litigants used the Acts' 
procedures - that is, by examining the litigation records 
of those parties who were involved in more than one Masters 
and Servants Act prosecution.
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Part I Multiple Appearances by Employees.
Assessment of the extent of multiple appearances by 
employees is complicated by a number of factors. While it 
is possible to 'sort' the employees' names alphabetically,^  
it is often difficult to be sure that the same names 
indicate the same persons. Employers leave more evidence 
of their existence and identity behind them. Employees, 
particularly in a nineteenth century frontier society, 
tend to drop into an almost impenetrable obscurity. Their 
employment records do not survive to show the pattern of 
their movement from job to job, occupation to occupation, 
or area to area. I have therefore had to identify 
multiple-appearing employees on a 'balance of probabilities'.
Quite often, employee parties are listed by surname
only. Where there are also references to parties of that
surname with different given names, there is no way of
telling to which of the fully-named parties to ascribe the
2cases where the surname only is given. For example, in the 
Armidale-Glen Innes area, a party named Burns appeared in a 
claim for wages on 2 March, 1847. On 7 October, 1856, Oswald
1. Details of all collected cases have been coded for 
computer analysis. Since the programmes used allowed 
alpha-numerical characters, I included plaintiffs' and 
defendants' names, coded as to whether employer or 
employee. It was then possible to run a programme to 
sort alphabetically according to employee's name, thus 
bringing together all the cases involving the same 
employee.
2. The examples of identification difficulties on pp
are, for convenience, all drawn from the records of the 
North East area. The same problems recur, however, in 
all areas.
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Bloxsome sued a Burns for absconding, and on 1 September, 
1857, Radford sued a Burns for an unspecified default. A 
John Burns appeared in a charge of absconding from 
Bloxsome on 29 May, 1855, and made wages claims against 
George Clutterbuck in 1866 and Henry McCulley in 1878. 
Finally, a Thomas Burns claimed wages from Henry Allingham 
in 1879. Does this mean there were six cases involving 
John Burns and one involving Thomas Burns? Or were there 
four cases involving Thomas and three involving John? Or 
was the Burns whose given name was not mentioned another 
person altogether?
A further difficulty is that Clerks may have used 
several spellings for the name of one party on his various 
appearances - being less likely to know the exact names of 
shepherds and labourers than of the local squatters. This 
is particularly likely in the case of Chinese and German 
employees, where the Clerk would have often been obliged 
to determine by himself the spelling of a name he had 
never seen in print. It is therefore quite probable that 
the case of George Burgess v Arr in Glen Innes in 1854 and 
James Jones v Tommy Ahh in 1863 involved the same defendant; 
and that Ah Thon, prosecuted in Glen Innes in January 1859 
for absconding from Mclnnes and Dumaresq was the same Ah 
Tong who claimed wages from C. Campbell in April 1859. It 
is less certain that John Clark who sued James Anderson for 
wages in Armidale in 1865 was the John Clarke who claimed 
wages from Alexander Menzies in 1862, or that the Tompson 
who sued Fletcher and Ross in 1856 for ill-usage, the James 
Tompson who sued Finlay Mclnnes for wages in 1871 and the
379
James Thompson who sued Mclnnes in 1870 are one and the 
same person, but it is not unlikely.
Another problem is that one cannot establish whether 
or not there were several persons of the same name working 
in a particular district. Where one name appears for an 
employee working for a given employer, and the same two 
names appear as parties again fairly soon after, there is a 
good chance the cases concern the same employee. On the 
other hand, it may be possible to show where a name appears 
in cases with two or more different employers that there 
are in fact two different employees of that name because the 
employment periods overlap.'1' Again, one is ultimately 
reduced to relying to some extent on guesswork, with some 
backing from probability. Thus, it is very likely that the 
Cornelius Donovan who sued T. Mitchell for wages in Armidale 
in February 1862 and the Cornelius Donovan who sued 
O'Brien for wages in March 1863 are the same person, for 
Cornelius Donovan is not a particularly common name. But 
William Duggan is a less uncommon name. Was the William 
Duggan who absconded from Jamison and McKenzie in Armidale 
in 1847 the same William Duggan who sued Finlay Mclnnes for 
wages in Glen Innes twenty years later? And what of William 
Smith? Is it at all safe to say that the William Smith who 
absconded from McHattie in 1856 was the same one who 
absconded from Ann McKay in 1864?
1. Because the same employee would have been unlikely to be 
working for two different employers at the same time.
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I have therefore approached the identification of 
multiple-appearing employees with considerable caution.
Where the same name appears more than once in the same 
court district within a relatively short span of years,
I have assumed the same person is involved. The assumption 
is even more soundly based where the cases involve the same 
employer. Where the span of years lengthens, the probability 
lessens. An unusual name can then tip the scales back to 
a finding of multiple appearance. Without it, I have not 
assumed that the employee is the same person if a 
significant period of time elapses between actions involving 
that name. A similar doubt is cast where the same name 
appears in different areas. Where the court districts are 
part of the same geographical and economic area, I will 
assume that the cases involve the same employee. The 
court records themselves, as well as more general evidence 
about nineteenth century employment in the Australian 
colonies,'*' testify to the mobility of workers, particularly 
rural workers. Here again, lapse of time weakens the 
assumption, and the further the districts are apart, the 
more seriously I have weighed the other factors. This means 
that the inability to identify with confidence may have 
led me to discount actual instances of multiple 
appearance. An employee who was involved in Masters and 
Servants Act litigation in - for example - Warialda and
1. Graeme Davison, 'The Dimensions of Mobility in Nineteenth 
Century Australia', Australia 1888, Bulletin No.2,
August 1979, pp.7-32.
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Moulamein^ would fail the tests caution has required me to
impose, yet it is quite possible that the same person could
2have worked, and litigated, in both districts.
Subject to these restrictions, I have identified 864 
employees who appeared in more than one Masters and Servants 
Act case. Since only 86 out of the total number of cases 
concerned those offences which did not involve an employee
3as litigant, there were, until 1930, 8113 cases in which 
an employee was a party. The 864 employees who appeared 
more than once accounted for 1943 cases. Therefore the 
total number of employee litigants was 7045, and thus 
12.2% of total employee litigants accounted for 24% of 
the cases in which an employee was a party. These 
percentages show two things very clearly. First, a 
considerable body of employees made multiple appearances. 
Second, very few of them appeared more than twice. The 
rate of multiple appearance amongst that group of 864 w£s
very nearly as low as possible.
For descriptive purposes, I have prepared Tables 
showing the multiple appearances by employees (divided 
according to number of appearances) classified by court 
district and area, and by period. Only two employees 
appeared more than five times. Both of these were in
1. Warialda in the North East of New South Wales and 
Moulamein in the Riverina are approximately 750 miles 
apart.
2. Particularly since both were, for most of the second half 
of the nineteenth century, sheep-raising areas.
3. Hiring the servant of another, hiring a servant without 
a discharge, harbouring or enticing a servant - supra 
pp . 51-5 3.
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Wilcannia and both made six appearances'1 2'. The total
appearances of the other 862 were as follows:-
Two Three Four Five
Appear. 
730
Appear. 
106
Appear . 
16
Appear. 
10
The following Table shows the groups of multiple 
appearances divided by the court district and area. The 
totals of each area do not add up to the totals above 
because where an employee appeared in different regional 
areas, and he or she cannot therefore be shown to 'belong* 
more to one area than another, his or her appearances have 
been omitted from the geographical breakdown. The Table 
also shows the percentage which the number of multiple­
appearing employees in the area bears to the total number 
of possible employee litigants in that area. These 
percentages can be seen to conform closely to the 12.2% 
overall rate. There is thus no marked geographical 
determinant in the rate of employee re-appearance.
1. John Holmes (between 1871 and 1883) and Arthur Lewis 
(between 1875 and 1887) .
2. For example, an employee appearing once in Warialda 
in the North East, and once in Merriwa in the Central 
North Coast and Hinterland area.
TABLE 1
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Multiple Appearances by Employees Classified by 
Court District and Number of Appearances
NORTH-EAST 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Armidale
Bendemeer
Drake
Glen Inn’es
Lismore
Tenterfield
Walcha
Warialda
10.7%Total
CENTRAL
NORTH-COAST 2 3 4 5 % of Total
j
Cundletown 7 1 0 0
Dungog 18 2 0 0
East Maitland 12 0 0 0
Gladstone 0 0 0 0
Grafton 8 2 0 0
Maitland 10 2 0 1
Merriwa 7 0 1 1
Morpeth 2 0 0 0
Newcastle 6 0 0 0
Raymond Tee 0 0 0 0
Scone 10 2 0 0
Stroud 2 0 0 0
Taree 7 0 0 0
Tinonee 5 2 0 0
Wingham 10 0 0 0
Wollombi 0 0 0 0
Total 104 11 1 2 10.8%
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CENTRAL WEST 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Binalong 10 5 0 0
Gulgong 11 2 0 0
Gundagai 7 2 1 1
Hill End 32 6 1 0
Molong 2 0 0 0
Mudgee 13 6 0 0
Oberon 2 0 0 0
Sofala 11 1 0 0
Tambaroora 6 1 0 0
Wagga 16 0 0 1
Wellington 0 0 0 0
Yass 6 3 1 0
Young 1 0 0 0
Total 117 26 3 2 10.8%
SYDNEY AND
CUMBERLAND PLN 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Camden 9 0 1 0
7
Newtown 50 3 0 0
Parramatta 7 0 4 2
Picton 4 1 0 1
Sydney 30 5 0 1
Total 100 9 5 4 8.8%
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SOUTH COAST 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Bega 29 2 1 0
Berry 0 0 0 0
Broughton Ck 1 1 0 0
Candelo 2 2 0 0
Cobargo 10 1 0 0
Eden 5 2 0 0
Kiama 17 1 0 1
Moruya 2 0 0 0
Nowra 2 1 0 0
Nerrigundah 1 0 0 0
Shoalhaven 5 0 0 0
TOTAL 74 10 1 1 8.8%
STHN T/LANDS
AND MONARO 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Araluen 0 0 0 0
Braidwood 9 1 0 0
Bungendore 1 1 0 0
Cooma 6 1 0 0
Michelago 1 0 0 0
Queanbeyan 1 0 0 0
TOTAL 18 3 0 0 8.8%
WESTERN DIV.
AND RIVERINA 2 3 4 5 % of Total
Balranald 1 0 0 0
Milparinka 3 0 0 0
Moama 6 2 0 0
Moulamein 21 0 0 0
Tibooburre 1 1 0 0
Wilcannia 66 10 2 0
TOTAL 98 13
2
0 12.3%
The next Table shows the chronological breakdown 
of multiple appearances by employees. Its significance is, 
of course, subject to the irregular rate of survival of court
records.
TABLE 2 386
Multiple Appearances by Employees Divided by Period
2 3 4 5 % of Cases ii 
Period
1845 - 60 244 32 9 8 9.5%
1861 - 80 199 26 4 3 8.5%
1881 - 1900 184 15 6 1 10.4%
1901 - 1930 37 3 1 0 8.8%
These figures may be further subdivided to show the 
numbers of multiple appearances in each period in the 
various regional areas, though irregularity of survival of 
records will effect an even greater distortion here.
TABLE 3
Numbers of Multiple Appearances by Employees 
in Each Area
NORTH-EAST
2 3 4 5
1845 - 60 79 14 4 1
1861 - 80 75 15 2 0
1881 - 1900 1 0 0 0
1901 - 1930 0 0 0 0
CENTRAL NORTH COAST
2 3 4 5
1845 - 60 31 5 0 1
1861 - 80 43 5 1 1
1881 - 1900 15 2 0 0
1901 - 1930 4 0 0 0
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CENTRAL WEST
2 3 4 5
1845  - 60 31 0 1 2
1851  - 80 53 0 1 0
1881  - 1900 20 4 1 0
1901  - 1930 2 0 0 0
SYDNEY AND CUMBERLAND PLAN
2 3 4 5
1845  -  60 52 6 4 4
1861  -  80 5 1 0 0
1881  -  1900 48 1 2 0
1901  -  1930 0 0 0 0
SOUTH COAST
2 3 4 5
1845  - 60 28 4 0 0
1861  - 80 11 3 0 1
1881  - 1900 21 2 1 0
1901  - 1930 15 0 1 0
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SOUTHERN TABLELANDS AND MONARO
2 3 4 5
1845 - 60 20 3 0 0
1861 - 80 2 0 0 0
1881 - 1900 1 0 0 0
1901 - 1930 0 0 0 0
WESTERN DIVISION AND RIVERINA
2 3 4 6
1845 -  60 8 0 0 0
1861 -  80 10 2 0 1
1881 -  1900 73 6 2 1
1901 -  1930 4 1 0 0
CENTRAL NORTH (i.e. Goodooga)
2 3 4 5
1845 - 60 0 0 0 0
1861 - 80 0 0 0 0
1881 - 1900 5 0 0 0
1901 - 1930 12 2 0 0
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These calculations are, of course, simply of 
descriptive value, showing the times and places at which 
employees made multiple appearances. They do not explain 
why a relatively large number of employees had such a 
low rate of multiple appearances. To clarify the nature 
of multiple appearances by employees, it is necessary to 
separate cases where the employee was the prosecutor from 
cases where the employer laid the charge. The following 
Table shows the distribution of employer- and employee- 
initiated cases amongst the various areas. Column 1 
represents multiple-appearing employees whose appearances 
were totally or predominantly initiated by the employer, 
Column 2 those whose appearances were totally or 
predominantly initiated by the employee himself, and 
Column 3 those multiple-appearing employees who were 
involved in an equal number of employer- and employee- 
initiated cases (generally one of each kind, but on 
occasion, two of each).
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TABLE 4
Multiple-Appearing Employees - How Cases Initiated
Most Cases
Employer-
Initiated
Most Cases
Employee-
Initiated
Cases Equally 
Divided Between 
Employer- and 
Employee-Initiated
North East 64 50 77
Central North 2 3 17
Central North 
Coast 42 53 31
Central West 24 94 34
Syd. & Cumb.Pln 48 65 18
South Coast 19 45 32
Sthn. Tbl. &
Monaro 16 3 12
West.Div. & 
Riverina 38 46 37
TOTAL 253 359 258
These figures result, in part, from the charge patterns 
shown in the following two Tables which are calculated 
from employees making two and three Masters and Servants 
Act appearances respectively, since most multiple-appearing 
employees were not involved in more than three cases.
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TABLE 5 Offence Pattern where one Employee involved in
Two Cases
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TABLE 6 Offence Pattern where Employee involved in
Three Cases
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I have also deciphered from the computer classification 
of these multiple-appearing employees the type of charge 
in which they were initially involved. Was their 
introduction to Masters and Servants Act ligitation 
through a charge by their employer? Or were they 
sufficiently aware of the procedures available under the 
Acts to engage in litigation without that involuntary 
experience? It is not always possible to say with 
certainty that an employee independently initiated his 
first involvement in Masters and Servants Act litigation 
because of the incidence of 'counter-claim* situations. 
Leaving those aside, the following figures appear. There 
were 210 multiple-appearing employees who initiated no 
cases - all their appearances were the result of charges 
laid against them by their employers. On the other hand,
325 employees who made multiple appearances initiated all 
the prosecutions in which they were involved. There were 
37 cases where an employee whose first experience of the 
Acts was through a charge laid against him was later a 
prosecutor himself. In 25 of these, the eventual 
total of cases in which he appeared was predominantly 
employer-initiated, but in ten instances the employee 
eventually initiated more cases than his employer brought 
against him.1 Eighteen employees who initiated their 
first Masters and Servants Act case were later prosecuted
1. In the remaining two instances, half the cases were 
employer-initiated and half employee-initiated.
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themselves, but in 11 of these, their total appearances 
were predominantly at their own initiation.
Of those multiple-appearing employees who were 
involved in only two cases of which one was employer- 
initiated and the other initiated by themselves, 61 can 
be largely ignored. These 61 initiated their first 
appearance, and were later prosecuted once. In attempting 
to explain the rates of multiple appearance, they are 
therefore in almost the same situation as employees who 
made only a single appearance. The most that can be said 
of them is that, despite their knowledge of the Acts and 
the provisions and penalties, they nevertheless became 
involved in disputes that led to their prosecution.
Little can be made of this because, as I show elsewhere, 
prosecutions were bargaining techniques - they did not 
indicate clear wrongdoing by employees but were in many 
cases, if not most, simply the outcome of tensions within 
the employment relationship. Even where such prosecutions 
resulted in a 'guilty' verdict against the employee, we 
need not conclude that he had, with knowledge of possible 
consequences, committed a definite breach of his employment 
contract, for the power-play of bargaining extended well 
into the courtroom, where most magistrates were simply 
local employers, and, as shown in Chapter 2, magisterial 
responsibilities were often discharged with a faulty grasp 
of the law of employment.
What, then, do the patterns of multiple appearance 
by employees show? For a start, they do not show that
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employees were incorrigible offenders. Only 210 out of 
7045 employee litigants appeared merely as multiple 
defendants, and almost all of those 210 appeared only twice. 
There was a substantial awareness of employees of their 
rights under the Acts - in only 321 cases of multiple 
appearance could it have been possibly said that the 
employees' introduction to the Acts came from charges 
laid against them. In the other 554 cases, the employees 
either initiated prosecutions without prior experience, or 
joined in the initial prosecutions.1 Yet comparatively 
few employees made use of their knowledge to indulge in 
much litigation.
The evidence certainly does not suggest that 
employees used the Acts to harass employers. It shows 
that in the working-out of employment relations, employees 
as well as employers used the processes of the Acts as a 
bargaining technique, but only one technique out of many.
If the relatively high level of multiple appearers and 
the small size of multiple appearances show anything, 
it must be that the processes of Masters and Servants 
Act litigation were not the most effective method
of bargaining available to employees. In the course of 
their working lives, they used such a technique rarely - 
but they certainly knew of its existence, and were quite 
prepared to use it when the situation demanded.
1 . That is, a counter-claim situation.
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Part II Multiple Appearances by Employers,
The problems encountered in identifying multiple- 
appearing employees recur, but are less intractable in the 
search for employers making multiple appearances. The 
information given in the court records, bolstered by 
external evidence, makes it possible to identify with 
certainty the larger employers - the squatters, publicans, 
whaling masters and the like. It is mainly in areas where 
the predominant economic activity is marginal farming 
that employers become elusive in the same way as employees.
I have used the same processes as described in Part 
I to gather the names of multiple-appearing employers.
The result of this analysis demonstrates a considerable 
rate of multiple appearances among employers in all areas.
There are altogether 1209 multiple appearing employers 
out of the 8195^ cases in which an employer was a litigant - 
that is between 1/6 and 1/7 of all employer parties. Some 
of these employers made striking numbers of appearances:
F.W. Bacon of Goodooga was involved in 65 Masters and 
Servants Act cases between 1890 and 1903, and Dr. Traill 
of Tenterfield made 37 appearances. The more common pattern, 
however, was for employers to be parties to from two to 
five Masters and Servants Act cases.
The following Table (Table 7) shows, area by area, the 
percentage of the total of employer litigants who were multiple 
appearers
1. That is, excluding four cases by the Crown against 
employees.
397
TABLE 7 Multiple-Appearing Employers as a Percentage of
the Total Number of Employer Litigants
Multiple -Appearing Total Employer
District Employers Litigants Percentage
North East
Armidale 37 184 20%
Bendemeer 10 35 28%
Drake 2 12 17%
Glen Innes 43 169 25%
Lismore 10 42 34%
Tenterfield 61 214 28%
Uralla 1 20 5%
Walcha 12 56 21%
Warialda 28 133 21%
Central North
Goodooga 13 75 17%
Central North Coast
Cundletown 7 38 18%
Dungog 23 113 20%
East Maitland 21 161 13%
Gladstone 0 0 0
Grafton 12 77 16%
Maitland 17 108 16%
Merriwa 6 47 13%
Morpeth 33 36 8%
Newcastle 14 81 17%
Raymond Terrace 1 10 10%
Scone 22 56 39%
Stroud 5 37 13%
Taree 10 72 14%
Tinonee 7 16 43%
Wingham 14 70 20%
Wollombi 0 13 0
Central West
Binalong 22 65 34%
Gundagai 14 70 20%
Gulgong 17 108 16%
Hill End 63 182 35%
Molong 3 18 17%
Mudgee 41 105 39%
Oberon 3 19 16%
Sofala 19 87 22%
Tambaroora 8 46 17%
Wagga 20 81 25%
Wellington 2 7 29%
Yass 11 63 17%
Young 3 27 11%
TABLE 7 (Continued) 398
District
Multiple-Appearing
Employers
Total Employer 
Litigants Percentage
Sydney and Cumberland Plains
Camden 22 108 20%
Newtown 72 469 15%
Parramatta 11 99 11%
Picton 17 83 20%
Sydney 51 300 17%
South Coast
Bega 55 216 25%
Broughton Creek 4 23 17%
Candelo 13 23 56%
Cobargo 21 82 25%
Eden 21 87 24%Kiama 27 109 25%
Moruya 3 25 12%
Nerrigundah 3 30 10%Nowra 8 49 16%Shoalhaven 13 47 28%
Southern Tablelands & Monaro
Araluen
Braidwood 17 40 42%
Bungendore 4 2 3 17%Cooma 17 73 23%
Michelago 2 11 18%Queanbeyan 3 20 15%
Western Division & Riverina
Balranald 3 28 11%Milparinka 5 10 50%Moama 5 15 33%Moulamein 16 47 34%
Tibooburra 5 36 14%
Wilcannia 100 342 29%
Thus, in Lismore, 34% of all employer litigants appeared 
more than once. In Tinonee, 43% reappeared, and in Candelo 56%, 
but in Uralla only 5% reappeared and in Morpeth only 8%. If 
the figures are arranged to give a comparison of the rates of 
multiple appearance, from lowest to highest, the following break­
down appears:-
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TABLE 8. Comparative Rates of Multiple Employer Appearances
(Number of Maltiple-Appearing Employers as Percentage 
of Total Number of Employer Litigants
Court Area
Percentage of 
Multiple — 
Appearing 
Employers
Uralla North East 5
Morpeth Central North Coast 8
Nerrigundah South Coast 10
Raymond Tee Central North Coast 10
Balranald Western Division 11
Parramatta Sydney & Cumberland Plains 11
Young Central West 11
Moruya South Coast 12
Merriwa Central North Coast 13
East Maitland Central North Coast 13
Stroud Central North Coast 14
Taree Central North Coast 14
Tibooburra Western Division 15
Queanbeyan Southern Tablelands 15
Newtown Sydney & Cumberland Plains 15
Grafton Central North Coast 16
Gulgong Central West 16
Maitland Central North Coast 16
Oberon Central West 16
Nowra South Coast 16
Drake North East 17
Molong Central West 17
Sydney Sydney & Cumberland Plains 17
Newcastle Central North Coast 17
Goodooga Central North 17
Broughton Creek South Coast 17
Tambaroora Central West 17
Yass Central West 17
Michelago Southern Tablelands 18
Cundletown Central North Coast 18
Gundagai Central West 20
Wingham Central North Coast 20
Armidale North East 20
Dungog Central North Coast 20
Camden Sydney & Cumberland Plains 20
Picton Sydney & Cumberland Plains 20
Warialda North East 21
Walcha North East 21
Sofala Central West 22
Cooma Southern Tablelands 23
Eden South Coast 24
Wagga Central West 25
Kiama South Coast 25
Glen Innes North East 25
Bega South Coast 25
Cobargo South Coast 2 5
Shoalhaven South Coast 28
Tenterfield North East 28
Bendemeer North East 28
Wellington Central West 28
Wilcannia Western Division 29
Moama Western Division 33
Lismore North East 34
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TABLE 8. (Continued)
Court Area
Percentage of 
Multiple — 
Appearing 
Employers
Binalong Central West 34
Moulamein Western Division 34
Hill End Central West 35
Mudgee Central West 39
Scone Central North Coast 39
Braidwocd Southern Tablelands 42
Tinonee Central North Coast 44
Milparinka Western Division 50
Candelo South Coast 56
In the next set of Tables, I have divided the number of 
multiple appearances according to the number of cases in which 
each multiple-appearing employer was involved.1 2 This bears 
out the earlier contention that from two to five cases was the 
norm, with two appearances being by far the most frequent rate 
of involvment for employers as for employees.
TABLE 9. Number of Cases in which Multiple-Appearing Employers
were Involved.
North East
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1845-60 33 20 12 9 3 6 2 1 0 1 0
1861-80 56 20 12 6 8 1 2 0 1 1 0
1881-1900 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1901-30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 91 40 25 16 11 7 4 1 1 2 0
1. This covers instances of up to 12 appearances. For over 12 
appearances, see infra p.403,
2. Supra pp.381-382.
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TABLE 9. (Continued)
Central North
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .11 12
1881-1900 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1901-30 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Central North Coast and Hinterland
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .11 12
1845-60 28 10 11 6 0 2 2 0 1 1 0
1861-80 47 13 12 1 0 4 3 0 1 0
1881-1900 21 8 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1901-30 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 102 32 28 10 0 6 5 1 2 1 0
Central West
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1845-60 34 14 10 7 5 5 0 1 2 1 0
1861-80 63 21 14 9 6 1 1 3 1 0 0
1881-1900 11 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1901-30 7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 115 40 29 18 12 6 1 5 4 1 0
402
TABLE 9. (Continued)
Southern Tablelands and Monaro
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1845-60 18 8 4 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0
1861-80 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1881-1900 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1901-30 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 23 9 4 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0
Western Division & Riverina
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1845-60 4 5 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
1861-80 17 4 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
1881-1900 34 8 12 7 2 3 1 1 2 1 0
1901-30 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Total 63 19 30 8 2 7 1 1 4 2 0
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In addition to this breakdown of appearance up to 12, 
the following are the most notable appearance rates -
13 appearances 8 employers
14 VI 10
15 II 5
17 II 2
18 1 1 3
20 1 1 1
22 II 1
26 VI 2
27 II 1
28 II 1
29 II 1
30 II 1
31 11 3
37 II 1
65 IV 1
Thus 41 employers made more than a dozen appearances.
While that is not a great number over a span of 75 years, it 
nevertheless demonstrates that some employers had very frequent 
recourse to the Acts, and that their employees were ready to use 
the same methods of bargaining and pressure against them.
Finally, in Table 9, I have indicated the total number 
of multiple-appearing employers in each area according to the 
main subdivisions of the period surveyed. The percentile 
relationship between these multiple litigants and the total 
number of employer litigants has already been set out in Table 7 
for each court district. Table If shows the percentage for the 
areas. As seen in Table 7, the rate of multiple appearance 
varied considerably from district to district within each 
geographical area.
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TABLE 10 Numbers of Multiple-Appearing Employers 
by Area and Period
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TABLE 11 Percentage of Employee Litigants in each District
Making Multiple Appearances.
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The analysis of multiple appearances by employees in Part I 
of this Chapter showed that though a significant number of 
employees made multiple appearances, the percentage of total cases 
which involved those multiple-appearing employees was comparatively 
low, with 12.2% of employees accounting for only 24% of cases.
The multiple-appearing employers, however, were parties to a much 
greater proportion of the cases. The 1209 employers appeared 
in 5333 cases: thus they made up 14.6% of employer litigants, but 
their cases made up 65% of all cases in which an employer was a 
party. The number of actual cases in each area in which these 
multiple litigants appeared is as follows:
North East 1025 
Central North 98 
Central Nth. Coast 610 
Central West 922 
Sydney & Cumberland Plain 488 
South Coast 544 
Southern Tablelands 139 
Western Division 607
Table 4 of part i indicated that multiple appearances 
by employees were much more the result of employees approaching 
the courts with complaints against their employers than of 
employees being brought to court to answer charges against 
them. Table 12 sets out the division of cases involving 
multiple-appearing employers according to the source of the 
prosecutions - that is, it differentiates multiple-appearing 
employers who initiated more than half of the prosecutions in 
which they were involved from those who were defendants in the 
majority of their Masters and Servants Act appearances, and 
from those whose appearances as complainant and defendant 
were equally divided.
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TABLE 12 . Multiple Appearances by Employers - Numbers 
of Employer- and Employee- Initiated Cases.
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated. Initiated Divided
North East 81 85 38
Central North 7 6 o-
Central North Coast 60 81 20
Central West 57 161 22
Sydney and
Cumberland Plains 68 81 18
South Coast 42 93 30
Southern Tablelands 13 8 8
Western Division 39 80 21
Total 347 595 157
From these figures, it can be seen that the result is the 
reverse of that applicable to multiple-appearing employees.
For here the multiple-appearing employers are brought to court 
more often than they appear there on their own initiative. Not 
only is that so on a colony-wide basis, but it is true in all 
areas except the Central North where there were only 13 employers 
covered by the Table, and the Southern Tablelands with only 
29 employers covered. Table 13 shows the source of prosecutions 
in the various areas in each period.
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TABLE 13. Distribution of Employer- and Employee-Initiated 
Cases according to Area and Period
North East
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 55 25 13
1861-80 25 57 25
1881-1900 1 3 0
1901-30 0 0 0
Total 81 85 38
Central North
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1881-1900 5 5 0
1901-30 2 1 0
Total 7 6 0
Central North Coast
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 43 7 9
1861-80 14 43 10
1881-1900 2 25 1
1901-30 1 6 0
Total 60 81 20
409TABLE 13. (Continued) 
Central West
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 48 24 11
1861-80 5 102 11
1881-1900 2 26 0
1901-30 2 9 0
Total 57 161 22
Sydney & Cumberland Plain
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 68 12 10
1861-80 0 4 5
1881-1900 0 65 3
1901-30 0 0 0
Total 68 81 18
South Coast
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 26 18 22
1861-80 14 14 5
1881-1900 1 36 2
1901-30 1 25 1
Total 42 93 30
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TABLE 13. (Continued) 
Southern Tablelands & Monaro
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 13 4 8
1861-80 0 0 0
1881-1900 0 2 0
1901-30 0 2 0
Total 13 8 8
Western Division & Riverina
More Employer- More Employee- Equally
Initiated Initiated Divided
1845-60 2 8 2
1861-80 9 26 4
1881-1900 20 43 11
1901-30 8 3 4
Total 39 80 21
Thus multiple appearances are predominantly the result of 
employee recourse to the Acts. This fact, taken with the excess 
of employee-initiated prosecutions over employer-initiated 
prosecutions in the total number of cases/ leads to the
1. 2618 cases by employers against employees; 4783 cases by
employees against employers.
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conclusion that the Acts were, to a considerable extent, a 
weapon of workers against employers, redressing in part 
the imbalance of power within the employment relationship 
which resulted from the basic structure of the economic 
system. Though the Acts could be used oppressively by 
employers, and though that type of use may have been more 
in line with the motives of those who framed the legislation, 
the conclusion is inescapable that in actual application, 
the Acts served the interests of workers.
An interpretation of Masters and Servants legislation 
as ultimately (if unintentionally) protective overturns 
earlier views of the Acts - both the opinions of earlier 
lawyers and the views of some contemporaries at least 
amongst the organised working c l a s s I t  also suggests that 
New South Wales experience was very different from that in 
Britain where alteration of the legislation in 1871 (to the 
state achieved by the reforms in the colony in 1857) followed
widespread agitation by the trade union movement throughout
2 3the 1860s. The little so far written on application of
the Acts in Britain portrays their use as being solely
employer-instigated, particularly as a weapon against
strikers. If this portrayal is accurate, the question
arises why New South Wales workers made the Acts into a
weapon - or tool - of their own? This question prompts an
1. Intercolonial Trades Union Congresses, op.cit.
2. See Daphne Simon, op.cit., pp.173-189.
3• Ibid.
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even more basic one. How did colonial employees have such
widespread knowledge of their rights under the Acts?
The colonial workforce had a considerable degree of
mobility, and attitudes and information could be spread
throughout the colony by workers moving from job to job,
particularly those in seasonal occupations where workers
followed the work from area to area - for example, shearers
who could work their way through a shearing season which
began in August in the Western Division and lasted through
to January in the North East.“*- Specialised shearing did
not however develop as the norm until well into the
2period surveyed. More significant an influence, I would
imagine, would have been the goldminers. There were gold
rushes right through the period, and many men drifted in
and out of the regular workforce as new fields were opened,
or as established fields were worked out. Contemporary
observers have commented on the numbers of educated men
3who found their way to the gold fields. More important 
than their formal education, however, was the experience 
gained on the fields themselves. Many of these men had been 
following the gold trail for years. In the Royal Commission
4of Inquiry into the Gold Fields in 1871, numerous miners
1. Merritt, 'W.G. Spence and the 1890 Maritime Strike, 
op.cit., p.594.
2. In the early part of the period, shepherds and other 
station workers were pressed into service as shearers 
at shearing time - a fact which emerges from a general 
reading of the Masters and Servants Act cases.
3. See, for example, Rolf Boldrewood, The Miners' Right, 
London, 1890, pp.25-30. Boldrewood was the nom de plume 
of T .A . Brown, at one time Gold Commissioner for Gulgong.
4. New South Wales. Legislative Assembly. Votes and 
Proceedings,1871-2, Vo1.2, pp.135 ff.
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spoke of having spent 10, 15, 20 years on gold fields in
Victoria, New Zealand, California and so on. Two factors
particularly would have made an impact. One was the
experience of selling their labour for a good price in what
was largely a seller's market. The other was the admittedly
rough and informal legal education that came from exposure
to the tortuous Mining Regulations.
The system on the Western goldfields for example,
was one of horrifying complexity, which, as the Commissioners
complained, gave rise to endless litigation.^ Men who were
2used to the intricacies of the 'frontage' system, and
3such niceties as 'swinging the base line', became 
accustomed to approaching the Courts with some assurance.
They became more assertive of their rights. In place of 
accepting the subordinate relationship of 'servants', they 
exercised the contractual powers of 'employees'. And they 
did so with the same facilities as those available to the 
employer - 10% of the wages cases in Hill End and Gulgong 
in 1872 saw the worker-plaintiffs represented by lawyers; 
in 50% of the wages cases there in 1873 the workers were
1. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 
Working of the Gold Fields Act. New South Wales. 
Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings.
1871-2, Vol.2.p .17 0.
2. Report from the Gulgong and Tambaroora Gold Fields 
Commission, 1871. New South Wales. Legislative 
Assembly. Votes and Proceedings. 1871-2. Vol.2. 
pp.376-378.
Boldrewood, op.cit., pp.57-58, has a good description 
of this. As Gold Commissioner, T.A. Brown was well 
versed in the details of the Mining Regulations.
3.
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legally represented. As men with this experience moved 
off the goldfields into another employment - or as they 
spent time at other work between one goldfield and 
another - they would have passed on this attitude to 
their fellow workers. Here then is one explanation for the 
shift from mainly employer-initiated cases to mainly 
employee-initiated cases which occurs somewhere between 
1850 and 1860. Experience of using the Masters and Servants 
Acts to their advantage, allied with the spread of unionism, 
helped to produce a workforce which utilised the law to 
ensure the enjoyment of its formal legal rights.
Another possibility is that workers were introduced 
to the Masters and Servants Acts by their use against them 
by employers, particularly in the 1845-60 period. But 
that is not really substantiated by the statistics, which 
are at best equivocal. In Part I , I have given details 
of the source of first prosecutions of multiple-appearing 
employees. 343 employees approached the court before they 
had themselves been prosecuted as against 247 who were 
defendants in their first appearance. Table 14 below 
shows the nature of first prosecutions involving the 
multiple-appearing employers.
1. Bench Books, Hill End. It is possible to discover 
that a party has been legally represented when the 
order recorded includes a sum for professional costs.
In some cases, the amount awarded for costs is broken 
down into court costs, professional costs and witnesses' 
expenses. In other cases, all that is given is the total, 
but it is possible to tell from the quantum of the total 
whether it includes professional costs. There were 
only 508 cases out of the 8199 surveyed in which either 
party had legal representation. Hill End employees 
obviously contributed materially to this group. Wages 
claims accounted for 358 of the 374 Hill End cases, and 
the bulk of those 374 cases were in 1872 and 1873.
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TABLE 14. Nature of First Case Involving Multiple — 
Appearing Employers
First Case 
Employer—Initiated
First Case Brought 
Against Employer
North East 102 93
Central North 5 6
Central North Coast 66 95
Central West 68 161
Sydney Cumb. Plain 81 109
South Coast 58 105
Southern Tablelands 27 6
Western Division 34 50
Total 361 525
Again the impetus comes from the employees. However, when 
the figures are broken down by period in Table 16 we see that in 
the early period, most of the multiple appearers initiated their 
first case, though even then there were employers whose first 
personal experience of the Acts was as defendant.
TABLE 15. Nature of First Case Involving Multiple-
Appearing Employers - Divided by Area and Period
First case 
employer-initiated
First case brought 
against employer
1845-60 321 120
1861-80 83 263
1881-1900 29 193
1901-30 8 49
Total 441 625
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In assessing these figures, it must, of course, he 
remembered that personal experience was not the only 
source of introduction to the Acts' provisions. The 
shared experience of both employers and employees would 
have introduced prospective litigants to the legal 
possibilities. Furthermore, employees' experience of 
the Acts through prosecutions against them does little to 
explain their knowledge of the provisions giving them 
rights against their employers. Daphne Simon's account 
of English workers' experiences as defendants does not 
indicate they made any concerted move to use their 
correlative rights.'*“ Perhaps the explanation for this 
apparent difference lies in the widely-circulated view 
that colonial workers were more independent and less 
deferential than their English counterparts, though that 
interpretation has obvious factual flaws as well as 
analytical weaknesses - the English working class from 
the Tolpuddle martyrs and before them has a noble 
tradition of militancy, and colonial workers for much of
1. Op.cit. It is not impossible, however, that there
may have been considerable employee use of the British 
Acts which a detailed examination of magistrates' 
records in Britain could reveal. There, as here, 
expressions of hostility by workers and their 
representatives may have led to an erroneous belief 
that the Acts were used only against employees.
Though Daphne Simon has referred to judicial 
statistics, taken alone these do not indicate the 
source of prosecutions.
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this period were of British origin, whether voluntary
or involuntary immigrants. Besides, lack of deference
may explain an independent and rebellious spirit, but
it does nothing to explain legal knowledge. Unfortunately,
the puzzle cannot be solved by facts, though it may be
illuminated by hypotheses. Maybe like the mythical
2individual rabbits let loose in Geelong, there was a 
shadowy lawyer-turned-shepherd lurking in a bark-walled 
hut who was father and grandfather of all employee- 
initiated prosecutions under the Masters and Servants 
Acts .
While the avenues by which workers came to an 
awareness of their rights under the Acts remain a puzzle, 
the effect of that awareness is clear. Masters and 
Servants legislation was a means which - increasingly over 
time - was utilised by employees for their own protection, 
and which was not solely enforced as a weapon against 
them by their masters.
Census of New South Wales, op.cit. The nationality tables 
show the following totals for British-born members of the 
population:
British-born Total Population
1846 78,258 189,609
1851 95,833 189,951
1856 140,768 266,189
1861 158,581 350,860
1871 173,188 503,981
It was claimed at one stage that all rabbits in 
Australia descended from the escaped progeny of a pair 
imported for game purposes by T.A . Austin of Barwon Park, 
Geelong in 1859. It is now recognised that a number of 
other landowners made earlier attempts to introduce 
rabbits onto their properties, that Austin imported 24 
rabbits and that he supplied bucks and does to many 
friends and acquaintances to stock their own warrens.
See Eric Rolls, They All Ran Wild, Sydney, 1969, p.6 
and pp.19-25
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CONCLUSION
At the end of a study such as this - and, I suspect, 
any large-scale study - one is more conscious of the 
questions which have been uncovered than of the answers 
one has provided. These have been internalised along the 
way until they are almost forgotten, or buried in the 
sub-conscious. What hold the forefront of attention are 
the avenues opened for further, deeper investigation. That 
subsequent investigation is, however, made possible only 
by the material uncovered and organised, the discoveries 
made, and the conclusions formulated.
Within the bounds set for this study, I believe I 
have provided a number of important answers, as well as 
a multitude of even more important questions. I have 
shown that Masters and Servants legislation in New South 
Wales was closely, though not completely, integrated with 
the common law of employment,I have established that the 
procedures set up by the legislation were consistently 
used, not only in the pre-1845 period with which other 
writers have dealt, but for more than one hundred years 
thereafter, almost to the present day.^  In addition, I have 
demonstrated that prosecutions under the legislation were 
initiated predominantly by employees. Thus, the study 
shows that, whatever the intention of the legislators 
who introduced the successive Masters and Servants Acts, 
the effect of the Acts was to provide a means whereby 
workers could gain redress for grievances against employers.
1 . See note, 3, p.iv.
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The legislation was ultimately, if unintentionally, protective.
In the course of examining the records of prosecutions,
I have been able to isolate the types of dispute which led 
to litigation and to show that these centred around the 
struggle of employees for job control and the corresponding 
struggle by employers to safeguard their right to manage.
These two issues could be said to be the key issues leading 
to industrial conflict today, and issues which will be of 
even more importance in the future.
In uncovering the way in which the Masters and Servants 
Act procedures were used as one method of handling 
negotiation arising from inherent industrial conflict,
(inherent because, whatever forms of regulation and 
negotiation are adopted, the employment relationship remains 
essentially conflictual), we arrive at a perspective on 
Australian industrial history which adds a new dimension 
to that so far presented by labour historians. That should 
not imply a criticism of their work - it is a comment on 
the focus of their inquiries and the different focus of 
mine. By concentrating on the common law of employment 
and the adversary proceedings of the Masters and Servants 
Acts, I have adopted an individual focus.
One of the important features about the evidence on 
Masters and Servants Act cases and about the actual 
experience of employment in nineteenth century Australia, 
is that it relates to individual confrontations. Yet, 
what has so far been written on employment is directed at 
group involvement. Thus, a great deal of labour history
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is concerned with the development of unions, and with 
groups of workers relating to groups of employers and to 
governments. Furthermore, theoretical material on 
industrial relations looks at the enterprise - the workers 
vs the management. The individual relationships remain 
unexamined. But union struggles and shop-floor politics 
arise partly out of the recognition of shared experience - 
the sharing of the experience of individual relations 
and confrontations. It is this experience that leads 
workers to seek strength in unity and leads management 
to seek greater control through rules and hierarchical 
organisation. Therefore, an understanding of the structure 
of the individual situations is necessary to appreciate 
fully the goals and strategies of the groups. This is 
particularly true in relation to employment law, where 
regulation bases itself on the contract of employment, 
for the philosophy of the common law of employment is 
basically individualist.
The organisation of work in nineteenth century 
Australia into very small employment units means that 
the class experience of the proto-unionists cannot be 
fully understood by projecting backwards the experience 
of workers in the large enterprises of the twentieth century. 
Because of the isolation of workers into one-to-one 
employment situations, the strengths and weaknesses of 
their positions were different in quality and character 
from those of workers today and they must be theorised 
differently. That is one reason why the Masters and 
Servants Acts present the basis of a valuable empirical
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study to aid this process of theorising. For not only 
do Masters and Servants cases provide evidence of specific 
individual employment situations, but the Acts proceeded 
on a basis of treating employment conflicts as individual 
breaches of individual contracts.
One important element in this process of theorising 
about work relations is the concept of militancy. Studies 
based on the development of unions, and of organisations 
of unions, see militancy as a characteristic of organised 
workers. They concentrate on strikes, work-to-rule 
campaigns etc. They see militancy as something that 
happens after workers have combined into unions, as 
something that can only be demonstrated by groups of 
workers. But an examination of actual work situations, 
in the nineteenth century at least, shows that militancy 
is a type of behaviour which can be exhibited as much by 
individual workers as by groups. It is one way in which a 
worker responds to the conflicts in his or her employment 
situation. Many of the Masters and Servants Act cases are 
examples of militant action by workers who reacted by 
'insolence', refusal to obey orders or insistence on doing 
their work in their way. It could be argued that, because 
of the individual nature of such confrontations, these 
workers were exhibiting a much greater degree of 
intransigence and courage than those whose militant action 
is supported by the simultaneous action of their workmates 
or backed by the strength of their union. For these 
individual militants were exposed to the undivided and
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undeflected reaction of the employer; and the rigours of 
the law which he could call to his aid were applied to them 
directly, without the interposition of the union to protect 
the worker and without the economic sanctions of combined 
worker pressure to persuade him to accede to demands or 
refrain from punishment or victimisation. One could go on 
to argue that it was the readiness of these individual 
workers to stand up for their views of their rights within 
the employment situation that laid the groundwork for the 
successful development of unionism in Australia, and provided 
the climate of militancy whereby those unions could organise 
campaigns for their demands.
Another aspect of the story of labour relations which 
can be lost by adopting the institutional perspective of 
much labour history is the ambivalence of employee attitudes 
to the Masters and Servants Acts. If we look only at the 
reaction of unions and union organisations to the Acts, 
the impression gained is one of unqualified hostility.
In New South Wales, at least, this picture does not truly 
represent the view of the majority of employees. For from 
the 1860s on, most prosecutions under the Acts were 
launched by employees. The Acts were treated by workers 
as a weapon against employers, they were used as a form of 
protection in the worker's struggle for what he saw as 
his rights. Workers thus turned to the Masters and Servants 
Acts just as they turned to the burgeoning trade unions.
The worker's efforts to protect his interests within the 
work situation took a number of forms - unionism, support 
for schemes of compulsory arbitration, and use of the
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provisions of the Masters and Servants Acts. This is not 
to say that the workers saw no threat at all in the 
Masters and Servants Acts. Many prosecutions were launched 
by employers - particularly during the great strikes of 
the 1890s; and since these strikes were organised by 
trade unions, the opposition of those unions to the 
legislation was understandably strengthened. Given that 
at the same time, schemes of arbitration were also being 
adopted, it is explicable that a rejection of the Masters 
and Servants Acts as a form of employee action in favour 
of arbitration or collective militancy would have surfaced 
in the unions and gradually circulated throughout the 
wider body of workers. But this process would have only 
been gradual, particularly since for a long time the bulk 
of the workforce was not unionised, and for a long time 
the arbitration systems failed to produce the protection 
promised (and of course, many would argue they never did 
produce it). Thus, throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, Masters and Servants prosecutions continued to 
be taken by employees.
Out of these new perspectives come a host of questions 
about the way in which industrial action proceeded from 
individual bargaining and confrontation and spontaneous, 
unorganised militancy to mass unionism and nation-wide 
strikes and industrial campaigns. Those are questions for 
the experts in labour history. Flowing on from there 
are questions for the experts in industrial relations.
What part does individual regulation of the employment
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relationship play within the overall system of 
industrial regulation today?
Beyond the arena of the work-place, there are other
implications arising from a study of Masters and Servants
Act prosecutions. Lurking behind the scenes throughout
this study has been the old imponderable - ’Why do people
litigate’? This survey of one coherent body of
litigation may contribute to the eventual discovery of
an answer to that question. It would enable, for example,
an extension to Galanter's impressive study^ as well as,
2to some extent, a challenge to his findings.
The interpretations I have suggested and the 
patterns of prosecution I have uncovered thus raise 
questions and hypotheses relating to many fields of inquiry 
outside the scope of my work. These must wait for solution 
by those with specialist expertise. My task has been to 
examine the development of the law itself, and its use 
by participants in employment relationships. I hope that 
completion of that task will lead others to seek answers 
to the important and compelling questions raised. That is 
not to say that I have refused the challenge of positing 
any answers myself. Insofar as 'answers' are ever possible 
about the past, or about human behaviour generally, I 
believe I have provided answers, within the bounds set, 
about the way employers and employees use the law in the
1. Marc Galanter, 'Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change ', Law 
and Society, Fall, 1974, pp.95-160.
2. Ibid., for example, pp.110-111, 130-132, 135.
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course of working out their employment relations. This 
has relevance not only to our understanding of the past 
but to our handling of the present. For the same concerns 
are still being regulated by what is basically the same law.
426
APPENDIX I
Araluen
Armidale
Balranald
Balranald
Bathurst
Bega
Bega
Bendemeer
Bendemeer
Berry
Binalong
Braidwood
Broughton Creek
Broughton Creek
Bungendore
Camden
Candelo
Cobargo
Cooma
Cundletown
Cundletown
Drake
Dungog
Dungog
East Maitland 
East Maitland 
Eden
Gladstone
Gien Innes (W/g
Goodooga
Gosford
Grafton
Gulgong
Gundagai
Charge & Summons Books 1888-1910
Bench Books 1844-79
Bench Books 1850-70
Judgment Book 1860-67
Judgment Books 1887-96
Bench Books 1863-81
Charge & Summons Books 1880-1949
Bench Book 1859-76
Charge & Summons Books 1872-1931
Bench Books 1873-87
Charge & Summons Book 1870-1959
Bench Books 1845-56
Bench Books 1883-87
Charge & Summons Book 1872-91
Charge & Summons Book 1870-91
Bench Books 1847-54,
1863-65
Charge & Summons Book 1891-1930
Charge & Summons Book 1883-1909,
1919-30
Bench Book 1854-60
Bench Books 1863-83
Charge & Summons Books 1875-1905
Bench Book 1887-1897
Bench Book 1843-53,
1860-66
Charge & Summons Book 1895-1930
Bench Book 1864-65
Charge & Summons Book 1866-1930
Bench Books 1847-78
Charge & Summons Book 1877-83
)Bench Books 1847-71
Charge & Summons Books 1890-1930
Bench Book 1845-55
Charge & Summons Book 1875-79
Charge & Summons Books 1871-1909
Bench Books 1856-61,
1884-86
Bench Books 1871-89Hill End
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Hill End Charge & Summons Book 1893-1912
Kiama Bench Books 1852-63
Lismore Bench Book 1860-74
Maitland Bench Books 1853-4,
1862-5
Merriwa Bench Books 1850-69
Michelago Charge & Summons Book 1875-1930
Milparinka Charge & Summons Book 1896-1918
Mo am a Judgment Books 1853-63
Molong Bench Book 1883-87
Morpeth Charge & Summons Book 1879-1913
Moruya Bench Book 1846-51, 
1854-64, 
1873-77
Moulamein Bench Book 1847-81
Mudgee Bench Books 1846-60
Mudgee Charge & Summons Book 1862
Nerrigundah Bench Book 1862-70
Newcastle Bench Book (P.M.) 1865-94
Nowra Bench Books 1852-53,
1858-69
Numba Bench Book 1852-64
Oberon Bench Book 1865-85
Parramatta Bench Books 1849-55, 
1867 , 
1878-79
Picton Bench Books 1853-74, 
1880-83
Queanbeyan Bench Books 1841-62
Raymond Terrace Bench Book 1884-96
Raymond Terrace Charge & Summons Book 1894-99
Scone Bench Books 1851-55,
1858-59
Scone Charge and Summons Book 1915-30
Sofala Bench Book 1878-81
Sofala Charge & Summons Book 1896-1930
Sofala Judgment Book 1873-75
Sofala Summons Book (P.M.) 1854-64
Stroud Bench Book 1854-63
Sydney Register of Cases (Free 
Persons) 1848-50
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Tambaroora Bench Books 1862-80
Taree Charge & Summons Book 1863-1905
Tenterfield Bench Books 1847-83
Tibooburra Charge & Summons Book 1883-89
Tinonee Charge & Summons Book 1876-1930
Uralla Bench Books 1864-74
Wagga Wagga Bench Books 1848-51,
1858
Walcha Bench Book 1860-73
Warialda Bench Books 1848-57, 
1864-71
Wee Waa Bench Book 1870-74
Wellington Bench Book 1870-74
Wilcannia Bench Book 1880-89
Wilcannia Charge & Summons Book 1870-90,
1892-95,
1898-1930
Wingham Bench Book 1863-83
Wingham Charge & Summons Book 1863-99
Wollombi Bench Book 1864-69
Yass Bench Book 1840-81
Yass Charge & Summons Book 1862-78
Young Bench Book 1863
1848-50
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4/8031.
- Police Charge and Summons Book, 1896- 
1918. New South Wales State Archives, 
7/84.
- Judgment Books, 1853-63. New South 
Wales State Archives, 4/5584.
- Bench Book, 1883-87. New South Wales 
State Archives, 1/3369.
- Police Charge and Summons Book, 1937-43. 
New South Wales State Archives, 7/8956.
- Police Charge and Summons Books, 1879- 
1913. New South Wales State Archives, 
3/3050-3052.
- Bench Books, 1846-51, 1854-64, 1873-77. 
New South Wales State Archives, 4/5587 
and 2/2383.
- Bench Book, Court of Requests, 1848-50. 
New South Wales State Archives, 4/5586.
- Bench Book, 1847-81. New South Wales 
State Archives, 4/5589.
- Register of Fines etc., 1890-98. New 
South Wales State Archives, 7/8971.
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Mudgee
Mudgee
Muswellbrook
Nabiac
Nerrigundah
Nerrigundah
Newcastle
Nowra
Numba
Oberon
Orange
Parramatta
Picton
Picton
Queanbeyan
- Bench Books, 1846-60. New South
Wales State Archives, 4/5591-5594.
- Police Charge and Summons Book, 1862.
New South Wales State Archives, 3/3057.
- Fees Received, 1838-47. New South Wales 
State Archives, 4/5603.
- Police Charge and Summons Books,
1912-49. New South Wales State 
Archives, 3/16836-16840.
- Bench Book, 1862-70. New South Wales
State Archives, 1/3367.
- Ledger of Fees for Fines etc., 1870-84. 
New South Wales State Archives, 1/3373.
- Police Charge and Summons Books,
1865-94. New South Wales State Archives, 
2/2152-2153 and 1/3363-3365.
- Bench Books, 1852-53, 1858-69. New 
South Wales State Archives, 4/5610- 
5611.
- Bench Book, 1852-64. New South Wales
State Archives, 4/5611.
- Bench Book, 1865-85. New South Wales 
State Archives, 7/79.
_ Journal of Fines Received, 1848-66.
New South Wales State Archives, 2/5202.
- Bench Books, 1849-55, 1867, 1878-79.
New South Wales State Archives, 4/5613- 
5616 and 4/5619.
" Bench Books, 1853-74, 1880-83. New 
South Wales State /archives, 10/187.
- Lock-Up Entrance Book, 1846-61. New 
South Wales State Archives, 4/5626.
“ Bench Books, 1841-62. New South Wales 
State Archives, 4/5652-5653.
- Bench Book, 1884—96. New South WalesRaymond Terrace
State Archives, 4/6581.
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Raymond Terrace
RyIstone
Scone
Scone
Sofala 
Sofala 
Sofala
Sofala
Stroud
Sydney
Tambaroora
Taree
Tenterfield 
Tibooburra
- Police Charge and Summons Book,
1894-99. New South Wales State 
Archives, 2/8335.
- Police Charge and. Summons Books,
1925-49. New South Wales State 
Archives, 7/11884-11885 and 3/12531.
- Bench Books, 1851-55, 1858-59. New 
South Wales State Archives, 4/5654- 
5655.
- Police Charge and Summons Books,
1915-49. New South Wales State 
Archives, 7/11478-11483.
- Bench Book, 1878-81. New South Wales 
State Archives, 7/106.
- Judgment Book, 1873-75. New South 
Wales State Archives, 7/138.
- Judgment Booh, Police Magistrate,
1854-64. New South Wales State 
Archives, 4/5563.
- Police Charge and Summons Books, 
1896-1914. New South Wales State 
Archives, 7/95-96.
- Bench Book, 1854-63. New South Wales
State Archives, 4/5666.
- Register of Cases involving Free Persons, 
1848-50. New South Wales State Archives, 
2/2176.
- Bench Books, 1862—80. New South Wales 
State Archives, 4/6596-6599.
- Police Charge and Summons Books, 
1863-1905. New South Wales State 
Archives, 3160-3163 and 3166.
- Bench Books, 1847-83. New South Wales 
State Archives, 7/70 and 7/73-78.
- Police Charge and Summons Book,
1883-89. New South Wales State Archives, 
7/81.
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Tinonee - Police Charge and Summons Books,
Uralla
1876-1936, 1878-1893, 1899-1905.
New South Wales State Archives,
2/8639, 3160-3163 and 3166.
Bench Books, 1864-74. New South Wales
Wagga Wagga
State Archives, 4/5669-5671.
Bench Book, 1848-51, 1858. New South
Walcha
Wales State Archives, 4/5676.
Bench Book, 1860-73. New South Wales
Warialda
State Archives, 4/5678.
Bench Books, 1848-57, 1864-71. New
Wee Waa
South Wales State Archives, 4/5679- 
5680.
Bench Book, 1870-74. New South Wales
Wellington
State Archives, 4/5685.
Bench Book, 1870-74. New South Wales
West Maitland _
State Archives, 4/5685.
Police Charge and Summons Book,
Wilcannia
1942-43. New South Wales State 
Archives, 7/8754.
Minute Books, 1880-89. New South Wales
Wilcannia
State Archives, 9/6094-6097. 
Police Charge and Summons Books,
Wingham
1870-90, 1892-95, 1898-1932. New 
South Wales State Archives, 9/6100- 
6113.
Bench Book, 1866-83. New South Wales
Wingham
State Archives, 3160.
Police Charge and Summons Books,
Wollar
1863-99. New South Wales State Archives 
3160-3164.
Ledger of Fees etc., 1876-1903. New
Wollombi
South Wales State Archives, 1/3370- 
3372.
Bench Book, 1864-69. New South Wales
Wyndham
State Archives, 4/5702.
Police Charge and Summons Books,
1901-49. New South Wales State Archives, 
39/2016-2017.
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Yass - Bench Books, 1840-81. New South Wales
State Archives, 4/5703-5705.
Yass - Police Charge and Summons Books,
1862-78. New South Wales State 
Archives, 4/5706-5708.
Young - Bench Book, 1863. New South Wales
State Archives, 4/5710.
(b) New South Wales Quarter Sessions Records
East Maitland
Goulburn
Mudgee
Orange
Sydney
Taree
Walgett
A. Cheeke, J.
H.E. Cohen, J.
J.S. Dowling, J.
Hargrave, J.
G.B. Simpson, J.
- Minute Book, 1871-74, 1883-98. New 
South Wales State Archives, 4/5544-
55 45.
- Minute Book, 1848-53. New South Wales 
State Archives, 4/5564.
- Minute Book, 1890-1928. New South
Wales State Archives, 2/2382.
- Minute Book, 1870-76. New South Wales 
State Archives, 2/5204.
- Rough Minute Book, 1845. Mitchell 
Library Manuscripts, MLF45.
- Minute Books, 1883-1936. New South 
Wales State Archives, 6/4432-4434.
- Minute Book, 1898-1949. New South 
Wales State Archives, 3/838-839.
- Notebooks, 1855-59. New South Wales 
State Archives, 2/2478-2485.
- Notebooks, 1881. New South Wales 
State Archives, 2/3627-3637.
- Notebooks, 1873, 1879-88. New South 
Wales State Archives, 2/3641-3695.
- Notebook, 1859. New South Wales State 
Archives, 2/4467.
- Notebooks, 1867-74. New South Wales 
State Archives, 2/6590-6593, 2/6596- 
6603, 2/6605-6606, 2/6608-6613, 2/6615 
6618, 2/6620-6626, 2/6628-6631, 2/6633 
6636, 2/6638—6651.
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(c) New South Wales. Colonial Secretary's Records.
Boundaries of Police Districts. 1860-65. New South Wales 
State Archives. 4/751.2.
Clerks of Petty Sessions. Returns of Business. 1869 and 
1870. New South Wales State Archives. 4/776.1-776.2 and 
4/785.2.
Copies of Letters to Magistrates, Police etc. 1826-50.
New South Wales State Archives. 4/3849-3859.
Copies of Letters to Magistrates outside the Settled Districts. 
1847-55. New South Wales State Archives. 4/3860-3862.
Courts of Petty Sessions Numerical Returns of Business 
transacted and attendance of magistrates. 1865-67. New 
South Wales State Archives. 4/760.1-761.1.
Law Commission. Return of Cases under the Masters and 
Servants Act tried before various Benches. 1849. New 
South Wales State Archives. 4/7158.4.
Letters from Police Magistrates. 1847-50. New South Wales 
State Archives. 4/1144.1.
Police Magistrates. 1869. Returns of Business. New South 
Wales State Archives. 4/777.1.
Register of Appointments of Justices of the Peace. 1844- 
1945. New South Wales State Archives. 3250-3257.
Register of Reports from Commissioners of Crown Lands 
beyond the limits of location. 1840-47. New South Wales 
State Archives. 4/6664.
Returns of Number of Livestock. 1843-54. New South Wales 
State Archives. 4/7253.
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Returns of Magistrates within the Settled Districts. 1852. 
New South Wales State Archives. 4/7230.
Returns of Gaols and Prisoners 1844-45, 1855-56, 1858.
New South Wales State Archives. 4/7276, 4/718.1, 4/724.
(d) New South Wales» Crown Lands Department Records
Lachlan District. Descriptions of Runs. 1869-70. New 
South Wales State Archives. 4/7069-7070.
Liverpool Plains. Occupiers of Crown Lands. 1851. New 
South Wales State Archives. 4/5498 (part).
Liverpool Plains. Return of Livestock. 1856. New South 
Wales State Archives. 4/5498.
Nominal Return of Licensees of Runs. 1845-47. New South 
Wales State Archives. 4/5498 and 4/7068.
Liverpool Plains. Returns of Population and Livestock, 
1845-57. New South Wales State Archives. 4/5498 (part).
Crown Lands Commissioner, Armidale. Letter Books. 1844-55. 
New South Wales State Archives. 4/5488, 4/5461, 4/5463.
(e) Company Records
Australian Agricultural Company - Despatches to London 
Office, 1848-57. Australian National 
University, Archives of Business and Labour, 
78/1/19 - 78/1/26.
Australian Agricultural Company - Warrah Papers. Letters, 
1856-75. Australian National University, 
Archives of Business and Labour, 1/244-1/246, 
1/41A/10-1/41A/20.
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Australian Agricultural Company - Warrah Papers. Letters, 
1876-79. Australian National University, 
Archives of Business and Laboun, 1/250—1/251. 
Australian Agricultural Company - Warrah Papers. Reports.
Australian National University, Archives 
of Business and Labour, 1/247-1/249, 1/251.
(f) Personal Papers
H.S. Bloxsome - Short Biography of Oswald Bloxsome Snr
by his grandson H.S. Bloxsome. 1942. 
Mitchell Library, B 1405.
Malcolm Henry Bridge - Reminiscences 1865-83. Mitchell
Library, ML MSS 1785.
T.A. Browne — Diaries. National Library of Australia, 
MS 2362.
F.W. Chapman - Early Days on the Macleay River. Mitchell
Library, ML MSS 1570.
Charles Kerr Chisholm - Diaries, 1862, 1867-82, 1887-89,
1891-96, 1891-1904, Mitchell
Library, ML MSS 1621/2.
George Cox - Letters, 1846-67. Mitchell Library, ML MSS 
1150.
Vincent James Dowling - Diaries, 1858,1861, 1863, 1866,
1876-77. Mitchell Library,
ML MSS 2241.
William Gardner - Description of a Map of the Five Northern
Districts, 1844-46. Mitchell Library,
MF FM4/1708.
Glasson Family - Correspondence. Mitchell Library,
ML MSS 1897.
Cunningham Henderson - 'Main Camp1 Reminiscences, 1864-
1950. Mitchell Library, MSS 1863.
- Correspondence, 1855-1891. Mitchell 
Library, ML MSS 1353.
Hobler Family
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Kelman Family - Papers. Mitchell Library, ML MSS 1183 
F.T. Moore - Papers. 1850-58. Mitchell Library, ML MSS 70. 
John Henry Parnell - Correspondence, 1860-69. Mitchell
Library, A5340.
J. Smith - Journal 1842-61. Mitchell Library, ML MSS 
2646/1 - 2646/4.
Wantabadgery Station - Diary 1879-1911. Mitchell Library,
A 3320 - 3338.
William Fisher Webb - Diary 1865-66. Mitchell Library,
MSS 1227.
J. D. Woodfield - Letterbook, 1881-86. Mitchell Library,
MSS 581.
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2 . Government Publications:-
(a) Parliamentary Debates
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1918 . Vols 129-131
South Australia Parliamentary Debates, 1877-78
Victoria Parliamentary Debates, Vol.10, 1864; 
Vol.ll, 1870; Vols.63-64, 1890;
Vols.66-68, 1891; Vols.139-140, 1915.
Western Australia Parliamentary Debates, 1886, 1892 Vol.ll.
(b) Parliamentary Papers
New South Wales Legislative Council. Select Committee 
to inquire into and report on an Act of 
the Governor and Council (4 Vic No.23) 
intituled 'An Act to ensure the fulfil­
ment of engagements, and to provide 
for the adjustment of disputes between 
masters and servants in New South Wales 
and its dependencies.' New South Wales 
Legislative Council. Votes and 
Proceedings, 1845,pp.509ff.
Royal Commission of Inquiry into New South Wales Gold Fields. 
1871. Report . New South Wales. Legislative Assembly.
Votes and Proceedings. 1871-2. Vol.2. pp.135 ff.
Tambaroora and Gulgong Gold Fields Commission. Report.
New South Wales. Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings 
1871-2. Vol.2. pp.373 ff.
Southern Gold Fields Commission. Report. New South Wales. 
Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings. 1871-2. 
Vol.2. pp.391 ff.
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(c) New South Wales Census Material
Census of the Colony of New South Wales. 1846.
New South Wales Government Gazette. 1846. Vol.2, pp.1327- 
1388 .
Census of the Colony of New South Wales. 1851.
New South Wales Government Gazette. 1851. Vol.2, pp.1799- 
1849.
Census of the Colony of New South Wales. 1856 and 1861. 
(separately published).
Census of the Colony of New South Wales. 1871.
New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings. 
Session 1872, Vol.2, pp.780-1207, and Session 1872-3, pp.1103- 
1484 .
Census of New South Wales. 1881 and 1891.
(separately published).
(d) Statistical Material (on Prosecutions and Wages)
New South Wales. Statistical Registers. 1837-59.
1881-1966.
3. Newspapers
Sydney Morning Herald 1856-58
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4 . Statutes^: —
(a) New South Wales
(i) Apprenticeship Acts
An Act for enabling persons holding certain Public Offices 
in New South Wales to take Apprentices to §erve under them 
and their Successors in Office, and for regulating all 
matters relating to Masters and Apprentices. 9 Geo IV 
No.8. 1828.
An Act for apprenticing the Children of the Male and Female 
Orphan Schools and Other Poor Children in the Colony of 
New South Wales. 5 Gul. IV No.3. 1834.
An Act to regulate and amend the Law of Orphan and other 
Apprentices in the Colony of New South Wales. 8 Vic No.2.
1844 .
(ii) Justices Acts
An Act to Confer upon all Justices of the Peace for the 
City of Sydney certain powers heretofore vested in the 
Police Magistrates of the said City. 13 Vic No.1. 1849.
An Act to consolidate the Statutes relating to Magistrates 
and Justices of the Peace, to proceedings before and in the 
nature of appeal from and to proceedings against such 
Magistrates and Justices; and to other matters in connection 
therewith. (Justices Act) Act No.27 of 1902.
(iii) Merchant Seamen's Acts
An Act for the better regulation of Seamen in the Merchant 
Service in the Colony of New South Wales, and for the protect­
ion of Masters and Ships from Vexatious Suits in the Colony.
2 Gul IV No.10. 1832.
1. (This section covers only statutes not cited in the 
text - those are listed in the Tables of Statutes, 
pp. xix-xxiii).
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An Act for the further and better Regulation and 
Government of Seamen within the Colony of New South Wales 
and its Dependencies and for establishing a Water Police.
4 Vic No.17. 1840.
An Act to amend an Act intituled 'An Act for the further 
and better Regulation and Government of Seamen within the 
Colony of New South Wales and its Dependencies and for 
establishing a Water Police' and further to amend the 
Law relating to the government of Seamen in the Merchant 
Service. 7 Vic No.21. 1843.
An Act to amend and consolidate the Laws relating to 
Seamen in the Merchant Service of the Colony of New South 
Wales and for keeping a Register of Seamen belonging to 
Ships registered in the said Colony. 13 Vic No.28. 1849.
An Act to facilitate the engagement of Seamen for the 
Colonial Trade. 23 Vic No.11. 1860.
An Act to amend and consolidate the Laws relating to 
Merchant Seamen. 27 Vic No.13. 1864.
(iv) Other
Contractors' Debts Act. (An Act for better securing the 
payment of Debts due to Workmen). 42 Vic No.22. 1879.
Contractors' Debts Act. (An Act to consolidate the Acts 
for better securing the payment of Debts due to Workmen, 
Tradesmen, and Others) Act No.29 of 1897.
Gold Fields Amendment Act. (An Act to amend Laws relating 
to the Gold Fields.) 30 Vic No.8. 1866.
(b) Queensland - Masters and Servants Acts 
An Act to regulate the law between Masters and Servants.
25 Vic No.11. 1861.
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(c) South Australia - Masters and Servants Acts 
An Ordinance to amend the Laws relating to Masters and 
Servants. No. 9 of 1847.
An Ordinance to amend an Ordinance (No.9. of 1847)
'To Amend the Laws relating to Masters and Servants'.
No. 5 of 1849.
An Act further to amend the Laws relating to Masters and 
Servants. No. 6 of 1852.
An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to 
Masters and Servants. 26 & 27 Vic No.7. 1863.
An Act to amend the Masters and Servants Act, 1863.
40 & 41 Vic No. 83. 1877
An Act to amend the Laws relating to Masters and Servants
41 & 42 Vic No. 112. 1878
(d) Tasmania - Masters and Servants Acts 
An Act to consolidate the Laws relating to Apprentices and 
Servants. 4 Vic No. 12. 1840.
An Act to repeal the Act of Council of this Island 
intituled An Act to consolidate the Laws relating to 
Apprentices and Servants and to substitute other Provisions 
in lieu thereof. 16 vic No_ 23. 1852.
An Act to amend the Law relating to Masters, Servants and 
Apprentices. 19 vie No. 28. 1856.
(e) Victoria - Masters and Servants Acts etc 
An Act to consolidate the Laws relating to Masters and 
Servants 27 Vic No. 198. 1864
An Act for better securing the payment of Debts due to 
Workmen. 34 Vic No. 385. 1870.
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An Act to consolidate the Laws relating to Employers 
and Employes. 54 Vic No.1087. 1890.
/An Act to Amend the Employers and Employes Act 1890 and 
for other purposes. 55 Vic No.1219. 1891.
An Act to consolidate the Law relating to Employers and 
Employes. 6 Geo V No.2646. 1915.
An Act to consolidate the Law relating to Employers and 
Employes. 19 Geo V No.3673. 1928.
An Act to
/Employes.
consolidate the Law relating to Employers and
Act No.6242 of 1958.
(f) Western Australia - Masters and Servants Acts etc. 
An Act to provide a summary remedy in certain cases of 
Breach of Contract. 6 Vic No.5. 1842.
An Ordinance further to provide summary remedy between 
Masters and Servants. 32 Vic No.8. 1868.
An Act to amend an Act passed in the sixth year of Her 
Majesty, No.5, intituled 'An Act to provide a summary 
remedy in certain cases of Breach of Contract'.
46 Vic No. 9. 1882
An Act to amend the Laws relating to Masters and Servants.
55 Vic No. 28. 1892
An Act to amend 'The Aborigines Protection Act 1886 and 
to provide a Summary Remedy for Breach of Contract by 
Aborigines. 55 Vic No. 25. 1892
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5. Theses - —
F.K. Crowley 'Working Class Conditions in Australia, 
1788-1851', Ph.D. thesis, Melbourne,1950, 
(unpublished).
D. Denholm 'Some Aspects of Squatting in New South 
Wales and Queensland, 1847-1864'. Ph.D. 
thesis, Australian National University, 
1972, (unpublished).
D. Denholm 'The Coming of the Germans to the 
Darling Downs, 1852-61' Honours 
Dissertation, University of Queensland, 
1967, (unpublished).
E.C. Fry 'The Condition of the Urban Wage 
Earning Class in Australia in the 
1880s', Ph.D. thesis, Australian 
National University, 1956, 
(unpublished).
J .A . Merritt 'A History of the Federated Iron­
workers' Association of Australia, 
1909-1952', Ph.D. thesis, Australian 
National University, 1968, 
(unpublished).
L. Thomas 'The Development of the Labour Movement 
in the Sydney District of New South 
Wales', M.A. Thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1919, (published by Australian
Society for the Study of Labour History)
6 . Books
The Letters of Rachel Henning 
Melbourne, 1969.
(a) Australian History 
D. Adams ed.
A. Barnard
M. Barnard
C. C. Barrett 
G. Blainey
R. Boldrewood 
E. H. Britten
P. L. Brown ed.
E. K. Burke 
N. G. Butlin
G. Buxton
C. Y. Choi
The Australian Wool Market 
1840-1900, Melbourne, 1958.
The Simple Fleece, Melbourne, 1962.
A History of Australia,
Sydney, 1962.
Gold in Australia, Melbourne, 1951.
The Rush that Never Ended, 3rd ed. 
Melbourne, 1978.
The Miner's Right, London, 1890.
The Chinese Labour Question or 
the Problem of Capital and Labour, 
Sydney, 1875.
The Narrative of George Russell of 
Golf Hill, London, 1935.
Gold and Silver, Melbourne, 1973.
An Introduction to Australian 
Economic Development. 1861-1900. 
Canberra, 1971.
The Riverina 1861-1891: An 
Australian Regional Study, 
Melbourne, 1967.
Chinese Migration & Settlement in 
Australia, Sydney, 1975.
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T.A . Coghlan Labour and Industry in Australia, 
London, 1918.
R.W. Connell and T. Class Structure in Australian
Irving History, Melbourne, 1980.
E.M. Curr Recollections of Squatting in 
Victoria, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1965.
F.C. Deakins Bullswool, Sydney, 1932.
R. Duncan Armidale: Economic and Social
Development 1839-1871, Armidale, 
1951.
E.W. Dunlop Gold and Australia, Sydney, 1968.
W. Evans Diary of a Welsh Swagman, 1869-1894,
(abridged and notated by)Melbourne, 1975.
D.S. Friend A Collection of HillEndiana, 
Sydney, 1973.
W.R. Glasson Our Shepherds, 1942.
Glen Innes Municipal The Beardies' Heritage: history
Council of Glen Innes and district. 
Glen Innes, 1972.
G. Greenwood ed. Australia: A Social and Political
History, Sydney, 1967.
William Hanson Pastoral Possessions of New South 
Wales, Sydney, 1889.
A .H . Hodge Guide to Historic Hill End,
Adamstown Heights, 1968.
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A .H . Hodge
C.P. Hodgson
K.S. Inglis
The Hill End Story, Book 1, 
Adamstown Heights, 1973. Book 2, 
Forrestville, 1974. Book 3, 
Adamstown Heights, 1972.
Reminiscences of Australia, with 
hints cn the squatter’s life. 
London, 1846.
The Australian Colonists, 
Melbourne, 1974.
C. Jeffries The Colonial Police, London, 1952.
M.J. Jennings Australian Goldfields, Melbourne,
1966 .
N. Keesing ed.
T. Keneally
C.G. Kerr 
M. Kiddle
Thomas Major
E. Maxwell ed.
Gold Fever: The Australian
Goldfields from 1851 to the 1890s, 
Sydney, 1967.
The Chant of Jimmy Blacksmith,
Sydney, 1979.
The Gold Seekers, Adelaide, 1975.
Men of Yesterday: A Social History
of the Western Division of Victoria, 
1834-1890, Melbourne, 1961.
Leaves from a Squatters Notebook, 
London, 1900.
Written in Gold; The Story of
Gulgong, 5th ed., Gulgong, 1975.
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G. Newbury
H. G. Palmer 
D. Pike
Charles A. Price
G .R. Quaife ed .
J. Rickard 
S.H. Roberts
S.H. Roberts 
J.S. Ryan
A.G.L. Shaw
A.G.L. Shaw 
A.G.L. Shaw
Echoes on the Wind. The Story of 
the Squatterages and Some Pioneers 
in Other Fields of the Central North 
East. Glen Innes, 1974.
Fencing Australia, Melbourne, 1961.
Australia: The Quiet Continent,
Cambridge, 1970.
The Great White Walls are Built: 
Restrictive Immigration to North 
America and A/sia 1836-1888,
Canberra, 1975.
Gold and Colonial Society, 1851- 
7 0, Stanmore, 1975 .
Class and Politics, Canberra, 1976.
The Squatting Age in Australia, 
1835-1847, Melbourne, 1935.
The Wool Trade and The Squatters,
1933 .
Land of Ulitarra: Early records
of the Aborigines of the mid-north 
coast of New South Wales, Grafton, 
1964 .
The Economic Development of 
Australia, London, 1946.
A Short History of Australia, 1962.
The Story of Australia, London, 1954.
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E.C. Sommerlad
W.G. Spence 
R.F• Spencer
E. Thorpe
John Vann
R.B. Walker 
R. Ward
R.F. Warner e d .
(b) British ] 
J. Burnett
J. Foster 
Royden Harrison
The Land of "the Beardies": being
the history of the Glenn Innes 
district, Glen Innes, 19.22.
Australia's Awakening, Sydney, 1909.
Hill End Public School Centenary 
1870-1970, Hill End, 1970.
The New England Plateau, Melbourne,
1957 .
Squatting Directory of New South 
Wales, 1865.
Old New England, Sydney, 1966.
The Australian Legend, Melbourne,
1958 .
New England Essays: studies of
environment in Northern New South 
Wales, Armidale, 1963.
listory
Useful Toil, London, 1977 .
Class Struggle and the Industrial 
Revolution, London, 1974.
e d . Independent Collier: The Coal Miner
as Archetypal Proletarian Reconsidered
New York, 1978.
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D. Hay, P. Linebaugh and Albion’s Fatal Tree, London, 1975. 
E.P. Thompson
E. J. Hobsbawm Labouring Men: Studies in the
History of Labour, London, 1964.
E.J. Hobsbawn and G. Rude Captain Swing, London, 1973.
May McKisack The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399 
(Oxford History of England) 
Oxford, 1959.
D. Phillips Crime and Authority in Victorian 
England. The Black Country 1835-1860, 
London, 1977.
R. Samuel ed. Miners, Quarrymen and Saltworkers, 
London, 1977.
E.P. Thompson The Making of the English Working 
Class, London, 1963.
E.P. Thompson Whigs and Hunters, London, 1975.
A. Trollope Australia and New Zealand, Vol.l 
Melbourne, 1876.
(o) Industrial Relations, Industrial Sociology, etc.
A .W . Shaw Co. Ltd. Handling Men, Chicago, 1917.
American Academy of Personnel and Employment Problems
Political and Social in Industrial Management, 1916. 
Science
Injustice: The Social Bases ofJ. Barrington Moore
Disobedience and Revolt, London, 1978.
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H. Beynon & R.M 
R. Blauner 
D. Bloomfield 
H. Braverman
N.M. Clark 
M.G. Davies
W.J. Deeley
A. Filene and I 
E.H. Fish 
W. Graham
R. Hyman and I 
J. Kuczynksi
. Blackburn Perceptions of Work, Cambridge,
1972 .
Alienation and Freedom, Chicago,
1964 .
Selected Articles on Problems 
of Labor, New York, 1920.
Labour and Monopoly Capital: The
Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century, New York, 1974.
Common Sense in Labor Management,
New York , 1919.
The Enforcement of English 
Apprenticeship, 1563-1642,
Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
Labor Difficulties and Suggested 
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